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“Nonverbal decoding is a potent example o f intuitive processing in social 
psychology... ’’(Lieberman, 2000, p.111).
A b s t r a c t
This study seeks to examine the relationship between personality variables and 
pain perception ability. Specifically this thesis hypothesises that the Intuitive 
psychological type (rooted in Jung’s theories of psychological type) will be effective 
at detecting faking of physical pain. Additionally, this thesis hypothesises that those 
scoring highly on Openness to Experience, as well as those rating as extraverts and 
those who rate high in emotional intelligence, will be more accurate at pain-faking 
detection than individuals who do not demonstrate these personality traits. It is also 
hypothesised that participants rating high in Machiavellianism will be accurate in 
detecting pain deception. In addition, it is speculated that a gender factor will exist in 
the ability to detect pain deception. In the first study, the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator (MBTI; Myers & McCaulley, 1985) and the NEO Five Factor Inventory 
(NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992b) are used to measure participants’ intuition level 
and openness to experience (as well as extraversion), respectively. In the second 
study, the Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, 
Salovey & Caruso, 2002) and the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld 
& Widows, 2005) are used to measure emotional intelligence and various 
psychopathy-related traits (including Machiavellianism), respectively. The stimuli 
presented are videotapes of facial expressions of pain, in which individuals display 
either genuine or faked physical pain.
The first study’s findings support the hypotheses that Intuitive and Open 
individuals are accurate at pain judgment, with Intuitive and Open females in 
particular displaying relationships with accuracy. Additionally, males categorised as 
‘Thinker’ types, as well as those low in neuroticism predicted accuracy in pain 
judgment. However, the hypothesis that extraverted individuals would be more 
accurate at detection was largely unsupported. In the second study, the hypotheses / 
that overall emotional intelligence and overall psychopathy would predict accuracy 
were generally unsupported. It was discovered, however, that particular subscales of 
the emotional intelligence measure such as the ‘Changes’ task were predictors of 
accuracy in pain judgment. The Machiavellianism subscale of the psychopathy
\
i
measure was indeed a predictor of accuracy for male participants. In addition, other 
subscales of the psychopathy measure that predicted accuracy included Blame 
Externalisation, which had an inverse relationship with accuracy, as well as 
‘Fearlessness’ in female participants. The significance of the study findings are 
discussed in terms of application to the realm of deception detection, as well as its 
relevance to the medical field in particular.
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1.1 Bac kg rou nd
This thesis assesses the role of individual differences in the ability to perceive 
facial expressions of pain, and specifically the ability to distinguish faked from 
genuine facial pain expressions. The primary purpose is to better understand 
individual differences in the perception of facial pain, together with their relation to 
and possible explanation in terms of other differences in personality and ability. This 
research also aims to contribute to the theoretical literature regarding facial decoding 
and the facial expression of pain, as well as the deception detection literature. In the 
present study, participants are presented with video clips of genuine or simulated 
pain, from which they attempt to discern real from faked pain. Additionally, 
personality measures are administered, such as those examining the Big Five 
personality traits, personality type, emotional intelligence and/or psychopathy.
A tremendous amount of information is communicated via the face, which is 
considered privileged relative to other nonverbal communication channels, such as 
vocal or bodily communication (Boyatzis & Sayaprassad, 1994; Fridlund, Ekman, & 
Oster, 1984). Certainly the ability to decode facial expression signals is an important 
interpersonal ability and facial expression researchers now admit that there are likely 
to be individual differences in this ability (Elfenbein, Marsh, & Ambady, 2002; 
Ekman, 2003; Hamann & Canli, 2004; Suzuki, Hoshino & Shigemasu, 2006). A 
relatively unexplored research area, and one that deserves particular attention is that 
of individual differences in the ability to recognise facial expressions of pain. 
Various aspects of the facial expression of pain have been investigated, such as facial 
movements in the expression or encoding of pain (Prkachin & Mercer, 1989; Galin & 
Thom, 1993; Craig, Hyde, & Patrick, 1991). However, individual differences in the 
ability to decode (or ‘read’) facial pain expressions remains an essentially 
unexamined research area. Therefore, the present study attempts to address this gap 
in the literature.
Whilst research has reported mixed results with respect to relations between 
accuracy in emotion recognition ability, or facial decoding, and personality 
differences (Cunningham, 1977; Hall, Gaul, & Kent, 1999; Rosenthal, Hall, 
DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979), higher accuracy has been found in individuals
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high in self-monitoring (the tendency to focus on situational appropriateness) and 
internal locus of control (Nowicki & Hartigan, 1988; Nowicki & Richmond, 1986; 
Snyder, 1974). Additionally, Matsumoto and colleagues found that the Big-Five 
personality trait of Openness to Experience, and to a lesser extent Extraversion and 
Conscientiousness, predicted accuracy in facial emotion recognition. Neuroticism, on 
the other hand, predicted low accuracy in emotion recognition (Matsumoto, LeRoux, 
Wilson-Cohn, Raroque, Kooken, Ekman, et al. 2000).
A long-standing debate has existed in the field of psychology regarding 
whether facial expressions of emotion should be regarded as read-outs of internal 
states (Ekman, 2003) or social communications serving the social goals of the actor 
(Fridlund; 1994, 1997). In his Behavioural Ecology theory, Fridlund contends that 
facial expressions are simply tools which are utilised to convey what the actor wishes 
to portray. Thus, in this view, natural selection will have worked in favour of the 
ability to convey convincingly whatever one wishes regarding one’s feelings, whether 
what one conveys is real or faked. In regards to the faking of pain, it might be 
evolutionarily advantageous to the actor in some circumstances to express pain when 
no pain is actually experienced and, conversely, disadvantageous at times to express 
pain while actually experiencing it.
Within the facial decoding realm, the investigation of facial expressions of 
pain is an emerging area of research (Hill & Craig, 2002; Poole & Craig, 1992; 
Prkachin, 1994). A variety of studies have examined facial movements involved in 
the encoding (expression) of pain (Prkachin & Mercer, 1989; Galin & Thorn, 1993; 
Craig et al, 1991), as well as the detection of deceptive pain (Craig, Hyde, & Patrick, 
1991; Hill & Craig, 2002), although not in relation to individual personality 
differences.
The ability to recognise facial expressions of pain has important social and 
clinical implications (Prkachin & Craig, 1995). In the clinical setting, this ability 
assists the medical professional in the diagnosis and treatment of patients in physical 
pain (Manne, Jacobsen & Redd, 1992). For instance, this skill assists the clinician in 
decisions regarding levels of pain medication, as well as deciding priority treatment in 
an emergency situation. The ability to recognise facial expressions of pain is also 
quite important to humans’ social and evolutionary history, as it assists the individual 
in providing assistance to another in physical distress (Prkachin & Craig, 1995).
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Furthermore, the ability to distinguish between genuine and malingered pain 
assists the clinician in decisions regarding the administration of medication, such as in 
the case of an individual attempting to fraudulently obtain pain medication. 
Additionally, medical insurance fraud is a large financial problem worldwide, for 
which fraudulent claim costs are undoubtedly passed 011 to the taxpayer and 
consumer. Individuals attempting to gain monetary benefit from insurance and 
governmental disability organisations fake or fabricate medical ailments and injuries, 
deceptions which may be difficult to detect.
1.2 Pa in  C o mm un i c a t i o n  Mode l s
Numerous nonverbal and pain communication theories have been proposed 
that may be applicable to the present study, from an evolutionary pain theory 
(Williams, 2002) to an operant model of rewarded pain behaviour (Fordyce et al, 
1968), to a cognitive-behavioural approach that examines escape and avoidance 
behaviours when threatened with increasing pain (Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000) (see Pain 
Chapter in the present thesis). Rosenthal (1982), a leader in nonverbal 
communication research, proposed the Judgment Study Model, which is a general 
model of nonverbal communication (NVC). This model states that an encoder is 
characterised by one or more attributes A) (such as underlying states or traits), which 
are observed by a decoder, who makes a judgement C), based on the encoder’s 
behaviour B).
A -------------------------► B  ► C
Encoder Encoder Nonverbal Decoder
State Behaviour Judgement
Figure 1: Rosenthal's NVC Model
A) The encoder’s attribute or underlying state
B) The encoder’s nonverbal behaviour
C) The decoder’s judgment regarding the encoder’s state (i.e. pain versus no pain 
in the present study).
Prkachin and Craig (1995) propose a judgment model specific to the judging 
of pain, that builds upon Rosenthal’s (1982) Judgment Study Model. The three 
processes Prkachin and Craig propose are the A) experience of pain, B) encoding of
Decem ber 2008 - 4 - Ph. D. Thesis
pain, and C) decoding of pain. Put simply, the individual experiences pain that 
exceeds threshold level, encodes this experience, and then an observer decodes the 
facial expression of pain.
Whilst Prkachin and Craig’s (1994) pain model is one that may be utilised in 
the genuine expression of pain, it does not address the scenario of faked (or 
simulated) pain expressions. Therefore, the present thesis proposes a modified pain 
expression model that synthesises aspects of Rosenthal’s (1982) Judgment Study 
Model with Prkachin and Craig’s (1994) Pain Judgment Model.
In the model proposed for the present thesis, an encoder is characterised by 
one or more states or attributes A) (in this case, the experience of pain or lack of 
pain). The encoder then displays a facial expression or nonverbal behaviour B) (in 
this case, either a genuine pain expression or a faked pain expression). Based upon 
their own personality characteristics C), a judgment is made by the decoder D) 
regarding the encoder’s underlying state (whether the encoder is faking or in genuine 
pain).
The ability to accurately distinguish between genuine and malingered physical
individual personality differences in this ability have not been previously empirically 
examined. Thus, the present study attempts to bridge this gap in the literature by 
addressing a variety of individual personality differences in regards to this ability, 
including Jungian personality types (and intuition in particular), the Big-Five 
personality traits (especially openness to experience) and emotional intelligence, as 
well as individual differences in psychopathy.
B
Encoder Nonverba 
Behaviour
D
Encoder
State
pain would thus be useful in a variety of clinical and social settings. However,
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Figure 3: Intuition, Openness & Other Personality Correlates of Accuracy in Pain Judgments
1.3 Personality Attributes and the Present Study
Jung introduced the concepts of personality ‘types’ (Jung, 1971), which were 
expanded upon by Myers and Myers (1990). The four dichotomous personality type 
categories consist of Intuition versus Sensing, Extraversion versus Introversion, 
Thinking versus Feeling, and Judging versus Perceiving.
A common thread among many psychological perspectives on intuition, 
including Jung’s and Myers’, involves perception at an unconscious or semi­
conscious level. For the purposes of the present study, the following definition by 
Hogarth (2001) will be utilised. Hogarth defines intuitive process as those that are 
‘...reached with little or no apparent effort, and typically without conscious 
awareness. They involve little or no conscious deliberation.’ (Hogarth, 2001, p. 14). 
In addition, intuition has been examined in the literature in regards to implicit 
learning, decision-making and intuitive judgments (Bastick, 1982; Crutchfield, 1960; 
Hogarth, 2001; Osbeck, 1999; Woolhouse & Bayne; 2000). Furthermore, several 
theorists have linked the concept of intuition to emotional sensitivity (Baumgarner, 
1973; Conklin, 1970; Gulford, 1966), as well as social intuition (Lieberman, 2000).
Thus, one might speculate that interpersonally-attuned individuals, such as 
those with a high score on an intuition measure, may be more adept at decoding facial 
expression signals. In fact, Buck and Ginsberg linked the concepts, saying “Concepts 
such as empathy, rapport, intuition, altruism, social sensitivity, accuracy in person 
perception, emotional contagion, and nonverbal receiving ability -  although varying 
in meaning -  are all similar in that they involve an intuitive level of knowing (or the 
feeling of knowing) another person’s inner feelings” (italics mine) (Buck & Ginsburg, 
1997, p. 18). Thus, this emotional and interpersonal sensitivity combined with an
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intuitive judgment ability might lead one to speculate that the intuitive individual may 
be more adept at perceiving facial pain expressions in others. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis examines intuitive individuals’ ability in facial pain perception.
Intuition has been closely linked in the literature to the Big-Five personality 
trait of Openness to Experience (MacDonald, Anderson, Tsagarakis & Holland, 1994; 
Furnham, 1996). Therefore, the present thesis hypothesises that the current study 
will also find a relationship between intuition and openness. Openness to Experience 
has been described by McCrae and Costa in the following manner, “Openness is seen 
in the breadth, depth, and permeability of consciousness, and in the recurrent need to 
enlarge and examine one’s experience” (McCrae & Costa, 1997, p. 2). Openness is 
characterised by an active imagination, aesthetic sensitivity, awareness of one’s 
emotions, preference for non-traditional values, preference for variety, intellectual 
curiosity, and independent judgement (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Furthermore, 
Openness to Experience has been associated with social openness, social perception 
and emotion recognition ability (Matsumoto et al 2000; Penton-Voak, Pound, Little & 
Perrett, 2006; Schenider, Ackerman & Kanfur, 1996). Thus, the present thesis 
hypothesises that ‘Open’ individuals will be more adept at facial pain perception. 
Due to the potential overlap between the concepts of intuition and openness, it is also 
hypothesised that there will be an interaction between intuition, openness and 
accuracy in pain perception.
Another Big-Five personality trait that has been addressed in the literature in 
regards to facial decoding ability is that of extraversion (versus introversion), though 
with mixed results (Cunningham, 1977; Matsumoto et al 2000; Riggio & Frieman, 
1982; Rosenthal et al, 1979). According to Jung (1971), introverts more often attend 
to their own ‘inner world’ of thoughts and emotions, whereas extraverts more often 
attend to the ‘outer world’ of people and experiences. The extravert’s interpersonal 
focus warrants investigation regarding their ability to judge facial expressions of pain. 
Thus, the next hypothesis proposes that extraverts will demonstrate accuracy in pain 
perception.
The concept of emotional intelligence has been examined extensively in the 
psychological literature in recent years (Austin, 2005; Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 
1998; Fredenthaler & Neubauer, 2005; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Petrides & Furnham, 
2000a). Mayer and Salovey describe emotional intelligence as including “the ability
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to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them 
and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (Salovey & Mayer, 
1990, p. 189). Hence, it would not be unreasonable to assume that those with a high 
score on an emotional intelligence measure would also be more adept at perceiving 
facial pain expressions, which is the next hypothesis.
The measure in the present study used to examine emotional intelligence is the 
Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey & 
Caruso, 2002), which includes a facial emotion decoding scale, aptly termed the 
Faces Task. Since this particular task measures the ability to judge facial emotion 
expressions, it appears reasonable to assume that this ability would correlate with the 
present study task of judging facial pain expression. Therefore, this thesis 
hypothesises that there will be a positive relationship between participants’ scores on 
the MSCEIT Faces Task and accuracy in pain judgment.
Given that the present thesis seeks to examine personality correlates of the 
ability to perceive pain deception, it is also relevant to include the investigation of 
individuals who may be more invested in interpersonal deception, such as those high 
in psychopathy. Psychopathy has been referred to as ‘one of the most enigmatic 
conditions in the field of psychopathology’ (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005, p. 1) and 
defined as including ‘...superficial charm, lack of guilt and empathy, dishonesty, 
failure to form close interpersonal attachments, and failure to learn from punishment, 
all in the absence of irrational or delusional thinking’ (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005, p. 
2). These qualities may lead one to speculate that this individual may take a 
particular interest in observing the suffering of others, as well as being more invested 
in deception in their own behaviour. Consequently, this thesis hypothesises that 
individuals high in psychopathy will be adept at judging deceptive pain.
Furthermore, there is a particular aspect of psychopathy which may especially 
lend itself to relationships with accuracy in pain deception detection, the trait of 
Machiavellianism. Machiavellian individuals demonstrate ‘a willingness to 
manipulate others for selfish goals, and a cynical and harshly instrumental view of 
human nature’ (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005, p. 31). Moreover, these individuals are 
known to use whatever means they deem necessary -  including deception -  to achieve 
their goals. The Machiavellian’s presumed investment in deception leads the present
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author to hypothesise that this individual may be adept at detecting pain deception in 
others.
1.4 Gender
Gender differences have been found for many psychopathy-related traits, 
including a tendency for males to have higher Machiavellianism scores than females 
(Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). However, the study of gender differences is a large 
research area and extends to other topics relevant to the present study, including 
emotion recognition ability. In fact, there is robust and rather consistent evidence that 
females are more effective facial decoders than males (Hall, 1984; Rosenthal et al, 
1979; Zuckerman, Hall, DeFrank & Rosenthal, 1976) and are able to perceive 
expressions of emotion as early as three years of age (Babchuck, Hames & 
Thompson, 1985; Boyatzis, Chazan & Ting, 1993; Hall, 1978, 1984; Rotter & Rotter, 
1988). Furthermore, this evidence has been cited as support for the concept of 
‘women’s intuition’ (Graham & Iclces, 1997). As a result, Lieberman (2000) cites 
neuroscience literature regarding possible biological reasons for females’ social 
intuition advantage over males, including the fact that women have more oestrogen 
than men, which affects the amount of dopaminergic (DA) input in the brains’ 
striatum (Becker, 1990; McDermott, Liu & Dluzen, 1994; Mermelstein & Becker, 
1995). Therefore, due to the apparent female advantage in facial decoding, as well as 
what may be termed a general female ‘social intuition’, the present thesis 
hypothesises that there will be a difference in pain judgment accuracy between 
females and males.
Gender differences may also be found in the present study in regards to 
confidence in decision-making. In fact, previous research has demonstrated that 
males tend to have higher confidence levels than females in decision-making, 
including in the judgment of deception (Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay & Muhlenbruck, 
1997; Lenney, Gold & Browning, 1983). Moreover, it appears that individual 
differences provide a meaningful source of variation in confidence level, as well 
(Pallier, Wilkinson, Danthiir, Kleitman et al, 2002). This appears to be particularly 
true in regards to extraversion, which has been found to be a predictor for confidence 
level, including in the judgment of deception (Cheng & Furnham, 2002; Vrij &
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Baxter, 2004). Thus, this thesis hypothesises that there will be a difference in 
participant confidence levels for the present study’s judgment task.
1.5 M ethodology o f the Present Study
In the present study, participants view thirty (one-minute) video clips of 
individuals either faking pain or in genuine pain, and attempt to determine which are 
in genuine pain. After viewing each clip on the computer screen, participants select 
their choice from the drop-down menu of either ‘faking pain’ or ‘real pain’, as well as 
their confidence level on a 1-5 Likert scale. Additionally, participants complete two 
personality measures, for which their scores are correlated to their pain perception 
ability. In the first study, these two measures are the Myers Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI; Myers and McCaulley, 1985) and the Neuroticism Extraversion Openness 
Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI, Costa & McCrae, 1992). In the second study, 
participants complete the Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test 
(MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2002) and the Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Widows, 1996).
1.6 Hypotheses
The present study investigates the relationship of intuition, openness to 
experience and other personality correlates of the ability to discriminate between 
genuine (spontaneous) and faked (posed) facial pain expressions (referred to as 
‘accuracy in pain judgments’). Based on prior research and extrapolation from the 
scholarly literature, the following eleven research hypotheses were adopted to guide 
this investigation.
1.6.1 Hypothesis  1: Intui t ion and Accuracy  in Pain Judgments  
There is a positive relationship between intuition level (as measured by the MBTI 
Sensing-Intuition scale) and accuracy in discriminating genuine from faked pain.
1.6.2 Hypothesis  2: Openness and Accuracy  in Pain Judgments  
There is a positive relationship between Openness to Experience (as measured by the 
NEO-FFI) and accuracy in pain judgments.
1.6.3 Hypothesis  3: Intui t ion & Openness
There is a positive relationship between Intuition level (as measured by the MBTI) 
and Openness to Experience (as measured by the NEO-FFI).
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1.6.4 Hypothesis  4: Intui t ion,  Openness & Accuracy  in Pain  
Judgments
There is a relationship between Intuition level (as measured by the MBTI), Openness 
(as measured by the NEO-FFI) and accuracy in pain judgment.
1.6.5 Hypothesis  5: Extravers ion & Accuracy  in Pain Judgments  
There is a positive relationship between Extraversion (as measured by the MBTI and 
the NEO-FFI) and accuracy in pain judgments.
1.6.6 Hypothesis  6: Emot ional  Intel l igence & Accuracy  in Pain 
Judgments
There is a positive relationship between Emotional Intelligence (as measured by the 
MSCEIT) and accuracy in pain judgments.
1.6.7 Hypothesis  7: Faces Task & Accuracy  in Pain Judgments  
There is a positive relationship between the MSCEIT’S Faces Task and accuracy in 
pain judgments.
1.6.8 Hypothesis  8: Psychopathy  & Accuracy  in Pain Judgments  
There is a positive relationship between psychopathy as measured by the 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) and accuracy in pain judgments.
1.6.9 Hypothesis  9: Machiavel l iani sm & Accuracy  in Pain  
Judgments
There is a positive relationship between Machiavellianism (as measured by the PPI) 
and accuracy in pain judgments.
1.6.10 Hypothesis  10: Gender & Accuracy  in Pain Judgments  
There is a difference in scores between male and female participants in regards to 
accuracy in pain judgments.
1.6.11 Hypothesis  11: Conf idence in Decis ion-Making
There is a difference in scores between participants in regards to confidence in 
decision-making.
1.7 Summary
In sum, the face is a powerful tool for nonverbal communication, and 
particularly for the expression of physical pain. The ability to recognise facial 
expressions of pain -  and specifically to discriminate between genuine and 
malingered pain -  appears to be relevant both clinically and socially. Moreover, it is 
likely that there are individual differences in facial pain perception ability. Therefore,
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the present thesis seeks to examine individual differences in the ability to discriminate 
faked from genuine facial pain expressions.
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C H A P T E R  2:  N O N V E R B A L  C O M M U N I C A T I O N ,
P S Y C H  T Y P E  & T H E  ‘B I G  F I V E ’
“Nonverbal decoding is a potent example o f intuitive processing in social 
psychology” (Lieberman, 2000, p.l 11).
2.1 Nonverbal Communication
2.1.1 Theories o f  Nonverbal  Communicat ion (NVC)
The study of nonverbal communication and behaviour has been widely 
researched in social psychology - as well as in fields such as evolutionary and 
cognitive psychology. Each field has proposed a variety of theories reflecting their 
particular perspective.
2 . 1 . 1 . 1  E v o l u t i o n a r y  P s y c h o l o g y
Evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists have focused on the many 
similarities between primates and humans in Nonverbal Communication (NVC), 
which has sometimes been referred to as the ‘naked ape’ approach. These similarities 
include: facial expressions, gestures (including pointing and beckoning), gaze (as a 
social signal), touch used as a signal of greeting, and postures for dominance and 
submission (Argyle, 1988, p. 296).
Certainly, other species communicate nonverbally as well -  from the alarm 
calls between birds (Thorpe, 1972) to courtship behaviour that exists in many animal 
species (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975). Additionally, many nonverbal forms of human 
communication could be explained as evolved adaptations. For instance, Preushoft 
and van Hoof (1997) have suggested that the smile is an adaptation of the primate 
‘bared-teeth’ and ‘open-mouth’ behaviour. In addition, the angry facial expression is 
similar to the primate glare and bared-teeth (Redican, 1982).
Buck and Ginsburg (1997) argue that nonverbal communication is 
demonstrated by even the simplest creatures in the form of innate displays and 
preattunements, which they believe have evolved into more sophisticated displays in 
humans. Similarly, Barbour (1977), who suggests the ‘animal-origins’ approach to 
nonverbal behaviour, traces a great deal of our nonverbal behaviour to our primate 
heritage, based on evolutionary theory. Schiefenhovel (1997) supports the 
evolutionary rationale for universals in human behaviour. Schiefenhovel cites our
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common anatomy and that evolution tends to utilise morphological features already 
available for new functions.
Many evolutionary psychologists espouse cognitive psychology beliefs and vice 
versa. One such author is Loritz (1999) who has a Darwinian approach to the 
development of communication, tracing its evolution from one-celled organisms up to 
humans. However, Loritz also incorporates neuropsychology in his discussion of 
certain brain mechanisms, and specifically neural networks, in his theory that they 
have adapted for human communication.
Whilst similarities do indeed exist between man and ape in nonverbal 
behaviour, Argyle (1988) also points out significant differences between man and 
primates. These include the following: 1) NVC in humans is partly spontaneous, as 
in the case of other primates. However, it is also partly cognitive. For example, as 
humans, we consider each situation and use our judgment as to the appropriate 
amount of facial expression. (This issue of choice and judgment may exist in more 
extreme levels in the case of using expression in manipulative and deceptive ways, 
which will be discussed later in this thesis.) 2) Socialisation is a much bigger factor 
in human NVC. While cultural similarities exist, for instance in facial expressions, 
humans learn what are considered appropriate distance, gaze and gestures for their 
particular culture. 3) In social interactions, humans almost inevitably use speech as a 
form of communication, and use NVC as a means of backing up and enhancing 
speech.
2 , 1 , 1 . 2  C o g n i t i v e  P s y c h o l o g y
Cognitively, facial expression is linked to the motor cortex via the second 
neural channel. Therefore, NVC is partly within our cognitive control and partly 
spontaneous. Neuropsychologists stress areas of the brain and neural networks in 
their theories of NVC. Bowers, Bauer and Heilman (1993) state that 
neuropsychological studies of affect perception demonstrate that the right hemisphere 
of the brain contains a vocabulary of nonverbal affective signals, such as gestures and 
facial expressions.
Emotional information processing is explained in one cognitive psychology 
theory called ‘multiple code theory’ (Bucci, 1998). Bucci states that there are three 
ways of processing and representing emotion information: the nonverbal
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subsymbolic, the nonverbal symbolic and the verbal symbolic modes. In his theory, 
the referential process connects the three modes, and emotional schemas are made up 
of all three systems.
In their discussion of contemporary nonverbal theories of message exchange, 
Giles and colleagues (1999) have a distinctly cognitive perspective. One of Giles et 
al’s theories is ‘Discrepancy Arousal Theory’, which states that cognitive activation 
(arousal) occurs when the behaviour of one’s communication partner is discrepant to 
what one expected. Another cognitive theory proposed in their book is ‘Cognitive 
Valence Theory’, which states that approach or avoidance in relational 
communication is affected by a mixture of immediacy levels, arousal level and other 
factors. In ‘Expectancy Violations Theory’, partners respond in varying ways to 
decreased or increased intimacy, depending upon whether they expect the 
communication partner to be rewarding or unrewarding (Giles, Wadleigh, Floyd, et al, 
1999).
2 . 1 . 1 . 3  S o c i a l i s a t i o n  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t a l  T h e o r i e s
Much of NVC could perhaps be explained by socialisation. Expectancy is 
also a factor in ‘Interaction Adaptation Theory’, according to Giles and colleagues, 
since communication partners respond based on required factors, expectations and 
desires. Burgoon, Stern and Dillman (1995) take a different approach and describe 
Interaction Adaptation Theory in the following manner. When individuals 
communicate, they often adapt their interaction styles to each other. For instance, 
people may match each other’s behaviour or behave in opposite ways, or synchronise 
the timing of their behaviour.
Research that is developmentally based examines early mother-infant 
interaction and the infant’s level of imitation of its mother. One developmentally 
based theory of NVC is von Raffler Engel’s (1981) view that body motion and vocal 
expression develop jointly starting at birth, as components of communicative 
interaction. Research on effects of various kinds of child-rearing practices shows 
interesting results. For example, in Malatesta’s (1985) study, it was found that male 
babies are actually more expressive than female babies, however, females are 
socialised to become more expressive.
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2 . 1 . 1 . 4  T h e o r i e s  o f  S o c i a l  I n t e r a c t i o n
Many of the theories of NVC derive from the field of social psychology and 
are theories of social interaction. The Social Skills model and Goffman’s theatrical or 
dramaturgical model are two social interaction theories that likely were the basis for a 
significant amount of NVC research to follow. The social skills model [based partly 
on work by Argyle and Kendon (Argyle & Kendon, 1967)] emphasises the role of 
gaze in collecting feedback, including the ‘back-channel signals’ (such as gaze and 
head-nods) of which it consists.
Goffman’s dramaturgical model, on the other hand, appears to take the 
viewpoint that ‘All the world is a stage.’ Goffman proposed that we act differently or 
put on ‘performances’ depending on who we are with, in order to manipulate the 
impressions that others have of us (Argyle, 1988; Goffman, 1956). Viewing this from 
another perspective, one might say that we put on a performance to explain ourselves 
to others, and different audiences might need to have different things explained. 
Interestingly, Barbour (1977) proposed what is termed the ‘role enactment’ approach, 
which appears to be essentially the same theory. Barbour goes on to state that the role 
enactment approach explains impression management, self-presentation and 
concealing of one’s faults.
While acting differently depending on the social situation may be appropriate 
at times, one could take the position that the theatrical (or dramaturgical) and role 
enactment models are rather jaded viewpoints. These models may have inspired an 
area of NVC research that continues to expand, that of the detection of deception, 
which will be discussed in a later chapter of the present thesis.
2 . 1 . 1 . 5  S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g y  T h e o r i e s  o f  N V C
Argyle and Dean’s (1965) Affiliative Conflict Theory is a theory based on 
social intimacy equilibrium and compensation, and much of the work in this area falls 
into the ‘proxemics’ subcategory of NVC. In their study, Argyle and Dean suggested 
that eye contact and proximity are linked to one’s affiliative motivation. Approach 
and avoidance forces produce an equilibrium level of physical proximity, eye contact 
and various other aspects of interpersonal intimacy. Thus, if one of these is disturbed 
or changed, compensatory changes are likely to occur.
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Affiliative Conflict Theory has been supported by other studies, including that 
of Wada (1990), Aiello and Cooper (1972), and Patterson (1977). Wada (1990) 
examined the effect of interpersonal distance change on nonverbal behaviour. 
Nonverbal behaviours such as eye-to-eye contact, gaze, smile and head orientation 
were studied, and it was found that affiliative conflict theory was indeed supported, 
and that intimacy levels and gender were mediating factors. Interpersonal space 
behaviour was examined in relation to positive and negative affect dyads (Aiello & 
Cooper, 1972) and in seating distance manipulation and the effects on subjects’ 
comfort levels (Patterson, 1977); both studies supported the theory of interpersonal 
equilibrium.
Social interaction theories of NVC fall into a number of different categories 
and encompass a variety of viewpoints. Theories range from a rather micro­
perspective of interaction, including examining the NVC of sub-cultures, to a rather 
macro-perspective, examining social influence and power. In Turner and Collins’ 
(1989) book, both authors provide their own theory of the microdynamics of 
communication. Collins’ theory of interaction rituals centres around ‘the encounter’ 
as the micro unit of analysis, in which there is a ‘shared conversational reality’ which 
revolves around negotiation-and-exchange of resources. In Turner’s theory of 
interaction, on the other hand, individuals create a sense of communication reality 
through signalling and interpreting, with both verbal and nonverbal gestures -  such as 
words, bodily positioning, etc.
Many theorists have examined the importance of nonverbal behaviour in the 
counsellor-client relationship. Norman (1982) states that nonverbal communication 
in the counselling relationship may be as important, if not more than, the spoken 
word. Similarly, Hamersma and Mark (1977) stress the importance of nonverbal 
communication in counsellor-client interaction. Furthermore, they argue that 
videotaping the counselling session is especially useful as it allows the counsellor, as 
well as the client, to observe this communication and also displays behaviour that 
may be contrary to the verbal message.
Other theories of social interaction examine differences in nonverbal 
behaviour of different cultures and subcultures, such as Majors (1991), who describes 
the nonverbal behaviours of African Americans. Majors and others have observed a
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large subculture of African Americans that have their own style of walking, stances, 
handshakes and facial expressions that are unique to that group.
Other approaches, such as Henley’s chapter in Kalbfleisch et al’s (1995) book, 
stress a ‘social power’ approach to nonverbal behaviour. Henley takes a feminist 
perspective and believes that there is a fundamental gender bias in society that allows 
males to behave in dominating ways, which is reflected in nonverbal behaviour.
2.1.2 Categories o f  NVC
Nonverbal behaviour may be further divided into categories such as kinesics 
(body movement), proxemics (use of space and distance), posture, gesture, gaze and 
facial expression. Birdwhistell (1983) defined kinesics as the study and analysis of 
communication by body motion.
Ekman and Friesen (1969) have divided body movements into five useful 
categories, primarily but not exclusively focusing on hand and arm movements: 1) 
emblems, which are body movements that communicate, and are substitutes for 
words; 2) illustrators, which are movements occurring with speech which accent, 
underline or modify speech patterns; 3) regulators, which are listener/speaker role 
regulators, and maintain or signal a change in listening/speaking roles; 4) adaptors, 
which are designed as self or object manipulations relating to emotional states or 
needs; and 5) affect displays, or displays of emotional expression, such as facial 
affect.
2.1.3 Reasons we use NVC
The reasons individuals use various forms of nonverbal communication vary, 
and the rationale one provides for it probably depends upon one’s theoretical 
orientation. However, Argyle (1988) proposed several reasons humans use NVC in 
interpersonal communication. The reasons for the use of NVC may include the 
following:
■ We simply do not have the words for every concept, for instance for various 
shapes. (Ekman and Friesen’s [1969] concept of ‘emblem’ body movements 
as substitutes for words appears useful in this context).
■ Nonverbal gestures and behaviours may be more powerful, quicker and get the 
point across more effectively than their verbal equivalent.
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■ Nonverbal behaviour is less easily controlled than verbal behaviour, which 
increases the likelihood of it being more genuine. We rely on facial 
expressions and various cues to interpret the mood of one’s communication 
partner, their emotions, and even their level of nervousness or relaxation.
■ In relationships (especially those of a non-intimate nature), at times it would 
be inappropriate or uncomfortable to verbally express certain things. 
Nonverbal communication may at times be a safer and less threatening form 
of expression, because it is more implicit.
■ It is quite helpful to have a second channel of communication. There are 
situations when it is more effective to use, for instance, a combination of a 
brief verbal explanation and a certain inflection of voice or expression, versus 
explaining a concept or feeling in depth. It is also important as a back 
channel, as it increases the efficiency of communication by providing richer 
information, such as in coordinating turn taking, etc. (This combination of 
body movement and words appears similar to the concept of ‘illustrators’ that 
Ekman and Friesen proposed.)
■ There are also times when words simply will not do justice to a concept, such 
as in the arts.
2.1.4 Nonverbal  Communicat ion as Language
In addition to the various perspectives and theories on nonverbal 
communication, another issue of nonverbal communication that has sparked some 
disagreement is whether NVC is actually a form of language. One’s answer to this 
question may depend upon one’s view of what actually constitutes language. In his 
1988 book, Argyle appears to leave it up to the reader to decide. He lists 
commonalities between NVC and language, such as suggesting that facial expressions 
are much like a form of vocabulary. In addition, gestures may be likened to words 
and rituals may be likened to sentences. Moreover, the meaning of a particular 
nonverbal behaviour may depend on the context and situation, as in language. In 
addition, Argyle states that language has syntax, in which words and sentences have 
rules of order, and that NVC appears to have similarities to syntax in some ways, for 
instance sequence rules in greetings and rituals. However, there are also significant 
differences between NVC and language -  such as the rather small ‘vocabulary’ of 
NVC and the fact that there are no real equivalents of phonemes or morphemes, to list
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a few differences. Additionally, one could argue that another feature of language 
would be that no other form of communication provides the capacity to share social 
information.
2.1.5 Microanalys i s  o f  Communicat ion
Bull (2002) incorporates NVC and language, as well as various other aspects 
of communication in his ‘microanalytic’ approach to the study of communication. 
Bull’s microanalytic approach to communication contains several key features. 
Firstly, this method studies communication as it actually occurs, through the use of 
tools, such as the analysis of videotapes. (Bull compares this approach to methods 
that study communication as it ‘should be’). Secondly, this approach regards the 
study of communication as an important activity in its own right, as opposed to 
studying communication simply as a portion of a social process, for instance.
Another feature of the microanalytic approach is the belief that all aspects of 
interpersonal interaction are potentially important, and should therefore be studied. 
The fourth assumption of the microanalytic view is that communication has structure 
and is not simply random in nature; for instance, communication can be organised in 
terms of social rules of behaviour. Another example is that certain aspects of 
communication may be ordered sequentially, and that conversations in particular have 
a sequential order. An additional example of this focus on lack of randomness in 
communication is the view that it is hierarchically organised; in other words, it may 
be organised into higher order units.
The fifth feature of the microanalytic approach is the assumption that 
communication can be thought of as a form of action in itself. Instead of regarding a 
conversation as simply information exchange, it may be viewed as an important 
activity in and of itself. A sixth feature of the microanalytic view is the belief that 
communication may be regarded as evolutionary in nature, in terms of being a 
necessary tool for human survival. Consistent with the evolutionary approach, Bull 
regards the study of communication in a naturalistic setting as important to the 
microanalytic approach. (However, he does allow for the necessity of empirical study 
in the laboratory in social psychology, due to its practical nature).
Other central beliefs of microanalytic theory include the view that 
communication may be regarded as a skill, and therefore it can be taught, similar to
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other skills. A final belief of microanalysis is that communication may be used to 
study macro social psychology issues, as well, such as racism, feminism, and politics.
2.2 Jungian P sychological Types
The present study explores psychological types, rooted in the theories of C.G. 
Jung, and their relation to nonverbal decoding ability -  specifically to the ability to 
detect pain deception. One hypothesis of this study proposes that the intuitive 
psychological type will be more adept at judging pain expressions. Therefore, at this 
point it is relevant to examine the theory behind psychological type, first proposed by 
Jung.
It could be argued that Jung rocked the boat in psychology, so to speak, with 
his groundbreaking (1923/1971) ‘Psychological Types’ book. Other theorists 
expanded on his theories of psychological type, such as Briggs and Briggs Myers, 
who created the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). The MBTI is used around the 
globe and in a variety of settings -  including clinical, organisational and academic. In 
addition, other less famous methods of measuring psychological type have been 
devised, such as Kiersey and Bates’ (1984) Kiersey Temperament Sorter and the 
Singer-Loomis Type Inventory (SL-TDI; Singer, Loomis, Kirkhart & ICirkhart, 1996).
2.2.1 The Four Psychological  Types
Jung defined four basic psychological functions or types: The Thinking Type, 
Feeling Type, Sensing Type and Intuitive Type. The four types are also the basis for 
Briggs Myers and Myers’ (1990) theories, which they then expanded upon, as well as 
the basis for other type inventories.
Jung’s writing is a bit long-winded in his Psychological Types book; 
moreover, English was not his first language. Thus, for simplicity’s sake it is easier to 
utilise the more conversational style he used in Evans’ (1976) book, in which Evans 
recorded his conversations with Jung. Jung stated the following as simple definitions 
of the psychological types:
“Sensation tells you that there is something. Thinking, roughly speaking, tells 
you what it is. Feeling tells you whether it is agreeable or not, accepted or rejected. 
And intuition -  there is a difficulty (here) because you don’t know ordinarily how 
intuition works. When a man has a hunch, you can’t tell exactly how he got that 
hunch, or where that hunch came from.” (Italics mine.) Jung goes on to say that the
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intuitive type “sees around corners; he smells a rat a mile away.” He then describes 
intuition as the following, “(it) can give you perception and orientation in a situation 
where your senses, your intellect, and your feelings are no good at all...This is a very 
important function under primitive conditions or wherever you are confronted with 
vital issues that you cannot master by rules or logic.” (Evans, 1976, p. 104).
Jung proceeds to supply an example of an intuitive type, by contrasting it with 
a sensation type (its opposite). He states that he had two patients, one an intuitive 
type and one a sensation type, who went to a lake together and watched birds diving 
in for fish. (The birds dive after the fish, and then after some time come back up out 
of the water, but there is no way to know when they will come back up). The two 
people began to bet on when the birds would come out. One might think that the 
sensation type individual would win at this, as he observes reality carefully. 
However, the intuitive type consistently won at this contest, as she was using her 
intuition. An explanation Jung provides is the following: “(Intuition) is a perception 
by intermediate links, and you only get the result of that whole chain of associations.” 
He concludes by saying that intuition is, “a perception, by ways or means of the 
unconscious” (Evans, 1976, p. 100). Thus, Jung appeared to be suggesting that 
intuitive individuals are more adept at picking up and linking clues about a situation 
at a less than conscious level. Similarly, Jung’s concise definition of intuition
in his Psychological Types book is the following: “It is the function that mediates 
(transmits) perceptions in an unconscious way” (Jung, 1971).
2 . 2 . 1 . 1  P e r c e i v i n g  ( ‘ I r r a t i o n a l ’) vs .  J u d g i n g  ( ‘ R a t i o n a l ’)  
T y p e s
Jung categorised the four psychological types into either one of two headings: 
Rational types or Irrational types. Briggs Myers and Myers (1990) based their 
categories on the four types with one of the two headings, but used what appears to be 
more useful headings: Judging vs. Perceiving. Judging types (Jung’s Rational Types) 
include the Thinking vs. Feeling preference, while Perceiving Types (Jung’s Irrational 
Types) include the Intuition vs. Sensation preference.
Briggs Myers and Myer’s definitions of the psychological types consist of the 
following: Sensation'. “.. .the familiar process of sensing, by which we become aware 
of things directly through our five senses”. The opposite preference is intuition,
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which Myers defined as “...indirect perception by way of the unconscious, 
incorporating ideas or associations that the unconscious tacks on to perceptions from 
the outside” (Briggs Myers & Myers, 1990, p. 2).
Myers defines the thinking function as “... a logical process, aimed at 
impersonal finding”. The opposite function, that of feeling, she states is 
“(Judging)...by appreciation...bestowing on things a personal, subjective value” 
(Briggs Myers & Myers, 1990, p. 3).
2 . 2 . 1 . 2  I n t r o v e r s i o n  v s . E x t r o v e r s i o n
Another concept that Jung introduced which is widely recognised by many 
theorists in modern psychology is that of Introversion vs. Extraversion. His concepts 
of introversion and extraversion are much as we would think of them today. As 
Briggs Myers and Myers state, “The introvert’s main interests are the inner world of 
concepts and ideas” while the extravert “...is more involved with the outer world of 
people and things” (Briggs Myers & Myers, 1990, p. 7). Kiersey goes on to say that 
the “...extravert is sociable, the introvert is territorial. That is, he desires space: 
private places in the mind and private environmental places” (Kiersey & Bates, 1984, 
p. 15).
Jung’s psychological type concepts were the foundation for several ‘type’ 
measures. However, arguably the most widely used psychological type measure is 
the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Myers & McCaulley, 1985), which is one of 
the four standardised measures utilised in the present thesis.
2.2.2 Myers-Briggs  Type Indicator  (MBTI)
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is a forced-choice, un-timed self- 
report inventory designed to be used by ‘normal’ (or non-psychiatric) individuals, 
which has been widely used and extensively researched (DeVito, 1985; Lynch, 1985). 
The measure is composed of 126 items, which constitute the four discontinuous scales 
of Jungian Type theory: Sensation-Intuition (SN), Thinking-Feeling (TF), Judging- 
Perceiving (JP) and Extraversion-Introversion (El).
2 . 2 . 2 . 1  R e l i a b i l i t y  & V a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  M B T I
Reliability of the MBTI has improved over the years, especially improvement 
of its internal consistency (Levy & Padilla, 1982; Myers & McCaulley, 1985). Its 
test-retest reliability indicated stability on all four major dimensions (SN, TF, JP and
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El) on a test of college students over a period of two months (Levy, Murphy, & 
Carlson, 1972). Other studies have shown slightly varying results. Leiden, Veach, 
and Herring (1986) found test-retest reliabilities of .41 (TF scale), .63 (SN scale), .64 
(El scale) and .66 (JP scale); while McCarley and Carskadon (1983) found test-retest 
reliabilities ranging from .77 to .89, depending on which scale was tested. In 
addition, split-half reliabilities have been favourable (Carlson, 1985; DeVito, 1985).
Factor analysis has shown support for the MBTI’s item validity (Sipps, 
Alexander, & Friedt, 1985), as well as its construct validity (Thompson & Borrello, 
1986). The four scales appear to measure personality constructs similar to those of 
Jung’s typology theory (Carlson, 1985, 1989; Goldsmith, 1985). Interestingly, 
McCrae and Costa (1989) did not find support for the view that the MBTI measures 
truly dichotomous preferences. Instead, they state that the inventory measures four 
rather independent dimensions. In addition, they found that the four MBTI indices 
did measure aspects of four out of the five major dimensions of normal personality 
(the Five-Factor Model of Personality).
Various studies have shown favourable evidence for the MBTI’s content 
validity (Bradway, 1964; Carlson, 1985), including comparison against the Gray- 
Wheelwright Questionnaire, a Jungian typology measure (Gray & Wheelwright, 
1946). The MBTI’s convergent and discriminant validity have been supported in a 
study by Sipps and DiCaudo (1988). Earlier, though, Sipps, Alexander, and Friedt 
(1985) found that a number of items failed to load significantly on their respective 
factors. Moderate predictive validity was found in studies that examined its ability to 
predict choice of major and success at university (Conary, 1966; Goldschmid, 1967). 
Strieker et al (1965) found that the MBTI had some ability to predict college dropout 
rate and Grade Point Average; however, predictive validity varied somewhat in this 
study.
The MBTI has been widely researched and therefore utilised in the present 
study along with the NEO-FFI personality measure, which is based on the Big Five 
Personality Model. Therefore, the next section will discuss this model of personality, 
which is widely utilised by personality theorists, followed by a discussion of the 
NEO-FFI measure.
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2.3 The Big Five Personality Model
The Big Five Personality Model is based on the following five factors: 
Extraversion (E), Neuroticism (N), Openness (O), Agreeableness (A) and 
Conscientiousness (C). The Five Factor Model (FFM) began as rather a natural 
language of personality description (Allport & Odbert, 1936; Baumgarten, 1933) and 
continued as a way of identifying the major dimensions of personality.
Cattell, beginning in 1943, identified twelve personality factors, which 
eventually led to his 16 Personality Factors (16 PF) questionnaire (Cattell, Eber & 
Tatsuolca, 1970). These factors were reduced to five, which Tupes and Christal 
described as “five relatively strong and recurrent factors...” (1961, pg. 14). This 
model has been replicated by Norman (1963), Borgatta (1964), and Digman and 
Takemoto-Chock (1981) and eventually became known as the “Big Five” (Goldberg, 
1981).
According to John and Srivastava (1999), the factors are usually labelled:
• Extraversion or Surgency (talkative, energetic, assertive).
• Agreeableness (good-natured, trustful, cooperative).
• Conscientiousness (responsible, dependable, orderly).
• Emotional stability vs. Neuroticism (calm, not easily upset, not neurotic).
• Openness or Intellect (imaginative, independent-minded, intellectual).
Psychologists with various perspectives have discussed the ‘Big Five’ 
personality model. Socioanalytic theory (Hogan, 1996) focuses on the social 
functions of self- and other-perceptions, proposing that trait concepts serve as the 
linguistic tools of observers. In interpersonal psychology theory, the theoretical 
emphasis is on the individual in relationships (Wiggins & Trapped, 1996). Similar 
personality traits are described as, “the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent 
interpersonal situations that characterise a human life” (Sullivan, 1953, pp. 110-111).
Evolutionary psychologists, on the other hand, believe that humans have 
evolved mechanisms to detect differences in others, in order to perceive individual 
differences vital to survival and reproduction (Buss, 1996). Buss goes on to say that 
personality is an ‘adaptive landscape’ and the Big Five traits are some of the most
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important to an individual’s survival. In their Five-Factor Model (FFM), McCrae and 
Costa (1996) view the Big Five as causal personality dispositions and believe that the 
traits have a substantial genetic and biological basis.
The primary Big Five measures of personality include the NEO PI-R and 
NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1985), the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue & 
Kentle, 1991) and the TDA (Goldberg, 1992). Reliability and validity studies on the 
Big Five have included quite a bit of external validity research. On studies of job 
performance, the Big Five have been shown to relate to important outcomes in the 
workplace (Barriclc & Mount, 1991; Mount, Barrick & Stewart, 1998). Additionally, 
a large study of adolescents examined childhood psychopathology, juvenile 
delinquency and academic performance (John et al., 1994; Robins et al., 1994). Some 
of their results include the finding that scores on the Big Five (specifically low 
Agreeableness and low Conscientiousness) may predict juvenile delinquency. 
Additionally, a longitudinal study examining the Big Five traits involved participants 
taking the NEO PI at age 67-68 and found the trait profiles to be relatively stable over 
time (Soldz & Vaillant, 1999).
2.3.1 Extravers ion & Introvers ion
Jung first introduced the concept of introversion and extraversion. However, 
this concept has become widely accepted by personality theorists as one of the ‘Big 
Five’ personality traits, and has been extensively researched. Morris (1979) sums up 
the differences between extraverts and introverts in the following manner. He 
describes extraverts as ‘...sociable, lively, impulsive, seeking novelty and change, 
carefree, and emotionally expressive.’ He contrasts this description with that of the 
introvert, who is seen as ‘...quiet, introspective, intellectual, well ordered, 
emotionally unexpressive, and value-oriented, prefers small groups of intimate friends 
and plans well ahead’ (Morris, 1979, p. 8).
Historically, the concepts of extraversion and introversion primarily began 
with Jung, though Eysenck was also influential in this area. Eysenck’s perspective 
tends to be rather biological and behavioural, compared to Jung, who focused on 
intrapsychic aspects. Eysenck proposes three main personality dimensions: 
extraversion-introversion, neuroticism-stability, and psychoticism -  and contends that 
these personality factors are essentially independent of each other (Eysenck, 1973). 
Eysenck states that the basic difference between extraverts and introverts is
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biological, and rooted in the reticular activating system of the brain. This system in 
the brain deals with monitoring incoming neural impulses that result from 
environmental stimulation, and either inhibits or stimulates responses of higher brain 
centres to this stimulation. Additionally, this system controls the arousal level of the 
cortex of the brain. Eysenck contends that extraverts and introverts differ in the 
relative strength of the opposing processes of inhibition and stimulation, so that an 
introvert would tend to have a higher level of cortical arousal than an extravert.
Thus, if individuals generally seek a moderate amount of arousal, it would be 
reasonable to assume that an introvert would seek environmental and social situations 
that do not over-stimulate them, and extraverts might seek situations that would 
provide them with a higher level of stimulation. In Eysenck’s ‘The Measurement of 
Personality’, he provides a fair amount of evidence to support his theory of the 
biological bases of these traits (Eysenck, 1976).
In contrast to Eysenck, Miller proposes what he terms an ‘Interactive 
Perspective’ on the study of personality, and on extraversion-introversion in 
particular. This perspective incoiporates aspects of social, environmental, ecological, 
and behaviouristic psychology, and is along similar lines as those labelled person- 
environment, interactionism, or person-situation interaction. His interactionist 
perspective grants equal weight to person and environment in detennination of one’s 
individual experience, as well as overt behaviour.
There are three main qualities of extraversion and introversion, according to 
Miller. The first quality is that it is cross-situational and is a rather pervasive 
personality trait. The second quality of this trait is that extraversion or introversion 
tends to show up early in childhood and evidences quite a bit of stability throughout 
development. The last important quality of this trait, according to Miller, is that there 
appears to be a continuum of extraversion and introversion, and individuals tend to 
exist somewhere along this continuum.
Studies have shown that extraverts tend to be better judges of traits of people 
they do not know well, however, introverts tend to be better judges of individuals 
with whom they are well-acquainted (Harkins, Becker, & Stoner, 1975; Vingoe & 
Antonoff, 1968). In a study of nonverbal communication, extraversion was found to 
be positively correlated with sending (encoding) ability (Cunningham, 1977). 
Carlson and Levy (1973) also found extraverts to be better at sending (encoding)
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ability. Various researchers have examined extraversion and introversion as they 
relate to other personality factors and traits. Locus of control does not appear to be 
related to extraversion or introversion (Platt, Pomeranz, & Eisenman, 1971; Shriberg,
1972). Extraversion, though, does seem to be related to self-report of assertiveness 
(Averett & McManis, 1977; Vestewig & Moss, 1976).
A personality variable related to extraversion that may be interesting as it 
relates to the present study is that of ‘sensation-seeking’, which encompasses thrill 
and adventure seeking, experience seeking, disinhibition and susceptibility to 
boredom. It is possible that extraverts may become bored more easily in the present 
study and thus not perform at their peak level. A literature review by Zuckerman, 
Bone, Neary, Mangelsdorff and Brustman (1972) on the relationship of extraversion 
and sensation-seeking revealed a positive correlation between the extraversion scale 
of the Eysenck Personality Inventory and this trait. Specific components of 
extraversion such as disinhibition and boredom susceptibility were found to be 
negatively related to the introversion scale of the MMPI. In yet another study they 
reviewed, sensation-seeking was positively correlated with three of the five 16PF 
extraversion scales -  adventurousness, dominance, and surgency. The authors of the 
review conclude from these and other studies that sensation-seeking is in fact related 
to an impulsive, uninhibited, nonconforming, dominant type of extraversion, but not 
to sociability.
2 . 3 . 1 . 1  F i e l d  D e p e n d e n c e  vs .  F i e l d  I n d e p e n d e n c e  (& 
E x t r a v e r s i o n )
Field dependence is another area of personality that has been examined in 
relation to extraversion. Field dependence vs. field independence refers to a 
continuum regarding the extent to which an individual depends on cues in his/her 
environment, in making perceptual judgments. An example of a test of field 
dependence would be when a stimulus (such as a rod) is placed within a second 
stimulus (such as within a frame), and the subject is asked to align the rod so that it is 
truly vertical within the frame. An individual who is able to set the rod vertically, 
independently of whether the frame is straight or tilted, is referred to as field 
independent. Field dependent individuals have difficulty overcoming the slant of the 
frame in the task of setting the rod vertically. Anther task that may distinguish field-
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dependent from field-independent individuals is when they are asked to find 
embedded figures or objects within a complex visual display. In this task, the field- 
dependent individuals seem to have a real difficulty.
Relating this concept back to social psychology, it is assumed that field- 
dependent individuals are more orientated towards environmental cues in social 
situations. It has been proposed that field-dependent individuals make increased use 
of external social cues in a rather ambiguous environment, have an increased 
interpersonal orientation, are more attentive to social cues, and may be more socially 
skilled than field-independent people. It is has also been proposed that field- 
independent individuals would have greater cognitive analysis skills (Witkin & 
Goodenough, 1977).
This description, then, might describe the differences between extraverts and 
introverts -  the extraverts being field-dependent, and the introverts being field- 
independent. The same theory is proposed by Lester (1974). However, there does not 
appear to be an abundance of studies in this area. In a study by Loo (1976), the 
Group Embedded Figures Test and the Eysenck Personality Inventory’s Extraversion 
Scale were used, which supports the hypothesis. Loo and Townsend (1977) found 
results that were not as clear, though. In addition, Blackburn (1972), who studied the 
unusual population of abnormal offenders, found the opposite in his study. 
Additionally, some studies have shown no relationship (Cegalis & Leen, 1977; 
Ghuman, 1977).
Yet, it is an intriguing theory when applied to person perception and to the 
present study. It would seem, according to this theory, that field-dependent, 
extraverted individuals, being more attentive to social cues, might be better at 
detecting pain deception. On the other hand, the field-independent, introverted 
individual, being more analytical, might be able to detach him/herself more from the 
situation to make a more educated guess regarding whether the target person in the 
video was faking pain or not.
2 . 3 . 1 . 2  R e p r e s s i o n - S e n s i t i s a t i o n  & E x t r a v e r s i o n
Another area that one may hypothesise to be related to the present study is the 
concept of repression-sensitisation. There appears to be a robust correlation in this
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area to the extraversion-introversion dimension: extraverts appear to be ‘repressors’ 
while introverts are ‘sensitizers’ (Cohen & Oziel, 1972; Dana & Cocking, 1969).
The theory states that one’s typical defence mechanisms or coping strategies 
in dealing with stress and negative emotions differentiates individuals. The 
‘repressors’, as the name implies, are those individuals that tend to deny emotional 
experiences and repress their emotions. This extends to the experience of pain, in that 
repressors will tend to tolerate higher amounts of pain without acknowledging it. 
Sensitizers, on the other hand, are more likely to acknowledge their emotions, and 
especially negative emotions and stress. They also tend to use coping mechanisms 
such as isolation, rationalisation, and intellectualisation instead of repressing or 
denying their emotions entirely. While repressors tend to view displays of emotion as 
a weakness, sensitizers do not. Many studies have found extraversion to be correlated 
with repression (Cohen & Oziel, 1972; Dana & Cocking, 1969). Interestingly, Miller 
and Magaro (1977) conducted a cluster analysis of extraversion’s association with 
other personality variables and found that extraversion was associated with repression 
and sensation-seeking. (Also, see discussion later in this thesis of Alvarado and 
Harris’ [2004] study on facial control as a coping mechanism as it relates to 
‘repressors’ vs. ‘sensors’).
The possible relationship between the repressing-sensitising function and 
extraversion vs. introversion has interesting implications for the present study. 
Assuming that extraverts tend to repress their own pain, it would not be unreasonable 
to assume that they would project that experience onto others. In other words, 
extraverts (pain repressors) might assume that other individuals react to (and repress) 
pain as the extravert himself would. It would follow, then, that they might judge 
targets who do not display a great deal of pain expression as experiencing real pain -  
since extraverts might assume that the targets are repressing their own pain.
2.3.2 Introverts ,  Ext raver ts  and Nonverbal  Decoding
There are clearly differences in the way introverts and extraverts perceive and 
react to others. Their apparent ease in, and tendency to seek out, social situations 
would naturally lead one to assume that extraverts are better nonverbal decoders than 
introverts. However, prior research examining introversion and extraversion in 
nonverbal decoding has had mixed results regarding extraverts’ advantage in 
decoding (Cunningham, 1977; Riggio & Friedman, 1982; Rosenthal et al., 1979).
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Lieberman and Rosenthal (2001) address this discrepancy regarding extraverts 
and decoding in a provocatively titled article, ‘Why Introverts Can’t Always Tell 
Who Likes Them: Multitasking and Nonverbal Decoding’. In their article, 
Lieberman and Rosenthal propose that the mixed results in extraverts’ decoding 
ability is not an issue of nonverbal decoding ability per se, but rather it is an issue of 
the underlying processes involved. Prior research on the decoding skills of introverts 
and extraverts has asked participants to simply concentrate on one task, nonverbal 
decoding. However, Lieberman and Rosenthal purport that it is an issue of a working 
memory deficit translating into a multi-tasking deficit which causes the problem for 
introverts in decoding. They propose that extraverts are better at pursuing multiple 
goals simultaneously; i.e. multi-tasking.
Nonverbal decoding in real life situations involves a certain amount of multi­
tasking. Firstly, one needs to attend to the verbal content of what the speaker is 
saying. Also, (whether knowingly or unknowingly) we tend to self-monitor, or 
monitor the way we appear to another person or persons in a conversation. Other 
miscellaneous thoughts tend to go through one’s head during social interactions, as 
well, such as “Am I appealing intelligent in this conversation?” and thinking about 
the next response one will articulate in the conversation. Social interaction is a 
complex dance between two or more people -  one that definitely involves multi­
tasking, and one that may leave the introvert feeling drained. This feeling of being 
drained may, in fact, be due to the complex multi-tasking aspect of the interaction.
Lieberman and Rosenthal base their hypothesis on three major theories. One 
of those theories is that of Jung, who introduced us to the concepts of extraversion 
and introversion. One of the main differences between introverts and extraverts, 
according to Jung, was what and who they attend to. While the introvert is involved 
in a social interaction, he is oftentimes attending to her own thoughts and reactions as 
much as, and sometimes more than, attending to the speaker. This ‘inner world’ of 
thoughts and reactions tends to take precedence over attending to the outside world. 
The extravert, in contrast, is a ‘lover of reality’ who does not spend much time in self­
reflection, but instead spends energy on sensing and experiencing the people around 
them, and especially social interactions. Due to the importance the extravert places 
on these social interactions, he will modulate or change his actions and behaviours
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depending on the needs of the social interaction, which affords him additional success 
in these interactions.
The second theory that Lieberman and Rosenthal turn to regarding 
introversion and extraversion is that of Eysenck. Eysenck (1973, 1990), as stated 
earlier, takes a decidedly physiological approach to introversion vs. extraversion. He 
proposes that introverts have a higher amount of physiological arousal due to higher 
baseline levels of cortical arousal, as well as a higher reactivity to stimuli than do 
extraverts. Thus, extraverts, in order to activate the same amount of the brain 
chemical, must seek out more activities and more arousing tasks, to gain greater 
sensory stimulation. This theory is supported by studies that have discovered that 
introverts are indeed more reactive than extraverts in physiological arousal (Matthews 
& Gililand, 1999; Stelmack, 1990). Additionally, introverts tend to acquire 
conditioned responses more efficiently if stimuli are neurtral or mild, but not when 
stimuli are arousing (Levey & Martin, 1981; Paisley & Mangan, 1988).
A last set of theories that Lieberman and Rosenthal point to are those proposed 
by Allport (1924) and Sapir (1958). They suggest that social interaction and 
competency is a long developmental process. Extraverts, who have a natural 
inclination toward social interaction, develop and improve their social skills through 
increased experience, as they desire these social situations more than the introvert.
Lieberman and Rosenthal point to the above three sets of theories as a basis 
for their hypothesis that extraverts simply need a different decoding experiment to 
truly shine in this area. Decoding experiments in the past have generally involved a 
single task -  watching an individual on a videotape and decoding the target person’s 
emotion. However, this situation does not mimic real life social interactions, and 
does not involve multi-tasking. Lieberman and Rosenthal, therefore, set out to mimic 
the multi-tasking involved in real life social interactions.
In a conversation, there are multiple tasks: listening to the speaker, 
comprehension, waiting for one’s turn to speak, and formulating one’s thoughts in 
order to contribute to the conversation -  in essence attending to the speaker and to 
one’s own thoughts about the conversation. This has been referred to as 
‘conversation maintenance’ or ‘CM’ (Swann et al., 1992). The other aspect of this 
social multi-tasking involves ‘reflected appraisals’ or ‘RA’, which means gauging 
how well we are being perceived and received by the other individual in the
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interactions. Nonverbal decoding is most heavily involved in the ‘RA’ component of 
the conversation. They suggest that CM & RA are ‘controlled processes’ as opposed 
to ‘automatic processes’, and that the controlled process is expected to rely on 
working memory (Gilbert, 1989), which is believed to cause a deficit for the introvert.
It is also possible that CM & RA are ‘conditionally automatic processes’ 
(Ambady, 1998; Bargh, 1989). If this is true, then it is likely that multi-tasking might 
still interfere with nonverbal decoding, as it would place a drain on the central 
executive component of working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Barkley, 1997). The 
executive system might then have to decide which task to attend to, partially 
excluding the other task. Thus, in the case of nonverbal decoding, RA (‘reflected 
appraisal’) might have to become a secondary task. The CM (‘conversation 
maintenance’) might become the primary task and therefore leave limited cognitive 
resources to deal effectively with the RA.
Lieberman and Rosenthal conducted three studies in this area, in which 
participants (introverts and extraverts) were required to engage in multi-tasking while 
decoding (such as being involved in conversations with others) to better simulate real 
life social situations. They discovered that introverts exhibited a decoding deficit 
only when the decoding was a secondary task such as conversing with other 
individuals (multitasking), and not a primary task. Thus, their series of studies might 
offer at least a partial explanation for the reason previous decoding studies have not 
demonstrated a distinct advantage for extraverts in decoding, as previous studies have 
not added the multi-tasking aspect to the interaction.
2.3.3 Process ing & The Big Five
Whilst Lieberman and Rosenthal focus on the introvert’s multi-tasking deficit 
in processing social information, Gray (1981) focuses on another area of the 
extravert’s information processing. Gray proposes that extraverts respond to rewards 
and punishments differently than other individuals, such as neurotics. Gray (1981) 
theorises that individuals’ scores on extraversion and neuroticism represent their 
individual differences in the relative strengths of two motivational and behavioural 
systems. Gray refers to the first system as the behavioural activation system (or 
BAS), and the second system Gray calls the behavioural inhibition system (or BIS). 
He posits that the BAS is related to the presence of reward signals and the BIS is 
related to the presence of punishment signals. He further states that those scoring
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high in neuroticism would be more motivated by BIS stimulation, as he theorises that 
this group of individuals would have an increased sensitivity to the signals of 
punishment. He further posits that those individuals who tend toward extraversion (as 
opposed to introversion) would have an increased sensitivity toward signals of 
reward, or strong BAS activation. This runs along similar lines of research that has 
discovered links between emotional sensitivity and reward and punishment 
sensitivity. Researchers have found evidence to support the position that positive 
affect may result (at least in part) from exposure to signals of reward, while negative 
affect appears to be influenced by exposure to punishment signals (Eysenck, 1987; 
Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991). Hence, if extraverts are more sensitive to reward signals, 
theoretically they would experience more positive mood, whereas those scoring high 
on neuroticism may be more sensitive to punishment signals and thus experience an 
increased negative mood.
The above studies on the Big Five personality traits and punishment and 
reward are especially relevant to the present thesis on judgment of pain faking for a 
number of reasons. If individuals scoring high on neuroticism are more sensitive to 
punishment signals, then it would seem to follow that those scoring high on 
neuroticism might be more attuned to, and therefore be able to notice and decipher, 
punishment signals. Therefore, one could speculate that those individuals scoring 
high in neuroticism might be more adept at judging pain, as pain could be considered 
a rather harsh form of punishment. It would also follow from this line of thinking that 
extraverts, who are more attuned to reward signals, may not be as adept at pain 
judgment. However, as stated previously, the results have been mixed in regards to 
extraversion and facial decoding.
There has been additional research in mood-congruent processing that points 
in this direction. Derryberry and Reed (1994) used a target-detection task and found 
that extraverts shifted their attention slower from the point where a positive incentive 
cue had been located, while introverts were slower to shift attention from the place 
where a negative cue had been located. Additionally, Derryberry (1987) conducted 
an experiment on errors regarding, and reaction times to, affective cues. After being 
given reward signals, extraverts responded more quickly and with higher error rates 
than those scoring as introverts, which could indicate that extraverts were distracted
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by the reward signal. Not surprisingly, after being given punishment signals, 
introverts responded slower than extraverts.
Rusting (1999) conducted experiments to further test the hypothesis that 
neuroticism and extraversion moderate mood-congruency effects. In her first study, 
Rusting had individuals who rated either high or low in extraversion, and either high 
or low in neuroticism complete several judgment tasks and a measure of mood. The 
second study was similar to the first, except that participants were randomly assigned 
to either positive or negative mood-induction conditions, instead of measuring the 
natural state of their mood. Both studies revealed evidence for trait-congruency and 
mood-congruency effects. Extraverted individuals were especially likely to 
remember positive words over negative words, and to make positive judgements. 
Those rating high in neuroticism tended to remember negative words and make 
negative judgments.
This research seems to echo previous research on emotionality and the ‘Big 
Five’ traits. Individuals who score high on extraversion tend to report more intense 
and frequent positive emotions than introverts, while those scoring high on 
neuroticism tend to report more frequent and intense negative emotions than those 
who score low on neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1980; Hepburn & Eysenck, 1989; 
Watson & Clark, 1992).
The research regarding personality traits, mood, and response may have 
possible implications for the present thesis on personality correlating with pain-faking 
judgements. One’s temporary state, or mood, may have an effect on ability to judge 
whether the target in the video is faking or in real pain. Furthermore, more stable 
personality traits (including extraversion/introversion and neuroticism) may have an 
effect on judgment ability. Thus, the present study utilises the NEO-FFI as a measure 
of the five-factor personality model.
2.3.4 The NEO Personal i t y  Measure
The NEO-PI was the precursor to the NEO-FFI, the measure used in the 
present study. The original NEO (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness) Personality 
Inventory was first published by Costa and McCrae in 1985, which they revised 
(NEO PI-R) in 1992. It is an un-timed self-report personality measure, consisting of 
240 items. The measure used in the present study, the NEO-FFI (NEO-Five Factor
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Inventory), is a shorter version of the NEO-PI developed by Costa and McCrae in 
1992, which consists of 60 items. The five factors measured in both tests are:
• Extraversion (E) vs. introversion
• Agreeableness (A) vs. antagonism
• Conscientiousness (C) vs. lack of direction
• Neuroticism (N) vs. emotional stability
• Openness (O) vs. closedness to experience
2 . 3 . 4 . 1  R e l i a b i l i t y  & V a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  N E O
The NEO PI-R has shown substantial internal consistency, temporal stability, 
and convergent and discriminant validity against spouse and peer ratings (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1990). In addition, the factor structure of the 30- 
facet scales replicates very closely in a broad range of cultures and languages 
(McCrae & Costa, 1997). In a review of the reliability and validity literature on the 
NEO-PI, Dolliver (1987) reports concurrent validity with a) the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory, b) the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey, c) the Holland Self- 
Directed Search and d) five selected measures of well-being. Test-retest reliabilities 
are reported as .66 to .91, using a study of men and women retested after six months 
(McCrae & Costa, 1985).
The NEO-FFI’s manual reports reliabilities that are acceptable, showing a 
mean of .78 across the five scales (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The NEO-FFI scales are 
also substantially correlated with the NEO PI-R scales, according to Costa and 
McCrae.
2.3.5 Comparison o f  the MBTI  to the NEO (& the 5 Factor  
Personal i t y  Model)
In a study comparing the MBTI to the NEO-PI, MacDonald et al. (1994) 
discovered several correlations between scales of the two measures. This included 
correlations between the MBTI’s El scale and the NEO Pi’s Extraversion scale, the 
MBTI’s TF scale and the NEO-PI’s Agreeableness scale, and the MBTI’s JP scale 
and the NEO Pi’s Conscientiousness scale. Most relevant to the present study, 
though, was their finding of a correlation between the MBTI’s SN (Sensation- 
Intuition) scale and the NEO-PI’s Openness to Experience scale (.71 for men and .65 
for women). However, in 1995, MacDonald and colleagues found low to moderate
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correlations between the MBTI and the NEO-PFs facets of Neuroticism, Extraversion 
and Openness. McCrae and Costa (1989), though, found that intuitive types (as 
measured by the MBTI) tended to score higher on the NEO-PFs ‘Openness to 
Experience’. The correlations between the MBTI SN (Sensing-Intuition) index and 
the NEO-PI Openness factor were approximately .7 (McCrae & Costa, 1989).
Wolffadt and Pretz (2001) found a positive relationship between openness to 
experience (on the NEO-FFI) and all measures of creativity used in their study. 
(Creativity measures included the Creative Personality Scale and ratings of 
participants’ written stories). Moreover, high ratings on intuition (and extraversion) 
were found to be the best predictors of creativity. In research examining graphology 
and personality types using the MBTI and the NEO-FFI, convergent validity between 
the two measures revealed significant correlations on all four factors (NEO-FFI’s 
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness along with the 
MBTI’s SN, EI, TF and JP scales) (ICopishke, 2001).
In a study that compared the MBTI to the NEO-PI, Furnham (1996) found a 
number of correlations between the two measures. The NEO-PI Agreeableness score 
was con-elated with the MBTI Thinking-Feeling (TF) dimension, and the NEO-PI 
Conscientiousness score was correlated with both the MBTI’s Judging-Perceiving 
(JP) and Thinking-Feeling dimensions. The NEO-PI Extraversion-Introversion (EI) 
and Neuroticism scores, though, were not related to any MBTI subscales. The 
Openness score of the NEO-PI was conelated with all four MBTI dimensions. 
Importantly, though, its highest correlation was again with Sensing-Intuition.
This consistent link between Intuition rating on the MBTI and Openness score 
on the NEO is important to keep in mind for the present study. However, as this link 
between MBTI’s intuition scale and the NEO’s Openness exists, it is unclear if the 
MBTI SN scale and the NEO’s Openness scale are measuring two different but 
related constructs, or if are they measuring the same construct.
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C H A P T E R  3:  I N T E R P E R S O N A L  S E N S I T I V I T Y  & 
D E C O D I N G
3.1 Theories o f Interpersonal Sensitivity
As the present thesis centres around the hypothesis that intuitive types will be 
more ‘tuned in’ interpersonally to the affective states of others, it seems relevant to 
examine other related issues of interpersonal sensitivity. These include concepts such 
as emotional intelligence (which will be addressed later in this thesis), empathic 
accuracy, social intelligence and social competence.
3.1.1 Accuracy  in Personal i t y  Judgment
There are several cognitive factors related to the accuracy of personality 
judgements. According to Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, and Quirk 
(2005), these factors include that the observer or judge must a) notice the target 
person’s behaviour, b) inteipret the behaviour in the context of recollections of past 
behaviour, c) understand how the behaviour related to the trait concepts used to 
describe social behaviour, d) have an awareness of the natural covariation of traits, 
and e) be able to take into account situational factors that may have played a role in 
determining behaviour (Christiansen et al, 2005, p. 125).
Additionally, Christiansen and colleagues posit that reasoning based on 
dispositional information involves knowledge of the relationships between traits, 
behaviour, and situations. They suggest that there are three declarative knowledge 
structures that are components of dispositional reasoning and ‘dispositional 
intelligence’: a) Icnowledge of linkages between traits and behaviours, b) 
understanding of situation-trait relevance, and c) proficiency at trait concepts 
(Christiansen et al, 2005, p. 126).
3.1.2 Emot ional  Inte l l igence and Competence
Many theorists believe that the ability to recognise emotions in others is a 
form of intelligence. In fact, Salovey and Mayer (1990) proposed the concept of 
emotional intelligence and defined it as a set of skills relating to “the ability to 
monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them, 
and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.” (See the chapter on 
Emotional Intelligence in the present thesis).
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Buck (1991) describes what he calls emotional competence as the ability to 
deal well with one’s internal emotions and desires. He states that emotional 
competence develops through social feedback mechanisms and is vital to social 
competence. Gardner (1993) speaks in terms of personal intelligence as awareness of 
one’s own and others’ emotional states.
3.1.3 Social  intel l igence
Hunt (1928) defined social intelligence as the ability to get along with others, 
while Wedeck (1947) defined social intelligence as one’s ability to correctly judge the 
feelings, moods and motivations of others. Walker and Foley (1973) divided 
definitions of social intelligence into 3 categories. The first category is particularly 
relevant to the present thesis, and is the ability to accurately decode social 
information. (Facial decoding will be discussed later in the Nonverbal 
Communication section of this paper). Walker and Foley’s second definition 
category of social intelligence is adaptiveness or effectiveness of social performance. 
Their third category is performance on any test that contains a social-skills 
component.
Using a behavioural definition (similar to Walker and Foley’s, above), 
Keating (1978), as well as Ford and Tisak (1983) discovered and validated a domain 
of social intelligence. Sternberg and Smith (1985) confirmed the appearance of a 
factor of social intelligence, as well.
3.1.4 Social  competence
Social competence is a concept somewhat similar to social intelligence, and is 
defined as effectiveness in social interaction (Rose-Krasnor, 1997), as well as the 
ability to obtain successful outcomes from relationships with others (Spence & 
Donovan, 1998). Social competence has been further defined as the attainment of 
relevant social goals in specified social contexts, using appropriate means and 
resulting in positive development (Ford, 1982), or viewed simply as social influence 
effectiveness (Wright, 1980).
3.1.5 Empathy & Empathic  Accuracy
Affective empathy is a particularly relevant concept to the present study. 
Affective empathy has been described as ‘Empathy, delimited to the component of 
affective sensitivity, which is the ability to detect and describe the immediate
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affective state of another’ (Johnson, 1971). In fact, it has been suggested that there is 
an important link between empathy and intuition. Conklin (1970) viewed empathy as 
essential to intuition, and stated, ‘...empathy is the power of intuition when applied to 
give knowledge to someone’s state of mind’ (Conklin, 1970, pp. 330-331). Cronbach 
discussed similar ideas when he referred to empathy as an ‘...intuitive pervasive 
feeling state which preceded any cognition’ (Cronbach, 1958, p. 376).
Similarly, the concept of empathic accuracy has been proposed and recently 
defined by Klein et al. (2001) as inferring the thoughts and feelings of a target person. 
In their study on gender differences in empathic accuracy, they found that gender 
differences were not found in terms of male and female abilities, but rather were due 
to differing motivations between the sexes. Somewhat counter-intuitive is the finding 
by Lowe (1997) that subjects who scored low on people-orientation were the most 
effective at identifying emotions in others. However, Ickes et al. (2000) found in their 
study of subjects inferring the thoughts and feelings of a target set of persons, that the 
best predictor of empathic accuracy appears to be verbal intelligence. Davis et al. 
(1997) state that good judges of empathic accuracy or social sensitivity tend to be 
“intelligent, cognitively complex, open-minded individuals who are also likely to 
score high on measures of field independence.”
3.1.6 Af fec t ive  social  competence
An especially relevant aspect of interpersonal sensitivity to the present thesis 
might be ‘affective social competence,’ as the present study examines intuitive 
participants’ competence in detecting emotional affect (and pain expressions in 
particular). Shrauger and Altrocchi (1964) contend that perception of others is 
affected by the process of assuming others are the same as oneself. They go on to 
conclude that motivational variables may be important in drawing inferences from 
cues, as well. Bruner and Tagiuri (1954) conducted a review of the person perception 
literature at the time, and concluded that accuracy is positively correlated with social 
and intellectual skills. In their 2001 article, Halberstadt, Denham and Dunsmore 
discuss affective social competence as comprising three dynamic and integrated 
components: sending affective messages, receiving affective messages and 
experiencing affect.
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3.2 Emotional Decoding and Encoding
The category of nonverbal communication that is most relevant to this PhD 
thesis is that on decoding, or recognising, facial expressions of emotion. This section 
begins with a brief discussion of other forms of decoding, namely bodily and vocal 
decoding. Additionally, there is a short examination of encoding, or sending 
nonverbal expressions of emotion.
3.2.1 Decoding and the body
In addition to facial decoding, emotional decoding studies have included 
bodily decoding, such as postural studies, as well as research on position and 
movement. Many studies suggest that these bodily forms of emotional decoding may 
communicate an individual’s emotional state (Rolf, 1977; Townsend, 1976; Weitz, 
1979). Bodily decoding studies such as these tend to focus on issues such as patterns 
of bodily movement and areas of muscular holding. While the body could be 
considered an additional form of emotional decoding, Ekman and Friesen (1975) 
found that when individuals were presented with pictures of a) the face only, b) the 
body only, and c) the face and the body, the face was the primary channel used for 
decoding the emotion expressed. The body, however, was used for understanding the 
intensity of the emotional expression.
3.2.2 Decoding and the voice
There are three ways that have generally been used to study vocal decoding: 
a) standard or constant content, b) electronic content filtering and c) randomised 
content splicing.
One method of studying vocal emotional decoding is that of using standard or 
constant content, in which an actor repeatedly recites a phrase or sequence of 
meaningless words in varying ways -  each to portray a specific emotion. Davitz 
(1964) used this method and found that the average accuracy was 56 percent. A
second vocal decoding method is electronic content filtering, which involves*
electronically altering the actor’s voice so that the words are not recognisable. 
Rosenthal et al. (1979) found that individuals using this method could accurately 
detect what emotions were being expressed. A third method, randomised content 
splicing (another form of content masking), involves splicing a tape of the voice 
recording and re-assembling it in a random order. Sherer (1971) discovered that
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when using this method of studying vocal decoding, judges consistently had better 
than chance ratings of speakers’ emotional traits.
3.2.3 Facial  Encoding
Personality and individual differences appear to play a part in the ability to 
decode and encode facial affect. Riggio has conducted many studies on encoding, the 
ability to send affective nonverbal messages. Friedman and Riggio (1999) found that 
dominant and exhibitionist subjects, as well as emotionally expressive females, and 
males that were good ‘social actors’ were better at encoding complex affect. Social 
skills were studied in relation to encoding posed and spontaneous facial expressions 
in a study by Tucker and Riggio (1988). They found that the ability to be emotionally 
expressive (but not the ability to control emotions) was related to spontaneous 
sending ability. Posed sending ability was associated with expressive ability and role- 
playing skills.
Some studies have examined both decoding and encoding, such as Sabatelli, 
Dreyer and Buck (1979), who examined cognitive style (field-dependence vs. field- 
independence) in relation to encoding and decoding skills. While they found no 
relationship between cognitive style and decoding ability, they did discover that field- 
dependent subjects were better at sending or encoding of facial expressions. 
Zuclcerman, Hall, DeFranlc and Rosenthal (1976) examined encoding and decoding, 
and found a modest relationship between the ability to encode and the ability to 
decode facial expressions of emotion.
3.2.4 Facial  Decoding
3 . 2 . 4 . 1  N e u r o p s y c h o l o g y  a n d  d e c o d i n g
Studies have demonstrated that neural structures exist in the brain which are 
involved in processing emotion. The amygdala in particular appears to be important 
in the processing of facial expressions, and especially certain negative emotions, such 
as fear (Adolphs et. al, 1995; Brolcs et. al, 1998; Calder et al, 1996). In fact, Adolphs 
et al (1998) found that those subjects with amygdala damage judged faces to be 
abnormally trustworthy and approachable that were generally judged to look the most 
untrustworthy by non-brain damaged subjects.
Nelson (1987) states that research with normal adults, primates and brain­
damaged subjects indicates that the posterior region of the brain’s right hemisphere is
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responsible for facial expression recognition. A study by Bowers, Bauer, Coslett, and 
Heilman (1985) examining right-hemisphere damaged (RHD) patients on facial affect 
tasks also indicated that patients with RHD performed significantly worse than 
controls. Spell (1997) studied patients with (general) traumatic brain injury (TBI) 
and found that they scored significantly lower 011 measures of facial affect 
recognition. However, research by Caltagirone, Ekman, Friesen and colleagues
(1989) on brain-damaged patients, using the FACS (Facial Action Coding System) 
did not support this view that the right hemisphere plays a role in facial expression.
3 . 2 . 4 . 2  E v o l u t i o n a r y  P s y c h o l o g y  & D e c o d i n g
Many theories of emotional decoding have a decidedly evolutionary 
perspective. Darwin first noted similarities in the decoding and labelling of emotions 
in 1872 (Darwin, 1872/1965). In his informal study, he produced facial ‘expressions’ 
in a man by stimulating various muscles in his face. Darwin then showed 
photographs of these expressions to subjects and found a strong similarity in the 
interpretations of the expressions. Evolutionary theorists believe that the ability to 
express and read others’ emotions is a human adaptive mechanism that is fundamental 
to human evolution. Ekman and colleagues have demonstrated similarity in both 
literate and pre-literate cultures in ability to read emotional expression. (Ekman, 
Friesen & Ellsworth, 1982; Ekman, Friesen, O’Sullivan et al., 1987). In primate 
studies, Brothers (1990) found structures in the brain that relate to the recognition of 
faces and motivational states. Emotions View theory (Buck, 1994) suggests that facial 
movements are directly linked to emotions and facial expressions are read-outs that 
directly appear in a reflex-lilce fashion.
Ekman and colleagues believed they demonstrated the universality of 
judgments of facial expressions in their 1987 study. They studied 10 different 
cultures around the world and found some agreement across cultures regarding 
emotional intensity. However, they admit that cultural differences were discovered in 
judgments of the absolute level of emotional intensity. This and other related studies 
of the universality of emotion have been criticized on the grounds of judgement 
context, the previewing of slides, the pre-selection of slides, presentation order, the 
use of posed expressions and type of response format (Russell, 1994). However,
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Biehl et al. (1997), Ekman (1994), and Izard (1994) have disputed several of these 
criticisms.
3 . 2 . 4 . 3  D e v e l o p m e n t a l  P s y c h o l o g y  & D e c o d i n g
It is likely that the ability to recognise facial expressions is a developmental 
task and process. Nelson (1987) states that this ability develops quite slowly in the 
first two years of life and that it is still rather rudimentary at the end of the second 
year. Not surprisingly, Singh and associates found that children with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) had deficits in facial decoding abilities, mirroring 
Shapiro and colleagues’ finding that children with ADHD had modest difficulties in 
facial decoding (Shapiro, Hughes, August & Bloomquist, 1993; Singh, Ellis, Winton, 
Singh, Leung & Oswald, 1998).
Certainly, the ability to recognise facial expression is an important skill and 
individuals without this ability are generally assumed to be at a higher risk for social 
failure (Nowicki & Duke, 2001). Not surprisingly, Edwards, Manstead and 
MacDonald (1984) found that children who rated themselves high on friendliness also 
were found to have higher emotion recognition abilities than those who rated lower on 
friendliness.
The detection of emotional affect is studied directly in relation to children’s emotional 
intelligence in a study by Greener (1999). This research found that those scoring high 
on a measure of emotional intelligence (termed ‘high prosocial’) scored significantly 
higher on accuracy of emotional decoding of other childrens’ faces.
Children who were better at decoding were also found by Nowicki and Duke 
(1992) to be more popular with their classmates, have an internal locus of control and 
have higher academic achievement scores than those who were poorer at decoding. 
Mufson and Nowicki (1991) examined locus of control and decoding ability and 
predicted that internally controlled, high self-monitoring individuals would be more 
accurate at facial affect recognition, and their results confirmed this prediction. This 
reflects Nowicki and Richman’s (1985) study, in which they also found those with 
internal locus of control to be better at decoding.
3 . 2 . 4 . 4  D e c o d i n g  -  I n d i v i d u a l  D i f f e r e n c e s
The importance of the face in decoding emotion cannot be overstated and is 
illustrated in a few of the following studies. Ekman and Friesen (1975) have, not
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surprisingly, found that the face is the primary channel used to decode emotional 
expression. Rosenthal et al (1979) also discovered that judges were more accurate at 
decoding expression from the face than from bodily movements, which is similar to 
Zuckeiman and colleagues’ (1975) finding in their review of the decoding literature.
Results have been mixed in regards to linking emotion recognition ability to 
individual differences in personality (Cunningham, 1977; Hall, Gaul, & Kent, 1999; 
Rosenthal et al, 1979). However, studies have demonstrated links between high self­
monitoring individuals and the ability to decode emotion (Snyder, 1974), as well as 
between an internal locus of control and emotion recognition (Nowicki & Hartigan, 
1988; Nowicki & Richmond, 1986). Additionally, emotion recognition was found to 
relate to the Big Five personality traits of Openness, and to a lesser extent 
Conscientiousness and Extraversion. Neuroticism, on the other hand, was negatively 
related to accuracy in emotion detection (Matsumoto, LeRoux, Wilson-Cohn, 
Raroque, Kooken, Ekman, et al. 2000).
Ekman and Oster (1979) reviewed hundreds of facial decoding studies and 
found several interesting points. One of these findings was that observers could 
accurately differentiate between pleasant and unpleasant emotions simply by viewing 
facial expression. Another finding by Ekman and Oster (1979) that is especially 
relevant to this PhD thesis is that people do in fact differ in their individual decoding 
(and e^ncoding) abilities, which reflects the finding of Zuckerman and associates 
(1975).
Numerous measures of nonverbal decoding have been developed by 
psychologists. Perhaps the most famous measure is Rosenthal et al’s (1979) Profile 
o f Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS), which has demonstrated high validity and reliability 
as a measure of nonverbal decoding. Rosenthal and colleagues (1979) have found 
that high PONS scorers tend to be better adjusted, more often female than male, less 
dogmatic, more interpersonally democratic and encouraging, and more extraverted. 
Their studies indicate that children’s nonverbal decoding skills tend to increase with 
age, levelling off at approximately 20 -  30 years of age, and do not appear to be 
related to IQ or race. Additionally, personality traits were demonstrated to have an 
effect on decoding ability in a study by Toner and Gates (1985). Female university 
students were studied and those with an inhibited, non-assertive personality style 
tended to score lower on the recognition of facial expression of emotion.
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3 . 2 . 4 . 5  S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g y  & D e c o d i n g
Halberstadt, Denham and Dunsmore’s (2001) model of affective social 
competence seems particularly relevant to a discussion of facial decoding. 
Halberstadt and colleagues state that there are three components of facial decoding: 
sending affective messages, receiving affective messages and experiencing affect. In 
their discussion of receiving affective messages, they list the following as essential 
components of receiving these messages. Firstly, as one might guess, one must have 
the awareness that the affective message is being sent. Next, one must identify the 
affective meaning of the message, and then understand the meaning within its social 
context. In addition, one needs to manage the receiving of the affective message, 
such as ignoring false signals and managing multiple message signals.
Conger, Conger and Cowan (1991) found that those subjects self-reporting 
heterosocial interpersonal difficulties (termed the Tow socially competent group’) 
may not be able to discriminate among social stimuli as well as those deemed to be 
‘high’ in social competency. In Christensen and colleagues’ study, low socially 
competent individuals reported having observed as many of the nonverbal messages 
sent to them as the high socially competent group, however the low-competency 
group did not succeed in responding to the nonverbal cues sent to them (Christensen, 
Farina & Cowan, 1980).
Another social psychology concept relevant to decoding is that of social 
intelligence. In their 1985 study, Sternberg and Smith found that nonverbal decoding 
skills were not part of social intelligence. However, when Sternberg teamed up with 
Barnes a few years later, that view was reversed. In their 1989 study, Bames and 
Sternberg conclude that decoding skills are indeed an important component of social 
intelligence.
3 . 2 . 4 . 6  G e n d e r  & D e c o d i n g
Studies suggest that females are more effective at recognising facial 
expressions than males (Rotter & Rotter, 1988; Zuckerman, Hall, DeFrank & 
Rosenthal, 1976). In addition, Thayer and Johnson (2000) found that women were 
better at judging and classifying emotional expression than men, and that males 
seemed to have more difficulty in distinguishing one emotion from another.
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Interestingly, when individuals were administered the PONS test (Profile of 
Nonverbal Sensitivity) and the Bern Sex-role Inventory, results indicated that the 
more androgynous individuals of both genders were the better facial decoders 
(Schneider & Schneider-Duker, 1984). In other words, those females scoring higher 
on masculinity and those males scoring higher on feminine traits were more accurate 
at recognising facial expressions of emotion.
3 . 2 . 4 .  7 E m o t i o n s  & d e c o d i n g
Buck (1994) describes what is referred to as an ‘Emotions View’ of facial 
expressions. Buck contends facial movements are directly linked to emotions, and 
facial expressions are thus viewed as read-outs that directly appear in a reflex-like 
fashion. Fridlund (1994, 1997) proposes the Behavioural Ecology view of faces, 
which is a model with an evolutionary flavour that examines the manner in which 
facial expressions evolved, what they signify and how they function in everyday life. 
His theory focuses on contextual factors, including the presence or absence of kin, 
predators and intruders affecting facial expressions. However, put simply, (and 
similar to Buck) Fridlund views facial expressions simply as tools which are ‘read’ 
according to the particular interaction context in which they occur.
Other areas of NVC studies address facial decoding and its relation to specific 
emotions. Angry expressions appear to interfere with an individual’s ability to 
quickly label a face’s identity or gender, which has been referred to as the Anger- 
Inferiority Effect (AIE). Mancino (1999) found this effect when she exposed subjects 
to two faces simultaneously for a very brief period (398.4 ms). When asked to judge 
whether the faces (which included faces with angry expressions) displayed the same 
or different affect, the Anger Inferiority Effect emerged.
Patients diagnosed with depression (most with major depression) that had 
difficulty in decoding negative affect - such as sadness, rejection and anger - were 
found to be less likely to demonstrate a lifting of their depression after 30 weeks 
(Bouhuys, Geertz, Mersch & Jenner, 1996). Interestingly, though, a study of 
schizotypal subjects did not find any significant deficits in facial decoding ability 
(Toomey & Schuldberg, 1995).
A number of studies have been conducted on emotional contagion’s effect on 
decoding ability, such as those examining the effects of mimicry and previous
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exposure to facial expressions on decoding ability. Thayer (1980) investigated the 
effects of exposing individuals to earlier facial expressions of emotion and whether 
this may influence the subject’s subsequent judgments of facial expressions. Thayer 
found that the judged intensity of identical facial expressions was increased 
significantly when it was preceded by a sequence of contrasting facial expressions.
Hess and Blairy (2001) wanted to know if individuals show emotional 
contagion and mimic in response to being shown relatively weak and idiosyncratic 
dynamic facial expressions of emotion. In fact, they did find evidence for mimicry 
for all types of facial expressions, including happiness and sadness. This finding is 
somewhat supported by those of Hietanen and Suraklca (1997), who found that 
viewing an expression of a genuine smile causes stronger muscle activity associated 
with feelings of pleasure, than viewing a face with a social smile. They conclude that 
viewing facial expressions of emotion by others induces compatible emotions in the 
observer.
3.  2 . 4 .  8 I n t u i t i o n  a n d  E m o t i o n a l  D e c o d i n g
It does not appear* that the topic of intuition (specifically) has been addressed 
as it relates to facial decoding. However, a Ph.D. thesis that studied aspects of this 
topic was written by Harman (1983), using the Myers Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI) 
and the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS). Harman used all MBTI scales: the 
El (Extraversion/Introversion), JP (Judging/Perceiving), SN (Sensing/Intuition) and 
TF (Thinking/Feeling). In his study, he found no relationship between psychological 
type and decoding ability. However, there are a few important points to consider.
Firstly, Harmon’s population consisted of university students enrolled in 
Nonverbal Theory and Practice classes. It is reasonable to question the results of a 
study using the PONS in which the subjects were students enrolled in a nonverbal 
communication class, as the students had been studying nonverbal communication 
throughout the term. Secondly, if the participants were interested enough in 
nonverbal behaviour to enrol in a nonverbal communication class, it is possible that 
they (as a group) may be more attuned to nonverbal behaviour than the average 
person. This could have a confounding effect on the study results.
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3,3 Summary
In sum, findings have been mixed regarding individual differences in 
emotional decoding. However, whilst numerous perspectives exist in the field of 
psychology regarding facial decoding and encoding, it appears rather clear that the 
face is a vital channel for nonverbal communication. Thus, the present thesis utilises 
this vital tool in examining individual differences in pain judgment.
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C H A P T E R  4:  I N T U I T I O N  A N D  U N C O N S C I O U S  
P R O C E S S I N G
4.1 Intuition
Mathematician Henri Poincare stated, “It is by logic that we prove. It is by intuition 
that we discover” (Arnheim, 1970, p. 274).
4.1.1 Introduct ion
Whilst psychologists and scientists in numerous fields have discussed the 
concept of intuition in one form or another over the past century (Allport, 1929; Baer, 
1976; Bouthilet, 1948; Lieberman, 2000; Lorenz, 1951; Vaughan, 1979), Jung’s 
discussion of intuition in relation to psychological types (Jung, 1971) could arguably 
be considered the most influential in the field of psychology. Intuition is a concept 
that is perhaps enigmatic and controversial, yet continues to be widely examined in 
the literature. There are numerous approaches taken to intuition in the psychological 
and empirical literature, including viewing it as a form of insight (Lorenz, 1951), as 
well as examining intuition in regards to implicit learning, decision-maldng and 
intuitive judgments (Bastick, 1982; Crutchfield, 1960; Hogarth, 2001; Osbeck, 1999; 
Woolhouse & Bayne; 2000). Furthermore, several theorists have linked the concept 
of intuition to emotional sensitivity (Baumgardener, 1973; Conklin, 1970; Guilford, 
1966), as well as social intuition (Lieberman, 2000). In fact, Jung stated the 
following in regards to the intuitive individual, “(he) see around corners, he smells a 
rat a mile away” (Evans, 1976, p. 104), which appears to indicate Jung’s perception of 
the intuitive as an effective deception-detector. Thus, this emotional and 
interpersonal sensitivity combined with an intuitive judgment ability might lead one 
to speculate that the intuitive individual may be more adept at perceiving facial pain 
expressions in others. Therefore, the present thesis hypothesises that the intuitive 
type individual will demonstrate high accuracy levels in pain perception.
4.1.2 Def ini t ions  & Perspect ives
Jungian concepts of intuition have been described earlier in this paper; 
however, a few general definitions may be in order. One definition of intuition 
describes it as: ‘A mode of understanding or knowing characterised as direct and
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immediate, and occurring without conscious thought or judgment’ (Reber & Reber, 
2001). This definition goes on to describe facets of intuition as ‘unmediated’ and that 
it is ‘...a response to subtle cues and relationships apprehended implicitly, 
unconsciously.’
Vaughan (1979) described intuition simply as “...knowing without being able 
to explain how we know.” (pg. 46). Merriam Webster dictionary lists “immediate 
apprehension or cognition” as well as “the power or faculty of attaining to direct 
knowledge or cognition, without rational thought or inference”. Hogarth (2001) 
defines intuitive responses as those that are “...reached with little or no apparent 
effort, and typically without conscious awareness. They involve little or no conscious 
deliberation.” (pg.14). The reader may recall Jung’s definition of intuition in his 
Psychological Types book as the following: “It is the function that mediates 
(transmits) perceptions in an unconscious way” (Jung, 1971).
While intuition may at first glance appear to be a relatively new concept, 
intuitive thought has been described as far back as the Middle Ages. Baer points out 
that ‘The Middle Ages distinguished between ratio (the power of discursive, logical 
thought) and intellectus (the power of direct intuition)...open to the gift of 
understanding.’ (Baer, 1976, p. 27).
Historically, the concept of intuition has been viewed by psychologists with 
mixed reactions. Earlier this century, McDougall (1923) called intuition “implicit 
apperception” as a contrast to “explicit apperception” connected with the ‘higher’ 
mental functions that include language use (p. 389). McDougall did not appear to 
have a very high opinion of intuition, stating it “works...on a lower plane of 
intellectuality” (p. 391). Bouthilet (1948) did not appear to have much higher of an 
opinion of intuition, describing intuition as “the capacity to make correct guesses 
without knowing why” (p. 47).
However, many psychologists as well as scientists in a variety of fields have 
recognised the importance of intuition and insight. Intuition may be applied to many 
fields of science. In fact, Henderson (1946) pointed out that scientists have 
historically utilised intuition, including ‘discovery by lightening flashes’ in making 
important scientific breakthroughs. Henderson also reminds us that this ability 
(intuition/insight) is shared by individuals from all backgrounds and professions 
(Henderson, 1946).
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This belief regarding intuition is shared and reinforced in a statement by 
Bruner and Clinchy, ‘If man is to use his capabilities to the full and with the 
confidence that fits his powers, he has no alternative but to recognise the importance 
and power of intuitive methods in all fields of inquiry -  literature and mathematics, 
poetry and linguistics’ (Bruner & Clinchy, 1966, p. 82). Some theorists go so far as 
to call intuition ‘one of the most important cognitive faculties of man’ (Lorenz, 1951) 
and ‘the foundation of the intellect’ (Bahm, 1960, p. 1). Renowned psychologist 
Gordon Allport even addressed intuition when he stated, ‘...the concept of intuition 
seems to represent a broad variety of theories of knowledge, some of which 
characterise direct knowledge, some knowledge of unities, some... innate knowledge.’ 
(Allport, 1929, p. 15).
Additionally, intuition may be divided into various categories, depending on 
one’s particular psychological perspective. Many approaches may either be 
categorised as applied psychology, experimental psychology, intuition as implicit 
learning or intuition as insight. Still other approaches examine the differences 
between intuitive thinking and analytical thinking.
4 . 1 . 2 . 1  I n s i g h t  & I n t u i t i o n
Closely related and rather akin to the concept of intuition, is that of ‘insight.’ 
In fact, Lorenz (1951) suggested that intuition is identical to insight. Bastick 
approaches the topic of insight from a rather behavioural viewpoint in his discussion 
of the reduction in tension following an insight, which has three main effects: 1) It 
conditions the response to the emotional set (the attitudes and feelings with which one 
approaches a given situation). This conditioning would then produce a changed 
emotional set that allows the transfer to new situations that involve this emotional set.
2) The reduction in tension following an insight also results in a second effect, that of 
a feeling of confidence, which encourages the individual toward intuitive action. 3) 
The third effect of this reduction in tension is a feeling of intrinsic motivation 
(directly linked to effect #2) (Bastick, 1982).
4 . 1 . 2 . 2  L i n k  B e t w e e n  E m o t i o n , E m p a t h y ,  a n d  t h e  I n t u i t i v e  
P r o c e s s e s
Many theorists propose that a strong link exists between intuition and 
emotion. Guilford (1966) mentions them in tandem, saying, ‘...the emotionally
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sensitive individual, the intuitive thinker,’ and Dymond (1948) referred to insight as 
‘emotional realisation’. Baumgardner also makes this link when referring to intuition, 
stating, ‘...Emotional involvement and global feelings are thus taken as definitive for 
this mode of thought.’ (Baumgardner, 1973, p.41).
Given the strong link that is likely between emotion and intuition, one might 
further speculate that empathy may play a role in intuitive understanding. Allport 
proposed that empathy consists of intuition and inference, and viewed intuition as 
similar to the Gestalt concept of direct perception. He then linked inference to ‘an 
associationist theory of understanding’ (Allport, 1960). Similarly, Conklin views 
empathy as essential to intuition, ‘...empathy is the power of intuition when applied 
to give knowledge of someone’s state of mind’ (Conklin, 1970, pp. 330-331).
This presumed link between empathy and intuition might lead one to speculate 
that the intuitive (and empathic) individual would be effective in decoding facial 
expressions. One could argue that pain in particular would be likely to elicit empathy 
from an individual viewing another in slight physical distress. Thus, the present 
thesis hypothesises that the intuitive individual will be effective at judging facial 
expressions of pain.
4 . 1 . 2 . 3  O s b e c k ys I n t u i t i o n  C a t e g o r i e s
Osbeck (1999) approaches the topic of intuition in a slightly different manner, 
and divides the research on varying concepts of intuition into four categories: 1) 
applied psychology, 2) experimental psychology, 3) intuition and decision-making and 
4) intuition as framed in its historical philosophical background.
The applied psychologists take the Jungian concept of intuition and apply it to 
the therapeutic milieu or to testing, as in the Myers Briggs Type Indicator. On the 
other hand, experimental psychologists, who reside on the opposite end of the ‘touchy 
feely’ spectrum, study such issues as intuition’s effects on judgment probability. 
Those in the implicit learning camp, who also tend to be experimental psychologists, 
study learning at a less-than-conscious level. Those grounded in philosophical 
psychology examine intuition as a process of insight, often involving an incubation 
period.
1) The applied psychology ‘camp,’ based on Jung’s Psychological Types, 
spawned the use of type-scales -  the most famous being the MBTI. In the clinical and
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counselling setting, intuition is researched in terms of psychological type, but more 
often it is applied to the therapeutic relationship between therapist and client. 
Another sector that seems to have recently embraced the concept of intuition and 
decision-making is the nursing sector. Numerous articles now explore the manner in 
which intuition may be utilised in clinical decision-making situations (Rew, 2000; 
King and Appleton, 1997).
2) In experimental psychology, intuition is most often applied as a means of 
judgment for problem-solving in interpersonal and non-social situations, for instance, 
implicit learning research.
3) A large amount of research now seems to fit into Osbeck’s next category, 
that of intuition and decision-making. In fact, managers now appear to be open to the 
use of intuition in business decision-making. Khatri and Ng (2000) found that 
intuitive processes are often used in strategic decision-making. Others advocating 
this new approach to management include McGinnis (1984) and Burke and Miller 
(1999). In fact, in his study on intuition and problem solving, Andersen (1999) found 
a link between intuition and organisational effectiveness.
Despite the varying perspectives on intuition, Osbeck (1999) does find some 
common ground between many psychological perspectives of intuition. These 
include 1) intuition being associated with unconscious processing, 2) intuition as an 
inferential process and 3) a frequent if unfortunate association of intuition with 
‘irrational’ processes’ -  or at least not in the traditional view of ‘rational.’
At this point in Osbeck’s (1999) dissertation, oui* viewpoints diverge. Osbeck 
proposes that our current view of intuition in psychology should be draped in its 
philosophical history - that of Plato, Descartes, Aristotle, etc. - and appears to suggest 
that we should not concentrate on the various newer approaches, such as those found 
in social or cognitive psychology. Many would argue that this could be considered a 
rather traditionalist, even backward-thinking viewpoint, in light of all the recent 
research on intuition.
While the author of the present paper believes it is relevant, and indeed 
important, to view a concept in relation to its history, we do not necessarily need to 
remain stuck in its history. In other words, yes, study its historical basis, however, we 
can also develop current perspectives based on more recent psychological 
developments and research.
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4 . 1 . 2 . 4  I n t u i t i o n  & P h i l o s o p h i c a l  P s y c h o l o g y
Osbeck (1999) takes a decidedly philosophical perspective in her paper. 
Another researcher who appears to come from a philosophical perspective on intuition 
is Petitmengin-Peugeot, who attempted to capture the intuitive experience in a 
qualitative research study (Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999). In this study, researchers 
gathered information on subjects’ intuitive experiences. From her study findings, 
Peugeot concludes that intuition corresponds to a complete experience or a ‘...set of 
interior gestures which involve the entire being’ (Peugeot, 1999, p. 76). In addition, 
the researcher concludes that it is possible to encourage the appearance of intuitions.
4 . 1 . 2 . 5  C o m b i n a t i o n  A p p r o a c h e s  to I n t u i t i o n
Lieberman (2000) proposes a theory of intuition that is a combination 
approach called a ‘social cognitive neuroscience approach’. Lieberman begins with 
the assumption that implicit learning processes lie beneath social intuition, and that 
intuition is a correlate of knowledge that is obtained through implicit learning. 
Lieberman supports his thesis by discussing the correspondence between intuition and 
implicit learning, and particularly emphasises social intuition. In the discussion of 
social intuition, he mentions a PONS experiment in which the frames were shown for 
5ms. Lieberman states, “Nonverbal decoding is a potent example o f intuitive 
processing in social psychology, as it involves drawing inferences with little effort or 
attention about the mental states and dispositions of other individuals on the basis of 
subtle sequences of nonverbal cues.” (Italics mine). (Lieberman, 2000, p.111). 
Lieberman draws links between nonverbal facial decoding and implicit learning by 
testing the following points; that nonverbal decoding and implicit learning both a) 
involve learning occurring mainly outside of conscious awareness, b) involve 
temporal sequencing and prediction, c) result in skills that are applied mainly without 
conscious intent, d) are divisible into judgment and action forms, and e) are dependent 
on multi-trial learning, in which skill develops gradually over time.
In addition, Lieberman also examines the neuropsychological aspects of 
intuition. In reviewing the neuroscience data on Huntington’s disease and 
Parkinson’s disease, Lieberman concludes that there are specific regions of the basal 
ganglia in the brain that are major components in intuition and implicit learning.
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Baylor, on the other hand, provides quite a different combination approach to 
intuition - an interesting three-component model based on a) immediacy, b) the ability 
to sense relationships between objects/concepts, and c) using reason (Baylor, 1997). 
Baylor proposes that all three components interact, and all contribute to specific 
aspects of intuition. One set of interactions is that of the components of the ability to 
sense relationships combined with immediacy, which contribute to the (intuitively 
based) concept of insight. An example might be the insight one receives when 
solving a visual puzzle. It could be a type of ‘aha’ reaction to the sudden or 
immediate sensing of the relationship that all of the individual clues have to each 
other and the whole (or the Gestalt).
The second set of intuitive interactions involves the components of sensing 
relationships combined with the use of reason, which contribute to metaphorical and 
analogical thinking. This is rather self-explanatory in that we are able to draw 
analogies by sensing relationships between objects or situations when we apply 
reason, a sort of ‘intuitive leap’. Immediacy combined with reasoning comprises 
another set of intuitive interactions, according to Baylor. Intuitive reasoning, she 
argues, is active, immediate and uninhibited -  which is contrasted with metacognitive 
reasoning.
4.1.3 In tu i t ion , Impl ic i t  Learning & Decis ion-Making
One branch of psychology and intuition approaches intuition in relation to 
problem-solving. Crutchfield (1960) applied his concept of intuition to solving 
spatial orientation puzzles, in which performance improved when repeated without 
the subject’s awareness of the previous exposure’s relevance. Osbeck (1999) views 
this as the precursor to the current concept of “implicit learning.”
$ Bowers et al. (1990) applied intuition to problem-solving and described it as a 
feeling of being close to solving a problem before one can consciously access the 
information (such as the information being ‘on the tip of one’s tongue’). ICleinmutz
(1990), on the other hand, viewed intuition as the foundation for quickly and easily- 
made judgements, without conscious awareness of the inferences which support them.
4 . 1 . 3 . 1  I n t u i t i v e  J u d g m e n t s
Another area of intuitive judgments that has been proposed is the concept of 
‘backward-looking’ and ‘forward-looking’ intuitions (Hogarth, 2001). Hogarth
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contends that backward-looking intuitive judgments are ones which are based on 
looking back at one’s previous experiences, and probably not occurring on a 
conscious level. Each individual has the capacity to draw from a large body of 
knowledge that he/she has accumulated over their lifetime. Because this knowledge 
and experience is so large, it may not be consciously available on a continuous basis - 
however, it exists, nevertheless. For example, when one meets a stranger and knows 
instantly that this individual will be friendly or unfriendly, one may be able to base it 
on past experiences. Forward-looking intuitions, on the other hand, are those that are 
more predictive in nature or rather an extrapolation from a trend, according to 
Hogarth. However, it could be argued that when one is extrapolating from a trend, 
this may not necessarily be intuition, per se.
While many definitions of intuition refer to concepts such as knowing 
something immediately or quickly, this may not always be the case. Hogarth gives 
the example of interviewing a job candidate. One may, by the end of the interview, 
have a sense that the candidate simply is not right for the job, even though there may 
not have been a specific moment during the interview when the interviewer made this 
decision. This judgment could be argued to be either from a ‘backward-thinking’ 
(experience-based) intuition or from a ‘forward-based’ (projecting) intuition.
Bastick (1982) approaches the subject of judgment and intuition from a 
different perspective, and proposes that we arrive at various situations (including 
those of decision-making and judgment situations) with what he refers to as emotional 
sets. Emotional sets are the attitudes, feelings, and thoughts with which we approach 
a situation. He posits that these emotional sets influence our perceptions, often at a 
less than conscious level, and may influence our intuitive judgments regarding a given 
situation.
Bastick, however, proposes that we may be able to change the judgements we 
make with tools such as ‘re-centering.’ Re-centering involves changing the 
relationship between two elements with an emotional set. Often this is accomplished 
by using an element whose subjective associations are with a different emotional set. 
Humour often involves re-centring, as it tends to build a relationship between two 
elements and then the punch-line reverses or changes the relationship. Bastick gives 
the following rather whimsical example of a joke that utilises re-centering:
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‘Two Irishmen driving along the motorway to London saw the sign ‘Clean Toilets 
Ahead’ and cleaned thirty-five toilets before reaching London.’ (Bastick, 1982, p. 75). 
The dual1 meaning of clean toilets (both as an adjective and verb) is used, which 
changes the relationship between the men and the toilets.
There are also deterrents to intuitive problem-solving, such as ‘functional 
fixation.’ When an object is depicted in its common form, it tends to inhibit new and 
novel ways of viewing it and solving the associated problem. It appears to deter 
creativity in problem-solving, since it reduces the tension that might otherwise occur, 
and motivate an individual to find a novel solution (Duncker, 1945; Adamson, 1952). 
Bastick contends that individuals who are more emotionally variable, such as creative 
and intuitive types, are more likely to be able to change their emotional set (or re­
centre), and are thus more likely to be able to avoid functional fixation. Similarly, 
empathic feelings may invoke emotional sets, as well -  allowing the individual to 
intuitively evaluate a present situation, based on a similar past experience. This may 
occur in a sudden, immediate maimer, without any actual conscious thought. In this 
situation, a sort of ‘emotional resonance’ may occur instantly.
Intuitive problem-solving appears to have deterrents, as well as situations that 
encourage and assist in the process. Not surprisingly, one deterrent to intuitive 
problem-solving may be the amount of stress imposed on an individual. Daniels 
(1973) conducted an experiment on the effects of inducing stress on intuitive 
problem-solving ability and judgment, and found highly significant main effects for 
stress on problem-solving ability. It appears that ego-threatening types of events 
seem to strongly inhibit intuitive problem-solving ability.
On the other hand, intuitive judgment may be assisted by a concept referred to 
as ‘memory hooks’ (Bastick, 1982). Situations that involve a certain amount of 
emotion, such as embarrassment or when one is the centre of attention seem to be 
more strongly remembered. The associated feelings may serve as ‘memory hooks’ 
for the particular memory. Bastick suggests that these experiences (with the 
associated emotional sets) may be brought back immediately (and one might say 
instinctively) when a similar element or situation occurs.
Whether the intuitive judgment is correct or incorrect, many conclude that there is a 
high level of confidence -  even a sense of certainty -  that accompanies intuitions 
(Wescott, 1968, p. 185; Hutchinson, 1941, p. 38). In an experiment examining a
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‘feeling of knowing’ and later recognition of trigrams, Blake (1973) found that 
individuals who had this ‘feeling of knowing’ about their answer were found to be 
significantly more accurate in their later recognition. Blake found this knowingness 
to be an effective predictor of intuitive recognition.
4 . 1 . 3 . 2  ‘ E d u c a t i n g ’ I n t u i t i o n
It has been argued that intuition can be ‘educated’. In other words, intuition 
may be improved with practice (Hogarth, 2001). This assumption is based on the 
following key ideas: Firstly, Hogarth suggests that what has been called the ‘mind- 
body problem’ should not be conceived of as a problem. The body is a complex 
system with subsystems, involving cognition, automatic processes, etc. that all work 
together. These systems have developed through an evolutionary process over time to 
work well together. Many of these systems have become automatic, which lowers the 
demand on the individual, and allows humans to be able to concentrate attention on 
other aspects of everyday life.
Secondly, learning may be shaped by our experiences. Trial and error, as well 
as increased experience assists us in learning, therefore the same concept of trial and 
error may be applied to learning to improve our intuition. Thirdly, he discusses the 
cognitive processing systems (dual-process theories) of the tacit vs. the deliberate 
information-processing system. The deliberate system may be merely the tip of the 
iceberg compared to the tacit (or automatic) system.
The fourth assumption in regards to educating intuition suggests that everyone 
has areas of expertise in which they excel, and for which they have particular 
knowledge. One may be able to concentrate on making intuition one of these areas of 
expertise, and therefore improve it.
Hogarth’s last assumption is that we should make the process of learning and 
improving intuition a scientific process involving observation, speculation, testing and 
generalization. This last assumption is one which would be difficult to dispute; 
further study in intuition may reveal important information, such as intuition’s 
relationship to decision-making and insight. It is primarily through science and 
investigation that we may truly learn and understand the workings of intuition.
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4 . 1 . 3 . 3  I n t u i t i v e  & I m p l i c i t  L e a r n i n g
Intuition has also been studied in relation to implicit learning in recent years. 
Woolhouse & Bayne (2000) gave individuals the sensing-intuition scale of the Myers 
Briggs Type Indicator and asked them to perform an implicit learning task, in order to 
study individual differences in the use of intuitive learning strategies. Not 
surprisingly, intuitive subjects used different strategies than the sensing subjects - 
with the sensing subjects using explicit knowledge to solve the task, while the 
intuitives were more likely to apply an intuitive problem-solving strategy.
4 . 1 . 3 . 4  I n t u i t i o n  & P r o b a b i l i t y
Studying the effects of using intuition vs. analytical judgments on probability 
is not a new concept. Simonton proposed a model of intuition based on four
assumptions (Simonton, 1980):
■ Thought and behaviour may be viewed in terms of probabilistic associations;
■ There are four probability thresholds: attention, behaviour, cognition and 
habituation. These thresholds are linked to the psychological consequences of 
any given association (whether it is nonconscious, infraconscious, conscious 
or ultraconscious, respectively);
■ The distribution of associations is the basis for a 2-dimensional typology; and
■ Level of arousal is related to this typology as well as to the four probability 
thresholds.
Hammond and colleagues (1987), who study the differences in results when 
using analytical vs. intuitive judgments, found that intuitive judgments result in small 
errors that tend to cluster around an average value (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia & 
Pearson, 1987). They found that when analytical judgments are used, errors tend not 
to cluster around a particular value, and tend to be larger and rarer. (An unbiased 
average will tend to be very close to the true value).
4.2 Preconscious & U nconscious Processing o f Information
4.2.1 Preconscious  Process ing
Preconscious processing has been defined as material which, while at the 
moment is unconscious, is ready to become conscious (Drever, 1974, p.219). This 
information, used in intuition and insight, has been collected and processed 
unconsciously, to be retrieved later (Bastick, 1982). While the line between
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preconscious and unconscious processing in descriptions appears blurred at times, the 
aspect of not currently being under conscious awareness did not escape psychologists 
such as Rollo May, who stated that ‘...creativity goes on with varying degrees of 
intensity on levels not directly under the control of conscious willing’ (May, 1959, p. 
62). Indeed, Bruner describes intuitive thinking as a process that can occur ‘...with 
little or no awareness’ of the process by which it is reached, with a similar description 
provided by Bahm (Bruner, 1960; Bahm, 1960).
A preconscious period of incubation prior to an intuition or insight may exist 
that involves unconscious processing. Bastick (1982) describes this incubation period 
as ‘...the time in which the intuition develops, the time between realising the 
problem, and arriving at an intuitive solution’ (Bastick, 1982, p. 147). Bastick 
theorises that in the incubation period, the unconscious mind is processing the 
information the entire time, much as the conscious mind processes information. He 
likens the hidden processing to the incubation of an egg, which, when the time is 
right, emerges like the chick as a fully-formed idea. This pre-insight period was also 
studied by Drever, who concluded that ‘...some sort of organisation seems to take 
place, but this organisation was not primarily a conscious idea or concept’ (Drever, 
1934, p. 202).
4.2.2 Unconscious Cogni t ion
The concept of unconscious cognition is connected to the concept of intuition, 
and frequently mentioned in definitions of intuition, is. In a study on the topic, 
Ballesteros (1996) defined unconscious cognition as ‘that set of cognitive contents 
and processes in the cognitive system that is unavailable to awareness, but 
nevertheless affects thought and action.’ In Ballesteros’ research on unconscious 
cognition and information retrieval, she studied the affects of relaxation state on 
information retrieval and problem-solving ability, using a programmed relaxation 
device and biofeedback technology. After the subjects achieved an extremely relaxed 
state, a marked increase was discovered in levels of subjects’ intuition, insight, ideas, 
affect and conceptual fluidity when given a research problem to solve.
A related concept that appears to be gaining momentum and attention in recent 
years is unconscious processing of information and its application to judgment and 
decision-making. Many who study this area are cognitive psychologists. However,
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there is a substantial group of psychologists who fall into categories of 
neuropsychology, evolutionary psychology, social psychology and those that 
subscribe to a combination of approaches.
4 . 2 . 2 . 1  ‘ D u a l - M o d e * P r o c e s s i n g :  I n t u i t i v e  P r o c e s s i n g
C o n t r a s t e d  wi th  A n a l y t i c a l  P r o c e s s i n g
Several theorists have taken the stance that intuitive and analytical (or logical) 
thinking are opposite cognitive modes. In this theory, intuitive processing is 
considered to be preconscious, sudden, and uses parallel processing of a global field 
of knowledge. Analytical thought, on the other hand, is considered to be completely 
conscious, step-by-step (linear) processing, and would compare two objects or 
elements at a time (Bastick, 1982). Indeed, even B.F. Skinner suggested two modes 
of thinking and cognition, the analytic mode that follows particular rules, versus an 
intuitive contingent mode of cognitive processing (Skinner, 1969). Similarly, Bruner 
states the following:
“Usually, intuitive thinking rests on familiarity with the domain of 
knowledge involved and with its structure.. .Analytic thinking 
characteristically proceeds a step at a time. Steps are explicit and 
usually can be adequately reported by the thinker to another 
individual. Such thinking proceeds with relatively full awareness of 
the information and operations involved.” (Bruner, 1960, p. 57).
Some consider intuitive vs. analytical processing to be cognitive styles which 
are difficult to change (Witlcin, Lewis, Hertzman et al, 1954), and are considered to be 
rather stable personality traits (Poincare, 1969). It has also been proposed that, 
instead of being two opposite modes of processing, there exists a continuum of 
analytic and intuitive thought. This continuum consists of the sudden, unaided, 
perception-based thinking on one end, and the aided, conscious, step-by-step 
cognitive mode on the other end of the continuum (Brunswick, 1966; Baumgardner,
1973).
4 . 2 . 2 . 2  C o g n i t i v e  P s y c h o l o g y , U n c o n s c i o u s  P r o c e s s i n g  & 
D u a l - M o d e  P r o c e s s i n g
Many of the cognitive psychological approaches propose information 
processing theories and tend to discuss a dual-mode information processing system. 
One of the leaders in this area is Epstein, who proposed the Cognitive-Experiential
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Self-Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1994). Epstein discusses two interacting and parallel 
modes of information processing and labels them the ‘rational’ and the ‘experiential’. 
Hogarth (2001) describes a similar information processing system, which he divides 
into the ‘deliberate system’ and the ‘tacit system’ (similar to Basticlc’s processing 
modes). Epstein describes the rational mode as a deliberate, effortful, abstract mode 
of processing which has a relatively short evolutionary history. Similarly, Hogarth’s 
deliberate system requires attention and deliberation.
Epstein’s experiential mode on the other hand, is an automatic mode driven by 
emotions, and is considered the intuitive mode. This system operates effortlessly, 
rapidly and according to Epstein, occurs in both humans as well as non-humans. It 
therefore has had a long evolutionary history. Hogarth’s counterpart, the tacit system, 
also occurs tacitly and automatically to process information. He provides the analogy 
of an iceberg, in the sense that the deliberate system is only the tip of the iceberg, 
while the tacit system is the large amount of automatic processing that lies beneath 
the surface.
Anderson (1983) provides a similar explanation of information processing, but 
views it in terms of one’s knowledge, described as either ‘declarative knowledge’ or 
‘procedural knowledge’. Declarative knowledge is described as an individual’s store 
of knowledge, their consciousness, and is present in working memory. In contrast, 
procedural knowledge occurs at a subconscious level and involves the procedures, 
strategies and rules that operate on declarative knowledge.
4 . 2 . 2 . 3  C o g n i t i v e  P s y c h o l o g y , C o m p u t e r  M o d e l i n g  &
N e u r a l  N e t w o r k s
Many cognitive psychologists have travelled into the realm of computer 
modelling of human information processing. One such pioneer who has paved the 
way for others in computer modelling is Smolensky (1988) who, like Epstein and 
Hogarth, also views information processing as a dual-mode system. He divides the 
systems into ‘symbolic’ and ‘sub symbolic’. The symbolic system is comparable in 
some ways to Epstein's rational system; it is at a conscious level and uses conscious 
rule application, similar to traditional computer models of information processing. 
The sub symbolic system is under the control of the so-called ‘intuitive processor’, 
and does not involve the conscious application of rules. Related models include the
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‘connectionist’ or parallel-distributed-processing (PDP) models such as those 
discussed by Rumelhart and McClelland (1986), which discuss a network of 
connections, again, similar to that of a computer, whose strength varies depending on 
the information or knowledge existing within the system.
Hoffman (1997) examines the neural network research and suggests a model 
of consciousness based on this research and on unconscious processing. Hoffman 
states that the recollection of previously stored memories, when experienced 
consciously, also activates sensory or emotive modules in a time-locked synchronous 
manner. In addition, his model presents the following three hypotheses regarding 
unconscious processes: a) most brain processes are unconscious, b) conscious mental 
processes do not control unconscious processes, and c) neurobiological systems 
responsible for sensory and emotive representations may be active, but not registered 
consciously.
Padgett (1999) proposes a neural network model for facial affect 
classification, an automated model capable of identifying six basic emotions. The 
model presents a group of neural network classifiers that learn to recognise facial 
emotion by incrementally adjusting their responses to positive examples of emotions.
4 . 2 . 2 . 4  E v o l u t i o n a r y  P s y c h o l o g y , t h e  B r a i n  & 
U n c o n s c i o u s  P r o c e s s i n g
In addition, there are also evolutionary psychologists with models of 
unconscious processing, often discussing it in terms of implicit learning. Reber 
(1992) provides an evolutionary context for the cognitive unconscious and implicit 
learning, and believes in the ‘primacy of the implicit’. Reber stresses that implicit 
learning is quite a basic process and is important in evolution, due to the advantage an 
organism has in being able to extract information from its environment and use that 
information to guide its interactions. This process, according to Reber, occurs mainly 
independent of the organism’s awareness. He states that implicit learning has a long 
evolutionary history and even antedates awareness and the capacity for conscious 
cognitive control.
In his discussion of the ‘emotional brain’, LeDoux (1996) points to 
MacLean’s theory of the ‘Triune Brain’. In the 1950’s, MacLean proposed a sort of 
‘3-brains-in-one’, which he suggests has gone through three evolutionary stages: the
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reptilian, paleomammalian and neomammalian. He states that we have a limbic brain 
system that has allowed us to survive by switching to an automatic mode of 
processing when necessary (e.g. flight from danger or fighting).
The brain and its effect on rational vs. emotional behaviour has been studied 
by Damasio (1994). Damasio found that individuals with damage to specific areas of 
the brain could make rational decisions, but not social and personal decisions. 
Damasio went on to propose what he labelled the ‘somatic marker hypothesis’, which 
states that there are implicit (learned) triggers that allow individuals to learn which 
emotional reactions are appropriate for a given circumstance, and suggests that these 
markers allow individuals to recognise warning signs automatically.
4 . 2 . 2 . 5  S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g y  & A u t o m a t i c  P r o c e s s i n g
The concept of automatic processing has also been discussed by social 
psychologists. Bargh (1996) describes ‘automaticity’ in everyday life as affecting 
automatic judgments, such as those based on facial decoding. In fact, he states, 
“...the emotional content of facial expressions is picked up outside of conscious 
awareness...” (Bargh, 1996, p. 169).
In addition, Bargh and Chartrand state that “...most of a person’s everyday 
life is determined not by their conscious intentions and deliberate choices, but by 
mental processes that are put into motion by features of the environment that operate 
outside of conscious awareness and guidance.” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 462). 
Chartrand and Bargh apply this to the area of social interaction and nonverbal 
communication in their concept of ‘the chameleon effect’. They state that in social 
interactions, individuals often automatically mimic the mannerisms of those they are 
interacting with. Importantly, though, it occurs at a less than conscious level 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
4 . 2 . 2 . 6  I m p l i c i t  P e r c e p t i o n  a n d  I m p l i c i t  S o c i a l  C o g n i t i o n
The concept of implicit perception, or the degree to which stimuli presented 
outside of an individual’s conscious awareness can undergo full perceptual processing 
is similar to unconscious processing. Implicit perception has often been studied in 
terms of information processing that is not affective in nature (MacLeod, 1998). 
However, Niedenthal (1990) did study implicit perception in relation to nonverbal 
communication and found evidence for the implicit, or less than conscious, perception
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of nonverbal affective information. In addition, Pitts (1998) found evidence that 
pictures of human faces may be unconsciously processed.
Two concepts that may be useful in studying implicit perception are the 
‘subjective threshold’ and the ‘objective threshold’ (Kihlstrom, Bamhardt, & Tataryn, 
1992). The subjective threshold is defined as the detection level in which subjects 
claim to be unable to discriminate perceptual information at a better than chance 
level, whereas the objective threshold is viewed as the level of detectability where 
perceptual information is discriminated at chance level.
Another related concept linked to interpersonal interaction is implicit social 
cognition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) in which social behaviour is proposed to 
operate mainly in an implicit or unconscious manner -  similar in ways to the views of 
Bargh and Chartrand. However, Greenwald and Banaji contend that past experience 
influences peoples’ judgments in a less than conscious fashion, and is further 
influenced by one’s attitudes, self-esteem and stereotypes.
4.3 Affect and Making Judgments
As the research in the present study involves subjects who are judging 
expressions of facial affect, the role of affect in making judgments is an important 
research area to consider. Therefore, this section will explore various theories and 
perspectives on the influence of affect on making judgments or decisions.
4.3.1 The Af fect  Heuris t ic
The ‘affect heuristic’ in decision-making is an intriguing concept that has been 
suggested as an intuitive means of making judgments (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & 
MacGregor, 2003). Slovic and colleagues discuss the affect heuristic and its effects 
on decision-making, as well as its positive and negative qualities. They define 
‘affect’ for their purposes as, ‘.. .the specific quality of goodness or badness’ that is 1) 
‘experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and 2) demarcating a 
positive or negative quality of a stimulus.’ Due to individuals’ varying affective 
reactions to different stimuli, affect automatically drives one’s choices, and thus 
affective responses occur rapidly and automatically. For instance, the reader may 
notice how rapidly one senses the feelings associated with the stimulus word 
‘treasure’ or the word ‘hate’. The reliance on these feelings is an example of the 
affect heuristic. In fact, Shafir et al (1993) grudgingly acknowledge a small role of
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affect in decision-making when they state, ‘People’s choices may occasionally stem 
from affective judgments that preclude a thorough evaluation of the options’ (p. 32).
However, a relatively early proponent of the idea of affect’s involvement in 
judgments and decision-making was Zajonc (1984). Zajonc’s theory of the ‘primacy 
of affect’ states that affect tends to be primary over cognition, and suggested that 
affective reactions tend to happen automatically, rapidly, and are often the first 
reaction one has to a given situation. Zajonc even suggests that all perceptions 
contain some affect, and states, “We do not see a house: We see a handsome house, 
an ugly house, or a pretentious house” (p. 154). Zajonc posits that we delude 
ourselves into thinking that we make purely rational, cognitive decisions, but in fact 
we make decisions based on affect and then rationalise the decisions.
Empirical studies on affect primacy, though, have had differing results. Lavine 
and colleagues found support for this theory in a study that examined attitudes toward 
presidential candidates (Lavine, Thomsen, Zanna & Borgida, 1998). Pitts (1998) 
studied whether affect and information from human faces can be unconsciously 
processed, and while he did find support for the unconscious processing of faces, he 
did not find support for the affect primacy theory.
However, an alternative to the theory that all judgments are affect-laden may 
be found in the dual-process theories described earlier in this thesis. For instance, 
Epstein’s (1994) work describes the intuitive, automatic form of processing (which 
also includes an affect-related component), as well as the analytic and rational form of 
processing.
It could be argued that there are certain situations in which one or the Other 
(the automatic and intuitive, or the deliberate and the logical) form of judgment would 
be the more appropriate choice. For instance, there are times when an automatic, 
rapid, and more instinctive type of reaction might save one from harm or even save 
one’s life. Say, for example, that you are walking down a sidewalk in a large city and 
a threatening-looking stranger approaches you, and you have that ‘gut feeling’ to get 
away. At this point, it is often better to go with your feelings and instincts by running 
away, than by waiting to see just how harmful this person might be to your safety. 
Moreover, this type of processing likely has an evolutionary component. As the 
human species has evolved over time, there have undoubtedly been countless 
situations in which this type of automatic and rapid processing saved the individual’s
Decem ber 2008 - 6 7 - Ph. D. Thesis
life. Therefore, it could be argued that affective, automatic processing may have an 
important part in human development and evolution.
In addition, there are studies devoted to far-reaching consequences of the 
affect heuristic, such as a study that examined the effects of introducing a hazardous 
facility in a town on the perceptions of the area by residents (Slovic et al, 2003). 
Slovic and colleagues examined the negative effects the hazardous facility opening 
had on individuals’ desire to vacation, live, and work in the community. This study 
of perceptions of image is another example of the affect heuristic at work.
The affect heuristic, though, is also likely to be applied to more mundane 
decision-making, as well. Slovic and colleagues provide examples such as gambling, 
in which individuals appear to make decisions based on the ‘attractiveness’ of a pay­
off. They also provide examples of studies based on affect associations that 
individuals tend to have with specific words or phrases (Sherman, Kim & Zajonc, 
1998; MacGregor, Slovic, Dremen & Berry, 2000).
The affect heuristic may also be involved in studies in which subliminal 
pictures of smiling faces affected the participants’ decisions in a subliminal priming 
paradigm (Winkielmen, Zajonc & Schwartz, 1997). Additionally, smiling faces 
shown consciously also appear to have an effect on subjects’ ratings of targets as 
being trustworthy, good, honest, genuine, obedient, blameless, sincere, and admirable 
-  as compared to non-smiling targets.
The concept of ‘somatic markers’ appears to be linked to the affect heuristic, 
and is described as ‘...feelings generated from secondary emotions. These emotions 
and feelings have been connected, by learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain 
scenarios’ (Damasio, 1994, p. 174). Damasio theorises that when a negative somatic 
marker is linked with an image of a future outcome, it sounds an alarm, in a way, to 
the individual. In addition, when a positive somatic marker is linked to an image of a 
future outcome, it becomes an incentive. Damasio views these somatic markers as 
ways of efficiently and rapidly making decisions, and suggests the absence of these 
markers has a negative effect on the decision process.
Similarly, representations of events and objects may be ‘tagged’ to a certain 
degree with affect (Slovic et al, 2003). When encountering new decision-making 
situations, either consciously or unconsciously, the individual refers to his/her ‘affect 
pool’ of positive and negative tags which are associated with a given situation, The
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affect heuristic, and related studies including those on subliminal priming, may 
demonstrate the importance of affect in certain decision-making situations. Indeed, it 
appears difficult to dispute the likely effect that affect has in many decisions and 
judgments.
It is interesting to consider the effect that the affect heuristic may have on the 
present study, and on the participants making pain judgments in the study. The ‘tags’ 
that may exist in a participant’s ‘affect pool’ may influence their decision regarding 
whether the target is faking or in real pain. These tags may be gender-related, 
culturally-related, or related to the manner in which the participant generally deals 
with pain him/herself. For instance, say one of the participants in the present study is 
a* young Asian woman who is watching a video of another young Asian woman 
displaying facial expressions of pain. Whether or not the target is actually in pain, the 
video may trigger (an unconscious) memory of when the participant was in pain, and 
she may make her decision based on this affect heuristic. Another Caucasian male 
participant who generally is rather stoic about displaying his emotions might watch a 
Caucasian male target in the pain-judgment videos who does not display any emotion 
whilst supposedly having his hand in ice-cold water. While the target male in the 
vijeo may not be displaying much emotion because he is not feeling any pain, the 
participant in the present experiment might have an unconscious association of when 
he stoically dealt with a recent pain experience. Thus, whilst these theories may seem 
somewhat simplistic to some, they appear relevant to the present study.
4.3.2 A f f e c t  I n fus ion  Theory
A similar theory regarding affect’s potential effect on judgment is called the 
Affect Infusion Model (AIM) (Forgas, 1998). Forgas defines affect infusion as ‘...the 
process whereby affectively loaded information exerts an influence on and becomes 
incorporated into the judgmental process...’ and suggests four different judgmental 
strategies. These judgment strategies are a) the direct access strategy (the direct 
retrieval of pre-existing judgments), b) the motivated processing strategy (used when 
judgment is guided by a specific motivation), c) the heuristic processing strategy 
(using mental shortcuts), and d) the substantive processing strategy (employed when 
judges must engage in constructive, selective processing of information and rely on a 
variety of learning and memory processes).
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Perhaps affect infusion exists along a continuum. On this continuum, 
judgments that require heuristic kinds of processing would be more likely to be 
infused with affect than motivated judgments or direct access judgments. The choice 
of judgmental strategy is also affected by a combination of the judge, the target and 
situational characteristics.
In addition, similar theories of affect and judgment include the ‘Affect 
Priming Model’ and the ‘Affect as Information Model’. The main principle of affect 
priming is that affect may indirectly have an effect on social judgments by facilitating 
access to related cognitive categories (Bower, 1991; Forgas & Bower, 1988). Affect 
may prime the encoding, retrieval and selective use of information in the processing 
of social judgments. In the ‘Affect as Information Model’, the individual essentially 
makes a judgment based on feeling or emotion instead of on the facts presented 
(Clore & Parrott, 1991).
Moreover, individual differences in mood and personality my also play a role 
in judgment and cognition (Rusting, 2001). Rusting suggests that there are two ways 
that personality may play a role in affect-cognition relations: 1) Personality traits that 
are emotion-relevant may either lessen or magnify mood-congruent cognitive 
processing, and 2) Motivation-orientated traits may serve to reverse the negative 
mood-congruent processing. In other words, the individual experiencing negative 
moods might retrieve positive information as a form of mood repair.
4 .4  Summary
In sum, there is reason to speculate that the intuitive individual will be adept at 
detecting pain deception. Intuition has been addressed in the psychological and 
empirical literature in regards to implicit learning, decision-making and intuitive 
judgments, as well as being viewed as a form of insight. In addition, intuition has 
been linked to emotional sensitivity and social intuition. In fact, Jung speculated that 
the intuitive type individual would be effective at detecting deception. Therefore, the 
present thesis hypothesises that the intuitive type individual will demonstrate high 
accuracy levels in the present study’s pain judgment task.
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CHAPTER 5; OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE
5.1 Bac kg rou nd
The ‘fifth factor’ in the five factor model, Opemiess to Experience, is 
important to the present study for a number of reasons. Whilst in the past it has been 
referred to as the most controversial of the Big Five personality traits (McCrae & 
John, 1992), it has also been associated with a number of traits and abilities that are 
relevant to the present thesis. Openness has been linked to intuition, accuracy in 
person perception, emotion recognition ability, creativity, intellect, socially competent 
behaviour (Matsumoto, LeRoux, Wilson-Cohn, Raroque, Ekman, Yrizarry, 
Loewinger, Uchida, Yee, Amo, & Goh, 2000; McCrae, 1993-1994; McCrae & John, 
1992; Schneider, Ackerman, & Kanfer, 1996) and to deception-detection ability (Ask 
& Granhag, 2003; Enos, Benus, Cautin, Graciarena, Hirschberg, & Schriber, 2006). 
Therefore, the present thesis hypothesises that those high in Openness to Experience 
will demonstrate higher accuracy in the study task of judging facial pain expressions.
Openness to Experience has been described by McCrae and Costa in the 
following manner, “Openness is seen in the breadth, depth, and permeability of 
consciousness, and in the recurrent need to enlarge and examine one’s experience” 
(McCrae & Costa, 1997a, p. 2). Openness is characterised by an active imagination, 
aesthetic sensitivity, awareness of one’s emotions, preference for non-traditional 
values, preference for variety, intellectual curiosity, and independent judgement 
(McCrae & Costa, 1997a).
5.2 The Openness  Face t s
The NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992b) measures the Big Five personality 
traits of neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness. (The present study utilised the abbreviated version, called the 
NEO-FFI). The six Openness to Experience facets described by Costa and McCrae 
(1992a) in the NEO PI-R and NEO-FFI manual consist of the following:
1) Fantasy -  The open individual is likely to have a rich and vivid imagination, 
and tends to be open to fantasy. They are inclined to daydream in order to 
enhance their inner world, instead of daydreaming out of boredom or as a 
form of escape. They believe that imagination contributes to a creative life.
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Low scorers on this facet tend to prefer to keep their mind on the task at hand, 
and are apt to be more prosaic.
2) Ideas -  Individuals with a high openness score have an intellectual curiosity 
that includes an open-mindedness not limited to academic pursuits. They are 
open to new ideas and willing to consider novel - and perhaps unconventional 
- ideas. The open individual has a tendency to enjoy discussions of a 
philosophical nature and ‘brain-teasers’. A high score on this facet does not 
necessarily equate to intelligence, however, a high level can contribute to the 
development of intellectual potential, according to Costa and McCrae (1992a). 
Those scoring low on this scale tend to have a limited level of curiosity, and if 
highly intelligent are apt to narrowly focus their efforts on limited topics.
3) Aesthetics -  The aesthetics facet includes an artistic outlook, and appreciation 
for the arts and beauty. This individual may not actually have a specific 
artistic talent, but is inclined to appreciate beauty and the arts. This person 
may be emotionally moved by poetry, intrigued by art, and/or may get 
absorbed in music. Those scoring low in this facet are relatively uninterested 
in art and beauty.
4) Feelings -  The high scorer in this area is an individual who is sensitive and 
explores his/her feelings. They are receptive to their inner feelings, and 
believe that emotion is an important part of life. These individuals experience 
deeper and more differentiated emotional states, and may feel emotions more 
intensely than others. Low scorers do not see the importance of emotional and 
feeling states, and tend to have a blunted affect.
5) Values -  The individual scoring high on this facet is open to re-examining 
social, religious, and political values, and tends to be unconventional. It is not 
that these individuals do not have strong values, but instead that their values 
may be more fluid, and the individual is non-dogmatic in their approach to 
values. Those scoring low on this area tend to be traditionalists and 
conservative in their viewpoints, and are apt to accept authority, regardless of 
political party affiliation.
6) Actions -  High scorers on this facet enjoy variety and have wide interests. 
They may enjoy trying new activities, varying their routine, travelling, and 
perhaps trying new foods. They prefer variety and novelty to routine and
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familiarity. Those scoring low in this area prefer to stick to the ‘tried-and- 
true’ and tend to find change difficult.
5.3 Openness  Across  the L i fe s pan
The developmental origins and precursors of Openness have yet to be 
determined. In fact, as is common in the psychological literature, there is 
disagreement as to whether it is a trait that does develop over the lifespan or whether 
we are ‘hard-wired’ to be Open.
Srivastava and colleagues describe two opposing views of the fluidity of the 
Five Factor Model of personality which may be applied to Openness, that appears 
relevant to this discussion: the ‘Plaster Hypothesis’ and the ‘Contextual Hypothesis’. 
The Plaster hypothesis proposes that the five factors of personality are set in stone or 
‘plaster’, and that these traits stop changing by age thirty. In contrast, the Contextual 
hypothesis suggests that changes in personality are more varied and should persist 
throughout adulthood (Srivastava, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003).
McCrae and Costa, generally viewed as the originators of the five factor 
model, appear to be rather conflicted regarding whether the five factors are set in 
stone. On the one hand, they remark that personality traits are exclusively biological 
in nature, and are “insulated from the direct effects of the environment” (McCrae & 
Costa, 1999, p. 144). On the other hand, they also state that the plaster hypothesis is 
“ripe for revision” (McCrae & Costa, 1999, p. 145). Their apparently conflicting 
views on the FFM may be due in part to studies (including their own) that have shown 
changes in mean levels of personality traits after age thirty (McCrae, Costa, deLima, 
Simoes, Ostendorf, Angleitner, et al, 1999; McCrae, Costa, Ostendforf, Angleitner, 
Hrebiclcova, Avia, et al, 2000; Roberts, Robins, Caspi, & Trzesniewski, 2003).
On the neuropsychological side of the debate, proponents of neurobiology 
have proposed a model attempting to link Openness to dopaminergic function and to 
functions of the prefrontal cortex of the brain (DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). 
There may also be a genetic aspect to Openness. In a study examining Openness to 
Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness of identical and fraternal twins 
reared apart, Bergman and colleagues report a substantial genetic influence on 
Openness to Experience, as well as Conscientiousness (Bergman, Chlpure, Plomin, 
Pedersen, McClearn, Nesselroad, Costa, & McCrae, 1993).
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Another group of researchers supporting the ‘hard-wired’ side of the debate 
are Caspi, Roberts and Shiner (2005), who cite the following as two possible 
temperamental bases for Openness: 1) The tendency for stimulation-seeking and to 
explore new environments actively in childhood have been predictors for later 
academic achievement and IQ, linking it to the Openness/Intellect concept (Rain, 
Reynolds, & Mednick, 2002). 2) Orienting sensitivity in childhood (including a 
tendency towards sensitivity to external and internal sensory stimulation) is associated 
with Openness in adulthood (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000).
Nevertheless, children whose parents nurture this trait may be more likely to 
develop it. The ‘chicken or the egg’ question arises in studies in which parents 
describe their high Open children in positive terms such as was found by Parker and 
Stumpf (1998). Parents described their (intellectually gifted) Open children in such 
terms as ‘original’, ‘insightful’, and ‘interests wide’. This positive description of their 
children encourages speculation regarding the extent to which the parent-child 
relationship affects the development of Openness.
McCrae and Costa’s (1988) work on recalled parent-child relations revealed 
an association between Openness and recollected experiences of parents as being 
quite loving, casual and non-demanding. In fact, individuals with a nurturing 
parenting style have themselves been found to be high in Openness (Metsapelto & 
Pulkkinen, 2003). In addition, many studies have found that a warm, nurturing, and 
supportive environment in childhood contributes to creativity, one of the aspects of 
Openness (Amabile, 1983; Harrington, Block, & Block, 1987; Martindale, 1989; 
Mumford & Gustafson, 1988).
Additionally, there is a rather extensive literature on childhood antecedents of 
Openness facets, such as imagination and creativity. Helson (1965) discovered that, 
as children, creative women engaged in more imaginary play, artistic expression, and 
‘tomboy’ behaviour. In addition, an expression of creativity and fantasy may also 
include the imaginary playmate, which has been shown to predict later creativity 
(Manosevitz, Fling, & Prentice, 1977; Schaefer, 1969).
Whilst there does not appear to be an abundance of research on levels of 
Openness in young children, ‘Openness/Intellect’ (the concept that Openness is 
intimately linked to intelligence, discussed later in this chapter) has been measured in 
children as young as age three (Halverson, Havill, Deal, Baker, Victor, et al, 2003).
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Openness/Intellect has also been found to correlate with academic achievement in 
school-age children and young adolescents (Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Finch, 
1997). *
There does appear to be fluidity and change in Openness over the lifespan - 
and in adolescence and early adulthood, in particular. Studies have reported that 
between age 12 to age 18, both boys and girls increased in Openness. This increase 
for both boys and girls during adolescence appears to continue into college age, 
according to these studies (Gray, Haig, Vaidya, & Watson, 2001; Robins, Fraley, 
Roberts, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Similarly, significant increases in Openness (as well 
as in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) and a significant decrease in Neuroticism 
have been found from the beginning to the end of college for undergraduates (Gray et 
al, 2001; Robins, et al, 2001).
However, psychologists are far from coming to a consensus on changes in 
Openness during the lifespan. McCrae and colleagues (2000, p. 183) state that “from 
age 18 to age 30 there are declines in Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness to 
Experience, and increases in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness; after age 30 the 
same trends are found, although the rate of change seems to decrease.” (Italics mine). 
(It is worth noting that McCrae and colleagues appear to lean toward a view of the 
fluidity of the five factors in this statement.)
Openness was measured across a wider adult age range in a large sample (n = 
132,515) of adults aged 21-60 who completed the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, 
1989) measure on the Internet. In this large sample, openness was found to increase 
prior to age 30, and decrease after age 30 (Srivastava, John, Gosling, & Porter, 2003). 
For men in this study, the magnitude of the decline after age 30 was slightly larger 
than the increase prior to age 30. However, for women, the magnitude of the decline 
after age 30 was not significantly different from the magnitude of the increase prior to 
age 30.
The majority of the Five Factor Model studies support the hypothesis that 
Openness and the other FFM traits are somewhat fluid and change during the lifespan. 
Moreover, it is likely that Openness and the other four traits are influenced by 
parenting style, as well as other factors we have yet to discover.
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5,4 The ‘O p e n ’ I nd iv i du a l
In the early 1990’s, Openness to Experience was still perceived as 
controversial (McCrae & John, 1992), and the least understood of the Big Five 
personality traits (Costa, 1991). Even in the second half of the 1990’s, Openness was 
still regarded as the least studied of the Big Five personality traits (Dollinger, Leong, 
& Ulicni, 1996). However, in the past decade or so, there has been a surge of 
empirical research on Openness to Experience, opening the door (so to speak) for 
continued exploration of this concept.
Whilst McCrae (1994) suggested that Openness to Experience may be viewed 
as a universal dimension of personality structure, geographic differences do exist in 
relation to Openness. In fact, Europeans and Americans have been found to be higher 
in Openness to Experience (as well as in Extraversion) than other cultures such as 
Africans and Asians (Olson, 2007).
It has been suggested that, of all of the Big Five traits, Openness to Experience 
best accounts for what people value in their life (Dollinger, Leong, & Ulicni, 1996). 
Open individuals have been found to value self-direction and universalism (Roccas, 
Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). In addition, Dollinger and colleagues found that 
openness was related to the positive valuing of imagination, the world of beauty, 
broadmindedness, maturity and self-direction. On the other hand, open individuals 
were found to place a low value on obedience, achieving social recognition, salvation, 
cleanliness, responsibility, and self-control (Dollinger et al, 1996).
Openness to Experience has been found to be positively correlated with 
ratings of current and past identity exploration, and negatively related to intensity of 
identity commitment (Tesch & Cameron, 1987). Openness has been found to be 
related to sensation-seeking (Garcia, Aluja, Garcia, & Cuevas, 2005), as well as to 
creativity and divergent thinking (McCrae, 1987). In examining the consistency of 
the Big Five personality traits, English and Griffith (2004) found Openness to be the 
second most consistent of the Big Five traits (extraversion being the most consistent).
Whereas the ‘Fantasy’ facet of Openness appears to be a predictor for 
depression, the ‘Actions’ facet of Openness predicts a lack of depression, (Carrillo, 
Rojo, Sanchez-Bemardos, & Avia, 2001). This is not entirely surprising since 
someone who tends to enjoy wide interests, travel, and various activities would be 
more likely to be an active individual who enjoys life, whereas one who leans more
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toward fantasy may be less active and more introspective. (This individual may be so 
introspective that enjoyable activities might be ignored, hence a tendency toward 
melancholy.) Overall, however, individuals high in Openness tend to subscribe to a 
greater degree of hope than those low in Openness (Misra, 2003), and another study 
revealed that Opemiess had a very modest positive correlation to life satisfaction 
(Law, Wong, & Song, 2004). Additionally, Openness has also been associated with 
the personality construct of hardiness (Maddi, Khoshaba, Persico, Lu, Harvey, & 
Bleecker, 2002).
One study found that individuals high in Openness to Experience tend to have 
more complex emotional experiences than those low in Openness (Kang & Shaver,
2004). Since the acquisition of new experiences tends to contribute to the elaboration 
of emotional life (DeRivera, 1984; Lewis, 1993), researchers have speculated that 
based on their diverse life experiences, open individuals will have more opportunity 
to develop emotional complexity (Zhiyan & Singer, 1997).
Studies examining the relationship of Openness to Emotional Intelligence 
have had somewhat mixed results. Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2004) found 
Openness to have modest correlations with overall ability El, as measured by the 
Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, 
Caruso, 2002). Additionally, studies have found modest correlations with the 
Managing Emotions and Using Emotions sub-scales of the MSCEIT (Lopes, Brackett, 
Nezlek, Schutz, Sellin, & Salovey, 2004; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004).
However, exceptions to this positive relationship between Openness and El 
have also been reported. In one study, modest negative correlations were discovered 
between Openness and overall ability El (measured by the MSCEIT), as well as 
between Openness and Managing Emotions, and Openness and Using Emotions 
(Lopes, Salovey, & Strauss, 2003). Additionally, in another study examining the 
relation of El to Openness, mixed results were also found. Openness was not found 
by Warwick and Nettlebeck (2004) to be related to ability El, as measured by the 
MSCEIT. However, they did find Openness to be weakly associated with trait El, as 
measured by the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, 
& Palfai, 1995).
Openness has been found to be highly correlated with MBTI Intuition, which 
is particularly relevant to the present thesis. Correlations between .65 and .71 have
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consistently been reported between Openness and MBTI Intuition (Furnham, 1996; 
MacDonald, Anderson, Tsagaralds, & Holland, 1994; McCrae 1992). McCrae 
(1992a) also reports Intuition correlations with the Openness facets as the following: 
Fantasy (r=.44), A esthetics^. 5 8), Feelings (r=.29), Actions (r=.55), Ideas (r=.58), 
and Values (r=.35).
5.5 Openness  and Gender
Generally there appears to be only slight gender differences in Openness to 
Experience. For the NEO-FFI (the abbreviated version of the NEO which was also 
utilised in the present thesis), Costa and McCrae (1992a) report males having 
M=27.09, SD=5.82, and females having M=26.98, SD=5.87. Moreover, whereas 
Cohen (2001) and Emmett (2001) found no significant gender differences in 
Openness, Galezewski (2001) and Costa et al (2001) found that females report higher 
levels of Openness to Experience than males. Whilst the Openness gender differences 
tend to be slight, it is quite likely that there are cultural differences regarding level of 
Openness for men and women. Misra (2003) reports that in an Indian sample (in 
Bhopal, India), females were significantly more Open than males.
Costa and McCrae (1992a) also provide the individual facet means and 
standard deviations. For Form ‘S’ of the NEO PI-R (tested on an adult population), 
the means are again quite similar for men and women. Women had slightly higher 
means for the Aesthetics, Feeling, and Actions facets; whereas men had slightly 
higher means for the Fantasy and Ideas facets, and males and females were 
approximately equal for the Values facet.
5.6 Openness  and In te l l ec t
There has been considerable disagreement between two groups of researchers 
regarding how to characterise Openness. Many regard Openness as one of the five 
factors of personality - an Openness to Experience, including facets such as an artistic 
outlook and an exploration of feelings (Dollinger et al, 1996; McCrae & Costa, 1987). 
Another group of researchers view Openness as nearly interchangeable with the 
concept of ‘intellect’ (Aston, Lee, Vernon, & Jang, 2000; DeYoung, Peterson, & 
Higgins, 2005), and even propose a new concept of the term entitled 
‘Openness/Intellect’ (Ashton et al, 2000). As evidence of this construct, they cite the 
relationship that has been found beween Openness and intelligence test scores, such
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as a correlation of .33 between NEO PI-R Openness and the Full Scale IQ of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), and a correlation of .42 between NEO PI- 
R Openness and the WAIS-Revised Full Scale IQ (Holland, Dollinger, Holland, & 
MacDonald, 1995; McCrae, 1993-1994). The difference in the two schools of 
thought regarding Openness versus ‘Openness/Intellect’ is not likely to be resolved in 
the near future.
5.7 Openness  & R i s k -T a k i n g  (& Risky D ec i s i o n- Ma k i n g)  
Individuals high in Openness have been found to make more risky judgments.
In controlled experiments, high scores on Openness to Experience were associated 
with greater risk-taking and making more risky judgments (Lauriola & Levin, 2001; 
Olson & Suls, 2000). However, Open individuals were found to be more effective 
decision-makers in situations with unforeseen changes in tasks than those low in 
Openness (LePine, Colquitt, & Amir, 2000).
5.8 Openness  and E mot i on  R e c og n i t i o n  Abi l i ty
Nonverbal facial decoding or ‘emotion recognition ability’ (ERA) has been 
widely researched, and associated with numerous traits, abilities, etc. ERA has been 
associated with social desirability (Cunningham, 1977), self-monitoring (Mill, 1984; 
Mufson & Nowicki, 1991), social style, achievement and mental ability (LeRoux, 
1987), and emotional expression itself (Lanzetta & ICleck, 1970; Levy, 1964; 
Zuckerman, Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1976), including full-face positive 
expressions (Abe & Izard, 1999).
It is difficult to dispute that emotion recognition ability is useful in our daily 
interpersonal interactions, and intuitively we may assume that it would be related to 
personality constructs such as the five factor model, including Openness to 
Experience. The Open individual tends to be one who seeks out stimulation, is rather 
curious, and is interested in -  and explores -  feelings and emotion. Thus, it would not 
be unreasonable to hypothesise that the Open individual would be effective at 
emotion recognition in others.
In fact, Openness has been demonstrated to be correlated with the ability to 
judge others’ personalities (Lippa & Dietz, 2000), dispositional intelligence 
(knowledge of how personality is related to behaviour) (Christensen, Wolcott- 
Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 2005), and social intelligence (Schafer, 1999). In
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addition, openness is correlated with social openness (Schneider, Ackerman, & 
Kanfer, 1996), as well as an open-mindedness to those of different races (Flynn,
2005). Additionally, Alexithymia, which involves a deficit in emotion recognition 
ability, has been found to be strongly negatively correlated with Openness to 
Experience (Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994).
In a series of experiments, Matsumoto and colleagues developed and refined a 
new measure of emotion recognition ability called the JACBART and examined it in 
relation to the Five Factor Model of personality (Matsumoto, LeRoux, Wilson-Cohn, 
Raroque, Ekman, et al, 2000). Matsumoto and colleagues used two measures of the 
‘Big Five’: The Big Five Inventory-54 (BFI; John, 1989) and the NEO PI-R (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992) and found correlations between ERA and Openness, as well as 
Extraversion and Conscientiousness (and negative correlations for Neuroticism). In a 
series of experiments, they found overall correlations between Openness and ERA 
ranging from .21 to .38. They also found gender differences in ERA in the series of 
studies, with males’ ERA and Openness correlations slightly higher than females’. 
(Males’ correlations ranged from .23 to .39 and females’ ERA and Openness 
correlations ranged from .17 to .32).
5.9 Openness  and D e c e p t i o n - D e t e c t i o n
There are several aspects of the Open personality that lend themselves to 
accuracy at deception-detection. The first aspect is that skilled lie detectors have the 
ability to employ flexible decision criteria when making veracity judgements (Ekman 
& Sullivan, 1991). These accurate detectors will, for instance, look for different cues 
to deception in different targets or in different situations; whereas unskilled lie 
detectors will rigidly focus on the same cues in each deception detection situation. 
The Open individual tends to be a flexible thinker, as described especially in the 
‘ideas’ and ‘values’ Openness facets of the NEO (McCrae & Costa, 1992a) and a 
creative problem-solver (George and Zhou, 2001).
Another aspect of openness that could assist in deception-detection is that 
effective detectors keep an open mind and resist making a judgment until all the data 
are available (Ask & Granhag, 2003; Ekman & Sullivan, 1991). This is particularly 
important when it comes to the judgment task in the present study, since the judges 
may miss important diagnostic cues that appear later in the video.
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In the Open individual, this may be explained by their lack of ‘need for 
closure’. The concept of need for closure is defined by Kruglansld (Kruglanski, 1989, 
p. 14) as, “the desire for a definite answer on some topic, any answer as opposed to 
confusion and ambiguity.” Highly open individuals are likely to have a lower ‘need 
for closure’ than those low in openness, due to their flexibility and openness to re­
examining perspectives and situations.
This would lead one to speculate that Open individuals are capable of 
avoiding the primacy effect in judging deceptive behaviour. That is, most individuals 
will tend to ‘freeze’ on an initial perception of the target person, and have difficulty 
‘unfreezing’ this perception when considering subsequent information (Belmore, 
1987; Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968). In a task involving detection 
deception, the primacy effect may cause inaccurate judgments, since the judge may 
miss subsequent cues.
In relation to the present study on pain-faking detection, avoiding the primacy 
effect may be especially useful since there may be qualitative time differences 
between the expression of true pain and malingering. The ‘onset duration’ in pain 
expression research refers to the average time lag between the initial onset of the 
facial action and the peak intensity (Hill & Craig, 2002). This ‘onset duration’ is 
equivalent between genuine pain and faked displays, however, there is a distinct 
difference in the temporal contiguity of facial actions. Whereas the facial actions 
instigated during genuine pain are largely contiguous, facial actions seen during faked 
pain are composed of pain expressions that are not clustered closely in time (Hill & 
Craig, 2002).
An additional component of an effective lie-detector, according to Ekman, is 
an ability to stay highly focused on the judgment task, often referred to as 
‘absorption’ (Ekman & Sullivan, 1991). In fact, absorption has been defined by 
Roche and McConkey (1990, p.92) as “a characteristic of the individual that involves 
an openness to experience emotional and cognitive alterations across a variety of 
situations” (italics mine). The open individual appears to particularly fit this 
description. It is crucial not to lose concentration during a deception detection task in 
order to avoid overlooking relevant details of the target’s behaviour (Ask & Granhag,
2003).
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Additionally, Vrig (2000) has proposed that overconfidence would impair 
judgment in deception detection, since overconfident participants may rely on specific 
cues and ignore other important deception cues. The individual Open to Experience, 
on the other hand, has been found to be confident but not over-confident (Schaefer, 
Williams, Goodie, & Campbell, 2003). This is yet another reason to speculate that 
the Open individual would be effective at the study task in the present thesis.
Furthermore, socially anxious individuals are at a disadvantage in deception- 
detection (DePaulo & Tang, 1994). The Open individual does not appear to be one 
with a tendency toward social anxiety. On the contrary, Openness to Experience has 
been linked to Social Openness and Social Insight (Schneider, Ackerman, & Kanfer,
1996). In addition, Open people have been described as curious about the ideas and 
attitudes of other people (Welsch, 1975).
It appears that there are many reasons to hypothesise that Open individuals 
would be accurate at deception detection. Previous studies have had conflicting 
results, though. In one study, (Porter, Campbell, Stapleton, & Birt, 2002) the Big 
Five were measured by the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), 
rather than any of the NEO personality measures. Participants viewed videotapes of 
targets (young adults) describing an emotionally-charged personal incident from 
childhood (e.g. a serious accident, animal attack, etc.). Some of the targets’ stories 
were true and some were false (as verified by their parents). Surprisingly, Porter and 
colleagues found no significant correlations between any of the Big Five personality 
traits and accuracy. (Apparently, the data was not analysed by gender and the Big 
Five). However, one could criticise this study regarding the videos viewed by judges, 
since only eight different targets (four lying and four telling the truth) were viewed 
and judged by participants.
'A  more recent study examining deception detection and the Big Five 
personality traits found very different results. Their research utilised the NEO-FFI 
(the same measure used in the present study), and found Openness to Experience to be 
strongly correlated with deception detection accuracy (Enos, Benus, Cautin, 
Graciarena, Hirschberg, & Shriberg, 2006). In the first half of this study, thirty-two 
targets (interviewees) answered questions and performed tasks in six areas. Then the 
targets (interviewees) were told that their scores did not fit the particular profile that 
the study was aiming for, however, the study also sought interviewees who did not fit
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the profile, but could convince the interviewer that they did. Targets’ motivation to 
deceive was increased by telling them that if they were successful at deceiving the 
interviewer, they would qualify for a contest to win a prize. In the second half of the 
study, participants listened to audiotaped interviews of targets (interviewees from the 
first half of the study) either lying or telling the truth, and judges attempted to decide 
the truthful scenarios from the lies.
Judges’ correlations between personality and accuracy at detection were 
highly significant for Openness (r = .51) and Agreeableness (r = .41). Additionally, 
Openness and Agreeableness were found to be predictors in a regression. 
Interestingly, Neuroticism in judges had a negative correlation with the audiotaped 
sections labelled ‘Lie’ by judges, and also had a negative correlation with their pre­
test expectations of the frequency with which people lie (r = -.39), indicating that 
those high in neuroticism may have a desire to believe that others are more truthful 
than they are.
5.10 Summary
In sum, the ‘fifth factor’ in the Five Factor Model of personality, Openness to 
Experience, appears to be quite relevant to the present thesis for several reasons. 
Openness has been associated with intuition, intellect, emotion recognition ability, 
and accuracy in person perception (McCrae & Costa, 1992a; Matsumoto et al, 2000; 
Schneider et al, 1996), as well as to deception detection (Ask & Granhag, 2003; Enos 
et al, 2006). In addition, the Open individual is likely to possess additional traits 
which should be useful in deception detection, such as being flexible thinkers, having 
a low need for closure, high in absorption, confidence without over-confidence, and 
being socially open (Ask & Granhag, 2003; Ekman & Sullivan, 1991; Roche & 
McConlcey, 1990; Schaefer et al, 2003; Vrig, 2000). Therefore, this thesis 
hypothesises that those study participants high in Openness to Experience as 
measured by the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992b), will be effective at the study 
task of judging pain deception.
Decem ber 2008 - 8 3 - Ph. D . Thesis
CHAPTER 6: EMOTIO NAL INTELLIGENCE
In recent years, emotional intelligence has become a rather ‘hot’ topic in 
psychology. Emotional intelligence (‘EF) has been the focus of a considerable 
amount of discussion in the empirical and scientific literature (Austin, 2005; Davies, 
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Fredenthaler & Neubauer, 2005; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; 
Petrides & Furnham, 2000a). Additionally, practical applications of El have been 
addressed, such as use in organisations (Cooper & Sawaf, 1997; Wessinger, 1998), as 
well as El appearing in the popular literature (Hein, 1997; Steiner, 1997).
A significant portion of emotional intelligence involves the ability to 
accurately perceive and recognise emotions -  including facial expressions - in others. 
Thus, it seems logical that those high in emotional intelligence may also be more 
likely to accurately discern and interpret the facial pain expressions of others. 
Therefore, this thesis hypothesises that those high in emotional intelligence will also 
be more accurate at the pain-faking detection task in the present study.
6.1 Over v i ew and De f in i t ion
An important basis for El (also called ‘EQ’) is a clear definition, and yet there 
has been much disagreement on a precise definition. This disagreement is reflected in 
the two distinct models of emotional intelligence, ‘Ability EF and ‘Trait EF.
For the purpose of this discussion, the following Salovey and Mayer definition 
of El may be used:
Salovey and Mayer describe emotional intelligence as including 
“the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and 
emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this 
information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (Salovey &
Mayer, 1990, p. 189). Additionally, they later defined El as 
including the ability to accurately perceive and express emotion, 
to use emotion to facilitate thought, to understand emotions, and 
to manage emotions for both personal and emotional growth 
(Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2004, p. 197 ).
More simply put, according to Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2004), El involves 
the mental processes involved in recognition, understanding, use, and management of 
one’s own and others’ emotional states, in order to regulate behaviour and solve 
problems. Salovey and Mayer began with the initial El definition, “the ability to
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monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them, 
and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (Salovey & Mayer, 
1990, p. 189). This definition was altered to become the 1997 definition, as well as 
evolving into a four branch model of El, which consists of the ability to a) perceive 
emotion, b) use emotion to facilitate thought, c) understand emotion, and d) manage 
emotion (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).
There have been numerous views and opinions expressed regarding El in 
recent years, ranging from calling it “an elusive construct” (Davies, Stankov, & 
Roberts, 1998, p. 989) to the rather extreme view that El is twice as important as IQ 
(Goleman, 1998, p.31). However, El, or variations of the concept, have existed for 
quite some time in one form or another. Constructs such as social intelligence have 
existed since the 1920’s (Thorndike, 1920; Thorndike & Stein, 1937), as well as more 
recently (Cronbach, 1960; Schneider, Ackerman, & Kanfer, 1996). Additionally, 
concepts such as interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence have been proposed in 
the last decades (Gardner, 1983, 1993). (See also the ‘Interpersonal Sensitivity’ 
section of the present thesis for a further discussion of related concepts).
6 .2  Two Concep tua l  Mode l s  o f  El
There are currently two distinct conceptual models of El, which employ two 
different forms of El measurement: Ability El and Trait E l (e.g. Petrides &
Furnham, 2000a, 2003; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2000b).
6. 2.1 A b i l i t y  E l
Ability El is based on the work of Mayer and Salovey (Salovey & Mayer, 
1990; Mayer & Salovey, 1997), and views El as an ability that may be measured, as 
well as an intelligence (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004). It consists of the ability to 
perceive, understand, use, and manage emotions, and is viewed as a cognitive model 
of El by Petrides and Furnham (2000), who offer the alternative model, Trait EL In 
fact, several years ago Ability El was referred to by Petrides and Furnham (2000) as 
‘Information-Processing EF.
Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2004) have made it clear that they perceive El as 
a form of intelligence. However, it has been suggested that in order for it to be 
considered an intelligence, it must show construct validity (Boyatzis & Sala, 2004; 
Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 1999). Mayer and colleagues argue that El meets the
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broad criteria for an intelligence in the following ways. Firstly, they contend that the 
test questions of their Ability EI measure, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional
■V
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002) can be operationalised 
with essentially correct or incorrect answers. Mayer et al. (2004) base this statement 
on the reliability and validity data from consensus and expert scoring. Secondly, 
Mayer and colleagues argue that EI demonstrates certain patterns of correlations 
similar to those of known intelligences (specifically, the mental tasks should describe 
a factorally unified domain), and state that the MSCEIT (and its precursor, the MEIS) 
yield one-factor solutions, reflecting a imitary ability. Additionally, EI should only 
moderately correlate with other intelligences, which was shown in Mayer et al (2004). 
Finally, there should be a developmental component to EI, which should develop with 
age. However, there have been mixed results regarding the extent of a developmental 
component (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Gohm & Clore, 2002).
6 . 2 . 1 . 1  A b i l i t y  E I  T h e o r y
Ability theorists view EI from a systems perspective, one ‘integrating emotion 
and cognition’ (Brackett et al., 2004, p. 175). The historical context of emotion- 
cognition interaction is proposed as a foundation for the Ability model of EI, dating 
back to the ancient Greek stoic belief that reason was superior to emotion (Brackett et 
al, 2004; described in Payne, 1986). The term ‘emotional intelligence’ was used in an 
incidental manner starting in the 1960’s (Van Ghent, 1961; Leuner, 1966), and was 
later coined and explicitly defined by Mayer and colleagues (Mayer, DiPaolo, & 
Salovey, 1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1990).
An important distinction in Mayer and colleagues’ theory of EI is that they 
contend that EI is a form of intelligence. They state that this was influenced by the 
desire to broaden the scope of the study of intelligence (Gardner, 1983; Wechsler, 
1950) and by a focus on the so-called hot intelligences, operating on social, personal, 
practical, and emotional information (Gardner, 1983; Lee, Wong, & Day, 2000; 
Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004; O’Sullivan, Guilford, & deMille, 1965).
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6 . 2 . 1 . 2  T h e  F o u r - B r a n c h  M o d e l  o f  E l
1 >
Ability El theorists propose a four-branch model on which the MSCEIT is 
based (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). This model includes the ability to perceive, 
use, understand, and manage emotions. The four branches are as follows:
Branch 1 (Perceiving emotions) -  This branch of El involves the ability to recognise 
emotions in the facial and postural movements of others, and the nonverbal perception 
and expression of emotions. (This branch is probably the most germane to the present 
thesis, and includes the ‘Faces’ task in which participants label facial expressions of 
emotion).
Branch 2 (Using emotions to facilitate thinking) -Concerns the ability to use 
emotional information to facilitate thought and cognition. Specifically, this branch 
involves the ability to feel, generate, and use emotions to communicate feelings (or 
employ feelings in other mental processes).
Branch 3 (Understanding of emotion) -  Focuses on the capacity to analyse emotions, 
understand their outcomes, and appreciate their likely trends over time. It involves 
the ability to understand how emotions combine and progress, and to be able to reason 
about emotional meanings.
Branch 4 (Management of emotion) -  Concerns the capacity to manage one’s 
emotions in the context of the individual’s goals, social awareness, and self- 
knowledge. Specifically, it involves the ability to manage one’s emotions in order to 
promote the attainment of personal goals, personal understanding and growth.
Figure 4: Diagram of the Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test
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6 .  2 . 1 . 3  M S C E I T  S c o r i n g
The MSCEIT is considered to be an objective test, in the sense that there are 
correct or incorrect answers, which was determined by the MSCEIT authors through 
consensus scoring and expert scoring. (The rationale for consensus and expert 
scoring is discussed more extensively in Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and Sitarenios 
(2 0 0 1b)}.
6.2.1.3.1 Consensus Scoring
In order to conduct consensus scoring, the MSCEIT was given to a large 
heterogeneous sample of over five thousand individuals from various countries. 
Responses for this sample were tallied, and participants now taking the MSCEIT 
receive credit to the extent that his/her answers match that of the normative sample.
6.2.1.3.2 Expert Scoring
The expert sample consisted of twenty-one members of the International 
Society for Research in Emotions (ISRE) who volunteered to take the MSCEIT at its 
2000 annual meeting. Membership in ISRE consists of scholars and researchers who 
are able to demonstrate a serious commitment to the field of emotion research. The 
sample comprised twenty-one individuals (ten male and eleven female) from eight 
Western countries with a mean age of 39.4 (SD = 6.4, range = 30-52). (No ethnicity 
data were collected). This scoring was conducted in the same manner that the general 
consensus scoring was conducted, with individuals receiving credit to the extent that 
they match the expert scores (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 2002; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 
Sitarenios, 2003).
6 . 2 . 1 . 4  R e l i a b i l i t y  &  V a l i d i t y
6.2.1.4.1 Reliability
Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2003) report the MSCEIT’s overall reliability as 
.91 for expert scoring and .93 for consensus scoring. The area reliabilities ranged 
from .8 6  to .90, with branch scores of the four-branch model demonstrating
reliabilities of .76 to .91., and test-retest reliability of .86 (Brackett & Mayer, 2003).
The MSCEIT’s full-scale split-half reliability reported by Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 
and Sitarenios (2001a) for over two thousand participants’ scores was approximately 
.90. Split-half reliabilities for the eight tasks yielded correlations from .65 to .8 8 ;
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however, the authors recommend scoring the MSCEIT at the branch level, but not at 
the task level (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003).
6.2.1.4.2 Factor Structure
Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and Sitarenios (2003) performed confirmatory factor 
analysis on the eight tasks of the MSCEIT, and tested for a one, two, and four factor 
model to investigate the range of permissible factor structures. Mayer and colleagues 
report that all models fit fairly well, and that the best fit was the four factor solution, 
evidence by the following goodness-of-fit indices: NFI=.98, .97; TLI^.96, .97; 
RMSEA= 05, .04 for consensus and expert scoring, respectively.
Gignac (2005) criticised these factor analysis findings, based on a reanalysis 
of the data. In response to Gignac’s analysis, Mayer, Panter, Salovey, Caruso, and 
Sitarenios (2005) reanalysed the data and discovered the source of the discrepancy. 
Their analysis revealed that the discrepancy in results appeared to be due to different 
versions of the computer program used in the analysis.
6.2.1.4.3 Validity
6.2.1.4.3.1 Discriminant and Convergent Validity
The MSCEIT appears to demonstrate appropriate discriminant validity from
measures of analytic intelligence and several personality constructs. In a study by
Brackett, Mayer, and Warner (2004), the MSCEIT area and total scores were only
modestly correlated with Verbal SAT scores (rs = .23 to .39). Additionally, in a study
by David (2002), correlations of .30 and .44, respectively, were found between the
Wonderlic Personnel Test and the MSCEIT total scores and Branch 3 (Understanding
Emotions) scores.
Moreover, MSCEIT scores have not been shown to be significantly related to 
the Big Five traits of Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness, and were 
only modestly correlated with Agreeableness and Openness (rs<.28) (Brackett & 
Mayer, 2003). Similar correlations were reported by Lopes, Salovey, and Strauss 
(2003). In addition, MSCEIT scores were not highly associated with self-report El 
measures, including the Self-Report El Test (Schutte et al., 1998) and the Bar-On EQ- 
I (Bar-On, 1997).
Evidence for convergent validity was provided by Lopes et al. (2003). The 
MSCEIT’s Managing Emotions branch was correlated with the Postive Relations with
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Others subscale of Ryff s (1989) scales of Psychological Well-Being. In 
addition, all four MSCEIT branches were inversely associated with the negative 
interaction (with a close friend) factor of the Network of Relationship Inventory 
(NRI; Furman & Buhrmester, 1985). Pusey (2000) analysed the face validity of the 
MSCEIT RV1.1 in an organisational setting, and reported interrater reliability of .83, 
with the author concluding, “In general, the MSCEIT has good face validity.”
6.2.1.4.3.2 Predictive Validity
Since the MSCEIT (and its precursor, the MEIS), were published in the last
few years, there are relatively few studies showing predictive validity. However, a 
few studies have begun to demonstrate predictive validity of EI. The relationship of 
academic performance to EI (specifically, grades received) was found to have 
correlations between r = .20 to .25 among college students (Ashkanasy & 
Dasborough, 2003; Barchard, 2003; Lam & Kirby, 2002). EI has also been inversely 
related to violence, bullying, tobacco use, and drug problems (Rubin, 1999; Trinidad 
& Johnson, 2002).
Ability EI theorists have recently conducted several studies to examine the 
relationship between EI and social interaction. In several recent studies, relationships 
were discovered between emotion regulation abilities (the ability to manage 
emotions) and the quality of social interactions. Lopes et al. (2003) reported a 
correlation of .27 between the Managing Emotions subscale of the MSCEIT and 
global self-perceived quality of interpersonal relationships. In addition, the Managing 
Emotions subscale was related (.22) to supportive relationships with parents. 
Additionally, they found that MSCEIT scores were inversely related to having 
antagonistic or conflictual relationships with close friends (-.25 to -.45). The ability 
to manage emotions was again associated with the quality of social interactions in two 
recent studies (Lopes, Brackett, Nezlelc, Schutz, Sellin, & Salovey, 2004; Lopes, 
Salovey, Cote, & Beers, 2005). In addition, the MSCEIT EI was found to be modestly 
related to NEO Agreeableness and Conscientiousness and as well as modestly 
inversely related to NEO Openness (Lopes, Salovey, & Strauss; 2004).
Researchers have also begun to examine EI in relation to developmental 
psychology. In a study of mother-child interactions, Marsland and Likavec (2003)
Decem ber 2008 - 9 0 - Ph. D . Thesis
found that maternal El scores were highly related to child empathy, prosocial peer 
relations, and relatedness.
Organisational and leadership settings are other areas in which possible 
predictive validity of El has been examined. Collins (2001) found that El appeared to 
decrease ‘moving up the corporate ladder’, in a study of executives at a large multi­
national organisation. However, the opposite was discovered by Lopes (2004) in a 
study of analysts and clerical employees, in which individuals high in El tended to 
hold a higher rank in the company, as well as receiving greater merit increases. 
Additionally, supervisors’ El appears to have a positive effect on their subordinates’ 
commitment levels. Giles (2001) found an association between supervisors’ El and 
aspects of their subordinates’ commitment to their organisation.
6.2.2 Trai t  ( ' M i x e d  M o d e l ’) E l
Trait El utilises an entirely different perspective than Ability EL In fact, these 
differing perspectives are reflected in the terms themselves. Trait El has even been 
referred to as ‘mixed model’ El by Ability El theorists (Brackett, Lopes, Ivcevic, 
Mayer, & Salovey, 2004; Mayer et. al., 2000a, 2000b). This is due to the contention 
by Trait theorists that El incorporates a mix of abilities (with attributes such as 
optimism, self-awareness, self-actualisation, and self-esteem) and should be in a self- 
report format (Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 1995, 1998). Trait theorists refer to Trait El 
as ‘emotional self-efficacy’ and Ability El as measuring ‘cognitive-emotional ability’ 
(Petrides & Furnham, 2003). Moreover, Trait El theorists describe Trait El as 
“concerned with cross-situational consistencies in behaviour manifest in specific traits 
or behaviours such as empathy, assertiveness, optimism.” This is contrasted with 
their view of ability El, “which concerns abilities (e.g. ability to identify, express and 
label emotions)” (Petrides & Furnham, 2000b, p.314). This distinction is 
demonstrated in the form of the measurement itself, such that Trait El is measured by 
self-report questionnaires whilst Ability El is measured by ‘maximum-performance 
tests’ (tests with items that have correct or incorrect answers).
Whilst Ability El tests such as the MSCEIT are frequently used, Day (2004) 
states that Trait El is the most prevalent model used in research, as well as in 
organisational and educational settings. Trait El is not considered to be a cognitive 
model of El, and examines non-cognitive personal characteristics considered 
beneficial to individual functioning and success (Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 1998).
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6.3 M e a su r em en t  o f  El
The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test is the primary 
measure of Ability El (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). Mayer, Salovey, 
and Caruso developed a previous test of Ability El, called the Multifactor Emotional 
Intelligence Scale (MEIS, Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1998). Mayer and colleagues 
state that the MSCEIT is a more user-friendly and professional battery than the MEIS, 
as well as being shorter and better normed (Salovey, Koldconen, Lopes, & Mayer,
2004). The MSCEIT consists of 141 items, representing four branches of El: 
perceiving emotions, facilitating emotions, understanding emotions, and managing 
emotions. (Please see Methods Section of this thesis for more detailed information on 
the MSCEIT).
There are various self-report measures that are based on the Trait El model. 
The Bar-On EQ-I (Bar-On ,1997) is probably the most frequently used Trait El 
measure. The Bar-On consists of 133 items with 15 subscales, clustered into five El 
factors (Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, Adaptability, Stress Management, and General 
Mood).
Another El self-report measure is called the Emotional Intelligence Scale 
(EIS; Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Domheim, 1998), which 
consists of 33 items, based on three of Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) categories. 
However, as it is a self-report measure, it is nevertheless considered to measure Trait 
EL
The Trait El Questionnaire (TEIQue; Petrides & Furnham, 2003) is a 144 item 
self-report measure with fifteen subscales based on the authors’ Trait El model. The 
Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI; Boyatzis, Goleman, & Rhee, 2000) is a self- 
report measure assessing 16 factors clustered into four areas: Self-Awareness, Self- 
Management, Social Awareness, and Relationship Management. Finally, the Trait 
Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfia, 1995) is a 
self-report measure that measures the degree to which one attends to one’s moods, is 
able to make oneself feel better, and is able to understand one’s moods.
6.4 Emot iona l  I n t e l l i gence  and Emot i on  R ec o gn i t i on  Abi l i ty
The face tends to be the primary nonverbal decoding channel and form of 
expressing emotions (Ekman, 1965), and thus appears to be particularly important to
Decem ber 2008 - 9 2 - Ph. D. Thesis
emotional intelligence (Elfenbein, Marsh, & Ambady, 2002). This focus on facial 
decoding is demonstrated in Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso’s Ability EI measure, the 
MSCEIT, in which one of the eight tasks involves the ability to recognise facial 
expression of emotion (called simply the ‘Faces’ task).
Studies have demonstrated a link between self-reported (‘trait’) emotional 
intelligence and the recognition of facial expression of emotion (Austin, 2004; 
Petrides & Fumham, 2003). Specifically, Petrides and Furnham (2003) found that 
those individuals high in emotional intelligence identified morphed facial expression 
more rapidly than low emotionally intelligent individuals, as well as being more 
sensitive to a mood induction task.
There are numerous facial expression recognition measures, and O’Sullivan 
and Ekman (2004) remind us that there are several factors to consider when 
examining these measures. Points to bear in mind include the stimulus (set of facial 
expressions) itself and its validity, the speed of presentation, the complexity of the 
facial expressions, and the subtlety of the facial expressions presented. O’Sullivan 
and Ekman present concerns regarding both the complexity and the subtlety of the 
faces presented in the MSCEIT. They suggest that the MSCEIT does not address 
Cronbach’s (1955) call for the clarification of differential and stereotypic accuracy, 
which they state are both likely to be involved in everyday emotional intelligence. 
Further, O’Sullivan and Ekman argue that the faces in the MSCEIT are not clear 
examples of particular expressions, but instead are rather faint representations of 
various affects and include idiosyncratic facial displays of the models used. 
Additionally, O’Sullivan and Ekman contend that the MSCEIT authors do not appear 
to provide justification for the particular facial expressions used. On the other hand, 
O’Sullivan and Ekman do praise the MSCEIT authors for having defined their 
domain and theory of emotional intelligence carefully.
6.5 Future  o f  EI and Ap p l i ca t i o n  to Presen t  Study
Whilst growing in popularity, emotional intelligence remains a relatively new 
area of psychology. As stated earlier, there appears to be a slight rift in the study of 
EI (primarily the ‘Ability EI’ camps vs. the ‘Trait EI’ camps), which Day refers to as 
‘the good, the bad, and the ugly’ of EI (Day, 2004, p.245). Day proposes four 
possible eventual outcomes for researchers in this difference of perspectives on EI: 1)
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consensus on one type of El, 2) consensus on the two types of El currently proposed 
(trait and ability El) with certain definition constraints, 3) a sort of ‘agreeing to 
disagree’ in which there are the two types of El that include an unlimited number of 
constructs, and 4) a sort of smorgasbord of El, in which there is agreement to have El 
represent an unlimited number of constructs and factors. It appears that only time will 
tell which direction El theory will take in psychology.
6.6 Summary
In summary, regardless of the agreement or disagreement in the near future 
between the two El schools of thought (trait vs. ability El), the concept of El appears 
to be here to stay in psychology. The perception and recognition of emotions in 
others -  including facial expressions of emotion, such as in the MSCEIT’s Faces task 
-  is a significant portion of El. Therefore, this thesis hypothesises that those rating 
high in emotional intelligence will also be more effective at discerning the facial pain 
expressions in the present study.
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C H A P T E R  7: P S Y C H O P A T H Y  & M A C H I A V E L L I A N I S M
7.1 Psyc ho pa t hy
In an empirical study of deception-detection and emotion recognition, a 
natural progression would appear to include examining the rather opposing concepts 
of emotional intelligence and psychopathy. One might hypothesise that participants 
high in emotional intelligence would be especially adept at the emotion recognition 
aspect of the study task. However, as the study involves deception-detection, it seems 
plausible to hypothesise that those individuals who would be most invested in 
deception (such as those high in psychopathy) may be those who are most adept at 
detecting it, as well. Therefore, Study No. 2 involved examining the pain-faking 
detection of those high in emotional intelligence and those high in psychopathy.
7.7.7 B a c k g r o u n d  and  Concepts
Psychopathy has been called “one of the most enigmatic conditions in the field 
of psychopathology” (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005, p. 1). It is considered to be a 
developmental disorder, generally appearing in early childhood and continuing 
through the lifespan (Harpur & Hare, 1994). The current study of psychopathy has its 
roots in the seminal work of Cleckley (1941, 1976). The sixteen personality features 
of the so-called ‘Cleckley Criteria’ for psychopathy include the following: a) lack of 
empathy, b) superficial charm, c) egocentric and self-centred behaviour, d) 
dishonesty, e) unreliability, f) absence of anxiety, g) lack of insight, h) lack of guilt 
feelings, i) failure to learn from punishment, j) failure to form strong emotional 
attachments to others, k) sexual promiscuity, 1) lack of sincerity, and m) lack of a 
coherent life plan, among other aspects. Cleckley suggested that these individuals 
lacked what we consider to be normal emotional reactions to common experiences. 
This emotional deficit is presumed to result in failure to learn from punishment and 
therefore socially deviant behaviour.
Another early author of psychopathy, Karpman (1941), theorised that there are 
two types of psychopathy, primary and secondary. Karpman proposed that the 
characteristics of secondary psychopathic individuals are by-products of guilt, 
anxiety, and other premorbid psychological difficulties; whereas the characteristics of
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individuals with primary psychopathy are not by-products of any particular pre­
existing condition.
There has been disagreement regarding the scope of psychopathy, as well as 
whether to define it by personality traits or by behaviour. The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (DSM-II; American Psychiatric Association, 
1968) definition of ‘antisocial personality’ seems to have its roots in Clecldey’s 
personality-based concept of psychopathy. The later editions of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980; DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) have a more behaviourally-based definition 
of Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), which essentially consists of a checklist 
of adult antisocial behaviours. This definition, however, has been criticised both for 
being under-inclusive and for being over-inclusive (Lilienfeld, 1994; Lykken, 1995). 
Additionally, one could argue that simply re-labelling antisocial behaviour as 
psychopathy is flawed in that psychopathy is being used to explain conduct, without 
addressing specific personality traits.
Hare (1991) integrated both the behaviour and personality aspects in his 
conceptualisation of psychopathy, stating that it is comprised of two 
symptomatological and correlated dimensions: a) personality traits (such as lack of 
guilt, narcissism, and shallow affect) and b) behavioural patterns (such as a history of 
engaging in aggressive, deviant, and criminal behaviours) (Hare, 1991; Harpur, Hare, 
& Hakstian, 1989). However, this approach has similar problems to those listed 
above, that is, the behavioural patterns may simply be a symptom of psychopathy.
Lilienfeld and Widows (2005) have outlined an extensive personality-based 
definition that will be used for the purpose of the present thesis that appears to have 
addressed the above definition problems. This definition seems especially appropriate 
in light of the fact that Lilienfeld’s Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; 
Lilienfeld, 1991; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) was used in study number two of this 
thesis. Lilienfeld and Widows define psychopathy as follows:
“Psychopathy is a constellation of personality features that includes superficial charm, 
lack of guilt and empathy, dishonesty, failure to form close interpersonal attachments, 
and failure to learn from punishment, all in the absence of irrational or delusional 
thinking” (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005, p. 2).
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7 . 1 . 1 . 1  L i l i e n f e l d ’ s  8  F a c t o r s  o f  P s y c h o p a t h y
Lilienfeld proposes eight dimensions or factors of psychopathy upon which 
the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld, 1991) and the revised version 
of the same measure (PPI-R; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) were based: 1) 
Machiavellian Egocentricity, 2) Social Potency/Social Influence, 3) Coldheartedness,
4) Carefree Nonplanfulness, 5) Fearlessness, 6) Alienation/Blame Externalisation, 7) 
Impulsive Nonconformity/Rebellious Nonconformity, and 8) Stress Immunity 
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). Additionally, both 
versions of the PPI include a global psychopathology score.
Factor 1, Machiavellian Egocentricity, is similar to Hundleby and Ross’ 
(1977) concept of ‘ruthless practicality’ and features elements of Christie and Geis’ 
(1970) concept of ‘Machiavellianism’. It includes narcissistic and ruthless attitudes in 
interpersonal functioning. (See the Machiavellianism section in the present thesis for 
further information and background on this concept). Factor 2, Social Potency 
(referred to as ‘Social Influence’ in the PPI-R), was named after Tellegen’s 
(1978/1982) ‘social potency’ construct, and assesses a tendency to be charming and to 
be adept at influencing others. Factor 3 is Coldheartedness, which derives its name 
from the interpersonal circumplex literature (Wiggins, 1982), and measures a diverse 
array of traits that appear to be characterised by a paucity of emotions. This factor 
includes a propensity toward callousness, guiltlessness, and lack of sentimentality. 
Factor 4 is called Carefree Nonplanfulness, and is similar to the ‘nonplanning’ 
component of impulsivity discussed by Eysenck and Eysenck (1977). It reflects a 
propensity to act on one’s impulses with little concern for long-term consequences. 
Factor 5, Fearlessness, measures an eagerness to take physical risks and an absence of 
anticipatory anxiety concerning harm. It is similar to Tellegen’s (1978/1982) 
reversed Harm Avoidance dimension. Factor 6, Alienation (called ‘Blame 
Externalisation’ in the PPI-R) is similar to Tellegen’s (1978/1982) Alienation factor 
and Millon’s (1981) construct of ‘malevolent projection’. It assesses a tendency to 
view others as the source of one’s difficulties and to offer rationalisations for one’s 
misbehaviours. Factor 7, Impulsive Nonconformity (called ‘Rebellious
Nonconformity’ in the PPI-R), took its original name from Chapman, Chapman, 
Numbers, Edell, Carpenter, and Beckfield’s (1984) construct of ‘impulsive 
nonconformity’, and measures a reckless lack of concern regarding social mores.
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Chapman et al (1984) originally identified this construct as relevant to psychosis- 
proneness. The final factor, Factor 8, is called Stress Immunity, and assesses an 
absence of marked reactions to anxiety-provoking events.
7.1.2 Theor ies  o f  P s yc h o p a t h y
The basis of psychopathy remains, of course, under debate. However, a 
number of theories have emerged to attempt to explain this condition, covering the 
gamut from neuropsychological to environmental explanations.
7 . 1 . 2 . 1  F r o n t a l  L o b e  D y s f u n c t i o n
The frontal lobe dysfunction model of psychopathy assumes that a deficit in 
the frontal lobe contributes to aggression. There has been empirical work to link the 
frontal lobe and consequent executive dysfunction to aggression (Elliot, 1978; 
Moffitt, 1993; Raine, 2002), which has led to suggestions that psychopathy and/or 
antisocial behaviour is related to frontal lobe dysfunction (Moffit, 1993; Raine, 2002). 
In support of this theory, neuroimaging data indicates that aggressive individuals 
display reduced frontal functioning (Raine, Buchsbaum, & LaCasse, 1997; Raine, 
Meloy, Birhle, Stoddard, LaCasse, & Buchsbaum, 1998; Volkow & Tancredi, 1987). 
In addition, patients with frontal cortex lesions present with a heightened risk for 
aggression (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000; Burgess & Wood, 1990). Whilst this model may provide a partial 
explanation, this strictly neuropsychological approach does not appear to paint the 
entire picture regarding psychopathy.
7 . 1 . 2 . 2  R e s p o n s e  S e t  M o d u l a t i o n  ( R M  M o d e l )
A cognitively-based psychopathy theory called the Response Set Modulation 
(RM) hypothesis proposes an attention-based attempt at explaining psychopathy. 
This model suggests that, in most individuals, a rapid and relatively automatic shift in 
attention occurs when necessary, on to a specific deliberate focus of attention. 
Newman (1998) contends that, whereas the majority of individuals are able to 
automatically feel shame for unkind deeds, automatically anticipant the consequences 
of their actions, are automatically cognisant of their commitments to others, and so 
on, psychopathic individuals are only able to accomplish these tasks and be aware of 
such factors with considerable effort. In other words, whereas for the majority of 
people these are relatively automatic responses guiding their actions, psychopathic
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individuals do not have these automatic responses. Further, Newman states that 
psychopathy may be understood as a failure in the ability to process the meaning of 
information that is incidental or peripheral to their deliberate focus of attention 
(Lorenz & Newman, 2002).
7 . 1 . 2 . 3  T h e  F e a r  D y s f u n c t i o n  H y p o t h e s i s
A different approach is taken in the Fear Dysfunction hypothesis, which 
assumes that there is a deficit in the psychopathic individual’s ability to feel fear. 
Cleckley (1976) suggested that the psychopathic individual appears incapable of 
feeling anxiety. This lack of fear may translate into a lack of fear of punishment, 
which this model assumes to be central to moral socialisation (Eysenck, 1964; 
Trasler, 1978).
The Fear Dysfunction model may be rooted in Gray’s Behavioural Inhibition 
System (BIS; Gray, 1987). The BIS model proposed that a unitary fear system exists 
in which behavioural inhibition, increased attention, and increased arousal occur 
when punishment signals are activated. Therefore, the Fear Dysfunction model would 
speculate that there is a deficit in this unitary fear system.
7 . 1 . 2 . 4  V i o l e n c e  I n h i b i t i o n  M o d e l  ( V I M )
It is commonly assumed that psychopathic individuals demonstrate a lack of 
empathy. This deficit in the ability to feel empathy is at the heart of the Violence 
Inhibition Model (VIM). This theory assumes that most individuals develop aversive 
emotional reactions to distress cues in others (part of normal early development), but 
that psychopathic individuals do not develop this internal system necessary for moral 
socialisation (Blair, 1995; Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997). In fact, this aversive 
reaction to the distress of others appears to be common to humans as well as other 
social animals, demonstrated in animal studies. One such study showed that once rats 
learned that pressing a bar would lower another, suspended, rat to the ground (which 
is distressing for the suspended rat), the observer rat will press the bar to release the 
suspended rat (Rice & Gainer, 1962). Thus, the suspended rat is no longer distressed, 
which causes the observer rat’s distressed state to end.
The ‘Theory of Mind’ (cognitive empathy) refers to the ability to represent the 
mental states of others, and would include their beliefs, thoughts, knowledge, desires, 
and intentions (Frith, 1989; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Whilst psychopathy is
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often associated with empathic dysfunction, most studies of the Theory of Mind, or 
cognitive empathy, do not show a correlation between this particular type of empathy 
and psychopathy (Blair, Sellars, Strickland, Clark, Williams, Smith, et al, 1996; 
Ritchell, Mitchell, Newman, Leonard, Baron-Cohen, & Blair, 2003; Wisdom, 1978). 
However, one study was located that did report impairment in this area (Wisdom, 
1976).
Emotional empathy, on the other hand, would be considered the more 
commonly-used concept of empathy. One method of examining emotional empathy 
is through the recognition of facial expressions of emotion (particularly applicable to 
the present thesis). Those individuals high in psychopathy tend to show deficits in 
specific types of emotion recognition. Psychopathic individuals display particular 
impairments in processing fearful and sad expressions, but do not appear to show 
deficits in processing happy expressions (Blair, Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 2001; 
Kosson, Suchy, Mayer, & Libby, 2002; Stevens, Charman, & Blair, 2001). 
Schizophrenics, on the other hand, tend to demonstrate deficits in facial affect 
processing overall (Bediou, Franck, Saoud, Baudoin, Tiberghien, Dalery, & d’Amato, 
2005; Brune, 2005).
7 . 1 . 2 . 5  T h e  I n t e g r a t e d  E m o t i o n  S y s t e m s  M o d e l  ( I E S )
The Integrated Emotion Systems (IES) model (Blair, 2005) is a cognitive 
neuroscience model of psychopathy, and appears to integrate the Fear Dysfunction 
model. The IES model proposes the existence of a primary amygdala dysfunction in 
psychopathic individuals. This deficit causes a disruption in the ability of this 
individual to form stimulus-reinforcement associations, and especially stimulus- 
punishment associations (Peschardt, Leonard, Morton, & Blair, 2005). This 
disruption is presumed to be linked to a deficit in the ability to feel fear. It is further 
assumed that this deficit interferes with socialisation, and the individual is less likely 
to avoid the use of antisocial behaviour to achieve their goals. Further, Blair (2005) 
suggests that orbital/ventrolateral frontal cortex dysfunction affects the system needed 
for the rapid alteration of responding that follows contingency change. This is viewed 
as a link to frustration-based reactive aggression, according to Blair.
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7 . 1 . 2 . 6  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  I n f l u e n c e s  o n  P s y c h o p a t h y
Certainly, possible environmental influences cannot be overlooked when 
examining theories of psychopathy. Environmental influences on this condition 
appear to be supported by physiological research. For instance, stressors in early life 
have long-term and profound physiological effects, such as effecting hypothalamic- 
pituitary-adrenal axis activity (Bremner & Vermetten, 2001; Charney, 2003). In 
addition, chronic stress is related to potentiated release of norepinephrine following 
stressor exposure (Nisenbaum, Zigmond, Sved, & Abercrombie, 1991), as well as a 
lifelong sensitivity increase of the noradrenergic system (Francis, Caldji, Champagne, 
Plotsky, & Meaney, 1999). In other words, chronic stressors can actually alter the 
development of threat-mediating bodily systems.
7.1.3 R e la t i o ns h ip  Be tw een  P s yc h o p a t h o l o g y  and  E m o t i o na l
In t e l l i ge nc e
Intuitively one would assume a negative correlation between psychopathology 
in general and emotional intelligence. This negative correlation has been supported in 
studies of self-reported emotional intelligence (using the Bar-On EQ-I, 1997) and 
psychopathology (Dawda & Hart, 2000; Hemmati, Mills, & Kroner, 2004). Rather 
counter-intuitively, though, Hemmati et al (2004) also found that offenders (inmates 
in a medium security prison) in their study had self-reported EI that was equal to or 
higher than the general population. However, the authors did find the expected strong 
inverse relationship between EI and psychopathology. The researchers speculate that 
the higher than expected level of EI in offenders may be due to factors such as 
socially desirable responding, and possibly that offenders interpret the questions 
differently than the majority of individuals responding to the EI measure’s items.
Additionally, another study examining the relationship of both ability EI (as 
measured by the MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2002) and self-report EI (as 
measured by the Bar-On EQi:S; Bar-On, 2002) to the psychopathy-related trait of 
Machiavellianism found a strong negative correlation between both types of EI and 
Machiavellianism (Austin, Farrelly, Black, & Moore, 2007). However, one could 
criticise this study on the grounds that, according to the authors, participants 
completed the MSCEIT and the EQi:S prior to attending a test session supervised by 
an investigator. In other words, it appears that participants completed both EI 
measures in their own homes with no supervision whatsoever. In this situation, a
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definite concern would be whether results may have been contaminated by the 
possible input of participants’ friends or family members in their completion of the El 
measures.
Emotional intelligence and psychopathy appeal* to be rather opposing 
concepts, and not surprisingly, have an inverse relationship. It does not seem much of 
a speculative stretch to hypothesise that emotionally intelligent individuals may be 
effective at the emotion recognition aspect of the task in the present thesis. However, 
a rather unexpected hypothesis might also be proposed in which individuals high in 
psychopathy may also perform effectively at the pain-falcing detection task in the 
present study.
One could reasonably argue that individuals high in psychopathy may perform 
poorly in an emotion recognition task in general due to their emotional detachment 
from - and lack of empathy with - other people, as has been demonstrated in previous 
research (Blair et al, 2001; Kosson et al, 2002; Stevens et al, 2001). However, the 
study task in the present thesis examined participants’ abilities to detect the faking of 
pain. In this situation, the individual high in psychopathy may actually have an 
advantage for several reasons.
The first reason for a possible advantage is that the individual high in 
psychopathy may actually enjoy witnessing the suffering of others, which may 
increase the psychopath’s attention to, and focus on, the task of detecting pain-faking. 
In addition, the psychopathic individual is likely to be more invested in deception, and 
consequently may be more adept at detecting deceptive behaviour in others. (This 
may be especially true for the individual high in Machiavellianism, discussed later in 
this thesis). This individual may perceive the ability to detect deception in others as 
an important tool in their ability to manipulate others, and thus may be particularly 
focused on the deception-detection task. Therefore, due to the psychopathic 
individual’s possible enjoyment of the suffering of others, as well as their investment 
in deception (and particularly so in the case of the Machiavellian), it is hypothesised 
that these individuals may be especially adept at the pain-faking detection task.
7.1.4 The P P I
The self-report measure used to assess psychopathy in Study No. 2 of the 
present thesis is called the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld &
Decem ber 2008 -  1 0 2 - Ph. D . Thesis
Andrews, 1996). It consists of 187 items with eight factors, and responses are given 
on a four-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘False’ to ‘True’.
The development of the PPI was first initiated in the late 1980’s by Lilienfeld, 
and later named the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld, 1991). 
When Lilienfeld undertook the rather large project of developing the PPI, the three 
primary aims were to: a) construct a personality-based measure which contained 
scales for separate lower-order facets of psychopathy, in addition to a global score, b) 
clarify the boundaries and nature of the psychopathy construct through an exploratory 
approach to test construction, and c) construct an easily administered and time- 
efficient measure of psychopathy that could be used in both clinical and non-clinical 
settings.
Lilienfeld set out to include a broad array of constructs in the PPI item pool in 
order to accomplish these aims. The author utilised an exploratory method of test 
construction, in which analysis (exploratory factor analysis, in this case) is used to 
select items, and also to clarify and modify the constructs themselves. In this way, 
the author progresses from constructs to items to data to analysis, and then utilises the 
analysis to revise the items and constructs as needed. The item writing and data 
collection is then conducted again, perhaps resulting in further modifications of the 
constructs. This process of exploratory test construction follows what Cattell (1966) 
referred to as the “inductive-hypothetico-deductive spiral”. This approach is iterative, 
sequential, and self-correcting.
One issue regarding the construction of a self-report measure of psychopathy 
is the deceptive nature of the psychopathic individual, and their well-known 
propensities for dishonesty and lack of insight. The author addresses this issue by 
stating that, instead of treating the responses to the self-report items as direct proxies 
of observable behaviour, one should instead view the answers to these items as 
interesting pieces of verbal behaviour in their own right. He contends that these 
written responses may provide valuable insight into the apperceptions and attitudes of 
psychopathic individuals. As an example, the author cites the PPI item “When I’m 
with people who do something wrong, I usually get the blame”. Lilienfeld states that 
the answer is useful to the extent that it is inaccurate, and may reflect the 
psychopathic individual’s well-known propensity for externalisation of blame 
(Millon, 1981), even if it is factually inaccurate. Additionally, the author took steps
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to minimise the potential influence of response styles, and to assess potentially 
problematic response styles, such as answering items in a socially desirable manner.
The original measure, utilised for a number of years, was the Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory, or PPI, which was also utilised in the present thesis. Quite 
recently, the author revised the measure slightly and named this version the 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory Revised (PPI-R; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). In 
this revision, the PPI-R was amended to be more applicable to forensic and clinical 
samples by lowering the reading level, re-wording culturally specific idioms, and 
reducing its length.
7 . 1 . 4 . 1  P s y c h o m e t r i c  P r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  P P I
7.1.4.1.1 Reliability
The reliability of the PPI was examined by Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996; see 
also Lilienfeld, 1991) in four undergraduate samples (with 69, 102, 96, and 113 
participants, respectively). The authors reported that the PPI Total Score was 
internally consistent, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .90 to .93; as were its 
Content scales, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .70 to .90, and 75% of the alpha 
coefficients in the .80 to .90 range. Additionally, Lilienfeld and Andrews report a 
test-retest reliability for the PPI Total Score of .95 over a mean 26-day retest interval. 
The PPI Content scales’ test-retest reliabilities ranged from .82 to .94.
Chapman, Gremore, and Farmer (2003) reported similar data on the PPI’s test- 
retest reliability and internal consistency. Chapman et al (2003) report a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .94 for the PPI Total Score, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .79 to .89 
for the PPI Content scales. In addition, they reported a test-retest reliability of .92 for 
the PPI Total Score over a mean 49-day interval, with the PPI Content scales’ test- 
retest reliabilities ranging from .77 to .90.
7.1.4.1.2 Validity
Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996) reported that the PPI showed convergent and 
discriminant validity with other measures of antisocial behaviour and psychopathy, 
including the CPI Socialization Scale (r — -.59), MMPI-2 Antisocial Practices Content 
scale (r = .56 and .58 in two samples), and the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire- 
Revised (PDQ-R; Hyler & Reider, 1984) Antisocial Personality Disorder scale (r =
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.58 and .43 in two samples), and with theoretically relevant self-report scales from the 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ; Tellegen, 1978/1982), which 
included the Social Potency (r = .39), Harm Avoidance (r = -.55), Control vs. 
Impulsiveness (r = -.27), Traditionalism (r = -.20), and Aggression (r = .38) scales.
In addition, the PPI displayed convergent validity with a measure of peer-rated 
psychopathy (rooted in Cleckley; 1941, 1988) (r = .45), with Antisocial Personality 
Disorder (r = .59), with interview-rated Cleckley psychopathy (r = .60), and 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder (r = .35), which was measured by the Structured 
Clinical Interview for the DSM-III-R (Spitzer, Williams, & Gibbon, 1987).
Additionally, discriminant validity of the PPI was evidenced by the PPI 
demonstrating low and nonsignificant correlations with measures of several constructs 
concepturally unrelated to psychopathy, such as the Schizoidia Scale (Golden & 
Meehl, 1979), the Perceptual Aberration Scale (Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 
1976), the PDQ-R Schizotypal and Schizoid Scales (Hyler & Reider, 1984), and the 
General Behavior Inventory (GBI) Depression Scale (Depue, Slater, Wolfstetter- 
Kausch, Klein, Goplerud, & Farr; 1981).
Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996) examined the PPI’s incremental validity above 
and beyond other self-report measures of antisocial behaviour and psychopathy, using 
hierarchical multiple regression techniques. Using both interview-rated and peer­
rated Cleckley (1941, 1988) psychopathy as dependent measures, the authors entered 
the MMPI-2 Psychopathic deviate scale, the MMPI-2 Antisocial Practices Content 
scale, and the MMPI-2 Antisocial Personality Scale (Morey, Blashfield, Webb, & 
Jewell, 1988) as the first step, with the PPI Total Score as the second step. The 
addition of the PPI to peer-rated Cleckley (1988) psychopathy increased prediction by 
10% of the variance (p<.01), and for interviewer-rated Cleckley psychopathy, the 
addition of the PPI increased prediction by 38% of the variance (p<.001). The 
authors of the PPI conclude that these findings provide adequate evidence that the PPI 
contains meaningful variance not shared with several self-report measures of 
antisocial behaviour and psychopathy.
7.1.5 S ummar y
In conclusion, the individual high in psychopathy may be highly invested in 
deception and may also actually enjoy witnessing the physical suffering of others.
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Therefore, the present thesis hypothesises that individuals with a high level of 
psychopathy will be accurate in the present study’s pain deception detection task.
7.2 M ac h i a v e l l i a n i s m
Whilst the intuitive and open personalities may be more attuned to nonverbal 
communication of others due to the benefits of increased level of interpersonal 
communication, the Machiavellian type personality may be interested in nonverbal 
communication for less altruistic reasons. In individuals with a high level of 
Machiavellianism, the individual may be attuned to others’ nonverbal communication 
in order to increase their advantage over the other in interpersonal settings. 
Additionally, similarly to the Psychopathic individual, the Machiavellian may be 
highly invested in deception and thus may be more accurate at deception detection. 
Therefore, the present thesis hypothesises that individuals high in Machiavellianism 
will be highly accurate at the present study’s task of pain deception detection.
7 .2 .1 B a c k g r o u n d
The concept of Machiavellianism is based on the teachings of Machiavelli 
(1513/1966), first introduced in 1513 when he wrote The Prince. In this book, the 
author advised rulers on manipulative ways of maintaining and acquiring power, with 
self-interest as the most important factor -  at whatever expense was deemed 
necessary to achieve one’s goals. This concept of the ‘ends justifying the means’ 
would include telling a lie or being deceptive when it was more effective than being 
truthful.
The ‘Machiavellian Egocentricity’ subscale of Lillienfeld and Widows’ (2005) 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) measures ‘a willingness to manipulate 
others for selfish goals and a cynical and harshly instrumental view of human nature’ 
(p. 31). Additionally, they describe this individual as one who has ‘a tendency to 
bend rules, to take advantage of others, to lie for one’s own advantage, and to see 
oneself as superior to other people’ (Lillienfeld & Widows, 2005, p. 31).
The Machiavellian personality appears to be dominated by a motivation of 
self-interest. The common theme in descriptions of the Machiavellian personality 
includes behaviour in which an individual uses another person as a tool or instrument 
in achieving his/her goals (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Christie & Geis, 1970; Linton & 
Wiener, 2001). Individuals with a high level of Machiavellianism (or ‘high Macks’ as
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they are frequently called) display an emotional detachment from others, with an 
interpersonal orientation described as cognitive rather than emotional (Christie & 
Geis, 1970). In fact, this emotional detachment appears to extend to emotionally- 
charged situations in which others tend to display anxiety, and has earned them the 
characterisation of ‘cool-blooded’ in their interactions with others (Mcllwain, 2003; 
Wilson, Near & Miller, 1996). Additionally, Machiavellianism has been foimd to be 
negatively correlated with empathy (Barnett & Thompson, 1985; Watson, Biderman 
& Sawrie, 1994) and highly positively associated with alexithymia (Wastell & Booth, 
2003).
There is an abundance of literature discussing Machiavellianism in terms of 
evolutionary psychology, including theories regarding its importance in our 
evolutionary history. Evolutionary psychologists contend that it has been a necessary 
mechanism in human evolution and theorise that the manipulative abilities of these 
individuals evolved due to intense competition for resources in social situations. 
Indeed, some theorists have even taken this theory a step further and refer to this 
ability as ‘Machiavellian intelligence’. So-called Machiavellian intelligence, 
according to their view, evolved when individuals or ‘social competitors’ competed 
for resources and developed increasingly sophisticated strategies to achieve higher 
social and reproductive success (Gavrilets, Vose & Ohta, 2006; Whiten & Byrne,
1997). This view may be affording the Machiavellian more credit than he is due, so 
to speak, as Machiavellianism does not necessarily lead to real-world success 
(Wilson, Near & Miller, 1996). Still, it is difficult to dispute the manipulative 
behaviour of an individual with this tendency.
7.2.2 Mach  & Other  A sp e c t s  o f  P e r s o na l i t y
In McHoslcey, Worzel and Szyarto’s (1998) review of the literature on 
Machiavellianism, they conclude that Mach questionnaires -  the most famous being 
Christie and Geis’ (1970) Mach IV  scales -  are actually global measures of 
psychopathy in non-clinical populations. They link Mach to primary psychopathy 
(which includes grandiose self-worth and superficial charm) and secondary 
psychopathy (including proneness to boredom, anxiety, and lack of realistic long-term 
goals). This link was also demonstrated when Mach was found to be positively 
correlated with psychoticism (P) and extraversion (E), but (surprisingly) negatively
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correlated to lie (L) scores. Gender differences also emerged, with correlations higher 
for E in males and higher for P in females (Allsop, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1991). 
Similar results were found in children, with overall Mach positively correlating to P 
(as well as neuroticism), and negatively correlating with L scores (Sutton & Keogh, 
2001). In addition, Machiavellianism has also been found to be negatively correlated 
with the Big Five Factors of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (Austin, Farrelly, 
Black & Moore, 2007; Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006; Lee & Ashton, 2005; Paulhus & 
Williams, 2002).
The issue of whether Mach is a multi-dimensional construct or a unitary one 
has caused considerable debate in the literature (Williams, Hazelton & Renshaw, 
1975; Hunter, Gerbing & Boster, 1982; Paritz, 1989). Christie and Geis (1970) 
originally incorporated into their Mach scale items which measured both dispositions 
and behaviours. Although several studies have suggested that Mach is a single factor 
(Allsopp et al, 1991; Christie & Lehman, 1970; Kno & Marsella, 1977), Fehr, Samson 
and Paulhus (1992) described Mach as two robust factors: tactics and views. A study 
by Sutton and Keogh (2001) on children revealed three main factors: lack of faith in 
human nature, distrust, and dishonesty.
The dishonest aspect of Machiavellians was also discovered in another study 
on Mach and children. Braginsky (1970) asked high and low Mach children to 
attempt to persuade middle-range Mach children to eat bitter biscuits. The high Mach 
children were demonstrated to be more persuasive than low Machs; high Machs lied 
more and their target children ate more bitter biscuits.
Given the Mach’s tendency toward distrust and dishonesty, the previously 
mentioned negative relationship between Machiavellianism and lie (L) scores may 
reflect a Mach’s decisions regarding when it would be most beneficial for him/her to 
lie. Perhaps the high Mach individual generally tells the truth regarding trivial 
transgressions and commits these transgressions more often, which would result in 
low (L) scores. Another explanation may exist in the Mach’s manipulative 
tendencies. As demonstrated in the bitter biscuit study, Machs -  even as children -  
tend to be quite manipulative, and one might speculate that Machs may obtain a 
certain satisfaction from the manipulation of others. Thus, in situations in which the 
Mach is able to manipulate other people by lying, they may do so readily.
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One study attempted to link Mach and its associated emotional manipulation 
to emotional intelligence, but was (for the most part) unsuccessful (Austin, Farrelly, 
Black, & Moore, 2007). Using the MSCEIT (Mayer et al, 2002) and the Bar-On 
EQi:S (Bar-On, 1997) to measure performance and self-report El respectively, they 
found a negative correlation between Mach (as measured by the Mach IV) and both 
types of EL As expected, emotional manipulation was positively associated with 
Mach; however, the authors found no association between emotional manipulation 
and EI.
7.2.3 Mach,  Theory  o f  Mind,  & D e c o d i n g
The emotional manipulation of others appears to be a dominant feature of the 
Machiavellian personality. This connection between emotional manipulation and the 
Mach individual might lead one to speculate that high Machs would have strong 
‘mind-reading’ abilities -  referred to as the Theory of Mind -  since this ability might 
be useful in manipulating others. However, results have been mixed in this area. 
Several studies found a positive relationship between Mach & ‘mind-reading’ or 
Theory of Mind (Davis & Stone, 2003; Sutton, 2001). In a recent study, though, no 
significant relationship was found between Mach & TOM (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007).
A theory has been proposed regarding types of empathy that may partially 
explain the varying results on studies of Mach and Theory of Mind. The concepts of 
‘cold’ and ‘hot’ empathy have been introduced (Davis & Kraus, 1991; Mclllwain, 
2003) in the field of prosocial behaviour. ‘Cold’ empathy refers to a primarily 
cognitive process in which the individual understands what may have caused the 
other’s present situation (e.g. the losses, disappointments or deficiencies); however in 
this type of empathy, the individual does not share the other person’s emotional state. 
This is akin to a perspective-taking without the associated emotions.
In ‘hot’ empathy, on the other hand, the individual does experience the other’s 
emotional state, often leading to a desire to come to his/her assistance when the other 
is distressed. Paal and Bereczkei (2007) suggest that the Machiavellian may 
experience ‘cold’ empathy; since a certain amount of comprehension of another’s 
emotional state may be beneficial to the Mach in manipulating the other individual.
The ability to recognise facial expressions of emotion, or decoding, would 
seem a logical place to start when considering the Mach’s interpersonal skills. 
However, there have been varying results in this area, with the majority leading one to
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conclude that high Machs are not particularly effective decoders. Several studies 
found no relationship between Mach and nonverbal receiving skills (Golombek, 2007; 
Manstead, Wagner, & MacDonald, 1986); in addition, a few studies discovered a 
negative correlation between Mach and the ability to recognise facial expressions of 
emotion (Mcllwain, 2003; Simon, Francis, & Lombardo, 1990). Similarly, a negative 
correlation was found between psychopathy and identification of facial expressions of 
emotion (Hastings, 2005).
7.2.4 Mach  & De ce p t i on
Studies examining Machiavellianism and deception have garnered a fair 
amount of attention in the literature, presumably due to the high Mach’s primary aim 
of achieving one’s goal at whatever means necessary. Geis and Moon (1981) found 
lying high Machs to be believed more than low Machs, and also discovered that high 
Machs were more difficult to judge than low Machs. Christie and Geis (1970) also 
demonstrated that high Machs were more willing and able con artists than low Machs.
On the other hand, contrasting results regarding the deception ability of high 
Machs were demonstrated in which high Machs were not more believed than low 
Machs (Geis & Leventhal, 1970; Kraus, Geller, & Olson, 1976). The contrasting 
results may be related to the level of anxiety elicited in their respective studies. Geis 
and Moon’s (1981) study involved a more realistic appearing situation, which would 
generally elicit more anxiety than in a more staged-type laboratory setting. Indeed, it 
appears that high Machs are more successful at lying than low Machs when certain 
states (such as anxiety) may distract the individual (Geis, Weinheimer, & Berger, 
1970; Geis & Christie, 1970). Thus high Machs may be more successful at 
controlling emotion when deceiving others.
Whilst the deception ability of Machiavellianism has been examined, the 
literature appears rather scarce regarding the Mach’s ability to detect deception in 
nonverbal communication. Berger (1977) examined Machiavellianism and deception 
detection ability using a decoding task in two populations. When examining Mach in 
a population of participants with normal hearing, Berger found no relationship 
between Machiavellianism and ability to detect deceptive nonverbal communication. 
However, when studying a deaf population of participants, a significant correlation 
was discovered between Machiavellianism and deception detection in a decoding 
task. Presumably, hearing-impaired individuals are more attuned to nonverbal
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communication than the general population, as they must utilise their other senses 
more than non-hearing impaired individuals. Still, this type of finding may lead one 
to hypothesise that Machiavellian type individuals may be more attuned to nonverbal 
deceptive communication of others than the general population. Since the high Mach 
individual would be more invested in deceiving others (as a means of achieving 
his/her goals), it is reasonable to assume that this person might also be more adept at 
detecting deception in others, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Mach individual 
tends to be distrustful of others and presumably would not want others to take 
advantage of him/her; one technique to avoid this situation would be the ability to 
detect another’s deception. Secondly, the Mach individual may believe that learning 
the deceptive techniques of others could improve their own deceptive abilities.
The individual with a high degree of Machiavellianism is one who is 
dominated by a goal of self-interest and manipulation of others. The high Mach does 
not appear to be an especially effective facial decoder in general; however, they 
presumably have an investment in the ability to deceive others and the ability to 
detect when they themselves are being deceived. Thus, the ability of high Mach 
individuals to detect deceptive nonverbal communication in others is an intriguing 
possibility and warrants further investigation.
7 .2.5 S ummar y
Therefore, the present thesis (in part) attempts to address this apparent gap in 
the literature regarding the ability of those individuals high in Machiavellianism to 
detect deceptive nonverbal behaviour in others. Specifically, the present thesis 
hypothesises that Machiavellians will be more effective at detecting faked physical 
pain. The measure utilised to test this hypothesis is the previously-mentioned 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI: Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Lilienfeld & 
Widows, 2005), which contains a content scale entitled ‘Machiavellian 
Egocentricity’.
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C H A P T E R  8: PA IN  J U D G M E N T
o
8.1 Bac kgr ou nd
The expression of pain has been approached from a variety of perspectives 
over a period of many years. Pain has been defined as “an unpleasant sensory and 
emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described 
in terms of such damage” (IASP, 1979). The suffering associated with physical (or 
emotional) pain has been defined as “a state of severe distress associated with events 
that threaten the intactness of the person” (Turk & Okifuji, 1999, p. 1785).
It could certainly be argued that the ability to feel pain is a self-protection 
method that assists in ensuring the survival of our species. The ability to effectively 
convey pain to other individuals, then, is likely to be another evolutionary form of 
ensuring survival. However, not only is the ability to express (or encode) pain to 
others important, but the ability to determine (or decode) facial expressions of pain in 
others is equally important in our evolutionary history.
A subset of this ability that has been studied in recent years is one which 
distinguishes between genuine pain and faked or malingered pain. Malingering has 
been defined as “the conscious and purposeful faking of a symptom to achieve some 
benefit, usually financial” (Turk & Okufug, 1999, p. 1786). This ability to distinguish 
between real and malingered pain has practical applications, such as in clinical and 
medical situations, and is a tool that would be especially useful to physicians and 
nurses. In addition, the ability to determine real versus faked or malingered pain 
expressions extends to fraudulent medical claims, including court testimony regarding 
such claims.
The ‘pain’ section of the present thesis begins by examining various theories 
of pain behaviour and pain expression. Subsequent to the theory discussion, two 
judgment models of nonverbal communication will be examined, followed by a 
model designed specifically for the present study. Additionally, pain studies will be 
addressed, as well as an examination of the concept of empathy for pain.
8.2 Pain E x p re s s i on  The or i es
There are numerous perspectives and theories regarding the facial expression 
of pain. A decidedly evolutionary approach to pain expressions is proposed by
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Williams (2002), who believes the best protection for survival is provided by 
suffering. Williams takes an adaptionist view, and proposes that the experience of 
pain prompts harm avoidance, allows us to distinguish harmful from harmless 
situations, motivates us to escape from danger, and promotes our healing by inhibiting 
other behaviours that would cause further physical harm (Bateson, 1991).
Another theory of pain behaviour that has been proposed is the operant model 
of pain behaviour (Fordyce et al, 1968). This behaviourist theory of pain behaviour 
states that pain is unknowable, and that the focus of pain research should be the 
observable, quantifiable behaviours associated with it. Operant theory states that the 
ability to simulate or amplify pain will be rewarded, whereas the ability to suppress 
pain would not be rewarded. In contrast, the cognitive approach to pain focuses on 
behaviours as driven by beliefs and their ‘emotional tone’ (such as the fear that may 
be associated with it).
Associations are currently being examined between cognitive variables (such 
as beliefs or expectations) and pain behaviours, as well as emotions (such as fear or 
distress) and pain behaviours. A cognitive-behavioural approach is proposed by 
Vlaeyen and Linton (2000) that examines escape and avoidance behaviours when 
threatened with increasing pain. An additional theory, the gate control theory 
(Melzack & Wall, 1965) focuses on the brain’s pain signals and the effect on this 
signal by the transmission of prior learning and memories.
Williams proposes that an evolutionary psychology perspective on pain 
expression should encompass all of the above (i.e., the cognitive, emotional and 
motivational dimensions), and views pain expression as focused on the behavioural 
control mechanisms that process and respond to adaptively significant information. 
Interestingly, Williams cautions against using descriptions of pain expressions to 
attempt to distinguish real from faked pain, especially in a clinical setting, and cites 
examples of patient-blaming when the expected pain expressions do not correspond 
with the actual pain expressions, which may result in treatment failure (Armstrong,
1984). Regarding the ability to fake or simulate pain expressions, Williams believes 
that evolutionary psychology provides a useful perspective, as well, given that the 
ability to detect simulated or faked pain would allow for the individual to decide 
whether to conserve or spend precious resources.
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8.3 Pa in  C o mm un i c a t i o n  Mode l s
8.3.1 R o se n t h a l  ’s Mode l  o f  NV C  J u d g m e n t  S t ud i es
Rosenthal has been one of the leaders in nonverbal communication (NVC) 
research for decades. It is fitting, then, that the basis for much research on (and other 
models of) nonverbal behaviour is Rosenthal’s (1982) ‘Judgment Study Model.’ His 
model states that an encoder is characterized by one or more attributes A) (such as 
underlying states or traits), which are observed by a decoder, who makes a judgement 
Q , based on the encoder’s behaviour B).
A —  —-------------—► B    —  ► C
Encoder Encoder Nonverbal Decoder
State Behaviour Judgement
Figure 5: Rosenthal's NVC Model
A) The encoder’s attribute or underlying state
B) The encoder’s nonverbal behaviour
C) The decoder’s judgment about the encoder’s state (i.e. pain/no pain in the
present study).
8.3 .2  Pr kach i n  and  C r a i g ’s Pain  Com mu ni ca t io n  Mo d e l
Prkachin and Craig (1995) propose a model of pain judgment based on 
Rosenthal’s (1982) model of conducting judgment studies. Their model builds upon 
Rosenthal’s model of nonverbal communication, with a focus on the communication 
and interpretation of pain. The three processes they propose are the A) experience of 
pain, B) encoding of pain, and C) decoding of pain. Put simply, the individual 
experiences pain that exceeds threshold level, encodes this experience, and then an 
observer decodes the facial expression of pain.
The first step in the equation is that an episode of pain occurs via a painful 
stimulus. Through nociception, the pain experience is transmitted to the brain and 
becomes a psychological experience. This experience is translated into facial 
expressions, which encode the pain information. The resulting pain expression is then 
decoded (detected and inteipreted) by observers.
Prkachin and Craig admit that psychological (intrinsic) factors, as well as 
extrinsic factors (such as social variables) may affect the process. For instance, they 
cite examples in which individuals may suppress their pain symptoms to be a “good
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patient.” Another example they cite was a patient who had a painful injury, however, 
at the moment of testing by a health-care professional, she did not happen to have 
pain. Consequently, she assumed the appearance of pain as she usually experienced it 
for the clinician. This led the physician to (erroneously) conclude that she was 
malingering her pain. Another patient’s test revealed no reasons to account for his 
pain, so the clinician concluded that his pain was “psychogenic.” The patient died 
soon afterwards, due to an untreated bowel obstruction.
Intrinsic factors affecting the encoding of pain include personality variables, 
such as health anxiety or hypochondrias (Hadjistaropoulos & Craig, 1994), and 
coping styles, such as having a resourceful vs. a catastrophic coping style. Extrinsic 
characteristics include factors such as a patient taking analgesic drugs, for instance. 
Additionally, Prkachin and Craig also discuss what they refer to as the ‘gain function’ 
(i.e. what the encoder has to gain from displaying or not displaying pain). The gain 
function of individual patients might include factors such as displaying increased 
expressions of pain in order to obtain attention, or conversely, feeling pain and not 
displaying it, if an individual desires to take a ‘stiff upper lip’ approach or appear 
hardy.
8.3.3 M o d i f i e d  M ode l  f o r  the P r es e n t  S tudy
Prkachin & Craig’s model is a detailed model of pain expression. However, it 
fails to address a vital aspect of the present study, specifically that the present study 
examines pain-faking. In contrast, Rosenthal’s classic model is elegant in its 
simplicity, which explains why it has been the basis for other NVC research models. 
However, it has been slightly modified to fit the present study. Figure 6 illustrates a 
modified version designed to fit the present study.
In the present model, an encoder is characterized by one or more attributes 
A) (in this case, feeling pain or not feeling pain). The encoder then displays a facial 
expression or nonverbal behaviour B) (in this case, either a genuine pain expression 
or a faked pain expression). Based upon their own personality characteristics C), a 
judgment is made by the decoder D) regarding the encoder’s underlying state 
(whether the encoder is faking or in genuine pain).
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8.4 Pain Enc od i ng  & D eco di ng  Studies
The above modified pain judgment model will be utilised to more deeply 
understand the present thesis. In addition, it is useful to review previous pain 
expression (encoding) studies, as well as pain judgment (decoding) studies. Many of 
these studies use the Facial Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman & Friesen, 1978), 
which is widely used in facial expression research. The FACS is a coding system that 
divides facial actions into discreet facial movements that can be objectively measured. 
This system has been used to examine the specific facial action movements involved 
in the expression of pain.
8.4.1 Pain  E n c o d i n g  S t ud i es
Le Resche (1982) was one of the first to examine the FACS of individuals in 
pain, and analysed candid photographs of patients in extreme pain (in childbirth, non­
anaesthetized surgery patients, and those with serious injuries). Le Resche found the 
specific facial actions of pain to be brow lowering, tightly closed eyes, open mouth, 
and furrowed brows. ‘Core’ pain-related facial actions have been commonly found to 
be the following: lowered brow, raised cheeks, tightened eye lids, a raised upper lip or 
opened mouth, nose wrinkle, and closed eyes or blinking (Craig, Hyde, & Patrick, 
1991; Galin & Thorn, 1993; Prkachin & Mercer, 1989). In faked (posed) pain, on the 
other hand, individuals displayed cheek raise, lip corner pull and brow raise more 
frequently than in genuine pain faces (Craig et al, 1991).
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8 . 4 . 1 . 1  P e r s o n a l i t y  T r a i t s , C o p i n g  S t y l e , a n d  F a c i a l
E x p r e s s i o n  o f  P a i n
The present thesis examines the relationship between personality traits and the 
ability to detect pain-faking facial expressions. When one views the video clips of 
targets who are either faking or in genuine pain, one generally finds differences in the 
expression of pain -  across genders, ethnicities and individual personalities. For 
instance, it was discovered by viewing the video clips that certain individuals in the 
videos (mainly females) would laugh, giggle, or smile during either the pain condition 
or the faking condition. Therefore, a relevant area of research to examine would be 
those that study individual and personality differences, and their relationship to the 
facial expression of pain and negative affect.
One such study was conducted by Alvarado and Harris (2004) that examined 
whether coping style would have an effect on reaction to three different emotion- 
evoking conditions: tickle, pain (using a cold pressor apparatus, as in the present 
study) and humour. Harris and Alvarado specifically examined whether the 
repressive-defensive coping style, as measured by the Weinberger Adjustment 
Inventor (WAI) (Weinberger & Schwartz, 1990) would show increased smiling or 
decreased facial activity while experiencing a physiological stressor. Additionally, 
they also set out to study whether coping style in general would demonstrate 
relationships between self-reported affect and facial activity.
Previous studies on the repressive style of coping have found that repressives 
tend to verbally deny a physiological stressor, and yet show strong physiological 
reaction to the stressor. Sensitised individuals, on the other hand, seem to show an 
opposite reaction: they report high levels of stress that appear to be unsupported by 
physiological response (Byrne, 1961; Walbott & Scherer, 1991). The previous 
research has been mixed, though, on the issue of facial activity. Walbott and Scherer 
(1991) did not find support for the assumption that repressors would show decreased 
facial activity (suppressing facial expressions of distress) while sensitized subjects 
would show greater facial activity.
Thus, Harris and Alvarado decided to examine coping style and reactions to 
emotion-evoking conditions, using the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory (WAI). 
The WAI measures two constructs, distress and restraint, and classifies individuals 
into six categories of coping styles: 1) reactive, 2) sensitive, 3) over socialised, 4)
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under socialised, 5) self-assured, and 6) repressive. Regarding the ‘Big Five’ 
personality factors, they conceptualize restraint as similar to agreeableness and 
conscientiousness, and distress is viewed as similar to neuroticism and negative 
affectivity, along with a low well-being dimension.
Given that they view inhibition of facial activity as a coping mechanism, 
Alvarado and Hams hypothesised that those individuals scoring higher in restraint 
would also inhibit their facial activity. They also predicted that those with repressive- 
defensive coping styles would delay reporting pain, and rate lower on distress during 
pain. Additionally this group was expected to display less facial activity during the 
tickling condition, and report low distress during tickling. Repressors were also 
predicted to show no differences in the humour condition from the self-assured 
subjects. This is based on the assumption that repressors use denial of distress as a 
control mechanism, and also due to a desire for social acceptance.
The study involved three conditions. In the tickle condition, the participant 
was tickled on their sides (from their waist to their armpits) for a period of ten 
seconds. In the humour condition, subjects listened to comedy (twelve jokes by 
various comedians). In the pain condition, a cold pressor type apparatus was used, in 
which the participants submerged their left hand in a bucket of cold water ( 1 - 5  
degrees Celsius). The participants were instructed to press a button when the 
condition became painful, and press the button again when the pain became 
intolerable. At that point, the subject was able to remove his/her hand from the water. 
If the subject did not press the intolerable button after three minutes, they were 
instructed to remove their hand from the water. (Oddly, this only occurred with one 
subject, who rated as a ‘sensitized’ individual on the WAI).
The Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978) was used 
to code subjects’ facial activity for all three conditions: for the tickle condition, ten 
seconds during tickling; in the humour condition, one second immediately following 
the punch line of each of the jokes; and for the pain condition, the ten seconds just 
before removing their hand from the cold water.
Participants completed a brief self-report measure regarding their subjective 
state after each condition. On a scale of 0 -  7, they rated how much they felt happy, 
angry, anxious, embarrassed and amused. They also rated how much the experience 
was unpleasant and painful, and completed a tickle inventory developed for the study.
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For the pain condition, participants also completed the McGill Pain Inventory 
(Melzack, 1987). Additionally, before experiencing the conditions, participants 
completed the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory.
In the pain condition, gender differences were discovered. The males waited 
significantly longer to press the button that indicated they were in pain. However, 
there were no significant differences regarding when they pressed the button to 
indicate that the pain was intolerable, so they did not seem more willing to tolerate 
pain. Regarding ethnicity, the majority of participants were either Asian (or Asian- 
American) (36), or Caucasian (34), out of 84 subjects. In the pain condition, 
interesting ethnic differences were discovered. Whilst there were no differences in 
latencies regarding pressing the button to indicate beginning pain, Caucasians waited 
significantly longer before pressing the button indicating intolerable pain. Alvarado 
and Harris interpreted this finding as Asians having a much higher willingness to 
tolerate pain. Another possibility, however, could be that this instead demonstrates a 
cultural difference regarding self-presentation.
There were gender differences discovered in the self-report, as well as a few 
differences with regard to ethnicity. Women rated being tickled as more ticklish and 
more unpleasant. Men reported lower pain ratings and higher amusement ratings 
during the humour condition than women. Regarding ethnic differences, Caucasians 
had higher ratings of both anger and amusement than Asians, and rated the tickle 
condition to be more pleasurable than did the Asians.
Alvarado and Harris found no significant differences between repressives and 
self-assured subjects on pain detection latency or willingness to tolerate pain, as well 
as no differences in pain self-reporting. Additionally, there were no significant 
differences found in self-report for the humour or tickle conditions, in regard to 
repressives vs. self-assured subjects.
Repressives also did not show higher frequency of smiling during the pain 
condition, as had been hypothesized. However, reactive and undersocialised subjects 
showed the highest frequencies of smiling during the pain condition. The hypothesis 
that repressives would smile to mask negative affect was found at non-significant 
levels in their correlations, but not in absolute frequencies of smiling. The repressives 
did show a moderate (but non-significant) correlation between smiling and their 
ratings on the McGill pain scale, while self-assured subjects showed no correlation,
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and oversocialised subjects showed a non-significant inverse correlation (decreased 
smiling with an increased reported pain). Additionally, reactive participants showed 
the highest correlation between self-reported pain and facial activity during the pain 
condition.
No support was found for their hypothesis that individuals with a repressive- 
defensive coping style would wait longer to report intolerable pain and rate lower 
distress on self-report of the pain condition. Additionally, there were no statistically 
significant differences found between repressor and self-assured subjects regarding 
facial action units in facial expression or self-reported affective responses to the three 
conditions. They did discover, though, that repressives had less congruence between 
their facial activity and their self-reported affect.
Alvarado and Harris’s findings suggest that those scoring high on the WAI 
self-restraint scale (repressives, self-assured, and over socialised) tend to exercise 
greater voluntary control over their facial expressions. Alvarado and Harris have a 
few explanations for this discovery. They suggest that the restraint dimension may be 
associated with greater conformance to display rules and social desirability, in that 
these individuals may modify their behaviour according to what they expect to be 
more socially acceptable behaviour.
Also, high-restraint individuals might suppress facial activity as a means of 
coping. Finally, self-report ratings and facial activity may be affected by arousal. 
Therefore, those rating high in the distress dimension (sensitised, reactive and 
oversocialised) tend to be individuals more easily aroused, and would tend to have 
correlations between facial activity and all three conditions.
8 . 4 . 1 . 2  ‘ L i a r ,  L i a r ,  P a n t s  o n  F i r e ’  -  V i d e o t a p e s  U s e d  i n  
P r e s e n t  T h e s i s
The videotapes of pain-faking used in the present thesis were video clips from 
a study of pain expressions conducted at Queen’s University in Canada by Tripp, Lee, 
Garcia-Browning, Hains and Van Horne (2004). (See ‘Methodology’ section of the 
present thesis for additional details regarding the tapes themselves and the manner in 
which they were applied in the study). It is pertinent at this time to examine the Tripp 
et al (2004) study and its findings.
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Tripp and colleagues studied sixty undergraduate participants who were all 
volunteers in the university undergraduate subject pool (thirteen men and forty-seven 
women). Three experimental conditions were applied in the study. The first 
condition was the baseline condition, in which the participant’s hand and arm were in 
warm water for sixty seconds and simply filmed ‘as is’. The second condition was 
the genuine pain condition, in which the participant’s hand and arm were placed in a 
cold pressor unit (a tub of water kept at just above freezing temperature, 3 degrees 
Celsius, for sixty seconds). The third condition was the faked pain condition, in 
which hand and arm were immersed in warm water (twenty degrees Celsius) for sixty 
seconds and the participants was instructed to fake facial expressions of pain, as if 
their hand were in freezing water. Half the participants were randomly assigned to 
the genuine pain condition followed by the deceptive condition, and the other half 
experienced the deceptive condition followed by the genuine pain condition.
Participants were videotaped during the above three conditions and the Facial 
Action Coding System (FACS) was used to code their facial expressions. Participants 
were asked to report their pain level on a scale of 0 -  10 (‘0’ being no pain and ‘10’ 
being extreme pain) at three different intervals during each video clip (at 5, 30, & 58 
seconds). In the faked pain condition, participants were asked to report a faked pain 
level.
Tripp and colleagues sought to address several hypotheses in their study. 
Firstly, they examined whether there were differences in facial action units (using the 
FACS) between faked pain and genuine pain. Secondly, they sought to examine 
whether there were differences in the number of facial expressions of pain over time. 
Lastly, they wondered if there were gender differences in the facial expression of 
pain.
Not surprisingly, the study revealed definite gender differences in the facial 
expression of pain. While both men and women displayed more eyelid tightening and 
lip tightening in the faked pain condition than in the genuine pain condition, women 
exhibited differences in lip biting and brow lowering, as well. Furthermore, women 
exhibited significantly more facial pain expressions than men, and reported 
significantly more pain than men.
Additionally, they discovered specific A.U.s (Facial Action Units) associated 
with pain-faking, which were ‘lid tightening’, Tip tightening’, Tip suck’, and ‘brow
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lowering’. These action units were shown to be specifically displayed in the faked 
pain condition, as opposed to the genuine pain condition. In the genuine pain 
condition, on the other hand, ‘cheek raise’ and Tip corner pull’ were displayed more 
often.
In addition, Tripp and colleagues did find evidence to support the hypothesis 
that pain expressions change over time. The 60-second pain condition was divided 
into three intervals (the first 20 seconds, the middle 20 seconds, and the last 20 
seconds). In the deceptive (faked) pain condition, the ‘brow lowering’ AU was 
displayed significantly less during interval 1 (first 20 seconds) than interval 3 (last 20 
seconds). In addition, while faking pain, ‘lid tightening’ was displayed less during 
interval 1 and 2 than during interval 3. In addition, differences over time were 
discovered in the genuine pain condition. ‘Cheek raise’ was displayed significantly 
differently during all three time periods, and Tip corner pull’ was displayed 
significantly more during interval 1 than during intervals 2 and 3. Thus, there was 
evidence to support all three of Tripp et al.’s hypotheses regarding the facial 
expressions of genuine and faked pain.
8.4 .2  Pain  De co d i n g  (Judgment )  S tud ies
w The above study demonstrated that there are facial expression differences 
between faked and genuine pain, which is echoed in additional research in this area. 
In a recent study by Hill and Craig (2002), the FACS was used to examine the 
differences between genuine and faked pain. The facial expressions of low back pain 
patients were filmed at rest and while undergoing a painful leg-raise. Patients were 
asked either to genuinely express their pain, fake pain while not moving, or to pretend 
the leg-raise did not hurt (suppress their pain). Faked pain was shown to be 
exaggerated, and patients showed a greater number of pain-related facial actions, as 
well as non-pain related facial actions. The faked pain also had a longer peak 
intensity, as well as overall duration. This exaggeration or caricature of faked pain 
was discovered earlier by Craig, Hyde, and Patrick (1991), who found that 
malingering tends to fool many untrained observers.
Poole and Craig (1992) found in a study of chronic pain sufferers, observers 
were able to distinguish between baseline expressions and genuine pain expressions. 
However, judges attributed more pain to faked pain subjects and less to those who 
were suppressing pain. Judges who were given an advance warning that there could
Decem ber 2008 -  1 2 2 - Ph. D . Thesis
be deception led to a more conservative (and less empathetic) judging style, and this 
advance warning did not improve judgment. Prkachin (1992b) found that observers 
underestimate pain by as much as 80%. Health professionals appear to underestimate 
in their judgments of pain, as compared to the self-report of those experiencing pain 
(Teslce, Daut & Cleeland, 1983; Zalon, 1993). Whilst individuals who had a family 
member in pain showed an overestimation bias of pain, unfortunately health 
professionals appear to underestimate pain (Prkachin et al., 2001).
Not surprisingly, Galin and Thorn (1993) found that training judges to detect 
pain improved their accuracy. FACS training plus feedback training increased 
accuracy in identifying posed (faked) pain, while feedback training alone increased 
accuracy in identifying faked as well as genuine pain. As expected, the target’s pain 
tolerance was a factor in judges’ ability to detect pain. Regardless of judges’ training, 
those targets with low pain tolerance were easier to detect than those with high pain 
tolerance. Interestingly, Prkachin, Berzins, and Mercer (1994) discovered that 
untrained judges tend to dramatically underestimate the target’s pain level. Observers 
in this study had pain estimates that were 50-80% lower than the self-report measures 
of the subjects in pain.
In addition, it is not surprising to learn that increasing or decreasing facial 
expressions appears to affect observer judgement of pain. Keefe and Block (1982) 
discovered that the amount of guarding and grimacing by targets did affect observers’ 
judgments regarding the level of pain they rated. In addition, Lee (1986) discovered 
that increasing the number of AU’s (Action Units) per expression led to higher ratings 
of pain by judges.
8 . 4 . 2 . 1  P a i n  J u d g m e n t s  b y  H e a l t h  C a r e  P r o f e s s i o n a l s
Whilst the above pain expression studies are quite useful, a study was 
conducted that is particularly interesting due to the profession of the judges. This 
study utilised medical professionals as the judges and examined the degree to which 
pain expressions resemble or differ from other facial expressions of emotion. The 
researchers (Kappesser & Williams, 2002) examined the accuracy of judges’ ratings 
regarding whether individuals were displaying pain expressions as opposed to other 
negative emotions, namely anger, fear, sadness, surprise, disgust, and embarrassment.
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Their sample consisted of health care professionals (nurses and physicians) working 
in the Accident and Emergency (ER) Departments in two London hospitals.
Researchers used photographs generated on the basis of emotion prototypes 
using the FACS. In addition to emotion expressions, the photographs included pain 
expressions, and participants were asked to imagine that the individuals in the 
photographs were patients in the ER.
The study consisted of two parts. In the first half of the study, participants 
were asked to judge and compare each possible pair of the seven photos on their 
similarity or dissimilarity with pain. They were presented with rating scales and 
asked to rate the photos on an 11 point scale from ‘exactly the same’ to ‘completely 
different.’ In the second part of the study, participants were asked to identify the 
facial expression of emotion displayed on each photo. (This was essentially a 
validity-check). Additionally, they were asked to rate their confidence in each 
decision.
Sixty physicians and nurses participated in the study, of which 68% were 
women and 73% were nurses. Identification of the pain face was good to moderate 
(58.8%), however, as expected, not as high as identification of emotions. 
Participants’ confidence levels approximated their accuracy in identification. There 
was a substantial correlation between their confidence levels and their accuracies, and 
confidence levels were lower for those who identified pain incorrectly.
The study provides some support for the identification of the facial pain 
expression. The fact that the sample of participants consisted solely of health care 
providers who were exposed to pain expressions on a daily basis has both positive and 
negative implications. It would be difficult to apply the study to the general 
population, as this is a select group of participants who are far more exposed to pain 
expressions than the general public. Therefore, it would be expected that their 
accuracy rates in pain judgment would be higher than that of the general public. 
However, if the goal is to apply the study in a practical manner to the health care 
field, this is certainly a population, and a study, that would be useful.
8 . 4 . 2 . 2  C r i t i c i s m  o f  F a c i a l  P a i n  E x p r e s s i o n  S t u d i e s
As in any field of study in psychology, there is rarely complete agreement 
regarding the most effective manner of conducting pain expression studies. In
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addition to her evolutionary theory of pain expressions discussed earlier in this thesis, 
Williams (2002) also addresses the issue of the pain expression studies themselves, 
and proposes that there are three main problems with these studies. Williams 
contends that the FACS (Facial Action Coding System) method does not measure 
aspects of pain expression such as speed, timing, and asymmetry of expression. Also, 
she is concerned that faked pain expressions in a laboratory setting may introduce 
elements of deception, such as shame or guilt. However, outside of the laboratory 
environment, the individual in a real life setting attempting to fake pain expressions 
might very well have the same feelings of shame or guilt (unless the individual is 
sociopathic). Therefore, this argument does not necessarily seem to ‘hold water’. 
The third problem Williams has with pain faking research is that it is conducted in the 
laboratory itself. An evolutionary perspective, she states, argues for a naturalistic 
setting.
Additionally, Williams contends that characteristics of the judge as well as 
contextual variables may affect the judge’s ratings of the target’s pain. For example, 
a study of physicians’ pain ratings found that these ratings may be affected by their 
beliefs about other factors in the patient’s life, such as the subject’s employment 
status and risks of opiate addiction (Carey et al, 1988; Marks & Sachar, 1973). 
Physicians also rate less pain for more physically attractive patients than for less 
attractive patients (Hadjistavropoulos et al, 1995).
Another point that Williams discusses regarding the problem with this type of 
research in a lab environment is the fact that the pain expression portrayed in a lab 
involves volunteer participants, in which the situation is controlled and predictable. 
Due to the predictable and controlled nature of the (artificial) lab environment, it is 
therefore not a threatening or emotionally charged situation, as would occur in real 
life.
However, Williams’s views on this topic are not without their critics. 
Whereas Williams has a definite evolutionary perspective in her approach to pain 
expressions, Harris and Alvarado approach facial expression from a social psychology 
and individual differences perspective. Harris and Alvarado (2002) disagree with 
Williams’ evolutionary perspective on pain expressions and critique Williams’s 
assessment of pain studies. They believe that Williams’s proposal that there exists
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specific adaptations for pain expression and detection is premature, and base their 
assertion on individual differences in this ability.
Harris and Alvarado state that in order to view pain expression as 
evolutionarily-based, the pain action units (AUs) must be 1) co-occurring, 2) visible 
among a certain amount of subjects, 3) brought on by a variety of pain-evoking 
stimuli. In addition, individuals must be able to clearly differentiate these expressions 
from other expressions and Harris and Alvarado have not found evidence to support 
the above points. Additionally, they contend that Williams’s statements that the 
FACS coding system cannot be used to record onset or offset times, durations, co­
occurrence of AUs, asymmetries or other subtleties occurring in dynamic stimuli 
appear to be contradicted by Ekman and Rosenberg (1997), Ekman (1997a), and the 
FACS manual.
8.5 Empa thy  for  Pain
It is difficult to dispute the assumption that humans are social and empathetic 
creatures. Evolutionary psychologists might state that this social nature is a 
requirement for our historic evolution. Social psychologists, on the other hand, might 
express the view that we are simply social beings with social interaction needs. 
Whether one argues from an evolutionary perspective, from a social psychology 
standpoint, or from some other viewpoint, it is nonetheless a difficult assumption to 
dispute. Therefore, when one examines the pain expression research, it is quite 
interesting to discover a phenomenon that reflects this social and sympathetic nature 
of humans. It is fascinating to find that when individuals view facial expressions of 
emotion in others, an emotional response is triggered in the observer that mirrors the 
emotion of the person displaying that emotion (Wild et al., 2001).
Neuropsychological researchers term this concept ‘emotional contagion’, in 
which observing or imagining another person in a particular emotional state will, in a 
sympathetic response, automatically activate areas in the brain associated with that 
emotional state (Carr et al, 2003; Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Wicker et al., 2003). 
Craig and Wood, in a cold pressor experiment, discovered that the physiological 
reactions (GSR & heart rate) activated in those observing the target person (in the 
cold pressor) were the same or even a stronger physiological reaction than the 
individual whose hand was actually in the ice-cold water (Craig & Wood, 1970). A
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similar empathetic reaction of those observing a target in pain occurred in an 
experiment by Lemineur and Meurice (1972).
This aspect of so-called emotional contagion - or rather empathy to pain - was 
investigated in a recent study of couples’ empathy for pain in their partner (Singer, 
Seymour, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan, & Frith, 2004). According to their research, 
empathy for pain was demonstrated to activate certain parts of the brain associated 
with the pain experience itself. In the fMRI study, Singer and colleagues discovered 
that part, but not all, of the brain’s ‘pain matrix’ was activated by empathy.
Previous studies have shown that noxious stimuli consistently activate the 
following areas of the brain: the secondary somatosensoiy cortex (SII), insular 
regions, the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), the movement-related areas such as the 
cerebellum and supplementary motor areas and, less robustly, the thalamus and the 
primary somatosensory cortex (SI) (Davis, 2000; Peyron et al., 2000). This has been 
labelled the ‘pain matrix.’
Singer and colleagues (2004) studied sixteen couples, in which the participants 
(the female partner) observed their romantic partner receiving a painful stimulus to 
the hand. It was discovered that when this occurred, parts of the ‘pain matrix’ in the 
brain of the observer would be activated in an empathetic response.
Participants were also given two questionnaires: the Balanced Emotional 
Empathy Scale (Mehabian, 1972, 1997) and the Empathic Concern Scale, which is a 
subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). The researchers 
discovered a relationship between empathy-related pain activity in the brain and 
individual differences in empathy, as demonstrated on the two scales.
However, there were problems with the study. The sample population was 
small (consisting of 16 apparently heterosexual couples), and the observer was always 
the female partner. Certainly future research in this area should include a larger and 
more diverse sample, in which both male and female partners are the observers, as 
gender differences will need to be examined. Additionally, friends and relatives, as 
well as homosexual couples, could be tested. Moreover, it would be fascinating to 
investigate whether this response is activated in strangers.
Chapman and Nakamura (2002) propose an interesting perspective on pain 
empathy, discussing what they term ‘inter-subjectivity.’ They remind us that we 
should not forget about the social nature of expressing pain, the adaptive role that
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empathy plays and the aspect of ‘second-person consciousness.’ Whilst pain may or 
may not always trigger a physiological response in the observer, people do tend to 
identify with the agony and to empathise with the person displaying the pain.
From the perspective of consciousness, Chapman and Nakamura discuss three 
positions of human consciousness that they relate to empathy for pain. The first 
position (first-person) is the individual’s own reality, which only that individual can 
experience. The third-person position would be describing an individual from the 
outside or behavioural observation. Lastly, the second-person position is a shared 
awareness between individuals, based in empathy. They propose that the 
evolutionary study of pain expressions should be studied in terms of 1) the extent to 
which facial expression is a mechanism of empathy and second-person consciousness,
2) the reasons empathy exists, and 3) the reason(s) that empathy is socio-biologically 
important.
8.6 Summary
The ability to accurately distinguish between genuine and malingered physical 
pain would thus be useful in a variety of clinical and social settings. However, 
individual personality differences in this ability have not been previously empirically 
examined. Thus, the present study attempts to bridge this gap in the literature by 
addressing a variety of individual personality differences in regards to this ability.
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CHAPTER 9: DECEPTION THEORY & SIGNAL 
DETECTION THEORY
9.1 Decep t i on  R es ea r ch  & Theor i es
“I f  his Ups are silent he chatters with his fingertips; betrayal oozes out o f him at every 
pore” (Freud, 1905).
9.1.1 B a c k g r o u n d
The present study seeks to examine individual differences in the ability to 
detect deceptive behaviour. Therefore, the field of deception detection is a relevant 
area of theory and research to examine.
Whilst the above quote by Freud appears whimsical, if not cynical, it reminds 
us that deception is not a new area of psychology. In recent years, however, research 
in deception has increased, as well as its detection through nonverbal (and verbal) 
behaviour. Deception has been defined as a deliberate attempt to mislead others 
(DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003). The ability to 
detect deception or lying in others has important practical applications. Applications 
of deception detection include court testimony (of adults and children), job interviews 
and interviewing crime suspects, as well as use by customs officers and other 
government agents. In fact, deception detection in a broad sense has become an 
important research area since terrorism has become an increased concern world-wide. 
Additionally, detecting pain malingering specifically would be beneficial to 
clinicians, who may then focus their efforts on those who are genuinely in need.
Studies on the detection of deception include physiological (skin) responses in 
deception, including that of the ‘lie-detector’ test used in the courtroom, as well as 
deception detection in police interviews of criminals. In addition, a fair amount of 
research has been conducted on ‘leakage’ or nonverbal clues that leak out during 
deception.
It has become widely accepted that in the majority of situations, the body 
provides physiological clues to deceptiveness. These nonverbal clues to deception 
have been discovered in meta-analyses to include reduced smiling, more postural 
shifts, gaze aversion, latency, unfilled pauses, pupil dilation, higher voice pitch, 
increased blinking, and slower speech (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Zuclcerman & Driver,
1985). Additionally, Ekman, Friesen and Scherer (1976) discovered in a study of
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student nurses that voice pitch increased while gestures decreased during deceptive 
behaviour. In a meta-analyis by DePaulo and Morris (2004), mixed results were 
found regarding predictors of deception. Not surprisingly, though, they did find 
increased pupil dilation, and found that liars appear more nervous and less relaxed 
than truth tellers, with higher pitched voices.
Studies including that of DeTurck and Millers (1985) indicate that 
physiological (skin) arousal occurs during deception. Studies such as theirs have led 
to the use of the skin-response test, as well as the ‘lie-detector’ test. Other forensic 
application studies of deception include Hall’s (1986) on ‘forensic distortion analysis’ 
(FDA), which involves procedures used to identify deception in criminals, as well as 
the discovery of fewer bodily movements of deceptive individuals in police 
interviews (Vrij & Winlcel, 1993).
However, previous research on the ability to detect lying (from a combination 
of verbal and nonverbal communication cues) by the general public has not shown 
terribly impressive accuracy rates. According to Kraut (1980), lie detection studies of 
average, untrained observers and of professional lie detectors (mainly law 
enforcement personnel) revealed rates of 45-60% accuracy.
Ekman, one of the leaders in the field of deception detection research, stated 
that there are few human relationships that do not involve deceit or the possibility of 
deceit (Ekman, 1985). Whilst this view may be a bit cynical, certainly many 
deceptions are less harmful than others, such as a Tittle white lie’ told to spare a loved 
one’s feelings. Ekman has extensively studied deceptive behaviour, and has found 
that facial and vocal cues may provide an accurate identification of ‘leakage’ or clues 
to deception (Ekman, 1989). Not surprisingly, he discovered that the U.S. Secret 
Service is one group that tends to be one of the most adept at picking up these cues, as 
they are trained extensively in this area.
Perhaps there are certain characteristics that comprise an effective lie-detector. 
Qualities of an effective lie-detector include the following, according to Ekman 
(1985): 1) The ability to maintain an open mind and resist temptation to “freeze” on 
an initial perception of the target person, and to avoid remaining locked into a 
decision of deception. 2) Effective lie detectors use flexible decision criteria, not 
adhering strictly to certain criteria such as lack of eye contact, for instance. 3) Skilled
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lie-detectors stay highly focused while making a decision regarding whether an 
individual is deceiving or not, and continue a high level of concentration on the task.
Ekman and Friesen (1969) discussed two categories of cues when describing 
deception, leakage cues and deception cues. Leakage cues tend to Teak out’ the 
information the individual is attempting to hide, or the emotions they are currently 
experiencing. These leakage cues include the micro-momentary expressions (micro 
affect displays) that leak out. Deception cues appear to be more general, and may 
reveal that an individual is attempting to hide or deceive, but do not necessarily reveal 
the nature of the information concealed.
Ekman contends that leakage cues include micro-expressions (facial 
expressions lasting less than 1/5 of a second) which leak out emotions that an 
individual is attempting to conceal, such as guilt or anger. However, it is important to 
note that signs of emotion are not always signs of guilt. For instance, an innocent 
person may be apprehensive, which could be interpreted as guilty behaviour.
Deceptive behaviour is approached from an interpersonal perspective in 
Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Buller, Burgoon, 
Buslig, & Roiger, 1995; Burgoon & Buller, 1994). This theory proposes that the 
deceiver is continually monitoring the individual (or ‘target’) they are attempting to 
deceive, and then adjusting their behaviour accordingly. The authors suggest that the 
deceptive behaviours lessen over time during the interaction, as the deceiver acquires 
more feedback, makes more adjustments, and gains further control over their 
performance. Their research has uncovered cues to deceptive behaviour, including 
deceivers acting rather uncertain in their interpersonal interaction, as well as being 
vague, reticent, withdrawn and showing more negative affect.
Zuckerman et al. (1981) discussed four factors that may be used to predict 
cues to deception: generalised arousal, the affect experienced during deception, 
cognitive aspects of deception, and attempts to control behaviour in order to maintain 
the deception. A meta-analysis of deceptive behaviour (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, 
Muhlenbruclc, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003) revealed that additional factors may 
contribute to the behaviour of those involved in deception, such as motivation, 
experience at deception, and self-presentation factors.
Zuckerman and colleagues (1981) discuss behaviours indicative of guilt 
regarding lying and the fear of being caught. (Of course, the degree of guilt and fear
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varies among individuals). They believed cues indicative of distancing would be 
reflected in the deceiver’s behaviour, such as decreased eye contact and increased 
evasiveness. Zuckerman and colleagues also viewed lying as a cognitively complex 
task, requiring the individual lying to have longer response latencies, increased speech 
hesitations, increased pupil dilation, and fewer illustrators (hand movements 
accompanying speech, which are used to illustrate speech). Lastly, they suggested 
that the attempted control of verbal and nonverbal behaviours would betray their 
deception. This attempted control could result in liars being less spontaneous than 
truth tellers, and result in verbal and nonverbal discrepancies.
Similarly, Ekman (1985, 1992) approached deceptive behaviour from the 
standpoint of guilt and fear felt by the deceiver, which he refers to as fear cues and 
guilt cues. The fear cues he proposes are faster and louder speech, higher pitch, 
increased speech errors and indirect speech. Interestingly, the guilt cues he describes 
are essentially the opposite of the fear cues, and include lower pitch, softer and slower 
speech, as well as downward gazing.
DePaulo et al (2003) describe a ‘self-presentational’ approach to deception, in 
which they suggest that deception involves a certain amount of deliberateness in the 
deceiver’s actions -  a conscious control and self-presentation. In addition, the amount 
of motivation a deceiver has may affect presentation, as well. DePaulo and Morris 
(2004) have discovered a difference in the behaviour that occurs more often when 
liars are highly motivated, in which they are telling a ‘high stakes’ lie. They 
discovered that liars in these situations make notably less eye contact with listeners 
and appear unusually still.
9.1 .2  Mo ra l  Psycho l ogy ,  D e v e l o p m e n t a l  Psychology ,  and
Decep t i on
At some point in their lives, most individuals have told a lie -  whether it was a 
small ‘white lie’, ‘bending the truth’, or a large deception. The degree of seriousness 
of the deception and the amount an individual attempts to deceive could arguably fit 
into the category of moral psychology.
Lawrence Kohlberg proposed that individuals progress through various 
developmental stages in moral judgment and decision-making (Kohlberg, 1984). 
Kohlberg contends that children start at the beginning stages of moral reasoning and 
progress to higher stages as they get older. Additionally, certain individuals may end
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up at lower stages of moral development as adults, and never progress to the higher 
levels.
Certainly an argument could be made that individuals who consistently 
attempt to deceive others are stuck in the lower levels of Kohlberg’s moral stages. In 
fact, there is some evidence that suggests morality is intimately linked to individual 
differences in personality characteristics, including the ‘Big Five’ personality traits. 
Specifically, two clusters of traits were studied and linked to moral behaviour: the 
conscientiousness cluster (which includes responsibility and reliability), and the 
agreeableness cluster (including compassion, sympathy, kindness, and generosity) 
(McCrae & John, 1992). Additionally, Eysenck (1977) addressed the ‘Big 5’ and 
morality, suggesting that neurotic extraverts, assumed to be the least ‘conditionable’ 
by society, would be the most anti-social. It would not be a stretch to assume that 
anti-social individuals would include deceptive behaviour in their pattern of social 
behaviours.
A popular debate in recent years is whether Western society is in a moral 
decline. Those who believe that it is in a decline point to issues such as sex and 
violence in the media (especially television), whilst the other camp reminds us of the 
rampant violence throughout history and across the globe, including wars and 
infamous occurrences such as lions devouring Christians as a form of entertainment.
Whether or not there is a decline in morality in present times, certain social 
psychological changes undoubtedly affect our interactions with others, such as the 
shift toward individualism over the years. Emler and Hogan (1992) discuss the impact 
of individualism and liberalism on moral psychology, and argue for a re-socialisation 
of the human conscience. They suggest that more attention should be paid to the 
social control of conduct and the social aspect of moral reasoning. Importantly, 
though, they also bear in mind the impact of individual differences in their statement, 
‘At the heart of the moral life of any society is the reality of individual differences’ 
(Emler & Hogan, 1992, p. 218).
In addition, the forming of an individual’s moral life may begin in childhood -  
influenced by family members, peers, and teachers. Much attention in children’s 
deceptive behaviour has focused on children’s moral evaluations of truth- and lie- 
telling and their concepts of lying (Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997; Bussey, 
1992; Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983). A study by Talwar and Lee (2002) found
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that children were poor at semantic leakage control when they lied, which meant that 
adults were able to detect children’s deceptions through the child’s verbal statements.
9.1.3 Tools  f o r  D ecep t i on  De tec t i on
The tool most widely used by social scientists for deception detection is the 
Facial Action Coding System (FACS), which may also be used for general facial 
expression research. Ekman claims that when used correctly in deception detection, 
the FACS has accuracy rates up to 90% in detecting deception (Ekman, 1985).
9.1.4 Cr os s - Mo da l  C o n s i s t e nc y  & Decep t ion  De t ec t i on
One method of studying deception detection is to examine the consistency of a 
deceiver’s (or suspect’s) communication modalities. Modality in this context is used 
to mean the expressive channels such as an individual’s facial expressions, gestures, 
and tone of voice. It is possible to detect deception through inconsistencies in an 
individual’s simultaneous activities or modalities (Zuckerman, Driver, & Koesener, 
1982). If the individual conveys similar expressions, the cross-modal consistency of 
their behaviour is high, whereas if they convey impressions that are dissimilar, cross- 
modal consistency is low (Bokenau & Liebler, 1992b). Cross-modal inconsistency, 
therefore, may indicate deceit.
This assumption was the basis for a study by Heirich and Borlcenau (1998), 
who studied deception detection in terms of the observers’ ability to infer the target 
person’s credibility through the consistency of their actions. The study examined the 
ability of observers to infer the target’s credibility through their outward actions and 
speech, and whether these inferences are justified.
Participants in the first part of the study viewed videotapes of individuals 
reading a standard text, and in the second half of the study, participants viewed tapes 
of persons either lying or telling the truth. The participants were asked to infer the 
videotaped person’s personality traits from this information. Cross-modal 
discrepancy measures were derived from differences in personality descriptions based 
on a silent film or videotape.
Several interesting results were discovered, including that lying was found to 
be related to participants’ judgments of dishonesty and that deceptive targets 
exaggerated certain facial movements. Additionally, these judgements resulted in 
cross-modal discrepancy ratings of targets’ Agreeableness. In addition, detection of
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deception was substantial when the audio of the tape was played, and when targets 
faked their curriculum vitae.
Thus, there are aspects of the cross-modal consistency theory that may be 
useful to consider in relation to the present study on pain deception. Since the 
participants in the present study’s videotapes were not trained to display faked pain, it 
is likely that their facial expressions were not always cross-modally consistent. For 
instance, the target in the video clip might purse their mouth in an attempt to fake 
pain, whilst not changing any corresponding movements in the face, such as eye- 
tightening. Furthermore, as discovered in the Heirich and Borkenau study, deceptive 
targets may exaggerate their facial expressions of pain.
9.2 Signal  De t ec t io n  Theory
In the present thesis, participants view videotapes that have been integrated 
into a computer programme. After viewing each video clip for one minute, they are 
required to make a forced-choice decision regarding whether the target individual in 
the video is faking pain or in real pain. After they select ‘Faking Pain’ or ‘Real Pain’ 
from the drop-down computer menu, they also rate their confidence level in each 
decision on a Likert-type scale of 1-5. Using this method, participants are forced to 
choose, and are not given the option of selecting ‘I do not know.’ This method is 
based on Signal Detection Theory (SDT), a brief discussion of which follows.
Signal Detection Theory has been defined in the following manner: “A 
mathematical theory of the detection of physical signals. It is based on the 
assumption that sensitivity to a signal is not merely a result of its intensity but is also 
dependent upon the noise present, the motivation of the subject and the criterion 
which the subject sets for responding.” (Reber & Reber, 2001, p.679). Signal 
Detection Theory (SDT) begins with the assumption that almost all decision-making 
occurs in the presence of uncertainty. SDT is a means of assessing this decision­
making process for an individual deciding between two items. It assumes that there 
will be uncertainty regarding whether a signal is or is not present. SDT has been 
widely utilised in various cognitive studies, such as attention and memory research 
(DeCarlo, 2002; Dobbins, Khoe, Yonelinas & Kroll, 2000 Tyler & Chen, 2000). 
Moreover, SDT is commonly used in pain-related research (Janal, Clark & Carroll, 
1993; Prkachin, 1992a; Rollman, 1979). Thus, SDT is utilised in the present study to
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require participants to make a decision and select a response (whether the target is 
faking or in real pain), and then measure the participant’s confidence in that decision.
9.3 Summary
The present study seeks to examine individual differences in the ability to 
detect deceptive behaviour and particularly the ability to detect pain deception. Thus, 
the present study seeks to examine these differences and Signal Detection Theory was 
utilised for this purpose.
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CHAPTER 1 0: THE VIDEO S
10.1 Chap t er  Aim
The aim of this chapter is to test a core claim of the current thesis, namely that 
there are generalised individual differences in the accuracy with which facial 
expressions of pain are judged. Although previous research has confirmed the 
expectation that individuals will differ in their ability to decode or interpret facial 
expressions of emotion, the more specific hypothesis that such differences also exist 
for interpretation of pain expressions has yet to be tested.
Testing the hypothesis that individuals differ in some characteristic is 
comparable to testing the hypothesis that situations or conditions differ in their 
impact, except that with respect to the former, the process of hypothesis testing is 
seldom articulated. In classical hypothesis testing, taking a simple case in which two 
conditions are compared, the aim is to determine whether there is an effect of 
condition over and above variation due to other factors. These latter sources of 
variance are typically bundled together under the heading of error. However, 
experimental designs are generally based on the assumption that differences between 
individuals constitute a major source of this variance. Consequently, designs will 
involve sampling across several individuals in each condition such that the inter­
individual variation in each condition is comparable. Effectively this treats the 
differences between individuals as noise or error variance. Within-subject 
experimental designs capitalise on the case where this inter-individual variance is not 
random, in other words, when individuals retain approximately the same rank order 
across conditions. In other terms, such designs actually assume the reality of 
individual differences that are independent of experimental conditions.
Testing the hypothesis that individuals differ is in key respects the 
complement of the classical hypothesis testing case: with respect to individual 
differences, conditions or situations are treated as the noise or error variance to be 
controlled. The aim here is to determine whether there is an effect of “person” over 
and above variation due to other factors, where these other factors may include truly 
random variations in responses but are also expected to include variation due to task, 
test or condition. Hence the appropriate designs will sample responses across a range
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of tasks, tests or conditions, such that the inter-task variation for each individual 
respondent is comparable.
It could reasonably be argued that this approach makes no allowance for 
effects of interactions unique to specific combinations of individuals and 
tasks/conditions. The same point could be made, however, with respect to classical 
hypothesis testing. But the more relevant point is that if response patterns were 
dominated by such unique interactions, neither form of hypothesis could be 
confirmed. In neither case is one seeking to show that these unique interactions do 
not exist or play no part. Rather the objective is to determine whether, over and 
above all other sources of variation in response - including unique individual-situation 
interactions - differences are apparent either with respect to individuals or with 
respect to situations.
What, then, in research design terms does a test of hypothesised individual 
differences look like? A test strictly analogous to classical hypothesis testing might 
compare two individuals, aggregating their responses across the same or equivalent 
samples of situations (mirroring a design that compares two situations or conditions, 
aggregating responses across the same or equivalent samples of individuals). 
However, one is rarely interested in whether two specific individuals differ, and 
remember in classical hypothesis testing, one is not strictly comparing two or more 
situations or conditions, but two or more classes of situation/condition. It is proposed 
here that an appropriate design to test for individual differences entails the steps that 
would be taken to construct a reliable measure of the differences in question. This 
would involve showing that a sample of tests in aggregate forms a scale of acceptable 
reliability, and that the scale so formed is unidimensional, a quality that can be 
established by factor analysis. Note that the conventional tests of reliability do not 
by themselves establish that a scale is unidimensional.
This chapter describes a test of the hypothesis that individuals differ in the 
accuracy with which they interpret expressions of pain. This test involved the 
construction of a measure of such differences, using video clips of individuals either 
experiencing real pain or faking the expression of pain. Before describing the 
construction of this measure, and the tests of reliability and unidimensionality that 
were performed, details are given of the video clips used in the research.
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10.2 B ac kg roun d  on the Vi deos  U t i l i s ed  in the P re sen t  Thes i s
The video clips utilised in the present study were obtained from a previous
study conducted at Queen’s University, Canada (with ethics approval from the 
University Ethics Review Board) that examined faked versus real pain (Tripp, Lee, 
Garcia-Browning, Hains, & Van Horne 2004). Tripp and colleagues studied sixty-five 
undergraduate participants, fifteen males and fifty females. The majority of 
participants were Caucasian, but the sample included several Asian, Black, and 
mixed-race participants. Tripp et al applied three experimental conditions (baseline, 
genuine pain, and faked pain) to the sixty-five participants. (See Pain chapter in the 
present thesis for additional information on the Queen’s University pain study).
The genuine pain condition in the (Tripp et al, 2004) videos was induced by 
the participant submerging his/her hand and arm in a tub of cold water, kept at 3 
degrees Celsius (referred to as a ‘cold pressor’ apparatus) for a period of sixty 
seconds. Participants were asked to display whatever facial expressions occurred 
naturally during this process. In the faked (posed) pain condition, participants were 
asked to place their hand and arm in a tub of warm water (kept at 20 degrees Celsius) 
for sixty seconds, and asked to simulate a facial expression of pain. Participants in 
this condition were asked to manipulate their faces so that an “expert would be 
convinced they were in actual pain.” Additionally, baseline conditions were also 
taken by Tripp and colleagues, in which the participant placed his/her hand and arm in 
20 degree Celsius water, and was asked to act naturally. (The baseline condition 
videos were not shown to participants in the two studies for the present thesis, as 
participants in the present studies were asked to make a forced-choice decision 
regarding whether the video target was faking or in genuine pain). The targets’ facial 
expressions were recorded using a digital video camera during each condition in the 
taping of the videos. Ekman and Friesen’s (1978) FACS (Facial Action Coding 
System) was used in the Queen’s University study to analyse the videotaped 
differences in facial expressions between genuine and faked pain expressions.
10.3 FA CS  Ana l ys i s  o f  Faked  and Real  Pa in  ( In de pe nd en t  of  the
Pr esen t  Studies )
The video clips used in the present thesis were analysed by the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1987) in two previous studies independent 
of the present thesis (Trip, Lee, Garcia-Browning, Hains, & Van Horne, 2004;
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Littlewort, Bartlett, & Lee, 2007). The videos were filmed and the (FACS) facial 
actions were coded by Tripp et al (2004) - and in a later study, the videos were 
analysed by FACS and integrated into a machine-learning system by Littlewort and 
colleagues (Littlewort, Bartlett, & Lee, 2007). The two independent studies revealed 
several consistent findings, as well as several differences in their analyses of facial 
actions in faked compared to genuine pain expressions.
The figure below depicts an example of the Facial Action Coding System. In 
this figure, a prototypical expression of fear is displayed, with the associated Facial 
Action Units (FACS) utilised in the Facial Action Coding System.
1C Inner brow raise 
2C Outer brow raise 
4B Corrugator
5D Upper lid raise
7B Lower lid tighten
20B Lip stretch 
26B Jaw drop
Figure 7: Example o f facial actions in the Facial Action Coding System
In a recent study in which an automated facial action recognition system was 
developed (Littlewort et al., 2007), twenty-six of the Queen’s University videos of 
faked and real pain were utilised. In this research, Littlewort and colleagues utilised 
the Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1987) to develop an 
automated facial expression recognition system to discern genuine (spontaneous) 
from faked (posed) pain expressions. They used a machine learning approach which 
has been used successfully to categorise basic emotional expressions using posed 
datasets, as well as to detect facial actions of the FACS (Littlewort, Bartlett, Fasel, 
Susskind, & Movellan, 2006; Bartlett, Littlewort, Frank, Lainscsek, Fasel, & 
Movellan, 2006). In their examination of the FACS units of facial pain expressions, 
they utilised 26 of the 31 videos used in the present thesis. They trained twenty 
Action Unit (AU) classifiers on over 5000 images of baseline, genuine pain, and
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faked pain expressions. The automated system they developed proved to be 72% 
correct in judging faked from genuine pain expressions.
1 0 . 3 . 1  F a k e d  P a i n  F a c i a l  A c t i o n s
Tripp and colleagues (2004) (who filmed the videos) analysed the videos 
using a priori paired t-tests, and found the following to be indicators of faked pain 
(relative to genuine pain): AU4 (lowered brow), AU7 (lids tight), AU23 (lip tighten), 
and AU28 (lip suck). They also analysed patterns of facial expression change over 
time (over the one-minute videos), and found a pattern of AU4 (lowered brow), then 
AU7 (lids tight), and finally AU10 (upper lip raise). (See the figure and table below 
for descriptions of the facial action units for pain).
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Figure 8: Facial Action Units for Pain
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F acia l A ction  U nits for  Pain
AU Name
1 Inner brow raise
2 Outer brow raise
4 Brow lower
5 Upper lid raise
6 Cheek raise
7 Lids tight
9 Nose wrinkle
10 Upper lip raise
12 Lip corner pull
14 Dimpler
15 Lip corner depress
17 Chin raise
18 Lip pucker
20 Lip stretch
23 Lip tighten
24 Lip press
25 Lips part
26 Jaw drop
28 Lip suck
1, 1+4 Distress brow
1+2+4 Fear brow
Table 1: Facial Action Units (FACS) for Pain
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Littlewort et al (2007) quickly discovered that there was relatively more facial 
activity in faked pain expressions than in genuine pain expressions. This finding is 
consistent with previous research on faked pain (Hill & Craig, 2002). In fact, 
researchers have found that often faked pain is similar to genuine pain in many ways, 
except for the stronger intensity of expressions in faked pain (Craig et al, 1991; Hyde,
1986). Z-scores were computed for faked pain expressions by Littlewort and 
colleagues, and the following facial actions were discovered to have the highest Z- 
scores when targets portrayed faked (posed) pain expressions (relative to baseline): 
AU4 (brow lower), AU 1 or 1+4 (‘distress brow’), AU1 (inner brow raise), AU25 
(lips part/mouth open), AU26 (jaw drop), AU6  (cheek raise), AU10 (lip raise), AU 
1+2+4 (‘fear brow’), AU9 (nose wrinkle), AU20 (mouth stretch), and AU7 (lower lid 
raise). Thus, both groups of researchers found brow lower and lids tight to be signs of 
faking pain. Additionally, computation of the difference of the two Z-scores between 
faked and genuine pain revealed the largest differences were found by Littlwort in 
AU4 (brow lower), AU 1 or 1+4 (‘distress brow’) and AU1 (inner brow raise).
The most consistent finding by the Littlewort study in examining individual 
differences in targets displaying faked versus genuine pain was that 35% of fakers 
displayed AU4 (lowered brow), whereas none of the targets in real pain displayed this 
facial action. In addition, 27% of faking targets displayed more AU6 (cheek raise), 
and 23% displayed more AU1 (inner brow raise) and AU 1+2+4 (‘fear brow’). 
Additionally, after principal component analysis was conducted on the Z-scores, it 
was discovered that the action unit channel with the most information for 
discriminating faked from genuine pain expressions was AU4 (brow lower). 
Exaggerated brow lower activity in faked pain is also consistent with previous studies 
of genuine compared to faked pain expressions (Craig, Hyde, & Patrick, 1991; Hill & 
Craig, 2002).
10.3,2 Genuine  Pain  F ac ia l  Ac t i ons
Tripp and colleagues analysed the videos (using FACS) for signs of genuine 
pain (relative to faked pain), and found those action units to be the following: AU6 
(cheek raise), AU12 (lip corner pull), AU25 (lip part), and AU26 (jaw drop). 
Additionally, they found a pattern of genuine pain over time to be AU7 (lower lid 
raise), then AU4 (brow lower), and finally AU10 (lip raise).
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Z-scores were computed for genuine pain expressions by Littlewort and 
colleagues and the following facial actions were discovered that portrayed genuine 
pain (relative to baseline): AU 12 (lip comer pull), AU 25 (lip part/mouth opening), 
AU26 (jaw drop/mouth drop), AU9 (nose wrinkle), and to a lesser extent, AU10 (lip 
raise) and AU6  (cheek raise). Thus, both studies revealed cheek raise, lip corner pull, 
and lip part to be indicators of genuine pain. These facial actions are consistent with 
other findings on genuine (acute) pain displays, which have also been found to 
include AU7 (lids tight) and AU25 (lip part) (Prkachin & Mercer, 1989; Craig, Hyde, 
& Patrick, 1991; Prkachin, 1992b).
10.4 The Presen t  S tudies
For the purpose of establishing whether there are measurable individual 
differences in accurately interpreting facial expressions of pain, data from two studies 
were combined.
10.4.1 Par t i c i pa nt s :
Study One
A total of 170 individuals participated in Study One, of which 112 were 
female and 58 were male. In addition to recruiting participants from the University of 
California, San Diego (UCSD) Psychology Department Subject Pool, in Study 1 
participants were also recruited from other college majors, as well as several non­
students who were employed. The participants received two course credits (in the case 
of undergraduate psychology students) or twenty dollars (if they did not fall under this 
category) for completing both halves of the experiment. Written consent was 
obtained from all participants prior to the commencement of any study activities.
Study Two
A total of 179 individuals participated in Study Two, of which 130 were 
female and 49 were male. Participants were again recruited from the UCSD 
Psychology Department Subject Pool. The participants received two course credits for 
completing both halves of the experiment. (Funding was not available for the second 
study to pay participants). Again, written consent was obtained from all participants 
prior to the commencement of any study activities.
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10.4.2 Test  Mat er i a l s :  Video Cl ips
For the present thesis, thirty-one of Tripp and colleagues’ video clips were 
utilised (fifteen males and fifteen females, plus one practice video with a female 
target). Approximately half of the targets (sixteen) were faking pain, and the other 
half (fourteen) were in genuine pain. The videos for the present studies were selected 
randomly to the greatest extent possible, with the following exceptions: 1) Gender 
balancing -  In order to obtain an equal number of males and females to reach the goal 
of thirty videos, all fifteen male targets were utilised, as well as fifteen females. 2 ) 
Faked versus real pain balancing -  Given the gender balancing goal, the present 
author also attempted to provide an approximately equal number of faked versus 
genuine pain video clips. 3) Quality of videos -  Many videos were of low visual 
quality. For instance, poor lighting often cast shadows across participants’ faces, and 
obscured a full view of their expressions. Additionally, a substantial number of video 
targets were chewing gum, which altered their facial movements, thus not providing a 
clear and accurate depiction of pain expressions. These ‘problem’ videos were not 
utilised for the present study.
The above 31 videotapes were integrated into a computer programme for the 
present study. Videos were randomly selected by the computer programme each time 
the programme ran; therefore, no particular order existed in which the video clips 
were displayed to participants. However, participants never viewed the same video 
more than once. Participants began by reading the instructions on the computer 
screen, which were then reiterated verbally by the experimenter. They were 
instructed to watch each video carefully and consider their decision regarding whether 
the target in the video clip was faking or in genuine pain.
10.4.3 Pr ocedur e
Participants viewed each (one-minute) video clip and selected from the drop­
down box on the computer programme either ‘Real Pain’ or ‘Faking Pain’. Then 
participants decided on their confidence level for each video on a Likert scale of one 
to five, in which one was ‘Completely Unsure’ and five was ‘Completely Sure’ of 
each decision. Participants viewed one practice video to acquaint themselves with 
the computer programme, and then viewed and judged the thirty videos themselves, 
attempting to discern if the target was in genuine (spontaneous) pain or faked (posed)
if
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pain. (See Methods chapter of the present thesis for more detailed information on the 
studies).
The figure below displays the computer screen viewed by participants after 
each video clip has played. In this example, ‘Faking Pain’ with a confidence level of 
‘4’ has been selected by the participant.
Please choose an answer from the drop down box and select a confidence range.
________| I (Fawng Pan •[] | “  J j
Nmi i |H k k tv,teok" H------------ *r----------- i ------------ t   v
  -------' Completely Urwuio Somewhat Unsue Neutial Somewhat Sue Completely Sue
Figure 9: Computer Screen between Video Clips
The figure below displays photos from four of the videos, and illustrates both 
genuine and faked pain expressions, as well as their associated Facial Action Units. 
(The clip on the targets’ left ear conducted physiological measurements). Both of the 
faked pain videos in this figure were utilised in the present thesis. (The real pain 
photos in this figure were not video clips used in the present studies.) In Study One 
of the present thesis, 58% of participants judged the faking male (in the photo below) 
correctly (with a mean confidence level of 3.51, on a scale of 1 - 5), and in Study 
Two, 55% of participants judged this faking male correctly (with a mean confidence 
level of 3.42). However, the female faking pain in the picture below proved to be 
more difficult for participants to judge. In fact, she was the most difficult female 
target for participants to judge in Study 1 and Study 2. In Study 1, only 36% of 
participants judged this female target correctly (with a mean confidence level of 
3.44). Similarly, in Study 2, participants again had a low accuracy rate for this female 
target, but were slightly more accurate than in Study 1. In Study 2, 40% judged her 
faked pain correctly, with a mean confidence level of 3.36.
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Real Faked
Real Faked
Figure 10 Real vs. Faked Pain with Action Units
1 0 . 4 . 4  S t u d y  O n e  V i d e o  R e s u l t s  (n = 170)
Videos with the Lowest Accuracy and Confidence Levels
As expected, the present study found distinct differences in participant
accuracy levels on the various videos. For Studies 1 and 2, Table 2 and Table 3
display the number of times each video was judged correctly and the mean confidence
level of participants judging the video. For instance, in Study 1 (n=170), the video for
which participants had the lowest judgment accuracy rate was No. 164, in which only
28% of participants judged this faking Caucasian male correctly, with a mean
confidence level of 3.19 (on a scale of 1 -  5). This male target was faking pain in a
manner that was difficult to judge, as he remained serious and sombre throughout the
video. He appeared to be rather stoically suppressing pain and was subtle in his pain
expressions. He pressed his lips together on two occasions during the one-minute
video; however, this was essentially the extent of his pain expressions. Whilst the
present author does not have training in coding the Facial Action Coding System
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(FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978), the (barely) identifiable facial action units appear 
to be a very slight AUI (inner brow raise), consistent with the Littlewort et al (2007) 
findings of faked pain, as well as a very slight AU24 (lip press).
The target in Study 1 for which participants had the lowest mean confidence in 
judging was No. 158, a male Caucasian who was faking pain. 29% of participants 
judged this target correctly, and had a mean confidence level of 2.88 (on a scale of 1 -  
5). This male target was faking pain in a manner that was difficult to judge, as he 
remained essentially expressionless throughout the video. Similar to video target No. 
164, he appeared to be rather stoically suppressing pain. He had what appeared to be a 
very slight AU25 (lip part) and slight AU6 (cheek raise), and a very slight eye squint, 
but otherwise remained rather expressionless. Perhaps the fact that this target 
displayed AU25 and AU6, which have been found by both independent studies to be 
indicators of both real and faked pain - as well as the low intensity of this target’s 
expressions - might begin to explain judges’ low mean confidence level for this 
target.
Video with the Highest Accuracy and Confidence Level
The video with the highest judgment accuracy rate in Study 1 was No. 152, for
which 85% of participants judged this faking Caucasian male correctly. (A still photo 
of his faked pain is displayed in the figure below.) In addition, the mean confidence 
level for this video (4.19) reflected the larger number of participants judging 
correctly. This male target was faking pain in a mamier that appeared a bit obvious, 
and he appeared to be over-expressing pain. He had numerous expressions of pain 
throughout the one-minute video, which included the following: scrunching his eyes 
together, biting his lip, moving his mouth around, scrunching his eyebrows up, lip 
press, 'gritting the teeth together, lip bite, closing eyes tightly, and blinking the eyes 
numerous times. The facial action units this target displayed that are consistent with 
previous studies of faked pain appear to be the following: AU4 (brow lower), AU25 
(lip part), AU26 (jaw drop), and AU9 (nose wrinkle). Additionally, the target also 
displayed what appears to be AUI2 (lip corner pull). This target was also the one in 
which participants had the highest mean confidence level.
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S tudy N o. 1 (N  =170, 30 v id eos, p lus one p ractice v ideo).
Video Number Number Correct Confidence Real/Fake Gender
164 48 3.19 0 0
158 50 2.88 0 0
116 61 3.44 0 1
114 64 3.28 0 1
145 73 3.30 1 1
118 74 3.28 0 1
135 75 3.35 1 0
161 77 3.40 1 1
130 77 3.19 0 0
124 84 3.56 0 1
148 84 3.20 0 1
115 84 3.63 1 1
140 84 3.71 0 0
142 86 3.47 0 1
159 86 3.30 1 0
144 91 3.79 0 1
121 92 3.42 1 1
120 92 3.47 0 1
149 93 3.06 1 0
155 94 3.39 1 0
123 95 3.49 1 0
134 96 3.07 0 0
103 97 3.29 1 0
122 99 3.51 0 0
126 103 3.58 0 1
147 111 3.38 1 0
109 112 3.75 1 1
101 114 3.47 1 0
113 116 3.44 1 1
152 145 4.19 0 0
Table 2: Study 1 - Accuracy & Confidence Levels for Videos
Video Number: Number randomly assigned to each video, to differentiate each clip 
during analysis.
Number Correct: Number o f subjects (N = 170) who accurately judged if the video 
displayed real or faked pain.
Example: For video 164, 48 out o f  170 participants accurately ju d g e d  the video. 
Confidence: Mean confidence level for that video.
Confidence level: Subjects answer on a Likert scale, in which 1=  'Completely Unsure' and  
5 =  'Completely Sure'.
Real/Fake: 0 = fake, 1 = real
Gender (of Target in Video): 0 = male, 1= female
10.4.5 S t udy  Two Video Re su l t s  (n = 179)
Videos with the Lowest Accuracy and Confidence Level
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In Study 2, the video with the lowest participant judgment accuracy was No. 
158, which was found in Study 1 to be the video for which judges had the lowest 
mean confidence level. In Study 2, there were only 66 participants out of 179 (37%) 
who judged this faking Caucasian male correctly, with a mean confidence level of
3.05 (on a 1 -  5 scale).
The target in Study 2 for which participants had the lowest mean confidence 
level was No. 149, a Caucasian male in genuine pain, for which participants had a 
mean confidence level of 2.93, and 55% judged correctly. This target was quite 
expressionless, and the present author viewed the video several times before noticing 
a few barely perceptible facial movements. His very slight facial movements 
appeared to be AU12 (lip corner pull) and slight AU6 (cheek raise). Research has 
suggested that genuine pain expressions are displayed at a lower intensity than faked 
pain (Hill & Craig, 2002), and this target’s facial movements are consistent with this 
finding. Additionally, it is likely that the barely perceptible facial movements 
contributed to the judges’ low mean confidence level forjudging this target.
Video with the Highest Accuracy and Confidence Level
The target with the highest participant accuracy rate in Study 2 was again No.
152, as in Study 1. In Study 2, the majority of the participants, 92% judged this 
faking Caucasian male correctly. This target was also the individual in which judges 
felt most confident in their judgements; judges’ mean confidence level for this target 
was 4.15 (on a 1 -  5 scale).
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S tudy N o, 2 (N  = 1 7 9 ,3 0  v id eos, p lus one practice v ideo).
Video Number Number Correct Confidence Real/Fake Gender
158 66 3.05 0 0
164 69 3.10 0 0
116 72 3.36 0 1
130 76 3.11 0 0
118 79 3.15 0 1
145 81 3.27 1 1
114 82 3.35 0 1
142 85 3.35 0 1
124 86 3.58 0 1
161 86 3.49 1 1
135 93 3.46 1 0
159 94 3.34 1 0
- 140 96 3.52 0 0
120 97 3.38 0 1
148 98 3.23 0 1
149 98 2.93 1 0
122 99 3.42 0 0
115 100 3.67 1 1
134 108 3.34 0 0
155 108 3.67 1 0
126 109 3.53 0 1
144 110 3.71 0 1
123 110 3.75 1 0
121 110 3.58 1 1
101 124 3.31 1 0
103 124 3.60 1 0
147 126 3.31 1 0
113 129 3.56 1 1
109 130 3.75 1 1
152 163 4.15 0 0
Table 3: Study 2 - Accuracies & Confidence Levels for Videos
Video Number: Number randomly assigned to each video, to differentiate each clip 
during analysis.
Number Correct: Number o f subjects (N = 179) who accurately judged if the video 
displayed real or faked pain.
Example: For video 158, 66 out o f  179 participants accurately ju d g e d  the video. 
Confidence: Mean confidence level for that video.
Confidence level: Subjects answer on a  Likert scale, in which 1 = 'Completely Unsure' and  
5 = 'Completely Sure'.
Real/Fake: 0 = fake, 1 = real
Gender (of Target in Video): 0 = male, 1= female
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Figure 11: Real Pain - View of Computer Screen
-10! *):'
Figure 12: Faked Pain - View o f Computer Screen
The above figures are photos of the computer screen while the software 
programme is playing, and display real and faked pain. The female in real pain 
(target No. 121) was judged accurately by slightly more than half (54%) of 
participants in Study 1 (with a 3.42 mean confidence level), and 61% of participants 
in Study 2 (with a 3.58 confidence level). The male in real pain (No. 155) was judged 
accurately by slightly more than half (55%) of participants in Study 1 (with a 3.39 
confidence level), and by 60% of participants in Study 2. Noteworthy is the fact that 
both targets in the photos in real pain are biting the lower lip. Also noteworthy is the 
trend of slightly higher accuracy rates in Study 2.
The female faking pain in the above photo (No. 144) was also judged correctly 
by slightly more than half (54%) of participants in Study 1 (with a 3.79 mean 
confidence level), and by 61% of participants in Study 2. The faking male in the 
above photo is the previously described target No. 152, who was the target for whom 
participants judged most accurately in both studies (85% with a 4.19 confidence level 
in Study 1 and 92% with a 4.15 confidence level in Study 2). This target clearly
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exaggerated his faked pain throughout the one-minute clip, as one may view from the 
photo.
10.4.6 Video Analys i s
Several tendencies were discovered in relation to video accuracy across target 
category (as one may see from the mean accuracy levels displayed in Tables 60 and 
93 in the Appendices). Overall, means for judging real pain were higher than those 
forjudging faked pain, male targets were judged more accurately than female targets, 
and males in real pain were judged more accurately than females in real pain.
Original examination of the overall correlations between accuracy and 
confidence for both studies revealed few significant relationships, and those that were 
found were generally quite low. The only significant correlations in either study 
involved judging faking female targets. (See Study One’s Tables 18, 19, and 20, as 
well as Study Two’s Tables 39, 40, and 41 in the Results chapters). Thus, on the 
surface a general tendency appears in which individuals have very little insight into 
their accuracy.
However, a few interesting correlations were discovered during analysis of the 
relationship between the level of judgment accuracy for a given video and 
participants’ confidence level when judging that video, which present a different 
picture. Examination of data for the individual videos revealed a relatively high 
correlation between accuracy and confidence in judging a given video. All 
correlations between video accuracy and judgment confidence for a given video, 
though, were higher for Study Two (Study One: r = .62, Study Two: r = .70). (See 
Tables 4 and 5).
There were highly significant correlations for accuracy and confidence level in 
judging a faked pain video for the first study (f  = .75), as well as the second study (r = 
.88) (see Tables 4 and 5). However, the correlation between accuracy when judging a 
video displaying genuine pain and confidence level in that judgment failed to reach 
significance in either study. Notable, as well, were the higher correlations for 
judgment and confidence level when judging male targets as compared to female 
targets.
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P earson  C orrelations: A ccu racy  and  C on fid en ce L evels on  V ideos
Accuracy Variable Mean Confidence Level
Overall Accuracy .62**
(Judgment Accuracy for Real 
vs. Faked Pain)
Fake .75**
Real .32
(Judgment Accuracy by 
Gender of Video Target)
Male Target 72**
Female Target .52*
Table 4: Study 1 - Video Accuracy & Confidence Correlations (n=170)
Accuracy Variable Mean Confidence Level
Overall 70**
(Judgment Accuracy for Real 
vs. Faked Pain)
Fake .88**
Real .33
(Judgment Accuracy by 
Gender of Video Target)
 ^j. Male Target .75**
Female Target 69**
Table 5: Study 2 - Video Accuracy & Confidence Correlations (n=179)
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Additionally, Tables 6 and 7 display the descriptive statistics for accuracy and 
confidence level on judging the videos, which are also higher for Study Two. In 
addition, as is displayed in Tables 6 and 7, the mean judgment accuracy on a given 
video (M=l00.27, SD=21.48) and confidence level for a video (M=3.43, SD=.25) for 
Study 2 were higher than the accuracy level in (M=88.57, SD=20.09) and just slightly 
higher for confidence level (M=3.42, SD=.25) for Study 1.
Descriptives: Videos
Min. Max. Mean SD
No. o f participants 
judging a video 
correctly (n = 170,
30 videos).
48 145 88.57 20.09
Mean confidence 
level for that video. 2.88 4.19 3.42 .25
Table 6: Study 1 - Video Descriptive Statistics
Min. Max. Mean SD
No. o f participants 
judging a video 
correctly (n = 179,
30 videos)
66 163 100.27 21.48
Mean confidence 
level for that video 2.93 4.15 3.43 .25
Table 7: Study 2 - Video Descriptive Statistics
It appears noteworthy and slightly curious that the extreme values for 
difficulty, as well as ease of judgement, were all for male video targets. One might 
speculate that this may be due to societal expectations regarding gender differences in 
expressions of pain (as well as expression of emotions). Males may be expected to 
display fewer and less intense facial expressions than females, and therefore may have 
slightly less experience at displays of facial expression, including displaying pain.
Certainly the target for whom participants had the highest accuracy and 
confidence levels (No. 152) was a male who was over-expressing and exaggerating 
his faked pain. Conversely, the targets who were the most difficult to judge were all 
males who might be considered to be under-expressing pain. Perhaps societal
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expectations of facial expression of pain and emotions based on gender have taught 
males to be generally more stoic regarding their pain. However, whilst the extreme 
values in the present thesis were for male targets, results were generally quite mixed 
regarding video accuracy by target gender.
In sum, there appear to be significant differences in relative level of video 
judgment difficulty, as well as accuracy and confidence differences between the two 
studies in the present thesis. Whilst some debate remains regarding the exact facial 
actions for faked pain, lowered brow appears to be a fairly consistent indicator. 
Additionally, overall intensity of expression is generally higher for faked pain, as 
revealed in previous research. Indeed, the target that the majority of participants 
judged correctly was simulating pain in an exaggerated manner. However, overall, 
accuracy and confidence level for a given video varied considerably. The foregoing 
analyses indicate that there is considerable variation in accuracy across individual 
videos, as well as more systematic variation as a function of target gender and 
whether faked or real pain is being displayed.
Are there measurable individual differences in ability to read facial expressions of 
pain?
Cronbach alpha was computed for a scale consisting of all thirty video clips. 
Alpha for this total scale was .639, which is not high but perhaps also not surprising, 
given the strong effects of individual clips. However, it was clear that alpha could be 
improved by excluding some of the video clips from the total. The exclusion of five 
clips resulted in a Cronbach alpha of .732.
Cronbach alphas were also computed for the eight subscales that could 
potentially be formed, namely male targets, female targets, faking targets, real pain 
targets, males faking, males displaying real pain, females faking and females
displaying real pain. The results are presented in the table below.
&
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Sub-scale
Male targets (14 clips) 
Female targets (16 clips) 
Faked pain (16 clips) 
Real pain (14 clips)
Male fake (8 clips)
Male real (6 clips) 
Female fake (8 clips) 
Female real (8 clips)
Alpha
.645
.246
.439
.504
.380
.524
.130
.164
Table 8: Sub-scale alphas
What these results indicate is that there is considerable variation in reliability 
across these subscales. However, these results also indicate that the reliability of the 
overall scale is not accounted for entirely by the reliability of any one sub-set of clips. 
Each category of clip contributes something to the reliability of the 25-item scale as a 
whole.1
Next, responses to the 25 items forming the more reliable scale were 
submitted to principle components analysis. This analysis extracted ten factors with 
an eigen-value greater than one. However, inspection of the scree plot supports a 
single factor solution, with the first factor accounting for 14.425% of the total 
variance (see figure below).
1 The five clips dropped to form the 25-item version of the scale were all of female targets, two 
expressing real pain and three expressing faked pain.
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C om ponent Num ber
Figure 13: Scree Plot
10.5 Summary
In sum, the present chapter attempted to examine the hypothesis that there are 
individual differences in the ability to accurately judge facial expressions of pain. 
This was accomplished by constructing a measure which displayed videos of genuine 
and faked expressions of physical pain. The hypothesis that there are individual 
differences in the ability to accurately judge facial pain expressions appears to have 
been supported. The measure utilised in the present study appears to demonstrate 
reasonable reliability, as well as being unidimensional.
%
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P A R T  I I :  R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y  
&  R E S U L T S
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CHAPTER 1 1 :M ETHODS
11.1 Study One Methods
11.1.1 P a r t i c i p an t s
A  total of 170 individuals participated in Study One, of which 112 were 
female and 58 were male. In addition to recruiting participants from the University of 
California San Diego (UCSD) Psychology Department Subject Pool, in Study 1 the 
present study was also able to obtain participants from other college majors, as well as 
several non-students who were employed. The participants received two course 
credits (in the case of undergraduate psychology students) or twenty dollars (if they 
did not fall under this category) for completing both halves of the experiment. 
Written consent was obtained from all participants prior to the commencement of any 
study activities.
Participants’ ages ranged from 18.2 to 59.3 years old, with a mean age of 23.4 
years and a standard deviation of 7.8. Their education levels ranged from ‘some high 
school completed’ to post-graduate level college degrees. Whilst many participants 
were psychology or social science majors (36.5%), fortunately there were also a 
variety of college majors represented (including the cognitive sciences, biology, 
mathematics, and the arts). There were a variety of ethnicities represented in the 
study, with the majority consisting of either Caucasian or Asian ethnicities: 
approximately 42% were Caucasian, 43% Asian American or Asian, 6% Hispanic, 
2% African American, %7 other, and less than 1% declined to state an ethnicity. All 
participants were residing temporarily (as students) in the San Diego (California) 
area, or were permanent residents of the area.
11.1.2 Pr o ce du r e  a nd  J u d g e m e n t  Task
Prior to beginning the studies, ethics approval was obtained from the 
university ethics review board (the UCSD Institutional Review Board). The study 
utilised a within-subjects design which consisted of two sessions of approximately 
forty-five minutes each, and most participants chose to have the two sessions 
separately. After obtaining informed consent, participants either were asked to view a 
series of videotapes or to complete two standardised and well-established personality 
measures, the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) or the Neuroticism Extraversion 
Openness Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI). Order was counter-balanced for
Decem ber 2008 - 160- Ph. D . Thesis
videotape viewing and for completing the measures, such that half of participants 
viewed the videos in the first session and half completed the measures at the first 
visit. Additionally, measures were counter-balanced such that half of the participants 
completed the MBTI first and then the NEO-FFI, and the other half completed the 
NEO-FFI first. (The MBTI and the NEO-FFI are both paper-and-pencil tests that 
were hand-scored by the present author or a research assistant.).
11.1.3 B a c k g r o u n d  on the Videos  Ut i l i sed  in the Pr e se n t
Thes is
Participants were asked to view videotapes and make a judgment regarding 
whether the adult in the video clip was attempting to deceive. These video clips were 
obtained from a previous study conducted at Queen’s University, Canada (with ethics 
approval from the University Ethics Review Board) that examined faked versus real 
pain (Tripp, Lee, Garcia-Browning, Hains & Van Horne, 2004). Tripp and colleagues 
studied sixty-five undergraduate participants, consisting of fifteen males and fifty 
females. Individual participants viewed in the videos from the Tripp et al (2004) 
study have given written permission to use the video clips of them for research 
purposes. The majority of Tripp and colleagues’ participants were of Caucasian 
ethnicity, as well as several Asians, several Blacks, and several mixed-race 
participants. They applied three experimental conditions (baseline, genuine pain, and 
faked pain) to the sixty-five participants. (See Videos Chapter for more information 
on the video clips).
The pain condition in the videotapes was induced by targets placing their hand 
in a ‘cold pressor’ apparatus (a tub of cold water, kept at 3 degrees Celsius) for a 
period of sixty seconds. The targets were asked to display whatever facial 
expressions came naturally during this process. In the faked pain condition, 
videotaped targets were asked to place their hand in a tub of water (kept at 20 degrees 
Celsius) for sixty seconds, and asked to simulate a facial expression of pain. Targets 
in this condition were asked to manipulate their face so that an “expert would be 
convinced they were in actual pain.” (Additionally, baseline conditions were also 
taken for the targets, in which targets’ hands were placed in 20 degree Celsius water 
and were asked to act naturally. The baseline condition videos were not shown to 
participants in the present study). The targets’ facial expressions were recorded by 
Tripp and colleagues using a digital video camera during each condition. Ekman and
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Friesen’s (1978) FACS (Facial Action Coding System) was used in the Tripp et al 
(2004) study to analyse the videotaped differences in facial expressions between 
genuine and faked pain expressions. (For purposes of clarity, the individuals in the 
videotapes will be referred to as ‘targets’ or ‘models’).
11.1.4 The P r es e n t  S t udy
A computer programme was written for the present studies that incorporated 
thirty-one videos (including one practice video) from the videos of targets (models) 
either simulating pain or displaying genuine pain. Videos were randomly selected by 
the computer programme each time the programme ran, so that there was no 
particular order in which the video clips were displayed. However, participants never 
viewed the same video more than once. Participants began by reading the instructions 
on the computer screen, which were then reiterated verbally by the experimenter. 
They were instructed to watch each video carefully and consider their decision 
regarding whether the target in the video clip was faking or in real pain.
Participants were informed that they would be viewing the videos in random 
order, and that approximately half of targets would be faking pain and half would be 
in genuine pain. They were also informed that the sound of the videos was muted, so 
they would not be able to hear anything from the video clips. Participants were 
instructed to wear the headphones provided, to assist them in blocking out outside 
noise and distractions, in order to increase their focus on the videos.
Participants viewed each video and selected from the drop-down box on the 
computer programme their choice of either ‘Real Pain’ or ‘Faking Pain’. Then they 
decided on their level of confidence for each video on a Likert scale of one to five, in 
which one was ‘Completely Unsure’ and five was ‘Completely Sure’ of each 
decision. To select their confidence level on the computer programme, participants 
clicked on a bar and dragged it to a number from one to five. (The computer 
programme was designed so that only whole numbers from one to five would be 
accepted). Participants then clicked ‘Next’, and then ‘Go’ in order to proceed to the 
next video.
After participants watched the practice video, made a judgment regarding 
whether they thought the target was faking or in real pain, and selected their 
confidence level, they were asked if they had any questions regarding how to use the
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computer programme. If they had any questions, these questions were addressed 
before proceeding to the actual experiment videos.
The computer programme was written to ensure that the participant was 
required to go through all the above steps in order to proceed to each video. Each 
computer button in the process had to be selected to continue on to the next video. In 
other words, in order to proceed to the next video, the participant was first required to 
select either ‘Real Pain5 or ‘Faking Pain’, and then was required to select their 
confidence level. If they missed a step, the next computer button was not highlighted
or active. This ensured that participants were not able to take any ‘short-cuts’ and
skip over answering the questions in order to finish the experiment sooner.
After participants completed the study, they were debriefed regarding what the 
hypotheses were and possible applications of the study. Additionally, any questions 
they had regarding the study were answered at that time.
1 1 . 1 . 4 . 1  I n d e p e n d e n t  M e a s u r e s
11.1.4.1.1 MBTI
Psychological type, including Intuition level, was measured by of the Myers- 
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; see manual by Myers and McCaulley, 1985). The 
measure is composed of 126 items, which constitute the four discontinuous scales of 
Jungian Type theory: Sensation-Intuition (SN), Thinking-Feeling (TF), Judging- 
Perceiving (JP) and Extraversion-Introversion (El).
11.1.4.1.2 NEO-FFI
The ‘Big Five’ Personality Traits, including Openness to Experience, was 
measured by the NEO-FFI (Neuroticism Extraversion Openness Five Factor 
Inventory; Costa & McCrae, 1992). The measure used in the study, the NEO-FFI 
(NEO-Five Factor Inventory), is a shorter version of the NEO-PI developed by Costa 
& McCrae in 1992, and consists of 60 items. The five factors measured in both tests 
are: Extraversion (E) vs. Introversion, Agreeableness (A) vs. Antagonism, 
Conscientiousness (C) vs. Lack of Direction, Neuroticism (N) vs. Emotional Stability, 
and Openness (O) vs. Closedness to Experience.
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a1 1 . 1 . 4 . 2  P i l o t  S t u d y
A pilot study was undertaken over a period of several weeks and was quite 
useful in the decision process regarding the details of the study procedure. There 
were 21 participants in the pilot, of which 14 were female and 7 were male. The pilot 
study began with 40 (one-minute) video clips of models in genuine pain or faking 
pain, which had been randomly chosen from approximately sixty video clips. Soon it 
was discovered that participants viewing the videotapes became extremely bored after 
a certain amount of time, especially approximately three-quarters of the way through 
the experiment. It was clear that participants at this point did not appear to pay much 
attention to the video clips, and became careless with their answers.
There were only fifteen useable male video targets (or models) and the other 
twenty-five were female. Many video clips were not useable, as there were issues 
such as lighting problems in particular clips, in which the target’s face was partially 
obscured. Additionally, there were a substantial number of targets who were chewing 
gum in quite an obvious manner, which distracted from watching the expressions and 
altered the targets’ expressions. Consequently, the present author decided to switch 
from forty video clips to thirty clips. Using thirty clips worked out well; having 
fifteen useable males provided the study with exactly half female and half male video 
targets.
The video clips were randomly chosen to the greatest extent possible. 
However, this proved to be an issue, as there were targets who were quite un- 
expressive. This lack of expressiveness did not provide the participants any 
nonverbal cues, and therefore there was essentially no effect. (Participants viewing 
the videos had accuracy rates of 50% or less in this scenario). Therefore, the next 
step in the pilot study was to select more expressive models as the targets to the 
greatest extent possible, bearing in mind that there were only fifteen useable male 
video targets. Therefore, several videos were ‘swapped out’ and replaced with video 
targets who were more expressive. Using more expressive models definitely began to 
provide effects.
However, there was another issue in the study that was discovered. In the 
video clips obtained from Tripp and colleagues, models were asked at three intervals 
during the one-minute session (at 5 seconds, 30 seconds, and 55 seconds) to report 
their pain level (or to report a faked pain level if the model was faking). Therefore,
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the study participants in the present study were able to hear this pain report, along 
with the sound of the cold pressor machine.
There were two problems with the fact that the present study’s participants 
were able to hear the video clips. Firstly, the study was designed to investigate 
whether participants could detect pain-faking from facial expressions (nonverbal 
communication), and verbal pain level reports provided auditory pain information. 
The second problem was that the volume of the cold pressor machine (a sound akin to 
water running) appeared to vary among the video clips. Furthermore, in the pilot 
study, there were several participants who (during the debriefing) stated they had 
based their answers on the sound of the volume o f water running in the videos’ cold 
pressor machines. Interestingly, when this was further investigated, it was determined 
that in many of the ‘faked pain’ video clips, the sound of the cold pressor machine 
appeared to be more audible. Therefore, considering the fact that this study was 
designed to detect pain (or pain faking) through facial expressions, as well as the 
problem of the cold pressor machine’s varying degrees of audibility, the reasonable 
solution was to mute the sound on the computer programme.
The last change that was made in the pilot study was to reduce the number of 
practice videos from two practice videos to one. Participants stated that one practice 
video was entirely sufficient to understand how to run the computer programme. 
Therefore, in the final study, participants viewed 30 video clips (and one practice 
video), with the sound of the video muted.
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11.2 Study Two Methods
11.2.1 Pa r t i c i pa n t s
A total of 179 individuals participated in Study Two, of which 130 were 
female and 49 were male. Participants were recruited from the University of 
California, San Diego (UCSD) Psychology Department Subject Pool. The participants 
received two course credits for completing both halves of the experiment. Written 
consent was obtained from all participants prior to the commencement of any study 
activities.
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 37 years old, with a mean age of 20.5 
years and a standard deviation of 2.3. Their education levels ranged from ‘some 
college completed’ to postgraduate students. Whilst many were social science majors 
(35%), fortunately there were also a variety of college majors represented (including 
the cognitive sciences, biology and the physical sciences, interdisciplinary, and a 
small percentage in mathematics and the arts). There was a wide variation in 
ethnicities, with the majority either Caucasian or Asian: 46% Asian American or 
Asian, 34% were Caucasian, 11% Hispanic, 2% African American, 6% other, and 
approximately 1% declined to state their ethnicity. All participants were residing 
temporarily (as students) in the San Diego (California) area, or were permanent 
residents of the area.
11.2.2 Pr oc ed ur e  and  J u d g e m e n t  Task
The procedure for Study 2 was identical to Study 1; the only exception was 
the personality measures utilised. Therefore, as in Study 1, Study 2 involved a 
within-subjects design which consisted of two sessions (of approximately forty-five 
minutes each), and most participants chose to have the two sessions separately. After 
obtaining informed consent, participants either were asked to view a series of 
videotapes or to complete two measures, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002) or the Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Lilienfeld & Widows, 
2005). Order was counter-balanced for videotape viewing and for completing the 
measures, such that half of participants viewed the videos in the first session and half 
completed the measures at the first session. Additionally, measures were counter­
balanced, such that half of the participants completed the MSCEIT first and then the
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PPI, and the other half completed the PPI first. The MSCEIT was scored 
electronically by its publisher, Multi-Health Systems (which specialises in 
psychological assessment), and the PPI (a paper-and-pencil test) was hand-scored by 
the present author or a research assistant.
The Videos
Participants viewed the same computer programme with identical videos 
(derived from Tripp et al, 2004) as in Study 1. The procedure was identical to Study 
2, with the exception of the substitution of the MSCEIT and the PPI for the MBTI and 
the NEO-FFI measures.
11.2.3 I n d e p e n d e n t  M easur es
1 1 . 2 . 3 . 1  M S C E I T
The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2002) was utilised in the second study to examine emotional 
intelligence ability. The (un-timed) electronic version was used in the present study, 
in which participants took the test on the Internet (in the laboratory). The MSCEIT 
consists of 141 items with four branches, each with two tasks. The following is a 
description of the branches and tasks. Additionally, there are two area scores: 
Experiential El (covering branches 1 and 2) and Strategic El (involved in branches 3 
and 4).
A r e a  1 :  E x v e r ie n t ia l  E l
Branch 1: Perception of Emotion -  measures the ability to perceive and identify 
emotions in oneself and others (as well as in other stimuli such as objects, stories, and 
art).
Task 1: Faces -  Participants view photographs of faces and attempt to identify 
the emotions portrayed.
Task 2: Pictures -  Participants view photographs of landscapes and abstract art 
designs, and identify the emotions portrayed.
Branch 2: Use of Emotion to Facilitate Thought -  measures the ability to generate, 
use, and feel emotions to communicate feelings, or to employ them in other mental 
processes.
Task 3: Sensations -  Participants match tactile, taste, and colour terms to 
specific emotions.
Task 4: Facilitation -  Participants identify the feelings that might facilitate or 
interfere with the successful performance of various cognitive and behavioural tasks.
A r e a  2 :  S tra te s ic  E l
Branch 3: Understanding of Emotion -  measures the capacity to analyse emotions and 
emotional information through the use of language, and the ability to reason about 
emotional meanings.
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Task 5: Blends -  Participants identify which emotions might blend together to 
form a complex feeling.
Task 6: Changes -  Participants demonstrate understanding of how feelings 
and emotions progress and change from one state to another over time, and how they 
follow one another.
Branch 4: Managing Emotions -  measures the ability to regulate moods and emotions 
in oneself and others.
Task 7: Emotion Management - Participants estimate the effectiveness of 
various strategies that could modify one’s feelings in various situations.
Task 8: Relationship Management -  Participants evaluate the effectiveness of 
various strategies for dealing with emotion-laden situations with others. (Brackett, et 
al., 2004; Brackett & Salovey, 2004; Salovey, Kokkonen, Lopes, & Mayer, 2004).
1 1 . 2 . 3 . 2  T h e  P P I
The (un-timed) self-report measure used to assess psychopathy in Study 2 is 
called the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; 
Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). It consists of 187 items with eight factors, and 
responses are given on four-point Likert-type scales ranging from ‘False’ to ‘True’. 
(A response of 1 = False, 2 = Mostly False, 3 -  Mostly True, and 4 — True).
The Psychopathic Personality Inventory measures eight factors: 1)
Machiavellian Egocentricity, 2) Social Potency/Social Influence, 3) Coldheartedness, 
4) Carefree Nonplanfulness, 5) Fearlessness, 6) Alienation/Blame Extemalisation, 7) 
Impulsive Nonconformity/Rebellious Nonconformity, and 8) Stress Immunity 
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). Additionally, the PPI 
includes a global psychopathology score.
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C H A P T E R  12: S T U D Y  O N E  R E S U L T S
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS Version 12.0. Initially, descriptive 
statistics were run on all variables, and data were inspected to identify and correct 
data input errors (and outliers). Demographic data are presented in Tables 54 - 59 (in 
the Appendices).
Multiple regression was utilised to explore the extent the present study’s 
independent variables (personality variables) predicted pain judgment ability. Given 
that there existed a fair number of correlations between the independent variables 
(personality variables), regression was utilised in the present thesis to examine the 
extent to which each personality variable independently contributed to explaining the 
variance in the dependent variable (accuracy in pain judgment). In addition, partial 
correlations were utilised to examine the extent that the relationship between intuition 
and accuracy was influenced by openness, as well as the extent that the relationship 
between openness and accuracy was influenced by intuition. T-tests were conducted 
to determine if there were any significant differences in detection of decision-making 
confidence between males and females. Analysis of Variance was conducted to 
examine difference in detection accuracy by age (see Appendices for additional 
tables).
12.1 Study 1: Overview
A total of 170 individuals participated in Study One, of which 112 were 
female and 58 were male. As expected, overall accuracy in participants’ abilities to 
distinguish between real and faked pain was approximately at chance level, with a 
mean judgment accuracy of 51.9% (SD = 14.6%). However, participants’ accuracy 
rate varied widely, ranging from 17% to 83%. Males’ mean judgment accuracy was 
52.5% (SD=15.4%) and females’ mean judgment accuracy was 51.6% (SD=14.2%). 
Despite such variability, participants’ overall detection ability of faked versus real 
pain for male targets in the videos was significantly correlated with their rates for 
female targets (r = .42, p<.0001), suggesting that participants had reliable detection 
accuracy. Descriptive statistics for accuracy in Study 1 are presented in Tables 49 
and 50 in the Appendices.
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The overall confidence level in decision-making for participants when making 
pain judgments ranged from 2 - 4 . 8  (on a scale of 1 -  5), with a mean of 3.5 
(SD^.52). Males’ mean confidence level was 3.6 (SD=.62) and females’ mean 
confidence level was 3.5 (SD=.46). Descriptive statistics for confidence in Study 1 
are presented in Tables 51 and 52 in the Appendices.
12.2 Demographic Variables and Accuracy
12.2.1 Gender & Detect ion Accuracy
The present thesis hypothesised (in Hypothesis 9) that there would be a 
difference in scores across gender for accuracy in judgments regarding whether the 
target in the video was faking pain or in real pain. In order to test this hypothesis, T- 
tests were conducted on accuracy variables for males and females.
This hypothesis was only partially supported. The accuracy differences 
between males and females were found in relation to specific personality variables, 
but not found for accuracy in general. For instance, ‘Thinker’ type (on the MBTI) 
males were accurate in detection, however, this accuracy was not found for ‘Thinker’ 
type females. When the data were analysed simply in relation to accuracy (without 
taking into account personality variables), no significant differences were found.
T-tests were conducted on all accuracy variables for males and females. No 
significant differences on any accuracy variables were found between males & 
females in either study; the results for Study 1 are as follows. An independent 
samples t-test was conducted to compare overall pain-faking detection accuracy 
between males and females. There were no significant differences for males 
(M=52.52, SD=15.43) and females [M=51.61, SD=14.19; t(168)=.39, p  = .54]. (The 
t-test for overall accuracy by gender is Table 55 in the Appendices).
12.2.2 Age and Detect ion Accuracy
In Study 1, analyses of variance were conducted to explore the impact of age 
on levels of detection accuracy. Participants were divided into three groups according 
to age (Group 1: 20.1 or younger; Group 2: 20.2 - 22.0 years old; Group 3: over 22.5 
years of age).
No significant differences were found for overall accuracy of detection, after 
examination of: a) overall accuracy and age, b) overall accuracy and age (comparing 
Group 1 with both Group 2 and Group 3), c) two-way ANOVA: overall accuracy, age
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and gender. Additionally, the same tests were conducted for accuracy when target is 
male and faking (which tended to show the strongest relationships in Pearson 
correlation and multiple regressions). (See Tables 76, 77, and 78 in the Appendices). 
However, again, no significant differences were found. (This was not entirely the 
case for the same analyses in Study 2, as one may see in Study 2ss Results chapter).
12.3 Testing the Hypotheses
In Chapter 1 of the present thesis, several hypotheses were presented. The 
following section discusses the manner in which the hypotheses were tested and the 
results of the analyses.
12.3.1 Hy po th es i s  1: In tu i t ion  and  Ac c u ra cy  in Pain
J u d gm en t s
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between intuition level (as 
measured by the MBTI Sensing-Intuition scale) and accuracy in discriminating 
genuine (spontaneous) pain from faked (posed) pain. In order to analyse this 
hypothesis, Pearson correlations were conducted on judges’ Intuition scores in 
relation to their detection accuracy scores, as well as being analysed in multiple 
regressions. On the dichotomous MBTI scale of Intuition vs. Sensing (in which a 
positive score places a participant in the ‘Intuition’ category and a negative score 
places a participant in the ‘Sensing’ category), relationships for Intuition were 
discovered.
Overall, the hypothesis that intuitive participants would be more adept at 
detecting pain-faking was supported. However, it was revealed that -  as was the case 
with almost all of the results -  the strongest results were obtained when examining the 
data by gender.
Pearson correlations proved to be quite modest when examining intuition and 
the ability to detect faked from real pain for all participants. Significant correlations 
ranged from r = .16 (p < .05) to r = .21 (p < .01) (see Table 9). Additionally, when 
multiple regressions were conducted on intuition and detection accuracy, intuition 
was a modest predictor for all participants when judging faking male targets (see 
Table 16).
However, the strongest results for intuition and the ability to detect faked from 
real pain were discovered when examined by gender. When Pearson correlations 
were conducted, male judges did not have any correlations with accuracy and
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intuition. Additionally, intuition was not a predictor in regressions for male judges. It 
was the female participants who revealed correlations with intuition and accuracy. 
These significant correlations ranged from r = .23 (p < .05) to r = .30 (p < .01). (See 
figure below and Table 10). Multiple regressions revealed similar results; with 
intuition a predictor for female participants and accuracy. In fact, it was a fairly 
strong predictor when females judged male targets and male targets who were faking 
pain. (See Tables 19 and 21).
0 20 40 60 80 100
Accuracy When Target is Male and Faking 
(r= .30, |X .01)
Figure 14: Intuitive Fem ales’ Accuracy in Pain Judgments
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Table 13: Regression Analysis for Overall Accuracy & MBTI, NEO - All participants
MBTI or NEO Variable B SEB P
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.05 .07 -.09
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .07 .06 .1 2
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.15 .06 -.24*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .00 .05 .0 1
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism - .2 1 .17 - .1 1
(NEO) Extraversion -.03 .23 -.0 2
(NEO) Openness .19 .22 .08
(NEO) Agreeableness .43 .2 2 .19*
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.24 .17 -.13
Notes: Results for all participants (N=T70). R2 = .12 */? < .05
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Table 14: Regression Analysis for Overall Accuracy and M B T I , NEO variables -  by
Gender.
MBTI or NEO Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.25 .13 -.40
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) -.01 .11 -.02
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.14 .12 -.20
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .01 .09 .02
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.63 .30 -.35*
(NEO) Extraversion .46 .45 .20
(NEO) Openness .11 .37 .05
(NEO) Agreeableness -.04 .39 -.02
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.22 .31 -.13
Female Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) .01 .08 .02
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .13 .07 .25
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.17 .07 -.28*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .01 .06 .02
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.07 .21 -.04
(NEO) Extraversion -.29 .28 -.15
(NEO) Openness .12 .28 .05
(NEO) Agreeableness .76 .26 .34**
(NEO) Conscientiousness
....  r>2_ no r-____ i____ l?_c___x_
-.30
7 o
.21 -.16
Notes: R2-  .22 for male participants (N=58) & R2= .17 for female participants (N=l 12). 
*p < .05, **p < .01
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MBTI or NEO Variable B SEB P
Extraversion vs. Introversion: 
Extraversion = (+) .00
Faked Pain 
.08 .00
Introversion = (-) 
Intuition vs. Sensing: 
Intuition = (+) .10 .06 .17
Sensing = (-) 
Feeling vs. Thinking: 
Feeling = (+) -.14 .07 -.21*
Thinking = (-) 
Perceiving vs. Judging: 
Perceiving = (+) .00 .06 .01
Judging = (-) 
(NEO) Neuroticism -.11 .19 -.05
(NEO) Extraversion -.21 .27 -.09
(NEO) Openness .23 .25 .09
(NEO) Agreeableness .40 .25 .15
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.21 .19 -.10
Extraversion vs. Introversion: 
Extraversion = (+) -.11
Real Pain 
.08 -.16
Introversion = (-) 
Intuition vs. Sensing: 
Intuition = (+) .02 .07 .03
Sensing = (-) 
Feeling vs. Thinking: 
Feeling = (+) -.15 .07 -.21*
Thinking = (-) 
Perceiving vs. Judging: 
Perceiving = (+) -.00 .06 -.00
Judging = (-) 
(NEO) Neuroticism -.32 .20 -.14
(NEO) Extraversion .18 .28 .08
(NEO) Openness ,18 .26 .06
(NEO) Agreeableness .44 .26 .16
(NEO) Conscientiousness
a h 'e t
-.29 .20
...... A,..., ....
-.13
* p  <  .05
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Table 16: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Male Targets (Faking vs. Real Pain) 
& MBTI; NEO_____________________________________________________________________
MBTI or NEO Variable B SEB P
Male Targets: Faking Pain
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) .06 .08 .08
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Jntuition = (+) .14 .07 .21*
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.15 .07 -.19*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.10 .06 -.16
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.22 .21 -.09
(NEO) Extraversion .03 .29 .01
(NEO) Openness .28 .27 .09
(NEO) Agreeableness .33 .27 .11
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.44 .21 -.19*
Male Targets: Real Pain
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.09 .08 -.13
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .04 .07 .06
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.10 .07 -.14
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.01 .06 -.03
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.28 .21 -.12
(NEO) Extraversion .09 .29 .04
(NEO) Openness -.01 .27 -.00
(NEO) Agreeableness .39 .27 .14
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.21
r>2_ n____ , _
.21
- ___r-ki.'.____ . ■ cj ' '
-.10
Notes: All participants (7V=T70). R2= .12 for male targets faking pain, R2 — .05 for males 
in real pain. *p < .05
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Table 17: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Real Pain and MBTI & NEO
-  by Gender.__________________________________________________________________
MBTI or NEO Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.37 .16 -.52*
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) -.06 .12 -.09
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.11 .14 -.14
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .03 .11 .05
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.60 .36 -.30
(NEO) Extraversion .79 .53 .32
(NEO) Openness -.12 .43 -.05
(NEO) Agreeableness .01 .46 .00
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.07 .36 -.03
• Female Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) .02 .10 .03
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .06 .08 .09
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.17 .09 -.23
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.02 .07 -.04
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.34 .25 -.14
(NEO) Extraversion -.28 .34 -.12
(NEO) Openness .40 .34 .14
(NEO) Agreeableness .76 .32 .28*
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.54 .25 -.24*
Notes: R = .18 for male participants, R = .15 for female participants. *p < .05.
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Table 18: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Male Targets vs. Female Targets &
MBTI, NEO_______________________________________________________________________
MBTI or NEO Variable B SEB P
Accuracy for Male Targets
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.01 .06 -.02
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .09 .05 .18
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.12 .05 -.22*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.06 .05 -.13
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.25 .15 -.14
(NEO) Extraversion .06 .21 .03
(NEO) Openness .13 .20 .06
(NEO) Agreeableness .36 .20 .17
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.33 .15 -.19*
Accuracy for Female Targets
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.08 .10 -.10
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .05 .08 .06
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.18 .09 -.20*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .06 .07 .08
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.20 .25 -.07
(NEO) Extraversion -.09 .34 -.03
(NEO) Openness .27 .32 .08
(NEO) Agreeableness .50 .32 .15
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.19 .25
• _ _ ___ o r,2
-.07...............   ; t   a   ■ 1 —...... ——.——  ......
Notes: All participants (N=170). R = .13 when judging male targets & R = .08 when judging 
female targets, *p < .05
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Table 19: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Male Targets and MBTI, NEO
-  By Gender.__________________________________________________________________
MBTI or NEO Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.20 .11 -.36
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) -.07 .09 -.13
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.15 .10 -.25
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.09 .08 -.18
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.53 .25 -.33*
(NEO) Extraversion .79 .37 .42*
(NEO) Openness .44 .31 .22
(NEO) Agreeableness .29 .33 .12
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.35 .26 -.22
Female Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) .05 .07 .10
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .17 .06 .34**
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.12 .07 -.20
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.03 .05 -.06
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.12 .20 -.07
(NEO) Extraversion -.31 .26 -.17
(NEO) Openness - .1 1 .27 -.05
(NEO) Agreeableness .57 .24 .27*
(NEO) Conscientiousness
• a t
-.37 .20
1 _ . j • • j *i>
-.21
Notes: R2-  .33 for male participants, RJ= .17 for female participants. *p < .05, **/? < .01
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Table 20: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Female Targets and MBTI, NEO 
by Gender.
MBTI or NEO Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.32 .20 -.35
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .05 .16 .06
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.12 .18 -.12
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .10 .14 .13
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.74 .46 -.28
(NEO) Extraversion .06 .68 .02
(NEO) Openness -.23 .56 -.07
(NEO) Agreeableness -.44 .59 -.11
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.08 .47 ' -.03
Female Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.00 .12 -.01
Introversion — (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .09 .10 .12
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.25 .11 -.27*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .03 .09 .04
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.07 .31 -.02
(NEO) Extraversion -.24 .41 -.09
(NEO) Openness .40 .42 .12
(NEO) Agreeableness .97 .38 .30*
(NEO) Conscientiousness 
nr~~rAmT ___ ,:1 - .
-.30
n 2 _  1 -> r .
.31 - . 1 1
•fc ^  A f
.......... y 11 —..... . 11 —.....  —... ...........  ..............
Notes: R = .17 for male participants & R = .13 for female participants. *p < .05
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Table 21: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Male Targets (Faking) & MBTI,
NEO -  by Gender.______________________________________________________________
MBTI or NEO Variable_________   B__________ SE_B_____________ £
Male Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.11 .16 -.13
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) -.02 .13 -.03
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.20 .15 -.22
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.19 .12 -.27
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.63 .38 -.27
(NEO) Extraversion .56 .56 .20
(NEO) Openness .86 .46 .29
(NEO) Agreeableness .07 .49 .02
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.68 .38 -.29
Female Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) .09 .10 .13
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .26 .08 .40**
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.15 .09 -.19
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.03 .07 -.05
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism .04 .26 .02
(NEO) Extraversion -.16 .35 -.07
(NEO) Openness -.32 .35 -.11
(NEO) Agreeableness .62 .33 .22
(NEO) Conscientiousness 
T r : '1' 'nS'_ ,,77: “  , ... .
-.28 .26
J?____ 1 _ ___.j * •_____ j.
-.12
^ a  r* st. nNotes: R2 = .17 for male participants & R2 = .04 for female participants. */? < .05, **p < .01
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12.3.2 Hyp o t h es i s  2: Openness  and  Ac c u r a c y  in Pain
Jud g me n t s
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between Openness to 
Experience (as measured by the NEO-FFI) and accuracy in pain judgments. In order 
to test this hypothesis, Pearson correlations were conducted on judges’ Openness 
scores in relation to their detection accuracy scores, as well as analysed in multiple 
regressions.
The hypothesis that there would be a relationship between Openness to 
Experience and the ability to decipher faked from genuine pain was supported. As 
was often found in this study, results proved to be stronger when examined by gender.
When Pearson correlations were conducted for all participants for Openness 
and accuracy in detection, quite modest significant correlations were revealed 
[ranging from r -  .15 (p < .05) to r -  .19 (p < .05)]. Additionally, Openness was a 
modest predictor for all participants in regressions.
However, when analyses were conducted by gender, stronger results were 
obtained. Interestingly, male judges revealed correlations [including r = .29 (p < .05) 
for judging faking male targets]; however, Opennness was not a predictor for male 
judges in regressions. Female judges revealed modest significant correlations for 
Openness and accuracy, ranging from r = .19 (p < .05) to r = .21 (p < .05), and also 
were slight predictors in regressions. (See figure below and Table 12).
0 20 40 60 80 100
Overall Accuracy 
(r = .20, p < .05)
Figure 15: ‘Open’ Females’ Accuracy in Pain Judgments
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12.3.3 H yp ot hes i s  3: I n tu i t io n  & Openness
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between Intuition level (as
measured by the MBTI) and Openness to Experience (as measured by the NEO-FFI). 
In order to test this hypothesis, Pearson correlation was conducted on Intuition scores 
(on the MBTI) in relation to Openness to Experience scores (on the NEO-FFI).
The hypothesis that there would be a relationship between Intuition and 
Openness to Experience was supported. As expected, there was a strong correlation 
between the two, both when the analyses were conducted for all participants (r = .58, 
p  < .01) and by gender (r = .59, p  < .01). (See Tables 65 and 66). This is consistent 
with the findings of previous studies (e.g. MacDonald et al, 1994; Furnham, 1996).
12.3 .4  Hyp o t h es i s  4: In tu i t ion ,  Openness  & A c c u r a c y  in Pain  
J ud gm en t s
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between Intuition level (as
measured by the MBTI), Openness to Experience (as measured by the NEO-FFI), and
accuracy in pain judgments. In order to test this hypothesis, partial correlations were 
conducted to determine if the strength of the relationship between accuracy and 
Intuition was affected by Openness, and if the relationship between Openness and 
accuracy was affected by Intuition.
Overall detection accuracy
In terms of overall detection accuracy for all participants, the extremely 
modest zero order correlation between Intuition (r = .16, n = 168,/? = .04) and overall 
accuracy changed to a correlation of .08 and no longer reached significance when 
controlling for Openness. When controlling for Intuition, the zero order correlation (r 
= .17) changed to .09.
Similarly, when examined by gender, females’ zero order correlation for 
Intuition and overall accuracy (r=.23, n = 110, p  = .01) changed to r = .14 and was no 
longer statistically significant when controlling for Openness. (There were no 
significant zero order correlations for males and Intuition). When controlling for 
Intuition, the zero order correlation of .20 changed to .08.
Accuracy when target is male and faking pain
Accuracy judging male targets faking pain provided stronger correlations with 
Intuition and Openness than overall accuracy; therefore, partial correlations were also
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conducted on this variable. Zero order correlations (for all participants) between 
Intuition and accuracy when the target is male and faking pain (r = .21, n=168, p=.01) 
changed to r = .12 and no longer reached significance when controlling for Openness. 
(Controlling for Intuition changed the zero order correlation from .19 to .08).
Accuracy when target is male and faking pain -  by gender
The relationship that remained largely unaffected in partial correlations was 
for accuracy in judging male fakers when conducted by participant gender. For 
female participants, the zero order correlation between Intuition and accuracy for 
male fakers (r=.30, 72=109, /K.01) was essentially unchanged when controlling for 
Openness (r = .29, p<.01). (There were no significant zero order correlations for 
males and Intuition).
Whilst correlations for Openness and accuracy for male fakers did not reach 
significance for female participants, correlations were significant for male participants 
and Openness. Male participants’ zero order correlations for Openness and accuracy 
judging- faking male targets (r = .32, n = 56, p  = .03) remained basically unchanged 
when controlling for Intuition (r = .29).
In sum, there appears to be an interaction between Intuition and Openness 
which affects the strength of the relationship between the two variables and overall 
accuracy in detection, and therefore the hypothesis was partially supported. However, 
Intuition and Openness do not appear to have an effect on one another in regards to 
accuracy for male targets faking pain when examined by participant gender.
12.3 .5  Hypo th es i s  5: E x t r av er s io n  & A c c u r a c y  in Pain  
J ud g me n t s
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between Extraversion (as 
measured by the MBTI and the NEO-FFI) and accuracy in pain judgments. In order 
to test this hypothesis, Pearson correlations were conducted on judges’ Extraversion 
scores in relation to their detection accuracy scores, as well as analysed in multiple 
regressions.
The hypothesis that extraverted participants would be more accurate at 
detection was essentially only supported for male participants. When the analyses 
were conducted for all participants, there were no significant Pearson correlations for 
extraversion and detection accuracy.
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Whilst no Pearson correlations were discovered by gender, multiple 
regressions revealed that (NEO) extraversion was a strong predictor when male 
participants judged male targets. (See Table 19). Interestingly, it was introversion, 
and not extraversion, that was a strong predictor for male participants when judging 
real pain. (See Table 17).
12.4 Ad di t iona l  F ind i ngs  -  Study 1
12.4.1 N E O - F F I
1 2 . 4 . 1 . 1  A c c u r a c y  a n d  ( L a c k  o f )  N e u r o t i c i s m
An additional correlation was discovered in Study 1 in which a negative 
relationship was found for Neuroticism (on the NEO-FFI) and accuracy at detection, 
with significant correlations ranging from r = -.16 (p < .05) to r = -. 20 (p < .05). (See 
Table 11). However, as was common in the present studies, the strongest results were 
found when the data was analysed by gender, and in this case the strongest results 
were discovered for male participants. Significant correlations for males ranged from 
r = -.27 (p < .05) for overall accuracy to r — -.36 (p < .01) for accuracy in judging 
male targets (see figure below and Table 12).
Additionally, low neuroticism was also a predictor in multiple regressions, and 
especially for male participants -  both for Overall Accuracy and when judging male 
targets (see Tables 13 and 19). Therefore, it appears that males low in neuroticism 
were more accurate in detection.
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Accuracy When Judging Male Targets 
(r = -.36, p < .01)
Figure 16: High Neuroticism Males’ Accuracy in Pain Judgment
1 2 . 4 . 1 . 2  A c c u r a c y  a n d  A g r e e a b l e n e s s
Additionally, whilst no significant correlations were found for NEO 
Agreeableness, it was a rather consistent predictor in regressions -  and especially for 
female participants. NEO Agreeableness was a modest predictor in regressions for all 
participants regarding accuracy in pain judgment. However, for females, 
Agreeableness was a consistent and fairly strong predictor for most of the accuracy 
variables. (See Study 1 regression tables in this chapter).
1 2 . 4 . 2  M B T I
1 2 . 4 . 2 . 1  A c c u r a c y  a n d  ‘ T h i n k e r  * v s .  ‘ F e e l e r  ’  T y p e  M a l e s
An additional relationship was discovered for ‘Thinker’ (vs. ‘Feeler’) type 
male participants and accuracy in pain judgment. Whilst no correlations were found 
when the data were examined for all participants, moderate correlations were 
discovered when analysed by gender. On the dichotomous MBTI scale of Thinking 
vs. Feeling (in which a positive score places a participant in the ‘Feeling’ category 
and a negative score places a participant in the ‘Thinking’ category), those rated as 
‘Thinkers’ had a positive relationship with accuracy, and ‘Feelers’ had a negative 
relationship with accuracy. (See figure below).
Significant Pearson correlations for Thinkers/Feelers revealed correlations 
ranging from r = -.31 (p < .05) to r = - .33 (p < .05) with pain judgment accuracy (see
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Table 10). Additionally, this personality trait was a predictor for both males and 
females in the majority of regressions. (See regression tables in this chapter).
Overall Accuracy 
(r = - .31, p < .05)
Figure 17: ‘Feeler’ Type (vs. ‘Thinker’ Type) M ales’ Accuracy in Pain Judgment
1 2 . 4 . 2 . 2  I n t u i t i v e s  v s .  S e n s o r s  a n d  T h i n k e r s  v s .  F e e l e r s
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare pain detection 
accuracy between ‘Intuitive’ and ‘Sensing’ (on the MBTI) participants. There were 
no significant differences for Sensors (M=50.46, SD= 13.30) and Intuitives 
[M=53.19, SD=15.58; t(168)= -1.22,p  = .22].
Additionally, an independent samples t-test was conducted to compare pain 
detection accuracy between ‘Thinker’ and ‘Feeler’ (on the MBTI) participants. There 
were no significant differences for Thinkers (M=54.08, SD=14.66) and Feelers 
[M=50.17, SD=14.37; t(168)=1.75,/? = .09].
12 .4 .3  C on fid en ce  in D e c is io n -M a k in g
(See Hypothesis 11, which predicted that there would be a difference in scores 
between participants in confidence in decision-making).
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare overall confidence 
in decision-making between male and female participants when making pain 
judgments in Study 1. There were no significant differences for males (M=3.58, 
SD=.62) and females [M=3.49, SD=47; t(90.07)= 1.02,/? = .31]. (Confidence scores 
were on a Lilcert scale of 1 -  5). In fact, there were no significant differences between 
genders on any of the confidence variables.
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Additionally, an independent samples t-test was conducted to compare overall 
confidence in decision-making between ‘Low Accuracy’ (score of <= 53) and ‘High 
Accuracy’ (score of 54+) participants. There were no significant differences for Low 
Accuracy (M=3.50, SD=.52) and High Accuracy participants [M=3.55, SD=.51; 
t(168)= -.65,p  = .52].
In addition, Pearson correlations were conducted on confidence scores in 
relation to accuracy, as well as confidence scores in relation to personality variables. 
No significant correlations were found when the data were analysed for all 
participants. However, very modest correlations were found for female participants’ 
confidence levels in relation to accuracy variables. When female participants judged 
faking female targets, a correlation of r = .20 {p < .05) was found for ‘confidence for 
faking male targets’ and a correlation of .19 (p < .05) was found for ‘overall 
confidence for male targets’. Additionally, the only significant personality variable 
that correlated with confidence was extraversion. For male participants, extraversion 
had a significant correlation (r = .28, p  < .05) when judging female targets. (See 
correlation tables for confidence in the Appendices).
The other area in which confidence in decision-making displayed correlations 
was when examined by age, however, only when examined by gender. Male 
participants had significant correlations ranging from r = .26 (p < .05) to r = .32 (p < 
.05), with a relationship of r = .29 (p < .05) for age and overall confidence level, and r 
= .32 (p < .05) for age and confidence for female targets. (See figures below).
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Confidence When Judging Female Targets
(r = .32, p < .05)
Figure 18: M ales’ Confidence in Decision-M aking and Age
Confidence When Judging Female Targets
(r = .28, p < .05)
Figure 19: M ales’ Confidence in Decision-M aking and Extraversion
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12 .4 .4  R e la t io n sh ip s  be tw een  M e a su r e s : M B T I and  N E O -F F I  
expected, there were numerous Pearson correlations between the MBTI
and the NEO-FFI (see Tables 65 and 6 6  in Appendices). The strongest correlation, as 
one might expect, was between the MBTI’s extraversion and the NEO’s extraversion 
variables (r = .74, p  < .01). Additionally, as hypothesised, intuition and openness 
were correlated (r = .58, p  < .01). Also, a fairly strong relationship was discovered 
between (NEO) Agreeableness and MBTI ‘Feeling’ (r = .49, p  < .01), as well as 
between (NEO) Conscientiousness,and MBTI ‘Judging’ (r = .48,p  < .01).
12.4 .5  In te r c o r r e la t io n s : M B T I & NEO
Pearson correlations were conducted on the MBTI and the NEO-FFI to 
examine intercorrelations. The largest correlation that was found for the MBTI was a 
relationship between Perceiving (vs. Judging) and Intuition (vs. Sensing)
(r = .51,/.? < .01) (see Table 67 in Appendices). Examination of Pearson correlations 
for the NEO revealed a negative relationship between extraversion and neuroticism (r 
= -.35, p  < .01), among others (see Table 68 in Appendices).
12.5 Summary
In summary, Study One revealed many significant differences in accuracy, 
especially in regards to the personality variables -  and particularly when examined by 
participant gender. Hypothesis 1, the hypothesis that there would be a relationship 
between Intuition and detection accuracy, was supported overall. However, as was 
discovered throughout the study, the strongest findings were found when examined by 
gender (females demonstrating the higher correlations with accuracy). Additionally, 
Hypothesis 2, that there would be a relationship between Openness and detection 
accuracy, was also supported (with slightly higher correlations for females). Male 
participants high in Openness, though, showed a correlation with accuracy in judging 
faking male targets.
Hypothesis 3 theorised that there would be a relationship between Intuition 
and Openness, and this hypothesis was supported. Following from these analyses, 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that a relationship would exist between Intuition, Openness 
and accuracy in pain judgments. Partial correlations revealed that the two personality 
variables did appear to influence the relationship each had with detection accuracy.
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In Hypothesis 5, it was theorised that a relationship would exist between 
extraversion and accuracy in pain judgments. This hypothesis was only partially 
supported. Whilst no relationships were found through Pearson correlations, 
regression conducted on male participants’ accuracy scores demonstrated a 
relationship with extraversion when judging male targets.
Additional relationships were discovered, in addition to those proposed in the 
hypotheses. Neuroticism was found to have a negative relationship with accuracy for 
male participants. In addition, male participants displayed correlations between 
confidence in decision-making and age. Beyond the confidence correlation, age did 
not appear to be a factor in relation to accuracy. Whilst gender in general did not 
appear to be a factor in accuracy, accuracy differences between males and females did 
appear in relation to specific personality types. For instance, the ‘Thinker’ type, as 
well as low neuroticism males showed a relationship with detection accuracy. 
Finally, as expected, several correlations were found between the MBTI and the NEO, 
as well as intercorrelations for each measure.
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CHAPTER 13: STUDY TWO RESULTS
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS version 12.0. Initially, descriptive 
statistics were run on all variables, and data were inspected to identify and correct 
data input errors and outliers. Demographic data are presented in Tables 87 -  92 in 
Appendices.
Multiple regression was utilised to explore the extent the present study’s 
independent variables (personality variables) predicted pain judgment ability. Given 
that there existed a fair number of correlations between the independent variables 
(personality variables), regression was utilised in the present thesis to examine the 
extent to which each personality variable independently contributed to explaining the 
variance in the dependent variable (accuracy in pain judgment). T-tests were 
conducted to determine if there were any significant differences in detection of 
decision-making confidence between males and females. Analysis of Variance was 
conducted to examine difference in detection accuracy by age (see Appendices for 
additional tables).
13.1 Study 2: Ove r v i ew
A total of 179 individuals participated in Study Two, of which 130 were 
female and 49 were male. As expected, overall accuracy in participants’ abilities to 
distinguish between real and faked pain was approximately at chance level. 
However, Study 2 revealed just slightly higher means for accuracy in pain judgments 
than in Study 1, with a mean judgment accuracy for Study 2 of 54.6% (SD=14.5%). 
Participants’ accuracy rates varied widely, ranging from 16% to 85%. Males’ mean 
judgment accuracy was 53.2% (SD=T4.4%) and females’ mean judgment accuracy 
was 55.2% (SD=14.5%). Despite such variability, participants’ overall detection 
ability of faked versus real pain for male targets in the videos was significantly 
correlated with their rates for female targets (r = .38, /X.0001), suggesting that 
participants had reliable detection accuracy. (This correlation, though, was slightly 
lower than that found in Study 1, which was r = .42,/K.0001). Descriptive statistics 
for accuracy in Study 2 are presented in Tables 87 and 88 in Appendices.
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The overall confidence in decision-making for participants when making pain 
judgments ranged from 2 - 5  (on a scale of 1 -5), with a mean confidence of 3.5
(SD=.52). Males’ mean confidence was 3.5 (SD=.57) and females’ mean confidence
was also 3.5 (SD=.50). Descriptive statistics for confidence in Study 2 are presented 
in Tables 89 and 90 in Appendices.
13.2 D emo gr aph ic  V ar i ab le s  and Accuracy
13.2 .1  G ender  and  A c c u ra c y
The present thesis hypothesised that there would be a difference in accuracy 
scores across gender in the ability to detect faked from genuine pain. This hypothesis 
was tested, and the results are presented as Hypothesis 10.
13 .2 .2  Age and  A c c u ra c y
Significant, but modest, differences between accuracy by age level were found 
when ANOVAs were conducted in Study 2. The following summarises the test 
performed and results received for each test. (Also see Tables 115 - 117 in 
Appendices).
Overall Accuracy and Age
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of age on levels of overall accuracy in detecting faked from genuine pain. 
Participants were divided into three groups according to age (Group 1: 20 or younger; 
Group 2: 20.1-21.5 years old; Group 3: over 21.5 years of age).
There was a statistically significant difference at the p  < .05 level in accuracy 
for the three groups [F(2, 175) = 3.4, p  = .04]. Despite reaching statistical 
significance, the actual difference in the mean scores between the groups was small. 
The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .04. A post-hoc test using Tukey 
HSD test did not indicate any statistically significant difference between the three 
groups.
Overall Accuracy. Age and Gender
Additionally, a two-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted 
to explore the impact of gender and age on levels of accuracy in detecting faked fiom 
genuine pain. Participants were divided into three age groups, as stated above. There 
was a statistically significant main effect for age [F(2, 172) = 3.35,p  — .04]; however, 
the effect size was small (partial eta squared = .04). Post-hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test did not indicate any statistically significant difference between Group
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1 (M=58.53, SD=T3.38) and Group 2 (M=52.82, SD=15.39) or Group 3 (M=52.27, 
SD=16.64). The interaction effect [F(2,172) = .42,/? = .6 6] did not reach statistical 
significance.
Accuracy for Male Targets Faking Pain and Age
Additionally, since male targets faking pain often showed strong results in 
correlations and regressions, this group was also addressed in regards to analysis of 
variance. A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore 
the impact of age on levels of pain-faking detection accuracy when the target is male 
and faking pain. Participants were divided into three groups, as previously stated.
There was a statistically significant difference at the p < .05 level in accuracy 
for male fakers for the three groups [F(2, 175) = 4.8, p  = .01]. Despite reaching 
statistical significance, the difference in mean scores between the groups was modest. 
The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .05. Post-hoc tests using Tukey 
HSD test indicated that the mean score for Group 1 (M=59.03, SD= 16.99) was 
significantly different from Group 2 (M= 51.75, &£>= 16.82). Additionally, the mean 
score for Group 1 was also significantly different from Group 3 (M=49.98, 
£D=15.20).
Accuracy for Male Targets Faking Pain, Age and Gender
In addition, a two-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of gender and age on levels of pain-faking detection accuracy 
when the target is male and faking pain. Participants were divided into three age 
groups, as stated above.
There was a statistically significant main effect for age [F(2, 172) = 4.67, p  = 
.01]; however, the effect size was modest (partial eta squared = .05). Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for Group 1 
(M=59.03, SD=16.99) was significantly different from Group 2 (M=51.75, 
SD=16.82). Additionally, Group 1 was significantly different from Group 3 
(M=49.98, SD=T5.20). The main effect for gender [F (2, 172) =.73, p= 40] and the 
interaction effect [F(2,172) = .51, p  = .57] did not reach statistical significance.
In sum, for overall accuracy and when judging male faking targets, modest 
significant differences were found using one-way and two-way ANOVAs, including 
differences between the youngest age group and the other two age-groups. However, 
gender did not appear to be a factor.
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13.3 Tes t ing  the Hypo thes i s
13.3 .1  H yp o th es is  6 : E m o tio n a l  In te l l ig e n c e  & A c c u ra c y  in Pain  
Ju d g m en ts
Hypothesis 6 : There is a positive relationship between Emotional Intelligence 
(as measured by the MSCEIT) and accuracy in pain judgments. In order to test this 
hypothesis, Pearson correlations were conducted on judges’ scores on the MSCEIT 
tasks, branches and areas in relation to then detection accuracy scores. Additionally, 
the MSCEIT tasks were analysed in multiple regressions.
The hypothesis that participants with high scores on emotional intelligence 
would be more accurate at detection was partially supported (see Tables 22-24). The 
present study found relationships between specific aspects of emotional intelligence 
and the ability to differentiate faked from real pain. However, there did not prove to 
be a relationship between overall emotional intelligence score and accuracy in pain 
judgments.
The Changes Task of the MSCEIT was discovered to be the emotional 
intelligence task with the strongest relationship to distinguishing faked from real pain. 
The Changes Task in the MSCEIT examines the participant’s knowledge of emotional 
‘chains’, or how emotions transition from one to another (such as how anger can 
change to rage). When examining the Changes Task’s relationship to detection for all 
participants, slight significant correlations were found (r = .18,/> < .05 and r = .16, p  
< .05), and this task was a slight predictor in multiple regression. (See regression 
tables, including Table 30).
However, as with previous results, the strongest results were obtained when 
examining the Changes Task by participant gender. Male judges were discovered to 
have the strongest relationship between the Changes Task and accuracy at detection. 
Their significant correlations ranged from r = .31 (p < .05) for accuracy when judging 
faking targets, to r -  .36 (p < .05) for accuracy when judging female targets, to r = .41 
(p < .01) for accuracy when judging female faking targets. Additionally, this task was 
a predictor in multiple regressions for male judges for the same target groups.
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Accuracy When Video Target is Female ancl Faking 
(r= .41, p < .01)
Figure 20: Changes Task for M ales & Accuracy in Pain Judgment
Interestingly, the Pictures Task of the MSCEIT revealed modest negative 
correlations with detection accuracy for all participants (r = -.15, p  < .05). The 
Pictures Task is one in which the participant indicates the extent to which certain 
images or landscapes express various emotions. Females in particular displayed a 
modest negative relationship of detection accuracy for the Pictures Task, with 
significant correlations of r = -.18 (p < .05) and r = -.19 (p < .05). Additionally, the 
Pictures Task was a modest predictor in multiple regressions for females in relation to 
detection for many accuracy variables, including overall accuracy and various faking 
variables. (See regression tables in this chapter, including Tables 29 and 33).
This trend of negative correlations between aspects of emotional intelligence 
and detection accuracy was again displayed in regards to the Emotion Management 
task of the MSCEIT. There was a negative correlation between the Emotion 
Management task and accuracy judging faking targets (r = -.30, p  < .05) for male 
judges. However, Emotion Management was a not a significant predictor in 
regressions. Additionally, male judges had a negative correlation of -.26 with the 
Managing Emotions branch of the MSCEIT when judging faking males, though it did 
not reach significance. (No correlations were found when analysed for all 
participants).
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Table 28: Regression Analysis for Overall Accuracy & MSCEIT (tasks), PPI (subscales).
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Faces task -.04 .06 -.06
Facilitation task .03 .09 .03
Changes task .23 .13 .16
Emotion Mgmt task .03 .15 .02
Pictures task -.13 .1 2 - . 1 1
Sensations task -.0 2 .1 2 -.0 1
Blends task .07 .15 .05
Social Mgmt task - .1 0 .16 -.07
Social Potency (PPI) - .1 0 .13 -.08
Fearlessness (PPI) .18 .14 .14
Cold heartedness (PPI) .04 .18 .02
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) -.00 .18 -.00
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.39 .16 -.2 1 *
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.09 .17 -.04
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.42 .25 -.18
Machiavellian (PPI)
a h ____ j . - : ____ n m
.16
1 rv rtf ^ rv /**
.1 2 .13
Notes: All participants (N — 179). R2-  .10 *p < .05
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Table 29: Regression Analysis for Overall Accuracy & MSCEIT (tasks), PPI (subscales) -
by Gender.__________________________________________________________________________
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Faces task -.19 .13 -.34
Facilitation task .20 .18 .2 1
Changes task .40 .26 .29
Emotion Mgmt task .04 .34 .03
Pictures task .04 .20 .04
Sensations task .2 1 .27 .17
Blends task - .1 2 .30 - .1 0
Social Mgmt task -.31 .33 -.2 2
Social Potency (PPI) -.32 .30 -.25
Fearlessness (PPI) -.37 .34 -.27
Cold heartedness (PPI) .31 .36 .15
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .45 .37 .26
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.8 6 .41 -.37*
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.40 .38 -.19
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.0 1 .69 -.00
Machiavellian (PPI) .51 .28 .39 .
Female Participants
Faces task .0 1 .07 .02
Facilitation task .02 .1 1 .02
Changes task .15 .15 .10
Emotion Mgmt task .00 .17 .00
Pictures task -.32 .16 -.23*
Sensations task -.13 .15 -.09
Blends task .08 .19 .05
Social Mgmt task .02 .19 .02
Social Potency (PPI) -.00 .15 -.00
Fearlessness (PPI) .38 .17 .26*
Cold heartedness (PPI) .02 .2 2 ..0 1
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .04 .23 .02
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.28 .18 -.16
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.0 2 .20 -.0 1
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.48 .30 -.19
Machiavellian (PPI)
™  A ■ _________
.04
a f \ \  r, ta2
.15 .03
Notes: R2= .39 for male participants (77=49) & R2=  .13 for female participants (A==130). *p < 
.05.
Decem ber 2008 - 2 0 8 - Ph. D . Thesis
Table 30: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Faked Pain vs. Real Pain &
MSCEIT; PPI._______________________________________________________________
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Faked Pain
Faces task -.04 .07 -.06
Facilitation task .02 .09 .02
Changes task .34 .14 .2 2 *
Emotion Mgmt task -.03 .15 -.0 2
Pictures task -.18 .13 -.15
Sensations task -.03 .13 -.0 2
Blends task .15 .16 .1 0
Social Mgmt task -.05 .17 -.04
Social Potency (PPI) -.03 .13 -.0 2
Fearlessness (PPI) .15 .14 .1 1
Cold heartedness (PPI) .06 .19 .03
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) -.14 .19 -.07
Blame Externalisation (PPI) - .1 2 .17 -.06
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.05 .18 -.0 2
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.28 .27 - .1 1
Machiavellian (PPI) .20 .13 .16
Real Pain
Faces task -.04 .08 -.05
Facilitation task .03 .1 1 .02
Changes task .1 2 .16 .07
Emotion Mgmt task .1 1 .19 .05
Pictures task -.09 .15 -.06
Sensations task -.03 .16 -.0 2
Blends task .0 1 .20 .0 1
Social Mgmt task -.16 .20 -.09
Social Potency (PPI) -.17 .16 - .1 1
Fearlessness (PPI) .20 .17 .1 2
Cold heartedness (PPI) .04 .23 .02
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .14 .23 .06
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.65 .2 1 _ 2 7 **
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) - .1 1 .22 -.04
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.57 .32 -.19
Machiavellian (PPI) .14 .16 .09
Notes: R2= .10 forjudging faked pain, R2 — .10 for real pain. *p < .05 **/? < .01
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Table 31: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Male Targets (Faking vs. Real) &
MSCEIT, P P I.___________________________________________________________________
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB
Male Targets: Faking Pain
Faces task -.00 .07 -.00
Facilitation task -.06 .10 -.05
Changes task .22 .15 .13
Emotion Mgmt task .1 1 .17 .06
Pictures task -.07 .14 -.05
Sensations task -.14 .15 -.09
Blends task .1 0 .18 .06
Social Mgmt task .05 .19 .03
Social Potency (PPI) .04 .15 .03
Fearlessness (PPI) .18 .16 .1 2
Cold heartedness (PPI) -.18 .2 1 -.08
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) -.18 .2 1 -.09
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.04 .19 -.0 2
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.06 .20 -.03
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.05 .30 -.0 2
Machiavellian (PPI) .27 .15 .19
Male Targets: Real Pain
Faces task -.0 1 .08 -.0 1
Facilitation task .09 .1 1 .07
Changes task .05 .17 .03
Emotion Mgmt task -.08 .19 -.04
Pictures task - .1 2 .16 -.08
Sensations task .03 .16 .01
Blends task .07 .20 .04
Social Mgmt task -.25 .2 1 -.13
Social Potency (PPI) -.09 .17 -.06
Fearlessness (PPI) -.04 .18 -.0 2
Cold heartedness (PPI) .05 .23 .02
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .29 .24 .1 2
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.76 .2 1 -.31**
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) - .0 1 .23 -.00
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.38 .33 - .1 2
Machiavellian (PPI)
rv2 _  A O  . J  X*-1 • _
.06
__1 _ _  _  1 A  A -
.18 .04
Notes'. R2 = .08 forjudging faking males, R2 = .12 forjudging males in real pain. **p < 
.01
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Table 32: Regression Analysis fo r  Accuracy Judging Female Targets (Faking vs. Real) &
MSCEIT; PPL______________________________________________________________________
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Female Targets: Faking Pain
Faces task -.07 .09 -.08
Facilitation task .09 .13 .06
Changes task .45 .20 .2 0 *
Emotion Mgmt task -.17 .2 2 -.07
Pictures task -.31 .18 -.17
Sensations task .09 .19 .04
Blends task .20 .24 .1 0
Social Mgmt task -.16 .24 -.07
Social Potency (PPI) -.08 .19 -.04
Fearlessness (PPI) .1 2 .2 1 .06
Cold heartedness (PPI) .31 .27 .1 0
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) - .1 0 .28 -.04
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.2 0 .25 -.07
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.04 .26 -.0 1
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.52 .39 -.14
Machiavellian (PPI) .13 .19 .07
Female Targets: Real Pain
Faces task -.07 .1 1 -.07
Facilitation task -.0 2 .15 -.0 2
Changes task .2 1 .2 2 .08
Emotion Mgmt task .23 .25 .08
Pictures task -.06 .2 1 -.03
Sensations task -.05 .2 2 -.0 2
Blends task -.08 .27 -.03
Social Mgmt task -.03 .28 -.0 1
Social Potency (PPI) -.25 .22 - .1 2
Fearlessness (PPI) .47 .24 .2 1 *
Cold heartedness (PPI) .00 .31 .00
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .02 .31 .01
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.52 .28 -.16
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.20 .30 -.06
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.79 .44 -.19
Machiavellian (PPI) .2 2 .2 2 .10
Notes: R2 =.11 forjudging faking females, R2 = .07 forjudging females in real pain. *p < 
.05
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Table 33: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Faked Pain & MSCEIT, P P I-  by
Gender.
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Faces task - .2 2 .15 -.35
Facilitation task .15 .20 .14
Changes task .37 .29 .24
Emotion Mgmt task -.44 .37 -.23
Pictures task .05 .22 .04
Sensations task .10 .29 .07
Blends task .2 1 .33 .15
Social. Mgmt task -.2 0 .36 -.13
Social Potency (PPI) -.04 .33 -.03
Fearlessness (PPI) -.44 .37 -.29
Cold heartedness (PPI) .06 .34 .03
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) -.06 .41 -.03
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.42 .45 -.16
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.26 .41 - .1 1
Stress Immunity (PPI) .2 2 .76 .06
Machiavellian (PPI) .67 .30 .45*
Female Participants
Faces task .03 .08 .05
Facilitation task -.05 .1 1 -.04
Changes task .25 .16 .16
Emotion Mgmt task .08 .18 .05
Pictures task -.36 .17 -.26*
Sensations task -.03 .16 -.0 2
Blends task .1 1 .20 .08
Social Mgmt task .02 .19 .02
Social Potency (PPI) .01 .16 .00
Fearlessness (PPI) .37 .17 .24*
Cold heartedness (PPI) .16 .23 .07
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) -.03 .24 -.0 2
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.04 .19 -.0 2
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.05 .2 1 -.03
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.33 .31 -.13
Machiavellian (PPI)
tA _ ___C'T + '™77r_
.02
a f\\ o r>2 _
.15 .0 1
-1 o /\\  ^ f\ rNotes: R2 = .43 for male participants (N=  49) & R? -  .11 for females (N =130). *p<  .05.
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Table 34: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Real Pain & MSCEIT, PPI- by
Gender.
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Faces task -.13 .18 -.18
Facilitation task .17 .25 .14
Changes task .45 .36 .25
Emotion Mgmt task .61 .46 .27
Pictures task .02 .28 .01
Sensations task .19 .36 .1 2
Blends task -.37 .42 -.24
Social Mgmt task -.45 .45 -.24
Social Potency (PPI) -.56 .41 -.34
Fearlessness (PPI) -.33 .46 -.18
Cold heartedness (PPI) .65 .50 .25
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .97 .51 .43
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -1.39 .56 -.45*
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.50 .52 -.17
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.29 .95 -.07
Machiavellian (PPI) .34 .38 .20
Female Participants
Faces task -.0 2 .09 -.03
Facilitation task .10 .14 .07
Changes task .05 .20 .03
Emotion Mgmt task -.07 .2 1 -.03
Pictures task -.27 .20 -.15
Sensations task -.23 .19 - .1 2
Blends task ,03 .24 .02
Social Mgmt task .02 .23 .0 1
Social Potency (PPI) -.0 2 .19 -.0 1
Fearlessness (PPI) .39 .2 1 .2 1
Cold heartedness (PPI) - .1 1 .28 -.04
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .08 .29 .03
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.51 .23 -.23*
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) .0 1 .25 .0 1
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.63 .38 -.20
Machiavellian (PPI)
xAAT A.... ' A ............ . . n r "
.08
A o __
.18 .05 '
1 o /\\ ^ r\ rNotes: R2 = .34 for male participants (N -  49) & R2 = .13 for females (N = 130). *p < .05.
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Table 35: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Male Targets vs. Female Targets &
MSCEIT; PPI_____________________________________________________________________
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Male Targets
Faces task -.00 .06 -.0 1
Facilitation task .02 .09 .02
Changes task .14 .13 .09
Emotion Mgmt task .02 .15 .0 1
Pictures task -.08 .1 2 -.07
Sensations task -.06 .13 -.04
Blends task .08 .16 .06
Social Mgmt task -.09 .16 -.07
Social Potency (PPI) -.0 2 .13 -.0 2
Fearlessness (PPI) .07 .14 .05
Cold heartedness (PPI) -.07 .18 -.04
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .05 .19 .03
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.41 .17 -.2 2 *
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.05 .18 -.03
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.19 .26 -.08
Machiavellian (PPI) .14 .13 .1 2
Female Targets
Faces task -.07 .09 -.09
Facilitation task .03 .1 2 .03
Changes task .33 .18 .16
Emotion Mgmt task .03 .20 J01 .
Pictures task -.18 .17 - .1 1
Sensations task .02 .17 .0 1
Blends task .06 .2 2 .03
Social Mgmt task - .1 0 .22 -.05
Social Potency (PPI) -.17 .18 - .1 0
Fearlessness (PPI) .29 .19 .16
Cold heartedness (PPI) .16 .24 .06
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) -.04 .25 -.0 2
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.36 .2 2 -.14
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) - .1 2 .24 -.04
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.6 6 .35 -.2 0
Machiavellian (PPI)
A/- • - J  •_________1-.L ______
.18
r.2 _ AA
.17 .10
Notes: R2=z .06 forjudging male targets, F? = .09 forjudging female targets. *p < .05
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Table 36: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Male Targets & MSCEIT, P P I-  by
Gender.
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Faces task -.20 .14 -.36
Facilitation task .0 1 .18 .01
Changes task -.19 .27 -.14
Emotion Mgmt task -.2 0 .34 - .1 2
Pictures task .18 .2 1 .20
Sensations task .17 .27 .13
Blends task .36 .31 .31
Social Mgmt task -.38 .33 -.26
Social Potency (PPI) -.0 2 .30 -.0 1
Fearlessness (PPI) -.54 .34 -.40
Cold heartedness (PPI) .36 .37 .18
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .33 .38 .19
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.73 .41 -.31
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.23 .38 - .1 0
Stress Immunity (PPI) - .2 2 .70 -.07
Machiavellian (PPI) .49 .28 .38
Female Participants
Faces task .04 .08 .06
Facilitation task .02 .1 1 .02
Changes task .23 .16 .15
Emotion Mgmt task -.0 1 .17 -.00
Pictures task -.24 .17 -.17
Sensations task -.07 .16 -.05
Blends task -.06 .19 -.04
Social Mgmt task .03 .19 .02
Social Potency (PPI) .06 .16 .04
Fearlessness (PPI) .33 .17 .2 2
Cold heartedness (PPI) -.06 .2 2 -.03
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .01 .23 .0 1
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.30 .19 -.17
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) .01 .20 .00
Stress Immunity (PPI) - .2 1 .31 -.08
Machiavellian (PPI)
___ * ___ j- . ___ x n 2 _  ore
.00 .15
o re2_ l o . 1- t
.00
Notes: (No significant predictors). R?= .37 for male participants & R2= .10 for female participants.
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Table 37: Regression for Accuracy Judging Male Targets (Faking) & M SCEITPPI -  by
Gender.
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Faces task -.27 .16 -.38
Facilitation task -.13 .23 - .1 1
Changes task -.33 .32 -.19
Emotion Mgmt task -.45 .47 -.2 1
Pictures task .36 .24 .31
Sensations task .07 .33 .05
Blends task .71 .36 .48
Social Mgmt task -.35 .39 -.19
Social Potency (PPI) .16 .37 .10
Fearlessness (PPI) -.51 .42 -.30
Cold heartedness (PPI) -.14 .47 -.06
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) -.43 .51 -.2 0  *
Blame Externalisation (PPI) - .2 1 .50 • -.07
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.0 1 .47 -.00
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.14 .82 -.04
Machiavellian (PPI) .89 .33 .55*
Female Participants
Faces task .07 .08 .1 0
Facilitation task -.09 .1 2 -.08
Changes task .33 .17 .20
Emotion Mgmt task .20 .19 .1 1
Pictures task -.25 .19 -.16
Sensations task -.08 .17 -.05
Blends task -.08 .2 1 -.05
Social Mgmt task .2 2 .2 1 .13
Social Potency (PPI) .07 .17 .05
Fearlessness (PPI) .55 .19 .34**
Cold heartedness (PPI) -.0 2 .25 -.0 1
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) -.09 .25 -.04
Blame Externalisation (PPI) .04 .20 .02
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.16 .24 -.08
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.08 .34 -.03
Machiavellian (PPI)
'k I T . "  W . 1 „  ____ 1.
.00
___ •______ r.2 _
.18
1 r-T _J?____ *1* ^ r\ r
.00
it* sfc . v f\-1Notes: Males faking pain. R2= .49 for male participants, R2 = .17 for females. *p < .05 **p < .01
December 2008
sf)
- 2 1 6 - Ph. D. Thesis
Table 38: Regression for Accuracy Judging Female Targets (Faking) & MSCEIT, PPI -by
Gender
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Faces task -.18 .24 -.18
Facilitation task .45 .32 .27
Changes task 1.15 .46 .48*
Emotion Mgmt task -.36 .59 - .1 2
Pictures task -.26 .36 -.17
Sensations task .04 .47 .02
Blends task -.24 .53 - .1 2
Social Mgmt task - .1 0 .58 -.04
Social Potency (PPI) -.33 .52 -.16
Fearlessness (PPI) -.36 .59 -.15
Cold heartedness (PPI) .34 .64 .1 0
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .45 .66 .15
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.61 .71 -.15
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.48 .66 -.13
Stress Immunity (PPI) .47 1 .2 2 .09
Machiavellian (PPI) .48 .49 .2 1
Female Participants
Faces task .0 1 .1 1 .0 1
Facilitation .task -.0 1 .16 -.0 1
Changes task .18 .23 .08
Emotion Mgmt task -.04 .25 -.0 2
Pictures task -.47 .24 -.23
Sensations task .05 .23 .02
Blends task .30 .28 .14
Social Mgmt task -.16 .28 -.08
Social Potency (PPI) -.06 .23 -.03
Fearlessness (PPI) .20 .25 .10
Cold heartedness (PPI) .31 .33 .1 0
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .02 .34 .01
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.13 .28 -.05
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) .01 .30 .00
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.56 .45 -.15
Machiavellian (PPI)
TCLL ni 1  Tn'r___
-.0 1  
_ ,A'o ni
.22
A A  J?_A___ 1_/ TV T ... -1 A A\
-.00
Notes: R2 = .37 for male participants ( N - 49) & R2 = .09 for females (N-  130). *p < .05
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Table 39: Regression for Accuracy Judging Male Targets (Real) & MSCEIT, P P I-  by
Gender.
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B SEB P
Male Participants
Faces task -.14 .17 -.2 0
Facilitation task .17 .23 .14
Changes task .02 .34 .01
Emotion Mgmt task .1 1 .44 .05
Pictures task .0 1 .26 .01
Sensations task .17 .34 .1 1
Blends task .07 .39 .05
Social Mgmt task -.45 .43 -.25
Social Potency (PPI) -.30 .39 -.19
Fearlessness (PPI) -.56 .44 -.33
Cold heartedness (PPI) .94 .47 .37
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) 1 .2 2 .49 .56*
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -1.24 .53 -.42*
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.41 .49 -.15
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.39 .90 - .1 0
Machiavellian (PPI) .13 .36 .08
Female Participants
Faces task .01 .1 0 .02
Facilitation task .1 2 .14 .09
Changes task .14 .2 1 .07
Emotion Mgmt task -.19 .22 -.09
Pictures task - .2 2 .22 - .1 2
Sensations task -.04 .20 -.0 2
Blends task -.05 .25 -.03
Social Mgmt task -.13 .25 -.07
Social Potency (PPI) .03 .20 .02
Fearlessness (PPI) .13 .2 2 .07
Cold heartedness (PPI) - .1 2 .29 -.05
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .08 .30 .03
Blame Externalisation (PPI) - .6 6 .24 -.28**
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) .1 2 .26 .05
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.30 .40 -.09
Machiavellian (PPI)
x r * . ____ a .............. ... r _________ i  :T""£5 x> „
-.0 2 .19
ni _ ire
-.0 2
Notes: Accuracy for real pain. R? for male participants = .36, R2 = .12 for females. *p < .05 **p < 
.01
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13 .3 .2  H y p o th e s is  7: F aces  Task  & A c c u ra c y  in Pain  Ju d g m en ts  
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between the Faces Task (on the
MSCEIT) and accuracy in pain judgments. In order to test this hypothesis, Pearson 
correlations were conducted on judges’ scores on the Faces Task in relation to their 
detection accuracy scores, and also analysed in multiple regressions.
The hypothesis that there would be a relationship between the MSCEIT’s 
Faces Task and accuracy in pain judgments was not supported. The Faces Task is 
one in which participants are asked to identify how a person feels based upon his or 
her facial expressions; it measures the ability to judge facial expressions of emotion. 
Since the present study examined the judgment of whether the target was 
experiencing genuine pain or faking pain based upon their facial expressions, it was 
hypothesised that the Faces Task would have a relationship with the present judgment 
task. However, no relationship was discovered between the Faces Task and detection 
accuracy in correlations or multiple regressions.
13.3 .3  H yp o th es is  8: P sy c h o p a th y  & A c c u ra c y  in Pain  Ju d g m en ts  
Hypothesis 8 : There is a positive relationship between psychopathy as
measured by the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) and accuracy in pain 
judgments. In order to test this hypothesis, Pearson correlations were conducted on 
judges’ psychopathy scores (on the PPI) in relation to their detection accuracy scores, 
and also analysed in multiple regressions.
The hypothesis that participants scoring high on overall psychopathy (on the 
PPI) would be more adept at detecting pain-falcing was basically not supported. 
There were no significant Pearson correlations for global psychopathy and accuracy 
in pain judgments. However, specific scales of the Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory did display modest to moderate relationships with pain judgment accuracy, 
such as Machiavellianism (see Hypothesis 9), as well as Blame Externalisation, 
Fearlessness, and Impulsive Nonconformity. (See tables in this chapter, as well as 
‘Additional Analyses’ later in this chapter).
13 .3 .4  H y p o th es is  9: M a c h ia v e l l ia n ism  & A c c u ra c y  in Pain  
Ju d g m en ts
Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relationship between Machiavellianism (as 
measured by the PPI) and accuracy in pain judgments. As the reader may recall,
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Machiavellian individuals are those with a willingness to manipulate others for selfish 
goals, and who have a cynical and harshly instrumental view of human nature 
(including utilising deception to suit one’s own.advantage).
In order to test this hypothesis, Pearson correlations were conducted on 
judges’ Machiavellianism scores (on the PPI) in relation to their detection accuracy 
scores, and also analysed in multiple regressions. The hypothesis that
Machiavellian-type participants (on the PPI) would be more adept at detecting pain- 
faking was basically not supported when examined for all participants, but instead 
was proven only for male participants. Pearson correlations revealed a very modest 
correlation (r = .15, p  < .05) for all participants between Machiavellianism and 
judging male targets who were faking pain. In multiple regression, Mach did not 
appear as a predictor, though, when examining accuracy for all participants.
However, striking differences were discovered when the data were analysed 
by gender, in which a strong relationship was found for male judges with Mach and 
detection. (See Table 26). Significant correlations ranged from r = .32 (p < .05) for 
male participants judging male targets, to r = .35 (p < .05) for male participants 
judging pain-fakers, to r = .44 (p < .01) for male participants judging male targets 
who were faking pain. (See the figure below). Similar results were found in multiple 
regression, with Machiavellianism being a predictor for many accuracy variables, and 
the strongest predictor when examining male participants judging male pain-fakers. 
(See regression tables, including Tables 33 and 37). (No relationship was found for 
female participants and Mach, in correlations or regression).
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Figure 21: Machiavellian Males’ Accuracy in Pain Judgments
An independent t-test was also conducted to compare the Machiavellianism 
scores for males and females. There was a statistically significant difference in the 
mean scores for males (M=69.71, SD=11.08) and females [M=63.23, SD=11.64; 
t(176)=3.36, p=.001]. The magnitude of the differences in the means was very small 
(eta squared =.060).
Partial Correlations: Mach & Accuracy for Male Faking Targets - by Gender
A partial correlation was conducted to explore the relationship between 
Machiavellianism and accuracy for male faking targets (by gender), whilst controlling 
for Deviant Response. For males, there was a significant correlation between 
Machiavellianism and accuracy (r = .44, n=46, p=.002). An inspection of the zero 
order correlation (r=.44, p=.002) suggested that controlling for Deviant Response had 
no effect on the strength of the relationship between these two variables. (There were 
no significant zero order correlations for females and Machiavellianism). 
Additionally, partial correlations were carried out for Machiavellianism and overall 
accuracy, in which Deviant Response displayed no effect.
In addition, a partial correlation was conducted to explore the relationship 
between Machiavellianism and accuracy for male faking targets (for male 
participants), whilst controlling for Unlikely Virtue. Controlling for Unlikely Virtue 
did not have an effect on the strength of the relationship. Additionally, partial
G
T
40
T
8020  60
Accuracy When Target is Male and Faking 
(r= .44, |) < .01)
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correlations were carried out for Machiavellianism and overall accuracy, in which 
Unlikely Virtue displayed no effect.
13 .3 .5  H y p o th es is  10: G ender  & A c c u ra c y  in Pain  Ju d g m en ts
Hypothesis 10: There is a difference in scores between male and female 
participants and accuracy in pain judgments. In order to test this hypothesis, T-tests 
were conducted on accuracy variables for males and females.
This hypothesis was only partially supported. The accuracy differences 
between males and females were found in relation to specific personality variables, 
but not found for accuracy in general. For instance, Machiavellian males were highly 
accurate in detection, however, this accuracy was not found for Machiavellian 
females. When the data were analysed simply in relation to accuracy (without taking 
into account personality variables), no significant differences were found. T-tests 
were conducted on all accuracy variables for males and females. No significant 
differences on any accuracy variables were found between males & females in either 
study; the results for Study 2 are as follows. An independent samples t-test was 
conducted to compare overall pain-faking detection accuracy between males and 
females. There were no significant differences for males (M=53.16, SD=14.44) and 
females [M=55.17, SD=14.54; t(177)= -.82,/? = .41]. (See Table 93).
13.4 Addi t ion a l  F ind ings  -  Study 2
13.4.1 PPI: A d d i t io n a l  r e la t io n s h ip s  w ith  A c cu ra cy
1 3 .4 .1 .1  B la m e  E x t e r n a l i s a t i o n  & A c c u r a c y  in  P a in  
J u d g m e n t s
Pearson correlations were conducted on judges’ Blame Externalisation scores 
(on the PPI) in relation to their detection accuracy scores, and also analysed in 
multiple regressions. As one may recall, Blame Externalisation measures the 
tendency to blame others for one’s problems and to view oneself as a victim. When 
the data were analysed for all participants, a (negative) correlation of r = -.25 (p < 
.01) was discovered, when participants judged male targets in genuine pain. Blame 
externalisation was also found to be a predictor in the majority of regressions 
conducted on accuracy variables (see regression tables).
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Accuracy when Video Target is Male and in Real Pain 
(r = -.25, p < .01)
Figure 22: Blame Externalisation and Accuracy in Pain Judgments
Similar results were found when examined by gender. Female participants 
had a correlation of r -  -.25 (p < .01) when judging male targets in real pain. (Male 
participants showed a correlation of r — -.28 when judging real pain, but this 
relationship did not reach significance.)
For female judges, Blame Externalisation was also a predictor, especially 
when judging real pain (and particularly when judging male targets in real pain).
In regressions, Blame Externalisation was found as a strong predictor for male judges, 
and especially when judging real pain.
Partial Correlations for Blame Externalisation
A partial correlation was conducted to explore the negative relationship 
between Blame Externalisation and accuracy for male targets in real pain (for all 
participants), whilst controlling for Unlikely Virtue. The partial correlation revealed 
that controlling for Unlikely Virtue had no effect on the strength of the relationship 
between these two variables for all participants. Similarly, controlling for Deviant 
Response had no effect on the strength of the relationship.
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1 3 .4 .1 .2  A d d i t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w ith  A c c u r a c y : 
F e a r l e s s n e s s
An additional correlation was discovered in Study 2 for accuracy in pain 
judgments for female participants and Fearlessness on the PPI measure (r = .27, p  < 
.01), including for judging faking males. Fearlessness was also found to be a 
predictor for female participants in multiple regressions, including for judging faking 
males. (See regression tables, including Table 37).
Accuracy When Video Target is Male and Faking Pain 
(i = .27, p< .01)
Figure 23: Fearless Females’ Accuracy in Pain Judgments
1 3 .4 .1 .3  A d d i t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  A c c u r a c y : I m p u l s i v e  
N o n c o n f o r m i t y
Impulsive Nonconformity was discovered as a strong predictor in multiple 
regression for male participants judging male targets in real pain. (See Table 74). 
Pearson correlations revealed a relationship of r = .21 when judging male targets in 
real pain, however, it did not reach significance.
13 .4 .2  C on fidence  in D e c is io n -M a k in g
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare overall confidence 
in decision-making (which participants rated on a Likert scale of 1 -  5) between male 
and female participants when making pain judgments. (See Table 94 in Appendices). 
There were no significant differences for males (M=3.53, SD=.57) and females 
[M=3.48, SD=.51; t(177)= .51 ,p  — .23]. In fact, there were no significant differences 
between genders on any of the confidence variables.
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Additionally, an independent samples t-test was conducted to compare overall 
confidence in decision-making between ‘Low Accuracy’ (score of <= 56) and ‘High 
Accuracy’ (score of 57+) participants. There were no significant differences for Low 
Accuracy (M=3.53, SD=.54) and High Accuracy participants [M=3.46, SD=.49; 
t(177)= .90,/? =.37].
In addition, Pearson correlations were conducted on confidence scores in 
relation to accuracy, as well as confidence scores in relation to personality variables 
for Study 2. As displayed in the correlation tables that follow, many confidence 
variables were modestly correlated with MSCEIT and PPI variables. However, as 
was often found in the present studies, the strongest results were obtained when the 
data were analysed by gender. In relation to the MSCEIT, males’ confidence 
variables did not display any significant correlations. However, females showed 
modest confidence correlations with many MSCEIT variables, and especially when 
the target was experiencing genuine pain, including the Emotional Experiencing 
(area) score (r = .23, p  < .01). One notable finding was that female participants’ 
confidence in decision-making (judging real pain) revealed a correlation of r = .23 (p 
< .01) with Overall Emotional Intelligence. (See Table 103).
When female participants’ confidence levels were correlated with their PPI 
scores, many modest correlations were also found, and the majority were negative 
correlations. However, the strongest correlations for females and the PPI were found 
(in positive correlations) with Social Potency, with significant correlations ranging 
from r = .20 (p < .05) forjudging males in real pain to r = .30 (p < .01) forjudging 
female targets. The other positive correlation for females and the PPI was found in 
Stress Immunity, which had modest correlations with confidence in decision-making, 
ranging from r -  .18 (p < .05) to r -  .21 (p < 05).
When male participants’ confidence levels were correlated with their PPI 
scores, only one PPI variable, Cold Heartedness, was found to correlate. In fact, Cold 
Heartedness was found to have a moderate negative correlation with males’ 
confidence levels. Significant correlations ranged from r = -.21 (p < .05) forjudging 
female targets, to r = -.34 (p < .05) for overall confidence level, to r = -.40 (p < .0 1) 
for ‘confidence when judging male targets’. Additionally, males’ confidence levels 
were found to correlate negatively with age, especially when judging female targets in 
genuine pain (r = -.30,/? < .05). (See the following scatterplots and correlation tables, 
as well as the correlation tables in the Appendices).
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Figure 24: Cold Hearted Males’ Confidence in Decision Making
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Figure 25: Males’ Confidence in Decision Making and Age
Q
T I ! I 1 T
Decem ber 2008 - 2 2 6 - Ph. D . Thesis
13 .4 .3  R e la t io n sh ip s  be tw een  M e a su r e s : M S C E IT  and  P P I
As expected, there were numerous negative Pearson correlations between 
emotional intelligence (as measured by the MSCEIT) and psychopathy (as measured 
by the PPI). Several of the strongest negative relationships between the two 
measures’ sub-scales were found with the PPI’s Carefree Nonplanfulness variable, 
which revealed Pearson correlations with numerous MSCEIT variables, including r = 
- -24 (p < .01) with Overall Emotional Intelligence and r — -.33 (p < .01) with 
Emotional Reasoning on the MSCEIT. Additionally, Machiavellianism was 
discovered to negatively correlate with the Managing Emotions branch of the 
MSCEIT (r = -.35, p  < .01). Overall emotional intelligence score on the MSCEIT, 
though, did not display any relationship to overall psychopathology score on the PPI.
However, global psychopathy (Overall PPI score) was negatively correlated 
with the MSCEIT’s Managing Emotions score (r -  - .26, p  < .01). (See the graph 
below). The strongest negative relationship between the two measures in general 
was found in the PPI’s ‘Deviant Response’ variable. Interestingly, when relationships 
between the two measures were examined by participant gender, female participants 
displayed the majority of negative relationships between the MSCEIT and the PPI 
(see Tables 105 - 107).
(The MSCEIT's 'Managing Emotions' Sutacale & the PPI)
500-
80 90 100 110
Managing Emotions Sub scale (MSCEIT) 
(r = -.26, p < .01)
Figure 26: Emotional Intelligence & Psychopathy
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13 .4 .4  In te r  c o r r e la t io n s : M SC E IT  and P P I
Pearson correlations were conducted on the MSCEIT and the PPI to examine 
intercorrelations. The Blends task revealed the largest number of correlations with 
other MSCEIT tasks, such as r -  .62 (p < .01) with the Social Management task. The 
PPI sub-scales displayed several strong intercorrelations, as well, including between 
Stress Immunity and Social Potency (r = .49, p  < .01), as well as Impulsive 
Nonconformity and Fearlessness (r = .53,p  < .01). (See Tables 108 - 113).
13.5 Summary
In summary, many relationships between detection accuracy and personality 
variables were discovered and several hypotheses were supported in Study 2. 
Hypothesis 6  proposed that a relationship would exist between emotional intelligence 
(as measured by the MSCEIT) and accuracy in pain judgments. Whilst several of the 
MSCEIT tasks demonstrated relationships with accuracy, overall emotional 
intelligence did not. As was found throughout much of the present studies, the 
strongest relationships between accuracy and MSCEIT tasks were discovered when 
examined by gender. For instance, male judges with high scores on the Changes task 
showed a relationship with accuracy and female judges showed a negative 
relationship with accuracy and the Pictures task However, the Faces task 
(Hypothesis 7) did not reveal any relationship with accuracy in pain judgments.
The theory that a relationship would exist between accuracy and overall 
psychopathy (Hypothesis 8) was basically not supported. Whilst overall psychopathy 
(as measured by the PPI) did not show a relationship with detection accuracy, sub­
scales of the PPI did demonstrate relationships, such as Blame Externalisation, 
Machiavellianism, Fearlessness and Impulsive Nonconformity. Hypothesis 9 
proposed that there would be a relationship between Machiavellianism and accuracy, 
and this hypothesis was strongly supported for male participants. In fact, Pearson 
correlations showed a robust relationship with accuracy for males, and multiple 
regressions revealed that Mach was a strong predictor for accuracy of male 
participants (and particularly when judging male targets faking pain).
In Hypothesis 10, it was theorised that a gender factor would exist in accuracy 
of pain judgments. This hypothesis was partially supported. Specifically, gender was 
a factor in relationship to many personality attributes, in both Study 1 and Study 2.
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For instance, the above relationship between Mach and accuracy was fairly strong; 
however, it only existed for male participants.
Additional relationships were discovered in Study 2, in addition to those 
proposed in the hypotheses. Blame Externalisation (on the PPI) displayed many 
negative relationships with accuracy in pain judgments. In addition, several 
interesting relationships were discovered in regards to participants5 confidence in 
decision-making, such as females high in Social Potency (on the PPI) and those high 
in Stress Immunity, as well as females high in Overall Emotional Intelligence. An 
interesting correlation was also found to exist for male participants’ confidence levels 
and Cold Heartedness (on the PPI), which revealed a negative relationship. Finally, 
as expected, many negative correlations were found between the MSCEIT and the 
PPI, as well as intercorrelations for each measure.
Decem ber 2008 - 2 2 9 -
\
Ph. D . Thesis
CHAPTER 14: D ISCUSSION
A primary goal of the present research was to examine the relationship 
between personality attributes and the ability to distinguish genuine from deceptive 
facial pain expressions. The present study attempted to integrate previous facial pain 
expression research with research in personality trait theories, as well as deception 
detection, in an attempt to identify particular personality attributes correlated with 
accurate pain judgment.
Results of the studies provided support for the position that accuracy in 
judging whether expressions of pain are real or faked is not random, but differs 
reliably from one individual to another. Furthermore, it was discovered that results 
were particularly robust when examined by personality and gender.
14.1 Comp ar i son  o f  the S tudies
Overall accuracy in pain judgments for both studies was approximately at 
chance level, which is consistent with previous research on deception detection (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Malone & DePaulo, 2001). 
Nevertheless, accuracy in the second study provided very slightly higher accuracy 
means than in the first study. This difference may be partially due to a minor 
participant age difference between the two studies. (In Study 1, there were funds 
available through the university to pay participants; consequently participants were 
recruited from outside the university, as well as from the University Subject Pool of 
students). Study One’s participant ages ranged from 18.2 to 59.3 (M=23.4, SD=7.8) 
whereas Study Two’s participant ages ranged from 17.9 to 37.7 (M = 20.9, SD = 2.2).
There were approximately the same number of participants (N = 170) for 
Study 1 as for Study 2 (N = 179). However, there were more male participants (34%) 
than females in Study 1, compared to Study 2 (27% males). Ethnicities for both 
studies were varied but comparable, with the highest percentages of participants 
reporting Asian and Caucasian ethnicities. Participant education levels for the studies 
were also comparable, with the majority reporting ‘some college/university’ as their 
level of education. Additionally, university majors were somewhat diverse, with 
approximately one-third in both studies reporting that their major was either 
Psychology or Sociology. Therefore, the more diverse age range, as well as higher
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percentage of males (not to mention the recruitment from outside the university) 
provided a slightly more representative sample in the first study than the second. 
Overall confidence levels in decision-making for both studies were comparable, with 
mean confidence levels for both studies at approximately 3.5 (on a 1 - 5 Lilcert scale).
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14.2 Resu l t s  Summary:  P re d i c t e d  Ef fec t s  Con f i rmed  versus  Not  
Conf i rmed
The following tables summarise which predicted effects were confirmed and which were not confirmed.
Relationship Confirmed
Confirmed Significant Predictor in
Correlation Regression
Intuition & Accuracy Yes Yes
Openness & Accuracy Yes (Modest)
Intuition & Openness Yes (Not conducted)
Intuition, Openness & Accuracy (Partial correlations) (Not conducted)
Machiavellianism & Accuracy Yes Yes
No Relationship Confirmed
Not Confirmed Comments
Extraversion & Accuracy (Only predictor when males judged male 
targets.)
Emotional Intelligence & Accuracy Global EI and accuracy: No relationship.
Faces Task & Accuracy No relationship.
Psychopathy & Accuracy Global psychopathy and accuracy: No 
relationship.
Gender & Accuracy No differences with t-tests, but relationships 
with accuracy & personality type.
Differences in Confidence in 
Decision Maldng
No gender differences with t-tests, but 
relationships with gender, age & personality 
type.
Additional Relationships: Study One
Relationshin with Accuracy Significant Predictor in
Correlation Regression
Thinkers Yes Yes
Low Neuroticism Yes Yes
Agreeableness No Yes
Conscientiousness No Yes
Additional Relationships: Study Two
Relationshin with Accuracy Significant Predictor in
Correlation Regression
Changes Task Yes Yes
Pictures Task (Inverse 
Relationship)
Yes Yes
Blame Externalisation (Inverse) Yes Yes
Fearlessness Yes Yes
Table 40: Predicted Results Confirmed vs. Not Confirmed
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14.3 Study One:  MBTI  and NE O -F F I  Cor re l a t es  o f  Pa i n  J udgment
14.3 .1  In tu i t io n  & O p enness  H yp o th eses
In Hypothesis 1, it was theorised that participants high in intuition would be 
more accurate in discriminating faked from genuine pain. The results provided 
support for this hypothesis, especially in regards to female participants (and 
particularly when females judged males faking pain). Whilst Harmon (1983) found 
no relationship between MBTI Intuition and facial decoding, there were several issues 
with Harmon’s study, which were addressed in the present thesis’ Intuition chapter. 
Several theorists, though, have linked Intuition to emotional sensitivity, including 
Baumgardner who stated (in reference to intuition) ‘...Emotional involvement and 
global feelings are thus taken as definitive for this mode of thought’ (Baumgardner, 
1973, p. 41). In fact, the intuitive’s ability to judge whether someone is in genuine 
pain may be due to the presumed empathic nature of this type of individual, as stated 
by Conklin, ‘...empathy is the power of intuition when applied to give knowledge to 
someone’s state of mind’ (Conklin, 1970, pp. 330-331).
In Hypothesis 2, the present thesis proposed that individuals who were high in 
Openness to Experience would display a relationship with accuracy in pain 
judgments. The results of the present study provide support for this hypothesis, and 
in particular for female participants. Additionally, when males high in Openness 
judged faking male targets, there was a correlation with accuracy.
There are numerous studies to support the hypothesis that Open individuals 
would be effective at the pain perception task. Openness has been demonstrated to be 
correlated with the ability to judge others’ personalities (Lippa & Dietz, 2000), 
dispositional intelligence (knowledge of how personality is related to behaviour) 
(Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 2005), social intelligence 
(Shafer, 1999), social perception (Penton-Voak, Pound, Little & Perrett; 2006), social 
openness (Schneider, Ackerman, & Kanfer, 1996) and emotion recognition ability 
(Matsumoto et al, 2000).
In addition, Open individuals possess traits that are likely to assist them in 
deception detection. Skilled lie detectors have the ability to employ flexible decision 
criteria when making veracity judgements (Ekman & Sullivan, 1991). Accurate 
detectors will, for instance, utilise various cues to deception in different targets or in 
diverse situations; whereas unskilled lie detectors will rigidly focus on the same cues
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in each deception detection situation. The Open individual tends to be a flexible 
thinker (as described especially in the ‘ideas’ and ‘values’ Openness facets of the 
NEO; McCrae & Costa, 1992) and a creative problem-solver (George and Zhou,
2001). Another aspect of openness that could assist in deception-detection is that 
effective detectors keep an open mind and resist making a judgment until all the data 
are available (Ekman & Sullivan, 1991; Ask & Granhag, 2003).
Hypothesis 3, based on previous research (MacDonald et al, 1994; Furnham, 
1996) predicted that there would be a relationship between the MBTI’s Intuition and 
the NEO’s Openness to Experience. As predicted, a robust relationship existed in the 
present study between intuition and openness. Following from this hypothesis, it was 
then predicted that there would be an interaction between intuition, openness and 
accuracy in pain judgments (Hypothesis 4), which was found for overall accuracy in 
detection.
14 .3 .2  A d d i t io n a l  M B T I & NEO A c cu ra cy  R e su lts
Previous research on extraversion and the ability to decode facial expressions 
of emotion has yielded mixed results (Cunningham, 1977; Matsumoto et al, 2000; 
Riggio & Friedman, 1982; Rosenthal et al, 1979). The present thesis hypothesised 
that extraverts would be more accurate at detecting faked from genuine pain 
expressions (Hypothesis 5), and the present study’s findings add to the mixed 
literature results, as it was only partially supported. Whereas extraversion was a 
robust predictor in regressions for male participants judging male targets, no Pearson 
correlations were found for any participants between extraversion and accuracy. 
Moreover, it was introversion and not extraversion that predicted males’ accuracy in 
judging genuine pain.
Additional relationships with accuracy in pain judgments were found that 
were not predicted, including an inverse relationship between NEO Neuroticism and 
accuracy. A previous study on facial decoding and NEO Neuroticism yielded no 
relationship between the two (Matsumoto et al, 2000). Moreover, contrary to Gray’s 
(1981) theory that neurotics would have a higher sensitivity to punishment signals 
such as pain signals (thus, higher accuracy in pain detection), the present study 
revealed an inverse relationship between accuracy in pain perception and neuroticism. 
In particular, male participants high in neuroticism displayed negative relationships 
with accuracy, and especially when judging male targets. An additional relationship
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was discovered in the present study in which NEO Agreeableness was a fairly 
consistent regression predictor, and particularly for female participants. 
(Agreeableness, though, did not show a correlational relationship with accuracy).
Additionally, one might expect an MBTI ‘Feeler’ type - as opposed to the 
‘Thinker’ type -  to be better at facial decoding, as was found by Morand (2001). In 
contrast, however, it was the ‘Thinker’ (as opposed to the ‘Feeler’) male participants 
in the present study who demonstrated relationships with detection accuracy. 
‘Thinker’ types are those that instinctively look for facts and logic in a decision­
making situation, and are highly focused on tasks to be accomplished. They are able 
to easily provide an objective and critical analysis of a situation and their goal is 
strictly to find the ‘.. .objective truth, independent of the personality and wishes of the 
thinker or anyone else’ (Briggs Myers & Myers, 1990, p. 65). This ability to 
objectively assess a situation and focus on the task at hand appears to have been a 
factor in their success in the present study’s pain perception task. Moreover, 
‘Thinker’ types are more likely to be male than female, and it was the ‘Thinker’ type 
male (and not the female) who was successful at the pain judgment task.
14.3 .3  C o n fid en ce  in D e c is io n -M a k in g  (H yp o th es is  11)
The present thesis hypothesised that there would be a difference in 
participants’ levels of confidence in decision-making during the judgment task. T- 
tests conducted on confidence in decision-making did not reveal any significant 
differences between males and females. However, male participants in the first study 
demonstrated a positive relationship between confidence and age. Additionally, in 
Study 1, extraverted males also displayed a positive relationship with confidence 
when judging females.
14.4 Study Two:  MS CE IT  and PPI Cor re l a t es  o f  Pain  J udgment
14.4.1 E m o tio n a l  In te l l ig e n c e  H yp o th es is
In Hypothesis 6 , it was predicted that there would be a relationship between 
Emotional Intelligence and accuracy in pain judgment. Studies have demonstrated a 
link between self-reported (‘trait’) emotional intelligence and the recognition of facial 
expression of emotion (Austin, 2004; Petrides & Furnham, 2003). Whilst Overall EI 
did not demonstrate a relationship with accuracy, several ‘tasks’ (subscales) of the 
MSCEIT did reveal accuracy relationships. In particular, the MSCEIT’s Changes
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task (which examines emotional ‘chains,’ or how emotions transition from one to 
another) displayed relationships with pain judgment. Male participants in particular 
demonstrated relationships with detection accuracy, and especially when judging 
faking females.
Interestingly, the Pictures Task revealed a quite modest inverse relationship 
with accuracy and in particular for female participants. However, this task is rather 
subjective. In the Pictures Task, the participant attempts to identify which emotions 
are portrayed by certain images, abstract ait and landscapes.
Another inverse relationship was discovered with the Emotion Management 
task and detection accuracy, and in particular for males judging faked pain.
This negative relationship of pain perception with the Emotion Management 
Task was unexpected. As one may recall, the Emotion Management Task examines 
an individual’s ability to incorporate his or her own emotions into decision-making, 
by rating the effectiveness of alternative actions in situations in which someone must 
regulate his/her emotions. In the MSCEIT manual, Mayer and colleagues make the 
point that Managing Emotions is not the repression of emotions, but instead entails 
the awareness, acceptance, and use of emotions in problem solving. It involves 
working with feelings in a judicious way, rather than acting on them without thinking. 
Therefore, one might predict a positive relationship between accuracy and this 
variable. The inverse relationship is curious and warrants possible further 
investigation in a future study.
Rather surprisingly, the MSCEIT’s Faces Task (identifying feelings based on 
facial expressions) yielded no relationship with accuracy in pain detection, thus 
providing no support for Hypothesis 7. The face tends to be the primary nonverbal 
decoding channel and form of expressing emotions (Ekman, 1965), and thus appears 
to be particularly important to emotional intelligence (Elfenbein, Marsh, & Ambady,
2002). Facial decoding is the focus of the Faces Task and it was therefore predicted 
that this task would demonstrate a relationship with the present study’s task of 
decoding pain expressions. However, no relationship was discovered between the 
variables. Furthermore, whilst intuitively one might expect its branch scale 
(Perceiving Emotions) to demonstrate a relationship with accuracy, no relationship 
was discovered.
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14 .4 .2  P sy c h o p a th y  H y p o th eses
In Hypothesis 8 , it was predicted that psychopathy would display a correlation 
with accuracy in pain deception detection. Although no relationship between Overall 
(global) Psychopathology and accuracy existed, several subscales of the PPI did 
provide results.
14 .4 .3  M a c h ia v e l l ia n ism  H yp o th es is
By far, the most robust accuracy results were found in regards to 
Machiavellian males (Hypothesis 9). In particular, when high ‘Mach’ males judged 
faking male targets, strong results were revealed. Machiavellian individuals are those 
with the belief that ‘the end justifies the means’ and will use whatever techniques they 
deem necessary to reach their goals -  including deception. In fact, the Mach 
individual is likely to be quite invested in deception, both in using deception as a 
manipulation tool and detecting deception in others. Therefore, this relationship 
between high Mach males and pain deception detection is not unexpected.
Theory of Mind & Machiavellianism
Theory of Mind refers to the ability to attribute independent mental states to 
another, and to understand what the other might be thinking and feeling. Theory of 
mind or ‘mentalising,’ ‘mind-reading,’ etc. could certainly be used in an altruistic 
manner -  such as to increase interpersonal communication -  or in a more sinister 
manner -  such as to manipulate others (e.g. in a Machiavellian manner).
This appears to be borne out in the results of the present research studies. In Study 
No. 1, Intuitive and Open individuals -  ones who presumably would be attuned to 
others’ thoughts, feelings, and behaviours -  were adept at pain-faking detection. In 
addition, those that were considered ‘Thinkers’ (as opposed to ‘Feelers’) on the MBTI 
were also quite adept at detection. Presumably ‘Thinker’ types would be considering 
what the target individual was thinking and experiencing in a rather analytical 
manner.
Study No. 2 demonstrated that Machiavellian type male judges were 
exceptionally adept at detecting pain-faldng -  and particularly Machiavellian males 
judging faking male targets. Whereas in a recent study, no significant relationship 
was found between Machiavellianism & Theory of Mind (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007), 
several studies have found a positive relationship between Mach & ‘mind-reading’ or 
Theory of Mind (Davis & Stone, 2003; Sutton & Keogh, 2001). Presumably
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Machiavellian individuals would be rather invested in analysing others’ states of 
deception or faking, as they are known to use deception as a tool to achieve their 
goals.
Mach and Hot vs. Cold Empathy
Additionally, the concept of ‘cold’ (versus ‘hot’) empathy may partially 
explain the success of high Machs in judging pain-faking. In ‘cold’ empathy, the 
individual has the capacity to comprehend another’s situation on a cognitive level, but 
not an emotional one (a form of perspective-taking and placing ourselves in the 
other’s situation without experiencing the associated emotions) (Davis & Kraus, 
1991; Mclllwain, 2003). In ‘hot’ empathy, on the other hand, one has the 
capacity to experience the other person’s emotional state itself. Examining the 
present study results from a cold empathy perspective, the high Mach male may be 
able to place himself in the situation of the video target, and especially so in the case 
of male pain-fakers. Moreover, the high Mach male individual may cognitively 
understand the deceptive experience and may relate to the deceptive experience more 
than low Machs.
14 .4 .4  G ender H y p o th e s is
Hypothesis 10 predicted that there would be a difference in accuracy across 
participant gender. Previous studies have found that females are better at facial 
decoding than males (Davits, 1964; Hall & Matsumoto, 2004). Whilst t-tests revealed 
no difference in accuracy scores between males and females (for either of the present 
studies), gender differences in accuracy were discovered when examined by 
personality attributes. In fact, in both Study 1 and Study 2, the strongest relationships 
between personality style and detection ability occurred when analysed by gender. 
For example, whereas females did not show a correlation between accuracy and 
Machiavellianism, Mach males displayed a robust relationship with accuracy. 
Gender-stereotyped Judges vs. Non-stereotypical Judges
The gender difference when examined by personality attribute was at times 
striking. Perhaps this particular area of detection ability may be linked to continuing 
gender differences regarding display of emotion and perceived weakness. Traditional 
(stereotypical) males have been discouraged by society to display emotions and what 
may be perceived as weakness, including physical pain, and instead to maintain a 
‘stiff upper lip’. Women, on the other hand, have stereotypically been taught and
ft,
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conditioned from early in life to be the expressive gender -  expressing their emotions 
as well as their physical pain.
In the first study, several relationships with accuracy by personality and 
gender tended to paint a portrait of a rather stereotypical female and stereotypical 
male as more accurate (i.e., the Intuitive and Open female, as well as the ‘Thinker’ 
type male), as well as the ‘Agreeable’ female in the second study. However, the 
relationship between gender-stereotyped personality and detection ability did not 
generally apply in the second study. The trait of ‘Fearlessness’ in females would 
usually not be considered a stereotypical female trait, on the contrary, it might be 
considered just the opposite. Females who were high in Fearlessness, though, were 
adept at detection - and especially at detecting faking male targets. Fearless females, 
by definition, would be those who are more courageous and brave -  traditionally 
considered the realm of the male.
The strong female’s ability to detect deception might also be an interpretation 
of another relationship that was discovered: there was a consistent relationship 
between females low in Blame Externalisation and accuracy in detection. An 
individual low in Blame Externalisation would be one who would have an internal 
locus of responsibility, one who does not place the blame for her/his actions on the
other (‘outside’), but instead places responsibility on oneself - rather the antithesis of%
the ‘victim role’. (On the other hand, an individual high in Blame Externalisation 
views herself/himself as simply a victim of the world’s injustices, a passive recipient 
of all that occurs in her/his life.)
14 .4 .5  A d d i t io n a l  A c c u ra c y  R e la t io n sh ip s
1 4 .4 .5 .1  B la m e  E x t e r n a l i s a t i o n  C o n t i n u e d
Low Blame Externalisation was related to accuracy for both males and 
females in the present studies, though it was especially related to accuracy for 
females. High levels of blame externalisation have been found to be significantly 
associated with aggression, borderline personality, identity diffusion and primitive 
defences (Sandoval, Hancock, Poythress, Edens, & Lilienfeld, 2000), as well as 
external locus of control, hostility, and psychoticism (Gudjonsson, 1984; Gudjonsson 
& Singh, 1989). Blame attribution appears to be a significant contributor to one’s 
relationships and interactions with others, and with the world in general. Given this, 
it would not be unreasonable to assume that an individual that tends toward an
Decem ber 2008 - 2 3 9 - Ph. D . Thesis
internal blame and responsibility attribution would be more likely to have healthier 
social interactions, relate to others in a more functional manner, and be more attuned 
to others. Perhaps this begins to explain the negative relationship between blame 
externalisation and accuracy at discerning real versus faked pain in the present study.
In sum, an external blame and responsibility orientation appears to be strongly 
linked to a number of undesirable personality traits and disorders, whereas an internal 
orientation of responsibility would be more likely to contribute to emotional stability 
and healthy interpersonal relationships. Thus, the present study’s findings of a 
negative association between blame externalisation and accuracy in detecting pain 
expressions is not surprising, and underscores the importance of this orientation in 
relating to others.
In addition, ‘Impulsive Nonconformity’ was a predictor in regressions for 
males judging male targets in real pain, however, it did not show a correlational 
relationship that reached significance. Impulsive nonconformity measures a 
propensity toward unconventionality and reckless defiance of societal norms. Perhaps 
these unconventional males (the only male participants to accurately judge real pain) 
are also individuals who defy stereotypes, and thus may be more attuned to the 
genuine pain of others.
NEO Agreeableness did not appear in Pearson correlations, however, it did 
consistently appear in regressions as a predictor for female judges’ accuracy. 
Agreeableness for the most part is a desirable trait in interpersonal relationships and is 
presumed to promote harmonious relationships. It may not be surprising, therefore, 
that this trait was a consistent predictor of detection accuracy for female judges. 
Given some of the trends toward rather positive other-directed behaviour as predictors 
(e.g. extraversion, intuition, openness) as well as what would be considered negative 
other-directed behaviour (e.g. Machiavellianism in males); the relationship of 
detection accuracy with the other-directed trait of Agreeableness is somewhat 
consistent with these results.
1 4 .4 .6  C o n fid en ce  in D e c is io n -M a k in g  H y p o th e s is
The present thesis hypothesised that differences would be revealed in regards 
to judges’ confidence in decision-making. Several MSCEIT variables demonstrated 
relationships with confidence in decision-making. Especially notable was a modest 
relationship between Overall El and confidence level when females judged real pain.
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Additionally, the MSCEIT’s ‘Emotional Experiencing’ area score revealed a 
relationship with confidence level, and particularly for females judging genuine pain.
Emotional Experiencing measures the individual’s ability to perceive, 
respond, and manipulate emotional information -  including the ability to ‘read’ (or 
decode) and express (encode) emotion -  therefore, this finding is not surprising. The 
relationship with Emotional Experiencing was demonstrated with confidence level, 
however, it was not shown with accuracy level. Females high in experiential EI, then, 
were more confident in their facial pain judgments, but were not more accurate in 
these judgments.
IJ In the second study, males’ confidence levels yielded inverse relationships 
with several variables. A striking inverse relationship with confidence was found for 
‘Cold Hearted’ males when judging male targets. Cold hearted individuals have a 
notable absence of deep feelings of guilt, empathy, and loyalty, as well as a lack of 
enduring attachments to others. In fact, this individual’s ‘failure to sympathise with 
others’ suffering’ (Lillienfeld & Widows, 2005, p. 22) speaks volumes about their 
ability to empathise with the pain of their video targets. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that Cold Hearted males’ confidence levels were low when judging the pain of others. 
One might expect that their accuracy levels for pain judgment would yield negative 
relationships, as well. However, no relationships were discovered between Cold 
Heartedness and accuracy.
14 .4 .7  R e la t io n sh ip s  be tw een  M easures
Whereas Overall Emotional Intelligence did not demonstrate a relationship 
with Overall (global) Psychopathology, global psychopathology did display a modest 
inverse relationship with the MSCEIT’s ‘Managing Emotions’ branch score. 
Additionally, other MSCEIT and PPI subscales yielded modest to moderate inverse 
relationships, including the MSCEIT’s ‘Managing Emotions’ branch with 
Machiavellianism. A not unexpected finding was that the PPI’s ‘Deviant Response’ 
(‘Faking Bad’) variable yielded many negative relationships with MSCEIT variables.
1 4 .4 .8  Age
The primary area in which age appeared to be a factor in the present studies was that 
of confidence level in decision-making for male judges (and especially when judging 
female targets). The relatively older population of male participants in Study 1
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displayed a positive relationship with confidence when judging female targets, 
whereas the relatively younger male population in Study 2 displayed an inverse 
relationship with confidence.
14 .4 .9  E m otions , E m pathy , & A c c u ra c y
In some cases, and particularly for males, the ability to be unemotional 
appeared to assist in pain judgment. ‘Thinker’ type males, who are able to coolly 
evaluate situations without the burden of emotions interfering, were effective. 
Furthermore, the Neurotic type (male) individual was not effective at the study task, 
which may indicate that their emotions were interfering with the objective task of 
determining faked from genuine pain. Perhaps the high neuroticism individual 
empathised with the pained target individual to such a degree that this empathy did 
not allow them to objectively evaluate the situation. On the other hand, the ability to 
effectively manage one’s emotions (the Emotion Management task) appeared to be a 
hindrance for male judges at detection. The extreme case of a non-emotional male, 
the Machiavellian male, was quite effective at pain judgment (especially when 
judging faking males). The Mach is one who tends to be able to ‘shut off emotions 
when the situation calls for it, and in fact their depth of feeling and emotions is likely 
to be rather lacking.
For female participants, it was often the more interpersonally-orientated 
female who proved more accurate at pain judgment. Agreeable and Intuitive females, 
as well as the ‘Open’ female, who tends to be more socially ‘open’ (Schneider et al, 
1996) was more effective at detecting. Thus, whereas in some cases an 
interpersonally-attuned style appeared to contribute to accuracy in detection 
(especially for female participants), in others it was a detached, analytical approach to 
detection that was more effective (especially for males).
1 4 .4 .1 0  T arge t G ender  & P ain  Ju d g m en t
Previous research has provided conflicting results regarding target gender in 
the ability to detect deception. For instance, DePaulo and colleagues found that 
female targets are easier to detect, whereas Porter and colleagues found male targets 
were more detectable than females (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Porter, 
Campbell, Stapleton, & Birt, 2002). Additionally, one study found that judges were 
more accurate at detecting deception in opposite sex targets (Porter, Campbell,
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Stapleton, & Brit, 2002). However, generally this did not prove to be the situation in 
the present studies.
Regarding overall trends in detection ability of the present studies, it was by 
far the ability to detect males that were faking pain that continued to appear in the 
correlational and regression results. Faking male targets presented the most robust 
results in both studies for both male judges and female judges. Moreover, in both 
studies, the ability to judge male targets (for male and female judges) revealed 
relationships with personality attributes, such as Intuitive type females, as well as low 
neuroticism, ‘Thinker’, and extraverted males. One of the few exceptions to this rule 
was for male participants in the MSCEIT’s Changes Task, who demonstrated a strong 
correlation with ability to detect female targets faking pain.
14 .4 .11  F a k ed  vs. Real Pain
In both studies, faked pain was generally more detectable than genuine pain, 
especially when examined by personality and gender. It is likely that this is due to the 
tendency to over-express pain when malingering, which was discovered by examining 
the videos. Furthermore, it was faking male targets that had the strongest 
relationships with accuracy. Further examination of the videos revealed that males in 
particular displayed a tendency to over-express faked pain.
Conversely, genuine pain was often difficult to detect. The High Mach males’ 
presumed lack of empathetic abilities would explain their lack of ability to judge 
video targets in real pain. However, this concept of empathetic judging would not 
account for the Intuitive participants’ lack of ability to detect targets in genuine pain. 
They, too, were able to effectively detect pain faking, but unable to detect targets in 
genuine pain. The main exceptions to this statement were Open females, who were 
slightly more adept at detecting genuine pain in female video targets, as well as 
Impulsive Nonconformist males -  which predicted accuracy in judging males in real 
pain.
14.5 P o s t - E x p e r i m e n t  I n te rv i ews
Post-experiment interviews were conducted in the first study with several 
participants who were highly accurate in their pain judgments. The two participants, 
‘Mary’ and ‘Bob’, (whose transcribed interviews appear in the Appendices of the
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present thesis) were extremely accurate in pain judgments and revealed personality 
scores which were consistent with those of other highly accurate participants.
‘Mary’, the female participant who rated as Intuitive and Open to Experience 
(consistent with other females’ personality scores who were high in pain judgment 
accuracy), displayed intuitive judgment strategies -  such as making her pain 
judgments somewhat quickly. She also considered her judgments in the experiment 
to be made in a rather unconscious or semi-conscious manner. ‘Bob’, on the other 
hand, who rated as a ‘Thinker’ and low in Neuroticism (consistent with other males 
high in accuracy), as well as Intuitive, displayed a very different judgment style. Bob 
considered his pain judgments to be rather analytic, conscious and thought-out.
Both Mary and Bob stated that they looked to the video targets’ facial 
expressions for indications of faking, and Mary stated she focused particularly on the 
targets’ eyes. Both Mary and Bob watched for exaggerated facial expression as an 
indicator of faked pain. Interestingly, whilst both participants were highly accurate in 
pain judgments, neither stated that they were particularly confident in their judgments, 
which was reflected in their confidence scores.
Mary’s and Bob’s interviews, as well as other interviews with highly accurate 
participants, revealed several consistencies which may be relevant to future research 
in pain judgment. On such issue was that participants consistently stated that using 
the headphones provided during the experiment did indeed assist them in blocking out 
noise and distractions, which assisted them in focusing on the study task. In addition,
highly accurate participants generally stated that exaggerated pain expressions -  and$
often male targets’ over-exaggeration in particular -  was a strong indicator of faked 
pain. There were mixed responses from participants regarding whether they felt that 
fatigue or boredom became an issue toward the end of the experiment, with Mary in 
particular expressing that she may have become less cautious toward the end of the 
thirty videos. This may be a consideration, though, for future research in this area. 
Perhaps a solution to the issue of over-expression in fakers and possible boredom or 
fatigue might be resolved by removing several of the exaggerated target videos, 
thereby reducing the number of overall videos.
The post-experiment interviews, though, did provide insight into the judgment 
styles that participants utilised - such as analytic versus intuitive - as well as providing 
information regarding tools participants utilised in their judgments, such as studying
Decem ber 2008 - 2 4 4 - Ph. D . Thesis
targets’ facial expressions and exaggeration of pain. Future experiments conducted 
on pain judgments might also include post-experiment interviews, and perhaps a 
qualitative analysis of the transcribed interviews.
14.6 L i mi t a t i on s  & Con t r i bu t i on s  o f  the Presen t  Study and
Future  Di rec t ions
A primary limitation of the present study was the videos utilised in the study. 
The videos were filmed at another university and the targets were not professional 
actors. Occasionally there were slight variations in the video clips such as the amount 
of the target’s upper body that was displayed, though this was minimal. On the other 
hand, the use of non-actors could be perceived as a study strength, due to the fact that 
the individuals in the videos were less likely to have preconceived notions of pain 
expressions, thus drawing from their own pain experience, as opposed to more 
stereotypical pain expressions.
An additional limitation of the videos was the relative difficulty of judging 
particular videos versus the relative ease in judgment of other videos. Factor analysis 
revealed that there were five video clips (of females) which could be dropped in order 
to produce a scale of higher reliability. One possible option for future studies could 
include weighting the videos according to relative level of difficulty, instead of 
simply scoring each video equally as judged correctly versus incorrectly. For 
instance, a scale of one to five might be used, describing the relative difficulty of 
judging a given video, with ‘One’ representing ‘Very Easy’ and ‘Five’ representing 
‘Very’Difficult’. This could be achieved by utilising the data for the number of times 
each video was judged correctly and ranking the videos accordingly.
Perhaps an additional option would be to include data from the confidence 
measure in the weighting of the videos, since participants in the present study have 
provided their confidence levels for each video on a Likert scale of one to five. There 
appeared to be a relationship between accuracy and confidence level for a given 
video, therefore incorporating the confidence data with the accuracy data for each 
video would b another possibility in regards to weighting the videos for relative level 
of difficulty. However, again, videos would ideally be balanced for gender, as well as 
for faking versus real pain.
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Another limitation of the present study is that it did not address potential 
interactions between personality variables in accounting for accuracy. Future 
research might address this issue by conducting multiple regression on predictors such 
as intuition and openness, but additionally including a variable derived by multiplying 
these two.
The taping of the videos (in another study), as well as the present research, 
were conducted in a laboratory setting. Therefore, the question of generalisability to a 
real-world setting does arise. Although it is a more difficult endeavour, perhaps 
future pain perception research could be conducted outside the laboratory, such as a 
, hospital setting. In addition, it is possible that there remained a certain degree of 
participant fatigue or boredom with the video study task itself, however this issue 
appears to have been addressed during the pilot study by reducing the number of 
videos from forty to thirty.
It is highly probable that different people decode pain expressions differently. 
Therefore, a future study might include selection and taping of individuals with 
diverse prior pain experiences and exposure. Additionally, the video targets 
themselves might be given personality measures to study individual differences in 
encoding (displaying) pain.
The Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) has been a somewhat controversial 
personality type measure due to its dichotomous nature, though it tends to be 
considered the ‘gold standard’ in personality type measurement. However, perhaps a 
continuous measure might also be useful in future individual difference research.
Whilst the present studies had large sample sizes, there was a larger age 
variation in the first study than in the second, with the second study mainly consisting 
of university students. Moreover, there were fewer male participants in the second 
study than in the first. Therefore, one could argue that results from the first study 
might be more generalisable than results of the second study.
Despite its limitations, prominent strengths of the study include the large 
sample sizes for both studies, as well as utilising standardised personality measures. 
A further contribution of the present study has been its attempt to incorporate findings 
from facial decoding, pain, deception detection and various personality attribute 
literatures.
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14.7 A pp l i ca t i on s  o f  the Resu l t s  and Con cl us io n
Certainly, deception detection itself is a complex arena, and other factors 
besides the ability of the observer may play a role in accuracy. The target 
individual’s ability to deceive, as well as a discrepancy between the cues provided 
and cues expected may hold a partial explanation.
Nevertheless, the use of pain expressions as a vehicle to study deception 
detection appears to be worthwhile, and applications of pain-falcing detection research 
abound. Pain-faking detection research might specifically be useful in situations in 
which individuals are attempting to fraudulently gain monetary benefits, such as 
medical insurance fraud that used a faked injury or ailment. More altruistically, 
however, this type of research might assist medical professionals in making 
judgments regarding pain treatment for patients. In addition, there are numerous 
applications to the field of deception detection itself, and especially for law 
enforcement officers.
The present study provides support for the position that individual differences 
play a role in the detection of pain-faking. In general, participants’ pain judgment 
detection rates are approximately at chance. However, there are large individual 
differences in pain deception detection ability. Additionally, certain traits predict 
detection ability, and these traits differ between males and females. These findings 
validate the importance of pursuing further research in pain deception detection that 
goes beyond group measures to examine individual personality difference variables in 
this ability.
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P A R T  I I I :  A P P E N D I C E S  &
R E F E R E N C E S
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Ap pend ix  A. D ef i n i t i on  o f  Terms
Cold pressor -  an apparatus used in the videos of this study, in which participants 
watch video clips of participants who have their hand and arm in water at slightly 
above freezing temperature for a period of sixty seconds.
Emotion recognition ability (ERA) -  a term used by Matsumoto et al. (2000) to 
describe the ability to judge facial expressions of emotion.
Emotional intelligence -  includes ‘the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ 
feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to 
guide one’s thinking and actions.’ (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 189).
Extraversion (Extroversion) — ‘.. .the tendency to direct one’s energies outwards, to be 
concerned with and derive gratification from the physical and social environment 
(contrast with introversion).’ (Reber & Reber, 2001).
Intuition -  The definition of intuition for the purposes of this paper will be the 
following by Hogarth (2001): intuitive responses as those that are ‘...reached with 
little or no apparent effort, and typically without conscious awareness. They involve 
little or no conscious deliberation.’ (pg.14).
Maver Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) -  a standardised 
measure of emotional intelligence, based on the ‘ability EF perspective discussed by 
Salovey and Mayer (1990; 1997) and used in the present study. The measure is based 
on their four-branch model, consisting of perceiving emotions, using emotions to 
facilitate thinking, understanding emotion and management of emotion. (See manual; 
Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2002).
Mvers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) -  a standardised Jungian-based forced-choice, 
un-timed self-report inventory developed by Briggs & Myers (1990) used in the 
present study to assess the subject’s strength of preference and psychological type. It 
is composed of 94 items that constitute the four bipolar discontinuous scales of 
Jungian theory: 1) Sensing-Intuition (SN); 2) Thinking-Feeling (TF); 3) Judging- 
Perceiving (JP); and 4) Extraversion-Introversion (El).
Machiavellianism -  Machiavellian type individuals demonstrate ‘a willingness to 
manipulate others for selfish goals, and a cynical and harshly instrumental view of 
human nature’ (Lilienfeld & Widows, p.31).
NEO-FFI (Neuroticism Extraversion Openness - Five Factor Inventory) -  an un-timed 
self-report personality inventory developed by Costa & McCrae (1992b), based on the
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‘Big Five Personality Traits’ and used in the present study. The five factors measured 
are Openness to Experience, Extraversion, Neuroticism, Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness. The personality measure consists of 60 items on a 5-point Likert- 
type scale from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’.
Nonverbal communication (NVC) -  ‘a general term covering any and all aspects of 
communication that are expressed without the use of the overt, spoken language.’ 
NVC includes, but is not limited to: gestures, body positions and facial expressions’. 
(Reber & Reber, 2001).
Openness to Experiences -  ‘Openness is seen I the breatdth, depth, and permeability 
of consciousness, and in the recurrent need to enlarge and examine one’s experience’ 
(McCrae & Costa, 1997, p.2) and includes traits such as an active imagination, 
aesthetic sensitivity, awareness of one’s emotions, preference for non-traditional 
values, preference for variety, intellectual curiosity and independent judgment 
(McCrae & Costa, 1997).
Pain -  An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage (International 
Association for the Study of Pain, 1979).
‘Pain-faking detection’ or ‘accuracy in pain judgments’ -  When referring to the 
experiment in this thesis, pain-faking detection will be defined as the participant’s 
accuracy scores on the video judgment task. This task involves viewing thirty videos 
(and one practice video) of participants who are either in mild-to-moderate pain 
(using a ‘cold pressor’ apparatus) or are faking expressions of mild-to-moderate pain. 
Psychological Type -  a term coined by Carl G. Jung (1971) to describe the observable 
differences in psychological functioning.
Psychopathy -  referred to as ‘one of the most enigmatic conditions in the field of 
psychopathology’ (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005, p.l) and includes ‘superficial charm, 
lack of guilt and empathy, dishonesty, failure to form close interpersonal attachments, 
and failure to learn from punishment, all in the absence of irrational or delusional 
thinking’ (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005, p.2).
Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPD -  an un-timed self-report inventory 
measuring psychopathy level, developed by Lilienfeld (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; 
Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) consisting of eight factors: 1) Machiavellian 
Egocentricity, 2) Social Potency/Social Influence, 3) Coldheartedness, 4) Carefree
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Nonplanfulness, 5) Fearlessness, 6) Alienation/Blame Externalisation, 7) 
Impulsive/Rebellious Nonconformity, & 8) Stress Immunity. Additionally, the 
measure includes a global psychopathy score.
Definitions o f MBTI Psychological Types (Briggs Mvers & Mvers. 1990)
Intuition -  ‘...indirect perception by way of the unconscious, incorporating ideas or
associations that the unconscious tacks on to perceptions coming from the outside.’ 
(P- 2 )
Sensing -  (The means of perception) ‘...through which we become aware of things 
directly through our five senses.’ (p. 2)
Introversion -  (One of two complementary orientations to life). ‘The introvert’s main 
interests are the inner world of concepts and ideas.’ (p.7)
Extraversion -  (One of two complementary orientations to life), ‘...the extravert is 
more involved with the outer world of people and things.’ (p. 7)
Thinking -  (Coming to conclusions) ‘...by a logical process, aimed at an impersonal 
finding.’ (p. 3).
Feeling -  (Coming to conclusions) ‘...by appreciation...bestowing on things a 
personal, subjective value.’ (p. 3)
Judging -  (A method of dealing with the world around us.) ‘The judging types believe 
that life should be willed and decided...Judging types like to settle things, or at least 
have things settled.’ (p. 69)
Perceiving -  (A method of dealing with the world around us). ‘The perceptive types 
regard life as something to be experiences and understood...perceptive types prefer to 
keep their plans and opinions as open as possible so that no valuable experience or 
enlightenment will be missed.’ (p. 69)
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Definitions o f  The ‘Bis: Five ’ Personality Traits (John & Srivastava. 1999) 
Extraversion or Surgency -  talkative, energetic, assertive.
Agreeableness -  good-natured, trustful, cooperative.
Conscientiousness -  responsible, dependable, orderly.
Emotional Stability vs. Neuroticism -  calm, not easily upset, not neurotic.
Qpemiess -  imaginative, independent-minded, intellectual.
Psychopathy Factors Measured on the PPI:
Machiavellian Esocentricitv (Factor 1) - narcissistic and ruthless attitudes in 
interpersonal functioning.
Social Potency (Factor 2) - a tendency to be charming and adept at influencing others. 
Coldheartedness (Factor 3) - a diverse array of traits that appear to be characterised 
by a paucity of emotions, and includes a propensity toward callousness, guiltlessness 
and lack of sentimentality.
Carefree Nonvlanfulness (Factor 4) - a propensity to act on one’s impulses with little 
concern for long-term consequences.
Fearlessness (Factor 5) - an eagerness to take physical risks and an absence of 
anticipatory anxiety concerning harm.
Alienation/Blame Externalisation (Factor 6 ) - a tendency to view others as the source 
of one’s difficulties and to offer rationalisations for one’s misbehaviours. 
Impulsive/Rebellious Nonconformity (Factor 7) - a reckless lack of concern regarding 
social mores.
Stress Immunity (Factor 8) - an absence of marked reactions to anxiety-provoking 
events.
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A ppendix B. Case Studies
Post-experiment interviews were conducted in the first study with several 
participants who were highly accurate in pain judgments, in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the ‘tools’ they utilised to distinguish genuine from faked pain in the 
video targets. In addition, the interviews were utilised to investigate the participants’ 
perceptions regarding the role their personality traits played in their pain judgment 
accuracy. Two participants in particular were prominent in the study due to their 
extremely high accuracy in pain judgments, as well as the relationship of their 
personality scores with the personalities of other highly accurate males and females.
Analysis of the data for the first study revealed that the most accurate female 
judges of pain were those who rated highly on Intuition (vs. Sensing) on the MBTI, 
and high on Opemiess to Experience on the NEO-FFI. Consistent with these findings, 
a participant called Mary (a female) rated highly on these personality traits and 
revealed extremely high rates of detection accuracy.
The males who were highly accurate in pain judgments in the first study most 
often had the following personality traits: a high rating on Thinking (vs. Feeling) on 
the MBTI and low on Neuroticism on the NEO-FFI. To that end, a male participant 
was interviewed who was highly accurate at detection and revealed these personality 
traits, called Bob.
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Case Study N o. 1: Fem ale Participant ( ‘M ary’)
The majority of the study participants were recruited from the UCSD 
Psychology Department Subject Pool and were therefore primarily social science 
majors between the ages of 18-22. In addition, however, the present study also had 
monies available to pay individuals for their participation. Thus, a more diverse 
population of participants was obtained in the first study. The first case study 
involves one such participant that was not drawn from the Psychology Department 
Subject Pool. This participant, ‘Mary’, (not her real name) was a fifty-eight year-old 
Caucasian female, with a master’s degree in Counselling, who is now an artist.
Mary’s personality scores were quite consistent with females in the first study 
who were accurate at detection. She rated quite clearly as ‘Intuitive’ on the MBTI 
(Myers Briggs Type Indicator), and rated highly on ‘Openness’ on the NEO-FFI 
(Neuroticism Extraversion Opemiess Five-Factor Inventory). Of note regarding her 
personality scores was that she also rated high in ‘Extraversion’ (vs. ‘Introversion’), 
‘Feeling’ (vs. ‘Thinking’), and ‘Perceiving’ (vs. ‘Judging’) on the MBTI. Fler NEO 
scores were generally modest, with the exception of her high ‘Openness to 
Experience’ score.
This participant stood out for a number of reasons. Firstly, she was 
exceptionally accurate in pain judgments; her overall accuracy rate was 83%, which 
was extremely high compared to most participants. (Mean participant accuracy rates 
for all accuracy variables was generally at approximately 50%). Mary’s accuracy and 
confidence rates on the videos are presented in the table that follows.
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Accuracy Variable Accuracy Confidence Variable Confidence
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An interesting -  and rather striking -  difference is noted between her accuracy 
in detecting M a l e  T a r g e t s  F a k i n g  P a i n  (57%) and F e m a l e  T a r g e t s  F a k i n g  P a i n  
(100%). In her transcribed interview (which follows), one may notice her mention of 
an increased comfort level regarding judgements for female targets over male targets, 
due to the ability to empathise with targets of the same gender. Another interesting 
difference appeared regarding her confidence ratings, in which her ratings were 
higher for F e m a l e  T a r g e t s  in  R e a l  P a i n  than for M a l e  T a r g e t s  i n  R e a l  P a i n .
Mary’s answers to many of the interview questions were consistent with her 
personality scores, such as intuitive-type processing. For instance, she generally 
made her judgments in the experiment quickly, and considered most decisions to be 
made in an unconscious or semi-conscious manner. She was astute and curious, 
displayed by her comment that she tended to analyse the purpose of the experiment 
and the variables being tested. Additionally, she pondered the situation and the 
personalities of the targets in the videos, such as whether they were drama students 
(they were not) and whether a certain individual or individuals in the videos were 
borderline personalities (borderline personality disorder). Whilst her interview 
answers were generally quite concise, Mary was an individual who was clearly 
interested in human nature and curious regarding the experiment, as is clear from the 
following transcribed post-experiment interview.
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Transcribed Post-Experiment Interview -  ‘Mary*
Participant Name: Mary 
Gender: Female 
Age: 58
Interviewer: Tamara 
( I n t e r v i e w e r  n o t e s  a r e  i n  i t a l i c s .)
Interviewer: What did you think was the purpose of the experiment today?
Participant: I think the purpose is to see if I was influenced by smiling people versus 
not smiling people, maybe ethnic diversity influencing what I might judge as pain or 
not pain.
Interviewer: What did you use to make your decisions regarding whether the person 
was faking or not? Facial expressions? Body movements or anything in particular?
Participant: Um, I looked at the eyes, and then I kept looking for the adam’s apple to 
see if it was quivering, but I didn’t get much out of the scenery there....um, I was 
seeing if people were overstating the pain.
Interviewer: Exaggeration?
Participant: Yes, exaggeration.
Interviewer: What personality characteristics in the participants (such as yourself) do 
you think would help to make them good at detecting faking pain?
Participant: Probably experiencing pain itself.
Interviewer: (Are there) any particular personality characteristics you think that would 
make it difficult for someone to detect?
Participant: Probably, um, maybe cultural, just observing what would be normal for 
their culture in expecting pain.
Interviewer: So maybe certain subjects in certain cultures might not be as good at 
detecting as others?
Participant: Not knowing the culture and how they would express it.
Interviewer: So cultural differences in the target person? Differences between the 
participant and the target person?
Participant: Yeah.
Interviewer: So are there any personality characteristics in the video target person that 
might make it easier or harder to detect, you think?
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Participant: I think similar to me, if I could see a person that looked similar to me and 
how they were perhaps expressing the pain...according to where I live and being a 
female perhaps, closer to myself.
Interviewer: Similarities?
Participant: Similarities.
Interviewer: Did you find one gender over another easier to detect?
Participant: Yes, I found the females like myself easier to detect.
Interviewer: And what would you say the reason for that might be?
Participant: Probably just facial features and how I would react if I were in pain. Just 
the look and maybe trying to disguise it differently with a smile or a laugh rather than 
the full extent of the pain, and I wouldn’t know in the males as much. How they 
would react in the situation.
Interviewer: Did you try to figure out what the target person in the video was saying? 
Participant: Yes.
Interviewer: Do you think that influenced your decision?
Participant: No. I thought it was interesting, though, because they would give a 
number during it. At first I thought “Oh, it’s just like a bit of a hint.”
Interviewer: Did it seem easier, harder, or the same to detect pain faking as you went 
through the videos? So, towards the beginning as opposed to the end of the videos?
Participant: No.
Interviewer: So, you thought it was about the same, then?
Participant: I think it stayed the same.
Interviewer: Did you find yourself getting bored or less cautious as you went through?
Participant: Um, yes, toward the end I was less cautious, waiting for them to just go 
away. I was tired of seeing them.
Interviewer: Did you find the computer programme easy to use?
Participant: Yes.
Interviewer: What did you like most or least about the experiment? Including the 
personality measures and watching the videos?
December 2008 -258 - Ph. D. Thesis
Participant: I liked the personality measures. I liked watching the video for about half 
of it, then I got bored with it. I liked trying to figure out what I was really being tested 
for, just analysing myself.
Interviewer: Ok, great. We found that people that are intuitive or open to experience 
have actually been proven to be better at detection, which is the original hypothesis. 
And um, what is it about the intuitive or the open personality that might make it easier 
for them to detect?
Participant: Probably because they would question themselves, and they would 
probably just let go and just look into the eyes or feel the feeling. Then they would 
probably be at a different level, rather than analytical. Then they would be more open 
and probably receiving more.
Interviewer: And what is it about fakers in general that you think might give them 
away?
Participant: Over-expression. Overly expressing it, drawing attention to their pain. 
Um, whereas a person that probably experienced pain would probably not want to 
bring it up to themselves, and probably try to disguise it.
Interviewer: On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being ‘not interested at alT and 5 being ‘extremely 
interested’, where would you say you are on the topic of pain faking in general?
Participant: Probably a 4.
Interviewer: And how interesting did you find this study compared to other studies 
that you have done? (And you can be totally honest).
Participant: Probably a 4.
Interviewer: Were there any distractions in the lab that affected your concentration 
today?
Participant: No.
Interviewer: Was it quiet enough?
Participant: Yes.
Interviewer: Did the headphones help?
Participant: Yes.
Interviewer: This question is regarding the day that you took the videos (because 
sometimes it’s the day after), but would you describe today as a good, bad, or average 
day for you?
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Interviewer: So, do you think that how today was for you affected - hindered or 
helped - or didn’t affect your abilities today?
Participant: It didn’t affect it.
Interviewer: And would you say your primary mode of taking in information would 
be visual, auditory, or hands-on? And maybe if you could think of your secondary 
mode, as well?
Participant: It would be visual and hands-on.
Interviewer: So, would you say visual is your primary mode or are they both kind of 
about the same?
Participant: They probably are both the same. I don’t know where the visual leads off 
in relation to the energy I pick up from the person. I don’t know.
Interviewer: And in watching the videos, do you think you generally made your 
decisions towards the beginning, middle or end of each video?
Participant: The middle.
Interviewer: The middle, Ok. And would you say you often make instant or very fast 
judgments about people’s characters -  say, when you meet someone, or do you take 
quite a while to decide whether you like someone or whether that person might be 
trustworthy?
Participant: Quick.
Interviewer: And when making your decision today, did you get a general overall 
impression or overall sense of each target person in the video, or did you find yourself 
keying into more specific facial features more? Which would you say you did more?
Participant: I was keying into specific facial features.
Interviewer: In previous experiences in your life, would you say you were able to spot 
a deceptive person easily or would you say it was difficult? And if you have any 
examples, without getting into personal details?
Participant: Probably, um, easier to see someone who was deceptive, yeah. Examples, 
probably because of my own experiences. Even in dating. Yeah.
Interviewer: So you had experiences with deceptive people in dating and you were 
able to pick up that they were deceptive?
Participant: I knew it intuitively. Sometimes it had to be proven to me over and over 
again, though.
Participant: Average.
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Interviewer: Yes, that is what happens. If you were able to spot a deceptive person in 
the past, would you say that you got an instant or gut feeling that the person was 
deceptive?
Participant: Yes.
Interviewer: I know you said in some cases. So, maybe you had that feeling, but you 
sort of ignored it? Is that kind of what happened?
Participant: Yes. If I chose to ignore it. Yes.
Interviewer: And generally did you find it difficult, somewhat easy, or very easy in 
today’s experiment to decide whether the person in the video was faking or not?
Participant: I found it somewhat difficult.
Interviewer: And do you think making the decision regarding whether each person is 
faking or not is a conscious, semi-conscious, or an unconscious decision?
Participant: Unconscious.
Interviewer: OK. And when you make judgments about people, would you say you 
make conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious decisions? For instance when you 
meet someone?
Participant: Probably semi-conscious.
Interviewer: Did you find yourself drawing on past experiences when making your 
decision regarding whether the person was faking or not? In other words, did you 
retrieve particular past experiences while you were watching the video that you drew 
upon?
Participant: Um, yes.
Interviewer: Anything in particular related to deceptive behaviour?
Participant: Yeah. Probably pain-related and mainly with the women again. Maybe 
because I identified ( w i t h  t h e m )  and with smiling and the person just trying to throw 
the other person off, so another person wouldn’t know what their pain level was. 
Probably trying to be, maybe some co-dependency, trying to make the other person 
feel ok.
Interviewer: So, experiences of when people would play down their pain - you kind of 
drew upon that?
Participant: Yes. Also, how they would be able to distract the other person away from 
what they were truly feeling inside of themselves, maybe.
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Interviewer: If someone had really been deceived in the past, do they think this would 
help or hinder them in making judgments of faking pain deception?
Participant: It would me. I don’t know if it would help someone else. If they were not 
willing to look at it.
Interviewer: Would you say your level of emotionality, how emotional a person you 
are, helped or hindered your ability to detect pain faking today?
Participant: Probably because, um, I think that I am intuitive and I carry a lot of 
emotion. It helped me in detecting. Although I did find it rather difficult on some of 
them, or most of them actually. I couldn’t come up with a complete 5 on a scale of 
truly knowing. ( R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  s c a l e  o f  1 - 5 ) .
Interviewer: So, you feel like your level of feelings did help you, and your level of 
intuition did help you?
Participant: Yeah.
Interviewer: Did you find yourself empathising with the person in the video when you 
thought they were in pain?
Participant: Yes.
Interviewer: And when making judgments about the target person in the video, did 
you find yourself thinking about how you personally reacted to pain in your life?
Participant: Say that again, please.
Interviewer: When you were making your judgments about the target person in the 
video, did you find yourself thinking back to your own past experiences with pain, 
and how you personally reacted to the pain?
Participant: Yes.
Interviewer: And do you think that helped or hindered you today?
Participant: Helped.
Interviewer: Did you find yourself actually kind of placing yourself in that target 
person’s ‘shoes’ and thinking how it would personally feel if you had your arm in ice- 
cold water, and all that?
Participant: Yes, I was looking for the similarities in the face.
Interviewer: And while you were watching the target people in the video, did you find 
yourself speculating about these individuals and their individual personalities at all?
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Participant: (laughing) Yes. I was wondering how many were drama students. I was 
wondering how many were borderline personalities. I was wondering, yes, I 
wondered a lot. ( C o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  t h i s  p a r t i c i p a n t  h a s  a  m a s t e r ’s  
d e g r e e  i n  c o u n s e l l i n g ) .
Interviewer: Yes. So, did you look at the video of the person and think “I think this 
person might be such-and-such personality type?
Participant: Yes.
Interviewer: And do you think that might have helped or hindered you in your 
decisions today?
Participant: I think it helped.
Interviewer: Good. So that concludes the questions.
Participant: Ok.
Interviewer: Thanks very much.
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Case Study N o. 2: M ale Participant ( ‘B ob ’)
The second case study participant, Bob (not his real name), was also quite 
accurate in distinguishing between real and faked pain. Bob was a twenty-six year- 
old Caucasian male with an undergraduate degree in English, who was preparing to 
begin a Ph.D. in History in the autumn. He was interesting in his complexity, as one 
would expect someone with this ‘soft science’ background not to be terribly analytical 
in his thinking. However, Bob scored quite high on ‘Thinking’ (vs. Feeling) on the 
MBTI, and proved to be a very analytical thinker in his post-experiment interview. In 
fact, his answers to the interview questions were long (in contrast to Mary’s relatively 
short answers), and revealed this analytical approach. It was clear from his answers 
that he was, in a sense, analysing the study as it went along.
Bob’s high score on ‘Thinking’ was consistent with other males in the first 
study who were accurate at detection. Additionally, Bob scored low on ‘Neuroticism’ 
(on the NEO-FFI), which is also consistent with accurate males. Moreover, he also 
rated as ‘Intuitive’ on the MBTI, which was consistent overall with those participants’ 
personality traits who were accurate at detection. Bob was quite accurate in pain 
judgments; his overall accuracy rate was 77%, which was extremely high compared to 
most participants. (Mean participant accuracy rates for all accuracy variables was 
generally at approximately 50%). His accuracy and confidence rates on the videos 
are presented in the table that follows.
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Interestingly, his scores reveal higher accuracy for female targets (in the 
videos) than for male targets, both when targets displayed real pain and when they 
faked pain. (This is in contrast to the mean accuracy for all participants in both 
studies, which was slightly higher judging male targets than female targets). 
Additionally, he had higher levels of detection accuracy for targets who were faking 
than for targets in real pain, and was most adept at detecting females who were faking 
pain (89% accuracy). Also of note is that this high level of accuracy in detecting 
faking females was mirrored in the female case study participant, Mary, who also had 
an 89% success rate in this area. (However, Mary’s accuracy scores were higher 
overall than Bob’s scores.) Additionally, his confidence scores (on a Likert scale of 1 
-  5) reflected a relatively low confidence level in decision-making.
In contrast to Mary’s short interview answers and focus on the personalities of 
targets in the videos, Bob’s answers were more detailed. Moreover, his style 
appeared to be quite analytical, providing quite a different result in the post­
experiment interview, which follows.
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Transcribed Post-Experiment Interview -  ‘Bob’
Participant Name: Bob 
Gender: Male 
Age: 26
Interviewer: Tamara 
( I n t e r v i e w e r  n o t e s  a r e  i n  i t a l i c s . )
Interviewer: Ok, so today we have Bob here, and he is participant number 255, and 
he’s male and 26 years of age. So what do you think was the purpose of the 
experiment today, Bob?
Participant: Well, we were looking at individuals who demonstrated pain stimuli and 
who either were faking or were genuinely experiencing it. As I figure it, there are two 
groups of people you could be testing, the people who you recorded or me. You were 
either testing the ability of people to fake pain stimuli, or the ability of people to 
perceive ‘falses’ in this regard.
Interviewer: Right, ok. And what did you use to make your decisions regarding 
whether the person in the videotape was faking or in real pain, for instance, particular 
facial expressions?
Participant: Ok, here’s what I looked at: first off, in terms of what sample I had to 
make the decision on, I had maybe sixty seconds of a silent speaker, there was no 
audio, that is. There was interaction - though I can’t hear what it is, and in that space 
of time, I feel like it’s very difficult to make a high confidence prediction in terms of 
getting a sense of: Is this an honest person, are they genuine? So I looked at what I 
knew about the study or rather about the subject, which is they are being exposed to a 
cold water stimulus; I have been exposed to cold water stimuli so I know that what 
happens, it’s numbing. ( U n k n o w n  w h a t  c o l d  w a t e r  s t i m u l i  h e  i s  r e f e r r i n g  t o ) .  Over a 
space of time, you’re going to become progressively more comfortable as opposed to 
less. I know that these are people who have voluntarily chosen to participate. This 
means that they are either going to attempt to deceive me or they are going into this 
thinking that they can withstand whatever the stimulus is, and therefore they’re not 
going to weep and wail. They can quit the study at any time, so if it’s an unbearable 
discomfort...and when people are in unbearable discomfort they try to minimize, shut 
down, try to control the experience; everyone’s done that in the doctor’s office. And 
finally, I know that the stimulus has to be relatively low intensity because it’s a 
voluntary study, it has to go through Ethics ( E t h i c s  C o m m i t t e e ) .  There is no way these 
people are experiencing screaming, agonising pain. Within that, what I’m looldng at 
is someone whose pain response, in terms of their expression, minimises over the 
course of the experience. I’m looking for someone who, let’s see... who is very still 
except when being spoken to, and then becomes relatively still again. In particular, 
anyone who is clearly experiencing a tremendous amount of pain is lying. Anyone 
who is largely sitting there like a bump on a log is there to bear pain. And I have a 
low degree of confidence in this, because some people are going to be more stoic than 
others, but that is essentially how I’m going to predict it. So I’m looking...the more
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motion there is in the face, the more likely they are to be false in this specific 
situation.
Interviewer: Ok, good. And so any other facial expressions, any other particular body 
movements or anything else that you used?
Participant: No, it’s not about any specific expression because that might be particular 
to the person - but rather scope and intensity, rather, and trend. If they become less 
active over the course of the interview, they are more likely to be genuinely 
experiencing a numbing discomfort.
Interviewer: That makes sense. And what personality characteristics in the participant, 
such as yourself, do you think would help someone to be good at detecting whether 
someone is faking or in real pain?
Participant: There are two ways to approach this, one of which is figuring out 
everything you can about the circumstance on the basis of what you are allowed to 
know, and making your best judgments from essentially low confidence indicators, 
which is what I did. Or, the other way to do a good job of figuring out whether 
someone is being truthful or not is being a good judge of character, who can 
empathise well with people. I don’t do that. And I feel like in this particular situation 
there is not enough time to get a good ‘read’ on these people. You can’t hear them; 
you’re only observing them for sixty seconds. So, for sort of the snap judgment thing, 
I think that it’s best to say, “Well, in general this is what you’re going to see, so based 
on this sort of gross analysis, this is probably a faker.” So, kind of having an 
‘experimental mind’ thing.
Interviewer: Ok. And what personality characteristics in the participant, such as 
yourself, do you think would make it more difficult to detect pain faking?
Participant: Well, because what I’m doing is looking at people who are expressing the 
largest volume of pain and assuming that they are lying because they are projecting 
that emotion most strongly...assuming they’re right, then being trusting would be the 
problem: taking people at face value, empathising with them.
Interviewer: And are there any personality characteristics in the video target person 
that you were watching, that might make it easier or harder to detect if they were 
faking or in real pain?
Participant: No, because I’m not looking at the individual. I have no real ability to get 
a sense of the individual. So, I’m just looking at, sort of, gross physical cues.
Interviewer: And did you find it easier to detect whether they were faking or in real 
pain for one gender over another?
Participant: Yes, because I assumed I was dealing with Americans ( t h e y  w e r e  a c t u a l l y  
C a n a d i a n s )  and I have some, I mean we do have different gender norms. In particular, 
men are expected to be more stoic than women, which meant that I had a stronger 
degree of confidence that a man who was projecting discomfort was probably lying.
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Whereas because women are generally given more freedom to display weakness 
without undermining their gender ideals, I have less confidence there, But since these 
are still people who have voluntarily chosen to accept the discomfort, I figure they’re 
going to want to project confidence at the task, which means there is still the same 
toughness ideal.
Interviewer: Good. And did you try to figure out what the target in the video was 
trying to say at all?
Participant: Yes because it was a data point, it’s not specifically what they are saying 
in the given point. It seemed as though they were periodically being asked a question, 
which is probably a discomfort intensity or a “Are you ok to go on?” Whether or not 
it’s expressing the volume and what that meant for me, largely that I shouldn’t be 
suspicious that they spoke at all. Because, in general, if you are experiencing 
discomfort what you do is shut down as much as possible, and in general because 
speaking distracts you from shutting down I would expect to see a spike in discomfort 
from the people when they were speaking, if they were truthfully experiencing 
discomfort.
Interviewer: Interesting. Ok. Did it seem to get easier, harder, or the same, to detect 
pain-faking, as you went through the videos, would you say?
Participant: Definitely easier, again because I’m making judgments on the basis of the 
data available to me. As I see three or four people going through it, I got a sense of 
the rhythm of the interviews and kind of the baseline for how people are acting. I can 
tell, again, I’m looking for ‘over-actors’; seeing several actors gives me a better sense 
of what the median is.
Interviewer: And did you find yourself getting bored or less cautious as you got 
toward the end of the experiment?
Participant: No. Bored, certainly there’s a degree of...inaudible...but I became more 
confident of how my particular system for gauging was working. But without a score 
card I couldn’t be certain whether or not all of my assumptions were accurate, so I 
was still looking; and in fact what happens as I get further on, is I become less 
confident about my early identifiers because they were made with less data.
Interviewer: Right. And did you find the computer programme easy to use?
Participant: Yes.
Interviewer: And what did you like most about the experiment, including both halves: 
the personality measures and the video - and what did you like least?
Participant: There’s a degree of....( i n a u d i b l e ) . . .which makes personality tests 
interesting and then, at least for me, when I’m talcing tests I generally am interested in 
trying to figure out what the test is, looking for how the test is asking the questions, so 
there was... ( i n a u d i b l e ) ... with both sides of that. In terms of what I liked most, 
probably gauging the interviews themselves, because the personality tests, well I can
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try to figure out what they’re wanting to know from me, there certainly is a 
competitive aspect to how valid can my results be in that process.
Interviewer: So watching the videos themselves and trying to detect was a little bit 
more interesting, maybe, for you?
Participant: Yes. Yes.
Interviewer: Ok. What is it about fakers in general and pain-fakers in particular, that 
you think gives them away or that makes it difficult to determine if they are faking or 
not?
Participant: What gives them away is that a person who is experiencing pain will, I 
think, in general (assuming the pain was bearable), try to minimize their expression - 
because pain is associated with weakness and people don’t wish to be observed as 
weak. Someone who is trying to fake pain is trying to convince people they are in a 
great deal of pain, which means they have to express it. And so if you have an idea, at 
least again I have a baseline, there is no one here who is having their hand chopped 
off, for instance, so I can expect that anyone who is expressing way over sort of a 
median line is faking.
Interviewer: Ok. And on a scale of 1-5, 1 being ‘not interested at all’ and 5 being 
‘extremely interested’, how interested would you say you are in the topic of pain 
faking?
Participant: I’m interested, in truth. And with that in mind, I have a tangential 
connection to this. The particular mode of deception is not something I’ve thought a 
lot about - but how to tell who is honest and who is not is I think, of concern. 1-5, 
pain-faking: I will say, relative to the standard population a 4, and relative to 
psychologists, a 3.
Interviewer: And how interesting did you find our study in particular, so about the 
same with ours, 1-5?
Participant: I have sat in a couple other ‘psych’ studies, and the fact that there was an 
active component to this made it much more interesting than most, which are kind of 
about being asked about your childhood.
Interviewer: And were there any distractions in the lab when you watched the videos?
Participant: No. Obviously these aren’t sound-proof walls and noise penetrates from 
other spaces, but with these headphones, the noise becomes sufficiently indistinct. 
You’re not trying to figure out what it is. So, I felt like I had a good environment to 
concentrate on the stimulus.
Interviewer: So, was it quiet enough, would you say?
Participant: Yes.
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Interviewer: And do you think the headphones did help?
Participant: I do. And given that you are in fact engaged in psychological testing, I 
would say that the addition of a neutral sound like ‘noise’, in essence, would be 
helpful except there’s probably not anything that really is like noise.
Interviewer: Interesting idea though. So, the day that you watched the videos, would 
you describe that day as a good, bad or average day for you?
Participant: I would say, average.
Interviewer: That’s good. Do you think this affected your ability to detect well? 
Participant: Yes, certainly a bad day would throw me off.
Interviewer: And would you say your primary mode of taking in information is visual, 
auditory, or hands-on? And how about a secondary mode if you have one?
Participant: Visual, and then hands-on. In fact, I primarily acquire information 
through text and don’t do very well with visual depictions at all.
Interviewer: But, so you would still say visual?
Participant: Visual over auditory.
Interviewer: Ok. And then hands-on?
Subject: Yes, I suppose in the respect that hands-on, you mean by interacting with the 
data, is probably the strongest form of interaction. Especially if reading text could be 
parsed in that way.
Participant: Ok. And when watching the videos, do you think you generally made 
your decisions towards the beginning, middle or end of each video?
Subject: Middle, because a lot of what I’m looking for is a trend. Amplifying stimuli 
means that you’re diminishing the stimuli means.. .inaudible...
Interviewer: 01c, and would you say that you often make instant or very fast 
judgments about peoples’ characters, say when you meet someone; or do you take 
quite a while, would you say, to decide whether you like someone or whether that 
individual is trustworthy?
Participant: Trustworthiness is something that waits a long time. Essentially that’s not 
something that is demonstrable in an initial interaction, you sort of need a situation in 
which there’s an incentive for them to be false. Snap judgments about people: I often 
decide whether I may like someone very early on - but in terms of their personal 
virtue, no, that takes a long time.
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Interviewer: Ok, sounds good. And when making your decision today, did you get a 
general overall impression or overall sense of each target person in the video, or did 
you find yourself keying in to more specific facial expressions?
Participant: I was watching physical stimuli; I wasn’t looking into their soul. Overall I 
was concentrating more on facial expressions than I was trying to get a sense of their 
character.
Interviewer: So would you say it was more of an overall impression or sense of each 
person, or would you say that the facial expressions were more important to you?
Participant: It wasn’t specific facial expressions but general facial expressions which 
would, I suppose, be an overall impression but it wasn’t into the character of the 
person, but just: How much did their face move?
Interviewer: Ok. And in previous experiences in your life, would you say that you 
were able to spot a deceptive person easily or was it difficult? And can you think of a 
specific example at work, school, whatever and talk about how you were able to spot 
their deceptiveness at all?
Participant: I don’t think that in casual interactions I am particularly good at spotting 
‘falses’ and indeed in this environment I was never particularly confident of the 
individual, because what I was looking at was overall trends. I deal much better with 
assessing non-interpersonal data and in this particular situation what I did was 
essentially reduced human interaction to sort of physical stimuli, which is more 
complicated in an uncontrolled environment.
Interviewer: Ok. And if you were able to spot a deceptive person in the past, did you 
get an instant impression, or gut feeling that this person was deceptive or anything?
Participant: No, in fact in general I have been able to spot people who have been 
deceptive, which does happen. In general, it’s people who lie who tend to provide 
elaborate details and get the story right repeatedly. So, if I have someone who is a 
subordinate at work, if someone is calling in sick, and they’ve got a glib 5 or 6 line 
story which plausibly explains exactly why it is they can’t come in - they’re probably 
lying, assuming that I don’t know them well enough to make a character judgment. If 
they call in and say “I’m sick,” and when pressed, provide a short generic description, 
they’re more likely to be telling the truth because they’re less nervous about being 
caught in a lie and less concerned that I believe them.
Interviewer: Right, right. And generally did you find it difficult, somewhat easy, or 
very easy to decide whether the target in the video was faking or not?
Participant: Any given target would be moderately difficult. Particularly yes, people 
who were closer to the median in terms of the volume of expression.
Interviewer: And do you think that making the decision regarding whether each 
person is faking or not is a completely conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious 
decision?
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Participant: I was making conscious decisions because I was looking at specific 
stimuli. I wasn’t interested in my gut feeling of whether they had an honest face or 
not.
Interviewer: So, actually the next question is: Do you specifically, and do you think 
that in general, people make their judgments about people when they’re making these 
decisions completely conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious? People in general?
Participant: I think that in general, especially snap judgments, are made on an 
unconscious level. I mean there are people who have done sort of visual profile 
studies of American presidents since TV became a major part of election campaigns, 
and there hasn’t been a bearded president since TV; and there is a tremendous amount 
of money spent on visual representation, and that’s because most people aren’t 
thinking about it critically.
Interviewer: Right. And, did you find yourself consciously drawing on past 
experiences to make your decision regarding whether the person was faking or not? In 
other words, did you retrieve particular past experiences to base your decision on?
Participant: Yes, absolutely. In particular what I was looking at was past experiences 
of pain and past experiences of cold in particular - which would be things that a 
genuine person experiences - experiences regarding how I reacted in that situation, 
looking for similar types of reactions, how I’ve seen other people react in that kind of 
circumstances. Just because I behaved in a certain manner doesn’t mean I can assume 
that’s normal behaviour. Now, of course, one of the major limitations of my approach 
was that if someone thought critically about how to deceive - by trying to act in the 
way that people would normally act in that circumstance. That is, if I had been trying 
to deceive myself in this study, it would have worked because I would have expressed 
the behaviours that I would have anticipated. And since I’m only looking at gross 
physical characteristics that would be something pretty cool.
Interviewer: Ok. And if someone had been really deceived in the past, do you think 
this would help or hinder them in making judgments of pain deception?
Participant: Having either a bad or sheltered experience would hurt you, because if 
you believe that you’re being constantly deceived, you’re constantly looking for 
deception, and you overwhelmingly find deception. If you have been raised in an 
environment where everyone has dealt with you sincerely and truthfully, then you’ll 
tend to believe that people are sincere and truthful. So, an overwhelming background 
of either kind would be probably not good.
Interviewer: Ok. And would you say your level of emotionality, how emotional of a 
person you are, helped or hindered your ability to detect today?
Participant: I don’t know how much of an emotional person I am, but I try to deal 
with challenges in my surroundings logically and rationally, sort of, regardless of 
emotionality. And I would say that presuming that I...that this helps me - and if not,
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then it probably hurts me. Because, again, I pretty much dismissed with trying to 
manage an emotional connection with these people ( i n  t h e  v i d e o s ) .
Interviewer: Right. And did you find (and this is actually connected to that question), 
did you find yourself empathising with the person in the video at all?
Participant: Yes, occasionally, in small amounts, which is something I attempted to 
suppress when I caught myself doing it.
Interviewer: Ok. And when making judgments about the target person in the video, 
did you find yourself thinking about how you’ve reacted to physical pain in the past?
Participant: Yes. That’s obviously highly important, and in particular it’s that most 
people, when experiencing pain, there’s kind of an on-off switch. Up to a certain 
point, you will minimize the experience, both to appear stoic and as a way of dealing 
with pain stimuli. If you’re still, and disconnect yourself from it, then you hurt less. 
Past a certain point, you will be numb, which I’ve also experienced. But in both I 
have a sense that the stimuli are constant across people. So when I don’t see most 
people doing that, it’s probably not the case, and ( t r y i n g )  to control the environment, 
so they’re not going to be experiencing that level of pain.
Interviewer: Right. And while you were watching the target people in the video, did 
you find yourself speculating about these individuals and their personalities at all?
Participant: To the extent that I became bored, maybe a little. But that again would be 
something that I was actively attempting to suppress when it occurred, because that 
would be, again, the whole basis of my scheme is that I don’t know these people.
Interviewer: And did you think this helped or hindered you, in deciding if they were 
faking or not?
Participant: I think this helps me because in the exposure time, you’re not going to be 
able to get a sense of these people’s views.
Interviewer: We have found that certain people, in the case of males, people who are 
high in thinking level and low in neuroticism, do particularly well at this. What is it 
about those particular personalities that you think might make it easier for them to 
detect?
Participant: Ok, I’m trying to remember psychological definitions and terms. So, 
thinking is valuing analytical approach and neuroticism, low end, is a degree of self- 
confidence, essentially?
Interviewer: More or less, kind of stability, not getting worked up and worried over 
things, and so people who are low in this do better at it.
Participant: That fits with my assessment, which is that I was calmly and rationally 
making low confidence predictions. If, instead, I was not comfortable with making 
decisions I was uncertain about it - which is what it sounds like a high neuroticism
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person would be uncomfortable with - that would make making the decision more 
difficult. And if you become stressed about what’s the right and what’s the wrong 
answer, then that becomes more important than accurately making the decision. So, 
yes, I think those would be helpful traits. I’m curious what traits females tested well 
for.
Interviewer: For females, it was intuitiveness and openness to experience. It’s 
interesting, because those were my hypotheses in the beginning, and now there seems 
to be specific gender differences... So I think that pretty much wraps it up. Thank you 
very much.
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Appendix  C. Additional  Study One Tables
Frequencies
T a b l e  4 3 :  F r e q u e n c i e s  -  G e n d e r  ( S t u d y  N o .  1 )
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Male 58 34.1 34.1 34.1
Female 112 65.9 65.9 100.0
Total 170 100.0 100.0
T a b l e  4 4 :  F r e q u e n c i e s  -  E t h n i c i t y  ( S t u d y  N o .  1 )
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid African American/ 1.8 1.8 1.8Black 3
Asian/ Pacific 73 42.9 43.2 45.0Islander
Caucasian 71 41.8 42.0 87.0
Other 12 7.1 7.1 94.1
Hispanic 10 5.9 5.9 100.0
Total 169 99.4 100.0
Missing System 1 .6
Total 170 100.0
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Table 45: Frequencies -  Education (Study No. 1)
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid High School 
graduate 10 5.9 5.9 5.9
Some College 152 89.4 89.4 95.3
Post-graduate 8 4.7 4.7 100.0
Total 170 100.0 100.0
T a b l e  4 6 :  F r e q u e n c i e s  -  U n i v e r s i t y  M a j o r  ( S t u d y  N o .  1 )
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Social Sciences
(Psychology & 
Sociology)
Business/
Economics
62
13
36.5
7.6
37.1
7.8
37.1
44.9
Arts (Music & Theatre) 
Mathematics/
4 2.4 2.4 47.3
Computer/
Engineering
Biology & Physical 
Sciences
12
48
7.1
28.2
7.2
28.7
54.5
83.2
Education, English &
History
Other
11
4
6.5
2.4
6.6
2.4
89.8
92.2
Undeclared 4 2.4 2.4 94.6
Interdisciplinary
Total
9
167
5.3
98.2
5.4
100.0
100.0
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Descriptives -  Age
___________________ N_______ Min._____ Max._____Mean_____ SD
Age 170 18.17 59.25 23.36 7.81
Table 47: Descriptives -  Age (Study No. 1)__________________________________
T a b le  4 8 :  D e s c r ip t iv e s  -  A g e ,  b y  G e n d e r  ( S t u d y  N o . I )
Gender _______________ N_______ Min. Max. Mean SD
Males Age 58 18.58 58.58 23.56 7.16
Females Age 112 18.17 59.25 23.25 8.15
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T a b l e  4 9 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s :  A c c u r a c y  V a r i a b l e s  ( S t u d y  N o .  1 )_____________________
Accuracy Variable_________ N Min. Max. Mean SD
Overall accuracy 170 17 83 51.92 14.59
Overall accuracy judging 170 6 88 49.27 16.69faked pain
Overall accuracy judging 170 14 93 55.04 17.28real pain
Accuracy judging male 170 0 100 50.14 18.47targets (faked pain)
Accuracy judging female 
targets (faked pain) 170 0 100 48.40 22.47
Accuracy judging male 
targets (real pain) 170 13 88 56.31 17.46
Accuracy judging female 170 0 100 53.90 26.65targets (real pain)
Overall accuracy judging 170 19.0 87.0 53.23 13.45male targets
Overall accuracy judging 
female targets 170 5.5 94.5 51.15 21.16
N o te :  J u d g e s 1 a c c u r a c y  in  p a i n  j u d g m e n t  i s  o n  a  s c a l e  o f  1 —1 0 0 .
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T a b l e  5 0 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s :  A c c u r a c y  V a r i a b l e s  ( b y  P a r t i c i p a n t  G e n d e r )  S t u d y  N o .  1
Accuracy Variable N Min. Max. Mean SD
Overall accuracy 
Overall accuracy judging 
faked pain
Overall accuracy judging 
real pain
Accuracy judging male 
targets (faked pain) 
Accuracy judging female 
targets (faked pain) 
Accuracy judging male 
targets (real pain) 
Accuracy judging female 
targets (real pain)
Overall accuracy judging 
male targets
Overall accuracy judging 
female targets ___
58
Males
17 80 52.52 15.43
58 13 81 48.69 17.52
58 14 93 56.81 17.70
58 0 100 50.48 20.29
58 0 89 47.12 22.75
58 25 88 58.67 17.33
58 0 100 55.17 27.93
58 25.0 81.5 54.58 13.81
58 5.5 94.5 51.15 22.66
Overall accuracy 
Overall accuracy judging 
faked pain
Overall accuracy judging 
real pain
Accuracy judging male 
targets (faked pain) 
Accuracy judging female 
targets (faked pain) 
Accuracy judging male 
targets (real pain) 
Accuracy judging female 
targets (real pain)
Overall accuracy judging 
male targets
Overall accuracy judging 
female targets _____
112
Females
17 83 51.61 14.19
112 6 88 49.57 16.31
112 14 93 54.12 17.06
112 0 100 49.96 17.55
112 0 100 49.06 22.39
112 13 88 55.09 17.47
112 0 100 53.24 26.06
112 19.0 87.0 52.53 13.27
112 5.5 94.5 51.15 20.45
N o te :  J u d g e s  ’ a c c u r a c y  in  p a i n  j u d g m e n t  i s  o n  a  s c a l e  o f  1 - 1 0 0 .
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T a b l e  5 1 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s :  C o n f i d e n c e  i n  D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g  ( S t u d y  N o .  1 )
Confidence Variable N Min. Max. Mean SD
Overall confidence
level in decision- 170 2.0 4.8 3.52 .52
making
Overall confidents 55
judging faked pain
Overall confidence 1„n. , . , . 1/U 2.0 5.0 3.52 .59judging real pain
Confidence judging
male targets (faked 170 2.0 5.0 3.42 .64
pain)
Confidence judging
female targets (faked 170 2.0 5.0 3.53 .64
pain)
Confidence judging
male targets (real 170 2.0 5.0 3.35 .61
pain)
Confidence judging
female targets (real 170 1.0 5.0 3.68 .75
pain)
Overall confidence 1?0 2Q 4 M
judging male targets 
Overall confidence
judging female 170 2.0 5.0 3.59 .59
targets________________________________ ________________________
N o t e :  J u d g e s  ’ C o n f i d e n c e  i s  o n  a  L i k e r t  s c a l e  o f l - 5 .
December 2008 - 2 8 0 - Ph. D. Thesis
T a b l e  5 2 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s :  C o n f i d e n c e  i n  D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g  ( b y  P a r t i c i p a n t  G e n d e r )  
S tu d y  N o . 1______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Confidence Variable N Min. Max. Mean SD
Males
Overall confidence level 58 2.0 4.8 3.58 .62
Overall confidence when 58 2.0 5.0 3.55 .65judging faked pain
Overall confidence when 58 2.0 5.0 3.55 .69judging real pain
Confidence judging 
targets (faked pain)
male 58 2.0 5.0 3.52 .71
Confidence judging female
58 2.0 5.0 3.59targets (faked pain) .73
Confidence judging 
targets (real pain)
male 58 2.0 5.0 3.43 .68
Confidence judging 
targets (real pain)
female 58 2.0 5.0 3.67 .85
Overall confidence 
male targets
judging 58 2.0 4.5 3.46 .63
Overall confidence 
female targets
judging 58 2.0 5.0 3.62 .69
Females
Overall confidence level 112 2.0 4.8 3.49 .46
Overall confidence when 112 2.0 4.5 3.44 .49judging faked pain
Overall confidence when 112 2.0 5.0 3.50 .53judging real pain
Confidence judging 
targets (faked pain)
male 112 2.0 5.0 3.38 .60
Confidence judging 
targets (faked pain)
female 112 2.0 5.0 3.50 .59
Confidence judging 
targets (real pain)
male 112 2.0 5.0 3.31 .57
Confidence judging 
targets (real pain)
female 112 1.0 5.0 3.68 .70
Overall confidence judging 112 2.0 4.5 3.35 .48male targets
Overall confidence 
female targets
judging 112 2.0 5.0 3.58 .53
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Descriptive Statistics
T a b l e  5 3 :  N E O - F F I  D e s c r i p t i v e s
N Min. Max. Mean SD
Neuroticism 170 3 47 21.62 7.82
Extraversion 170 11 47 29.19 7.33
Openness 170 13 45 30.47 6.29
Agreeableness 170 12 46 32.37 6.27
Conscientiousness 170 4 48 32.03 7.95
T a b l e  5 4 :  M B T I  D e s c r i p t i v e s ________________________________________________________________________
_____________   N Min. Max. Mean SD
Introversion/
Extraversion score:
(+) = extraversion /
(-) = introversion 
Sensing/ Intuition
score:
(+) = intuition /
(-) = sensing 
Thinking/ Feeling
score:
(+) = feeling /
(-) = thinking 
Judging/ Perceiving
score:
(+) = perceiving /
(-) = judging________
170 -55 47 -3.78 25.32
170 -65 49 .12 27.25
170 -57 41 -.19 24.27
170 -55 59 -3.32 29.92
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Table 65: Correlations for MBTI and NEO-FFI Variables {All Participants)
MBTI Variable (NEO)
Neuroticism
(NEO)
Extraversion
(NEO)
Openness
(NEO)
Agree­
ableness
(NEO)
Conscien­
tiousness
Extraversion vs. 
Introversion: -.36** .74** .08 .17*Extraversion = (+) 
Introversion = (-) 
Intuition vs. Sensing:
.12
Intuition = (+) 
Sensing = (-) 
Feeling vs. Thinking:
-.11 .13 .58** .01 -.23**
Feeling = (+) 
Thinking = (-) 
Perceiving vs. Judging:
.15 .25** .06 .49** -.06
Perceiving = (+) 
Judging = (-)
-.05 .20** .32** .01 -.48**
* p  < .05, **p < .01.
December 2008 -293 - Ph. D. Thesis
Table 66: Correlations for MBTI and NEO-FFI Variables (by Gender)
MBTI Variable (NEO) (NEO) (NEO) (NEO) (NEO)
Neuroticism Extraversion Openness Agree­ Conscien­
ableness tiousness
Males
Extraversion vs.
Introversion: -.46** .09 .09Extraversion = (+) .25
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) -.22 .10 .59** .12 -.15
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) .19 .12 .07 44** .10
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs.
Judging: 
Perceiving = (+) -.08 .07 .23 .01 _ 49**
Judging = (-)
Females
Extraversion vs.
Introversion: -.36** 7 j ** .07 .08Extraversion = (+) .10
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) -.02 .17 .59** -.01 -.26**
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) .05 27** .06 .47** -.22*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs.
Judging: 
Perceiving = (+) -.01 .28** 38** .03 -.47**
Judging = (-)
* p  < .05, **p < .01.
December 2008 -294- Ph. D. Thesis
Table 67: Intercorrelations for MBTI Variables (A ll Participants)
Extraversion
vs. Intuition vs. 
Introversion: Sensing: 
Extraversion Intuition (+) 
(+) Sensing (-) 
Introversion (-)
Feeling vs. Perceiving vs. 
Thinking: Judging: 
Feeling (+) Perceiving (+) 
Thinking (-) Judging (-)
Extraversion vs. 
Introversion: 
Extraversion = (+) 
Introversion = (-) 
Intuition vs. Sensing: 
Intuition = (+) 
Sensing = (-) 
Feeling vs. Thinking: 
Feeling = (+) 
Thinking = (-) 
Perceiving vs. 
Judging:
Perceiving = (+) 
Judging = (-)
.14 .16*
.20**
.19*
.51**
.21**
*p < .05, **p < .01.
Table 68: Intercorrelations for NEO-FFI Variables ( A l l  P a r t i c i p a n t s )
Neuroticism Extraversion Openness ^Sree
*  ableness
Conscien­
tiousness
Neuroticism -.35** -.12 -.19* -.19*
Extraversion .14 .21** .18*
Openness .06 -.06
Agreeableness .12
Conscientiousness
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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Table 69: Intercorrelations for MBTI Variables (by Gender)
Extraversion vs. Intuition vs. Feeling vs. Perceiving vs.
Introversion: Sensing: Thinking: Judging:
Extraversion (+) Intuition (+) Feeling (+) Perceiving (+)
Introversion (-) Sensing (-) Thinking (-) Judging (-)
Males
Extraversion vs.
Introversion: .15 .12 .14Extraversion = (+)
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .28* .51**
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) .22
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs.
Judging:
Perceiving = (+)
Judging = (-)
Females
Extraversion vs.
Introversion: .19 .08 24**Extraversion = (+)
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .25** .50**
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) .27**
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs.
Judging:
Perceiving = (+)
Judging = (-)
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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Table 70: Intercorrelations for NEO-FFI Variables (by Gender)
Neuroticism Extraversion Openness Agree­ableness
Conscien­
tiousness
Males
Neuroticism -.36** -.30* -.14 -.21
Extraversion .07 .03 38**
Openness .02 -.03
Agreeableness .10
Conscientiousness
Females
Neuroticism _ 39** -.01 -.28** -.21*
Extraversion .17 .27** .04
Openness .072 -.09
Agreeableness .11
Conscientiousness
*p < .05, **p<.01.
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Table 71: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Female Targets (Faking vs. Real
Pain) & M BTI, NEO
MBTI or NEO Variable B S E B P
Female Targets: Faking Pain
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.04 .10 -.05
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .07 .09 .09
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.13 .09 -.14
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .09 .08 .12
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.04 .26 -.01
(NEO) Extraversion -.40 .37 -.13
(NEO) Openness .19 .34 .05
(NEO) Agreeableness .43 .34 .12
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.02 .27 -.01
Female Targets: Real Pain
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.12 .12 -.12
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .02 .10 .02
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.22 .11 -.20*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .03 .09 .03
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.36 .31 -.11
(NEO) Extraversion .22 .43 .06
(NEO) Openness .36 .40 .09
(NEO) Agreeableness .57 .40 .13
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.35
T s r r  ™  ~ .__ ,
.31
r . i  • rJ n et
-.10
real pain. * p  <  .05
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Table 72: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Faked Pain and M B T I & NEO - by
Gender.
MBTI or NEO Variable B S E B P
Male Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.15 .15 -.21
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .02 .12 .03
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.16 .13 -.20
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.01 .11 -.02
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.65 .34 -.32
(NEO) Extraversion .19 .50 .08
(NEO) Openness .37 .41 .14
(NEO) Agreeableness -.11 .44 -.04
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.40 .35 -.20
Female Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) .01 .09 .02
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .20 .08 .33*
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.18 .09 -.25*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .03 .07 .06
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism .16 .24 .07
(NEO) Extraversion -.33 .33 -.15
(NEO) Openness -.14 .33 -.05
(NEO) Agreeableness .75 .30 .29*
(NEO) Conscientiousness 
*7 ' re a , ' 7- .. r
-.10 .24
i*___1 - - _ A * _ * _ J_ &
-.04
\ i i i      ■  ...................................
N o te s :  R  = .24 for male participants & R  =  .14 for female participants. * p  < .05..
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Table 73: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Female Targets (Faking) & M BTI,
N E O -  by Gender.______________________________________________________________
MBTI or NEO Variable B S E B P
Male Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion -  (+) -.18 .20 -.20
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .05 .16 .07
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.12 .18 -.12
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .12 .14 .16
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.67 .47 -.25
(NEO) Extraversion -.12 .69 -.04
(NEO) Openness -.03 .56 -.01
(NEO) Agreeableness -.29 .60 -.07
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.18 .47 -.07
Female Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.05 .13 -.06
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .15 .11 .18
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.20 .12 -.20
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .08 .10 .10
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism .25 .34 .08
(NEO) Extraversion -.45 .46 -.15.
(NEO) Openness .01 .46 .00
(NEO) Agreeableness .84 .43 .24
(NEO) Conscientiousness
ni Ar 'n"  ,.......„
.04 .34 .01          \ t      '■   1
N o te s :  R  = .15 for male participants & .10 for female participants. (No predictors).
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Table 74: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Male Targets (Real Pain) & M BTI,
NEO  -  by Gender.______________________________________________________________
MBTI or NEO Variable B S E B P
Male Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.29 .15 -.41
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) -.ll .12 -.17
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.10 .14 -.14
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .02 .11 .03
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.44 .35 -.22
(NEO) Extraversion 1.02 .52 .43
(NEO) Openness .02 .43 .01
(NEO) Agreeableness .50 .46 .17
(NEO) Conscientiousness -.02 .36 -.01
Female Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) .01 .10 .02
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .08 .09 .12
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.08 .10 -.11
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.02 .07 -.04
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.28 .27 -.12
(NEO) Extraversion -.46 .36 -.19
(NEO) Openness .10 .36 .04
(NEO) Agreeableness .53 .33 .19
(NEO) Conscientiousness 
A +T ’A"'"' 1___ -.47r> n i _ .27 -.20A ................ # 1t ".. ....N o te s '.  R  =  .17 for male participants & R  = .09 for female participants. (No predictors).
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Table 75: Regression Analysis for Accuracy Judging Female Targets (Real Pain) &
M BTI, NEO  -  by Gender._______________________________________________________
MBTI or NEO Variable B S E B P
Male Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) -.46 .25 -.41
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .05 .20 .05
Sensing = (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.12 .22 -.10
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) .07 .18 .07
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.80 .57 -.25
(NEO) Extraversion .24 .85 .06
(NEO) Openness -.43 .69 -.11
(NEO) Agreeableness -.59 .74 -.12
(NEO) Conscientiousness .03 .58 .01
Female Participants
Extraversion vs. Introversion:
Extraversion = (+) .04 .15 .04
Introversion = (-)
Intuition vs. Sensing:
Intuition = (+) .03 .13 .03
Sensing -  (-)
Feeling vs. Thinking:
Feeling = (+) -.29 .14 -.26*
Thinking = (-)
Perceiving vs. Judging:
Perceiving = (+) -.02 .11 -.02
Judging = (-)
(NEO) Neuroticism -.39 .39 -.11
(NEO) Extraversion -.04 .52 -.01
(NEO) Openness .79 .53 .18
(NEO) Agreeableness 1.09 .48 .26*
(NEO) Conscientiousness
w A ii'7 + v ___1___ o ' -.64 .39 -.19  \    —  11     ' 'N o te s :  R  = .17 for male participants & .14 for female participants. * p  < .05
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Analysis of Variance: Effects of Age on Levels of Detection Accuracy
T a b l e  7 6 :  O n e - w a y  B e t w e e n  G r o u p s  A N O V A s  -  A c c u r a c y  a n d  A g e  G r o u p
(Study No. 1)________________________________________________
Sum of 
Squares df F Sig.
Overall Accuracy 119.63 2 .28 .76
Accuracy Judging 
Faking Males 297.54 2 .43 .65
T a b l e  7 7 :  T w o - w a y  B e t w e e n  G r o u p s  A N O V A  -  O v e r a l l  A c c u r a c y ,  A g e  G r o u p  
a n d  G e n d e r
(Study No. 1)
Source df F Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared
Gender 1 .20 .66 .001
Age Group 2 .31 .73 .004
Gender X
Age Group 2 .08 .93 .001
Error 164
R 2 = .006 (Adjusted R 2 — -.025)
T a b l e  7 8 :  T w o - w a y  B e t w e e n  G r o u p s  A N O V A -  A c c u r a c y  J u d g i n g  F a k i n g  I
G r o u p  a n d  G e n d e r
(Study No. 1)
Partial Eta
Source df F Sig. Squared
Gender 1 .18 .67 .001
Age Group 2 .70 .50 .008
Gender X
Age Group 2 .49 .62 .006
Error
....aY\ /  a j.
164
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Analysis of Variance: Effects of Age on Confidence in Decision-Making
T a b l e  7 9 :  O n e - w a y  B e t w e e n  G r o u p s  A N O V A  -  C o n f i d e n c e  L e v e l  a n d  A g e  G r o u p
(Study No. 1)
Sum of 
Squares df F Sig.
Overall
Confidence Level .47 2 .87 .42
T a b l e  8 0 :  T w o - w a y  B e t w e e n  G r o u p s  A N O V A  -  C o n f i d e n c e  L e v e l ,  A g e  G r o u p  a n d  
G e n d e r
(Study No. 1)
Source df F Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared
Gender 1 1.23 .27 .007
Age Group 2 1.13 .33 .014
Gender X
Age Group 2 .72 .49 .009
Error
n'l / A I- , 1 n'l
164
R 2 -  .026 (Adjusted R 2 = -.004)
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Appendix D. Additional Study Two Tables
Frequencies
T a b l e  8 1 :  F r e q u e n c i e s  -  G e n d e r  ( S t u d y  N o .  2 )
Frequency Percent ValidPercent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Male 49 27.4 27.4 27.4
Female 130 72.6 72.6 100.0
Total 179 100.0 100.0
T a b l e  8 2 :  F r e q u e n c i e s  -  E t h n i c i t y  ( S t u d y  N o .  2 )
Frequency Percent ValidPercent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid African
American/Blaclc 4 2.2 2.2 2.2
Asian/ Pacific 
Islander 83 46.4 46.4 48.6
Caucasian 61 34.1 34.1 82.7
Other 11 6.1 6.1 88.8
Hispanic 20 11.2 11.2 100.0
Total 179 100.0 100.0
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Frequencies
Table 83: Frequencies -  Education (Study No. 2)
Frequency Percent ValidPercent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid High School 22 12.3 12.4 12.4graduate
Some College 154 86.0 86.5 98.9
Post-graduate 2 1.1 1.1 100.0
Missing System 1 .6
Total 178 99.4 100.0
T a b l e  8 4 :  F r e q u e n c i e s  -  U n i v e r s i t y  M a j o r  ( S t u d y  N o .  2 )
Frequency Percent ValidPercent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Social Sciences
(Psychology & 
Sociology) 
Business/ 
Economics
62
10
34.6
5.6
35.2
5.7
35.2
40.9
Arts (Music &
Theatre)
Computing/
Engineering
Biological &
Physical Sciences
Education,
English & History
4
13
33
4
2.2
7.3
18.4
2.2
2.3
7.4 
18.8 
2.3
43.2
50.6
69.3
71.6
Other 19 10.6 10.8 82.4
Undeclared 13 7.3 7.4 89.8
Interdisciplinary 18 10.1 10.2 100.0
Total 176 98.3 100.0
Missing System 3 1.7
Total 179 100.0
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Descriptives - Age
Table 85: Descriptives - Age (Study No. 2)
N Min. Max. Mean SD
Age
178 17.89 37.66 20.86 2.22
Table 86: Descriptives - Age (Study No. 2)
Gender N Min. Max. Mean SD
Males
Age 49 17.89 34.08 21.07 2.40
Females
Age 129 18.07 37.66 20.77 2.14
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T a b l e  8 7 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s :  A c c u r a c y  V a r i a b l e s  ( S t u d y  N o .  2 ) ________________________
Accuracy Variable N Min. Max. Mean SD
Overall accuracy
Overall accuracy judging 
faked pain
Overall accuracy judging 
real pain
Accuracy judging male 
targets (faked pain)
Accuracy judging female 
targets (faked)
Accuracy judging male 
targets (real pain)
Accuracy judging female 
targets (real)
Overall accuracy judging 
male targets
Overall accuracy judging 
female targets__________
179 16 85 54.62 14.50
179 13 92 53.99 15.33
179 9 94 55.03 18.54
179 11 100 53.60 16.78
179 0 100 54.44 22.40
179 0 100 58.29 18.98
179 0 100 52.22 24.87
179 6 100 55.94 14.65
179 6 100 53.33 20.12
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T a b l e  8 8 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s :  A c c u r a c y  V a r i a b l e s  ( b y  P a r t i c i p a n t  G e n d e r )  S t u d y  N o .  2
Accuracy Variable________ N______ Min. Max. Mean_______SD
Males
Overall accuracy 49 16 82 53.16
Overall accuracy 
judging faked pain 49 13 82 52.77
Overall accuracy 
judging real pain 49 13 92 53.31
Accuracy judging male 
targets (faked pain) 49 14 86 52.00
Accuracy judging 
female targets (faked) 49 0 100 53.53
Accuracy judging male 
targets (real pain) 49 25 100 55.76
Accuracy judging 
female targets (real) 49 0 100 51.67
Overall accuracy 
judging male targets 49 25 87 53.88
Overall accuracy 
judging female targets 49 6 100 52.60
Overall accuracy 
Overall accuracy
judging faked pain 
Overall accuracy
judging real pain 
Accuracy judging male 
targets (faked pain) 
Accuracy judging
female targets (faked) 
Accuracy judging male 
targets (real pain) 
Accuracy judging
female targets (real) 
Overall accuracy
judging male targets 
Overall accuracy
judging female targets
Females
130 19 85 55.17
130 20 92 54.45
130 9 94 55.68
130 11 100 54.20
130 0 100 54.78
130 0 100 59.25
130 0 100 52.43
130 6 100 56.72
130 6 93 53.61
14.44 
16.33
18.94
17.95 
24.84 
18.18 
25.36
14.44 
21.73
14.54 
14.98
18.42
16.35
21.50
19.26
24.79
14.71
19.55
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T a b l e  8 9 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s :  C o n f i d e n c e  i n  D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g  ( S t u d y  N o .  2 )
Confidence Variable N Min. Max. Mean SD
Overall confidence
level in decision­ 179 2.0 5.0 3.49 .52
making
Overall confidence 179 2.0 5.0 3.47 .57judging faked pain
Overall confidence 179 2.0 5.0 3.52 .58judging real pain
Confidence judging
male targets (faked 179 2.0 5.0 3.43 .67
pain)
Confidence judging
female targets (faked 179 2.0 5.0 3.51 .69
pain)
Confidence judging 
male targets (real pain) 179 2.0 5.0 3.42 .67
Confidence judging
female targets (real 179 2.0 5.0 3.62 .68
pain)
Overall confidence 179 2.0 5.0 3.42 .58judging male targets
Overall confidence 179 2.0 5.0 3.56 .58judging female targets
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T a b l e  9 0 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s :  C o n f i d e n c e  i n  D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g  ( b y  P a r t i c i p a n t  G e n d e r )  
S t u d y  N o .  2 ___________________________________________________________
Confidence Variable N Min. Max. Mean SD
Overall confidence level
Overall confidence judging 
faked pain
Overall confidence judging 
real pain
Confidence judging male 
targets (faked pain) 
Confidence judging female 
targets (faked pain) 
Confidence judging male 
targets (real pain) 
Confidence judging female 
targets (real pain)
Overall confidence judging 
male targets
Overall confidence judging 
female targets________
Males
49 2.5 5.0 3.53 .57
49 2.5 5.0 3.51 .64
49 2.5 5.0 3.54 .61
49 2.0 5.0 3.43 .71
49 2.0 5.0 3.59 .81
49 2.0 5.0 3.45 .74
49 3.0 5.0 3.63 .67
49 2.5 5.0 3.44 .62
49 2.5 5.0 3.61 .65
Females
130 2.0 4.8 3.48 .50
130 2.0 5.0 3.45 .54
130 2.0 5.0 3.51 .57
130 2.0 5.0 3.42 • .66
130 2.0 5.0 3.49 .64
130 2.0 5.0 3.41 .64
130 2.0 5.0 3.61 .69
130 2.0 5.0 3.42 .56
130 2.0 5.0 3.55 .56
Overall confidence level
Overall confidence judging 
faked pain
Overall confidence judging 
real pain
Confidence judging male 
targets (faked pain) 
Confidence judging female 
targets (faked pain) 
Confidence judging male 
targets (real pain) 
Confidence judging female 
targets (real pain)
Overall confidence judging 
male targets
Overall confidence judging 
female targets___________
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Descriptive Statistics
T a b l e  9 1 :  M S C E I T  D e s c r i p t i v e s
MSCEIT Variables N Min. Max. Mean SD
Faces task 179 48 143 110.06 23.91
Facilitation task 179 60 133 101.71 14.78
Changes task 179 79 122 99.58 9.85
Emotion Mgmt task 179 74 118 95.66 9.12
Pictures task 179 28 126 97.96 12.20
Sensations task 179 61 118 98.13 10.59
Blends task 179 65 126 98.46 10.69
Social Mgmt task 179 66 119 96.43 10.10
Perceiving
Emotionsa 179 35 132 101.37 14.78
Using Emotionsa 179 64 130 99.42 13.47
Understanding
Emotions3 179 71 122 99.33 9.28
Managing
Emotions3 179 57 114 94.83 9.22
Emotional
Experiencing13
Emotional
Reasoning13
179
179
55
70
132
116
100.59
97.09
14.22
8.76
Overall E.L 179 58 121 99.04 11.87
N o t e s ’, a. Branch Scores, b. Area Scores. E.I. = Emotional Intelligence.
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Descriptive Statistics
PPI Variable N Min. Max. Mean SD
Table 92: PPI Descriptives__________________________________________________
Social Potency 179 35 90 60.80 11.67
Fearlessness 179 24 74 46.68 11.09
Cold heartedness 178 22 60 41.66 7.21
Impulsive
Nonconformity 177 19 61 35.98 7.98
Blame 178Externalization 19 61 35.02 7.76
Carefree 179 23 66 37.79Nonplanfulness 7.53
Stress Immunity 179 15 41 27.78 6.03
Machiavellian 178 38 101 65.02 11.82
Deviant Response 179 10 23 12.41 2.51
Unlikely Virtue 178 19 45 29.92 4.92
Total PPI Score 174 264 461 356.39 40.68
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Table 114: Regression for Accuracy Judging Female Targets (Real) & M SCEIT, P P I -
by Gender.________________________________________________________________________
MSCEIT or PPI Variable B S E  B
Male Participants
Faces task -.22 .25 -.22
Facilitation task .29 .33 .17
Changes task .88 .49 .36
Emotion Mgmt task .90 .62 .30
Pictures task .10 .38 .06
Sensations task .49 .49 .22
Blends task -.94 .56 -.45
Social Mgmt task -.37 .61 -.15
Social Potency (PPI) -.86 .55 -.39
Fearlessness (PPI) -.08 .62 -.03
Cold heartedness (PPI) .24 .68 .07
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .79 .69 .26
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -1.30 .75 -.31
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.67 .70 -.17
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.16 1.28 -.03
Machiavellian (PPI) .54 .52 .24
Female Participants
Faces task -.03 .12 -.03
Facilitation task .05 .18 .03
Changes task -.05 .26 -.02
Emotion Mgmt task .05 .29 .02
Pictures task -.33 .28 -.14
Sensations task -.41 .26 -.17
Blends task .12 .32 .05
Social Mgmt task .19 .32 .08
Social Potency (PPI) -.06 .26 -.03
Fearlessness (PPI) .64 .28 .26*
Cold heartedness (PPI) -.11 .37 -.03
Impulsive Nonconformity (PPI) .11 .39 .03
Blame Externalisation (PPI) -.41 .31 -.14
Carefree Nonplanfulness (PPI) -.12 .34 -.04
Stress Immunity (PPI) -.94 .51 -.22
Machiavellian (PPI)
j r . . ____ a _________________ _____________ i  „  • r>2 _  £■_...........  ,
.15
______•___________ _______________
.25
1 a  o ___r* ______ i  ^  A r
.07
Notes: Accuracy for real pain. R2 = .32 for male participants, R2= .13 for females. *p < .05.
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Analysis of Variance: Effects of Age on Levels of Detection Accuracy
Table 115: One-way Between Groups ANOVAs -  Accuracy & Age Group (Study No. 
2)_____________________________________________________________
Sum of
Squares df F Sig.
Overall Accuracy 1380.56 2 3.37 .04
Accuracy Judging 
Faking Males 2577.62 2 4.75 .01
Table 116: Two-way Between Groups ANOVA -  Overall Accuracy, Age Group & 
Gender (Study No. 2)_______________________________________________
Source df F Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared
Gender 1 .74 .39 .004
Age Group 2 3.35 .04 .037
Gender X Age Group 2 .42 .66 .005
Error
ty2 n A s  , * J- . 1 n2
172
R = .046 (Adjusted R = .018)
Table 117: Two-way Between Groups ANOVA -  Accuracy Judging Faking Males, Age
Source df F Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared
Gender 1 .73 .40 .004
Age Group 2 4.67 .01 .051
Gender X Age Group 2 .57 .57 .007
Error 172
Rf= .061 (Adjusted .034)
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Analysis of Variance: Effects of Age on Confidence in Decision-Making
Table 118: One-way Between Groups ANOVA -  Confidence Level & Age Group 
(Study No. 2)________________________________________________________
Sum of
Squares df F Sig.
Overall n  1 A _
Confidence Level
Table 119: Two-way Between Groups ANOVA -  Confidence Level, Age Group & 
Gender (Study No. 2)
Partial Eta
Source df F Sig. Squared
Gender 1 .19 .66 .001
Age Group 2 2.04 .13 .023
Gender X Age Group 2 1.51 .22 .017
Error
"Xr ....  r e ' r e r e  /  A J  r e r e r e r a
172
i^  = .030 (Adjusted R2= .002)
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Appendix E. Study Consent Form
University of California, San Diego 
Consent to Act as a Research Subject 
for study on Judging Pain
Tamara Goldsby and Kang Lee, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Psychology, 
are conducting a research study on adults’ ability to judge pain in others. 
Approximately 300 participants will participate in this study. Participation will 
involve approximately 120 minutes of your time. You have been asked to 
participate in this study because your age and experience is ideally suited for the 
purpose of this study. If you choose to participate you will be presented with 
videotapes of individuals either with their hand in a tub of cold water (just above 32 
degrees Fahrenheit) or in a tub of lukewarm water, and asked to judge which 
individuals are feeling pain due to the temperature of the water. Then you will be 
given the Myers Briggs Type Indicator and the NEO-FFI personality trait measures.
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You can choose not to 
participate in the study. You may withdraw from the study at any time with no 
negative consequences. You are also not obliged to answer any questions that you 
find objectionable or that make you feel uncomfortable. As no identifiable 
information will be recorded, participant’s responses will be kept from inappropriate 
disclosure.
Risks to participants are minimal and should be no greater than those 
experienced in everyday social interactions. You may experience fatigue or 
boredom when participating. We expect that oui' project will make both theoretical 
and practical contributions. Theoretically, we hope that this research will begin to 
answer questions regarding whether certain personality types are more adept at 
detecting malingering or faking of pain. On the practical side, this research has 
important applications to helping clinicians determine when patients are in pain.
You may choose to receive two course credits or $20 for your participation in 
this study. You could also choose to participate in another on-going study in the 
Department of Psychology to receive similar benefits. You may choose not to 
participate in this research study and complete alternative course work.
Please feel free to call Tamara Goldsby at (858) 822-0781 or Dr. Kang Lee at 
(858) 822-1630 if you have any questions about the study. You may also contact the 
UCSD Human Research Protections Program at (858) 455-5050 to inquire about 
your rights as a research participant or to report research-related problems.
You have received a copy of the consent document to keep. You agree to 
participate in the study.
Your signature _________________________________  Date_________
Print Name
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Appendix  F. Study Researcher Instructions
1. * Subject must 1st sign consent form.*
2. Assign subject number. Study participants start w/ #200. Make sure this 
number goes on video test, MBTI, & NEO. Counter-balance watching videos & 
personality measures. Counter-balance order of personality measures.
3. Remind subject: “This is a 2-part experiment (worth 2 credits). You will 
schedule your 2nd visit at the end of this visit.”
4. Have subject read instructions on computer, then go over highlights, such as 
drop-down box, moving cursor, etc.
5. Check sound of program to make sure it is muted (‘Mute all’ box is checked).
6. Remind subject: “It is important that you really watch each video & think about 
your decision, so you make the best choice for each one.”
7. Remind subject: “Please do not close the program at any time. At the end you’ll 
click ‘OK’ & program will close itself.”
8. Make sure subject puts on headphones.
9. Subject watches videos.
10. Give subject a card w/ his or her subject number & date of next session.
11. Debrief subjects at end of 2nd visit.
Instructions to Participants Watching Videos
“You are about to watch subjects from a previous study on faking pain, in which the 
participants are either faking pain or in real pain. The subjects displaying real pain 
have their hand in a tub of water that is just above freezing temperature. The 
subjects who are faking pain have their hand in warm water & were told to fake pain 
expressions, as if their hand was in freezing water.”
Additional Info:
Approximately 50% of the video clips you’ll see are faking pain and 50% are 
experiencing real pain. The videos you will see are completely in random order. 
You may see a video you think is faking pain, for instance, and the next video could 
be either faking or real pain. The sound is muted, so you will be able to focus only 
on their facial expressions. [The subjects are asked at 3 different times during the 1- 
minute session (at 5 seconds, 30 seconds, & 55 seconds) to report their pain level on 
a scale of 0-10 (0 being ‘Not Painful at Alt’ and 10 being ‘Extremely Painful’), so 
you will see them reporting their pain level]. The device attached to their ear is
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measuring their heart-rate. Your task is to try to decide which people are faking & 
which are experiencing real pain.
Instructions to subjects on using the program:
“You will have 1 practice video to acquaint yourself with the program. (A 
‘Practicel’ will show in the dialog box during the practice videos. After you’ve 
completed the practice video, & are starting the real experiment, the dialog box will 
say ‘Real Test Videos’.) You will watch each video clip & select either ‘Real 
Pain’ or ‘Faking Pain’ from the drop-down box. You will then decide how 
confident you are on a scale of 1- 5 (1 being ‘Completely Unsure’ & 5 being 
‘Completely Sure’). You must drag the cursor to select it, instead of clicking on it. 
If you want to choose 1 (‘Completely Unsure’), you need to click on it to select it, as 
this is where the cursor rests automatically. The cursor must be moved to a number, 
and not in-between numbers, in order to work. In order to move on to the next video 
clip, you must then click on ‘Next’ & then click on ‘Go.’
Please do not close the program at any time. When you have watched the last 
(30th) video, you will get a message saying you are done. Click ‘OK’ & the program 
will close itself. If you have any problems along the way, please tell a researcher 
immediately.”
Instructions to Participants taking the MBTI
“The MBTI is a questionnaire about preferences, not abilities. Please use a pencil & 
mark your answers only on the answer sheet. Erase your answer if you want to 
change it. Please do not make any marks on the MBTI booklet.”
Instructions to Participants taking the NEO-FFI
“On the NEO, the answers on the answer sheet go across: left to right. Since the 
measure has a carbon copy, if you want to change your answer, please cross it out & 
fill in your new answer.”
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